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Thesis Abstract
This thesis makes a contribution to the study of Israeli foreign policy, Israeli-American 
relations and the role of Israeli political culture in foreign policy. First, all the works on 
American-Israeli relations focus on American policy. Second, works examining the role 
o f Israeli values in foreign policy focus primarily on the values of the Israeli right, usually 
purely in regard to the Palestinian question and use a concept of political culture that is 
static. In contrast, this thesis examines, US-Israeli relations from the Israeli view point 
and encompasses the impact of the Israeli left's values on policy. Moreover, it uses a 
concept of political culture that is fluid rather than static.
Following a brief introductory section outlining the interpretative concept of political 
culture employed, the thesis turns towards a section on Israeli political culture. Here two 
main sub-cultures are identified; a universalist orientation which views Israel as a normal 
country and which aspires to normalisation and a particularist orientation which sees 
Israel as 'a nation that dwells alone', with a particular mission to fulfil. From this basis, 
four approaches within the Israeli elite towards relations with the United States over the 
Palestinian question are drawn out.
The next section then examines and accounts for shifts in Israeli political culture, first 
towards particularism and then towards universalism, as well as the impact of these shifts 
on underlying foreign policy attitudes and their political strength.
The third section consists of a number of chapters which demonstrate the role of the 
various approaches, motifs, values, and developments within Israeli political culture on 
relations with the United States over the Palestinian question 1981-96. It covers the main 
issues that arose in that period including the Lebanon War, the London agreement, the 
Madrid Conference, the loan guarantees question and the Oslo accords. The final part of 
this section focuses on relations between Israel, pro-Israel groups in the US and Congress.
I acknowledge the generous support of the University of London Central Research Fund.
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Chapter 1; Introduction, Political Culture and Foreign Policy
The Thesis as a Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis covers new ground in a number of respects. First and foremost, there has been 
no previous study about the impact of Israeli political culture on Israel's relations with the 
United States over the Palestinian question. Nor has there been an empirical study of 
Israel's relations with the United States over the Palestinian question since Camp David. 
Some research has been done which, while not explicitly referring to the term political 
culture, nonetheless uses similar concepts to analyse the impact of Israeli attitudes on 
foreign policy in general and over the Palestinian question in particular (Sandler, 
Benvenisti). Some studies have also examined both the changing nature of these attitudes 
and the changing nature of the policy norms themselves. Occasionally, these 
developments have analysed in relation to wider changes within the belief systems 
prevalent in Israeli society at large (Inbar, 1991, 1991a, 1995, 1996a; Auerbach and Ben 
Yehuda 1991, 1993). There are also journalistic, literary and academic works which 
examine the relationship between Israeli political culture and the Israeli approach towards 
the question of the territories and the Palestinians (Arian 1996: Friedman 1990; Frankel; 
Grossman). Most of these, however, have focused on the Revisionist or religious 
nationalist right-wing approaches to the Palestinian question (Peleg). Only very recently, 
during the course of my research, did works examining the developments within the 
centre and left of Israeli political culture, and its changing attitudes towards the 
Palestinian question, begin to be published (Klieman 1994; Keren 1994; Inbar 1996).
Several journalistic and academic surveys sought to identify Israeli attitudes towards 
America and in particular towards American Jewry (Friedman 1990; Frankel; Schiff 
1987/8; Sheffer 1996; Gruen 1988; Golan 1992), but there is virtually nothing written on 
the impact of Israeli values and political culture on its policy towards and relations with 
the American executive, barring some informal observations in several journalistic works 
(Friedman 1990; Frankel). The bulk of the academic literature analysing American-Israeli 
relations focused either on American policy processes and the American framework of 
reference (Schoenbaum; Ball; Quandt 1992; Novik 1984, 1986) or on questions of
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leverage within the relationship (Efrat and Bercovitch; Bar-Simantov 1987, 1988; Ben 
Zvi 1986, 1993). Overall, the underlying assumption seems to have been that there was no 
need to analyse the Israeli policy process as it was simply seeking to maximise its 
leverage whatever the ultimate purpose. One of the main contributions of this thesis is to 
demonstrate how the different political sub-cultures within Israel and subsequently the 
different existential and instrumental values of the policy elite have led to differing 
approaches, both in theory and practice, to relations with the United States as pertaining 
to the Palestinian question.
In addition, although this thesis is not primarily a historical survey, in the course of my 
research I have been able to uncover some important new facts regarding Israeli policy. 
For example, regarding Prime Minister Shamir's willingness to withdraw from the Golan 
Heights in return for peace with Syria and the pressure put on George Shultz in 1987 by 
hawkish elements within the American Jewish community to not back Peres’ London 
agreement. Again, although this thesis should not primarily be understood as a case study 
of political culture's influence on foreign policy, nonetheless, it does provide a distinct 
contribution to foreign policy analysis (FPA), given that the conception of political 
culture employed here has only just begun to be used in the field (Katzenstein). This will 
be demonstrated more clearly below.
Defining Political Culture and Finding a Methodology
Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the future controls 
the present George Orwell, '1984'.
The most fundamental failure o f  totalitarianism was its failure to control 
thought Francis Fukuyama, 1992.
In the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Lucian Pye defines political 
culture as:
“the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning 
to the political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and 
rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the 
political ideas and the operating norms of a polity” (215).
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A useful analogy is to look at the role of political culture as if politics was a sport. Rather 
than representing the flow of play in a particular sporting event, political culture can be 
seen as describing, “the larger framework that sets up its overall nature: the rules of the 
game; the contrasting ideas about it, even its purpose in the larger scheme of things, 
believed in by opposing coaches; the kind of people the two teams tend to recruit, their 
values, and their consequent style of play; who their traditional enemy is, towards whom 
they orientate themselves; and their sense of identity, of cohesion (Kelley xv). However 
any single definition of political culture can only take us so far. Of the hundreds of 
definitions available in the literature (Tucker: 1), why pick one over another? Why indeed 
are there so many definitions? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that the vast array of 
definitions are symptomatic of the contested nature of the concept of political culture; a 
fact which is due to it touching on one of the key debates in the philosophy of the social 
science: that of agency and structure. The agency-structure problem relates to many of the 
meta-theoretical controversies within social science regarding dichotomies such as 
individual and society, actor and system, voluntarism and determination and so forth.
In Gibbens (1989), Brint (1991) and Welch’s (1993) studies on the use of political 
culture, the main differences between definitions and usage related to the agency-structure 
debate. While some focused on individual orientation, others focused on collective 
orientation. Some defined political culture as embracing beliefs and behaviour, while 
others defined it in terms of beliefs alone. A third major distinction was between those 
who accept certain values as a given and those for whom values are a construction. 
Whereas the Marxist tradition conceived of political culture as part of the superstructure 
of society, an epiphenomenon, a function of economic relations, other theorists such as 
Wittgenstein, Oakshott and Maclntrye have, in one form or another, taken the opposite 
approach in which political culture itself is the most significant factor in the constitution 
of society. They have argued that traditions of beliefs and practices are what bind a 
society together within a common subscription to language, rules of life and some 
techniques of discourse (Gibbens 3-6). All in all, these differences are best summed up as 
differences over ontology and epistemology that are at the core of the agency-structure 
question. Hence, in order to decide which definition of political culture to adopt, we must 
first come to adopt one of the suggested solutions to this problem.
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Epistemology and Ontology
According to strict positivism, the social world is like the scientific world. The only 
variable to study is actual behaviour because this constitutes the observable data. Values 
and attitudes which make up political culture do not constitute observable data. Human 
beings are more or less reduced to the level of Pavlov’s dog, merely responding 
unconsciously to stimuli. On this view, human consciousness does not have an 
independent existence, it merely responses rationally to the environment. The positivist 
tradition predated the emergence of the agency-structure question, a fact which is evident 
in the absence of any agency at all in its system, where all the emphasis is on structure. 
Although some, like Richard Dworkin, have sought to continue to work within its basic 
assumptions, the trend within the social sciences has been to recognise the inadequacy, or 
at least the incompleteness, of this approach. Subsequently, a modified positivist 
paradigm has been suggested. It tries to resolve the obvious fault with the pure doctrine 
by recognising a role for human consciousness, as part of a psychological domain, either 
individually or as part of a collective conscience. The element of agency is constructed in 
strict opposition to the external environment (Neufeld). Carlsnaes (1992) viewed this as a 
major ontological flaw. One of the central dichotomies he identified regarding agency- 
structure, was the question of whether society is made up of individual decisions, as Karl 
Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein would have it, or whether society is a collective in of 
itself as Durkheim argued. The problem, however, with either of these options is that they 
reduce the components of the actor-structure linkage to an explanation of one in terms of 
the other, thereby excluding a reciprocal interplay between the two (Archer: 97). As 
Wendt has argued, adherents of this approach reify social structures when they assert or 
imply not only that certain social relations are irreducible but that these relations are 
politically independent of, and in ontological terms prior to, those agents (Wendt: 347). In 
other words, the modified positivist epistemology reifies both the agent, be it individual 
or collective and the structure. To resolve these problems, Carlsnaes lauds both Archer 
and Giddens attempts to demonstrate that agency and structure are mutually constitutive. 
In the end he comes down on the side of Mary Archer's answer to the agency-structure 
problem which is to unravel the dialectic interplay between structure and action which
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constrain and enable each other, and which can be broken up into time bound intervals for 
the purpose of analysis: morphogenisis (Carlsnaes 259). In terms of political culture this 
suggests, at the minimum, the need to adopt a working definition which is cognisant of 
the imperative to avoid the agent-structure dichotomy. What this means in effect is the 
use of an interpretative epistemology.
Interpretative theorists argue that there is no such thing as a wholly external social
universe of raw data, or events such that its complicated relations and conclusions can be
grasped fully from out side of those data and events. Rather as Neufeld (1991) stated:
“Human beings act in the context of a web of meaning, a web that they 
themselves have spun. As a consequence the social world, in contrast to 
the natural world, is itself partially constituted by self interpretation.”
Charles Taylor explained in Interpretation and the Sciences of Man that meaning is not a 
property of the subjective mind, but part of the social and discursive practises that are 
constitutive of a society. Political culture then, is a, ‘supra-individual phenomenon’ and in 
order to understand it one cannot only observe the behaviour exhibited by individuals but 
one must also learn what might be called the cultural grammar of a polity, the internal 
coherence of its social, cultural and discursive practises (Brint: 117).
Some post-modernist theorists take this idea to its logical conclusion and deny the 
possibility of social science at all on the basis that researchers cannot escape their own 
cultural milieu. In this case their studies tells us more about researchers’ 
values/beliefs/culture than about the subject of research under consideration. However, 
this is not a necessary conclusion drawn by all those who accept this model. Rather, 
interpretative theorists refer to a ‘hermeneutic circle’ in which theorists endeavours to 
make sense of the social world by demonstrating that there is a coherence between the 
actions of an agent and the meaning of the situation for that agent. This involves 
explaining the web of meaning in terms of the concrete social practises in which it is 
embedded and demonstrating the coherence of the observed social practises in terms of 
the web of meaning which constitute those practises (Neufeld: 47-8). This requires the use 
of a modified dialogical concept of political culture, founded on the idea that society itself
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is constituted through an on-going process, an interaction between social forces and 
discursive practise.
A Dialogical Concept of Political Culture
The hermeneutic philosophical tradition views the production of culture as a dialogical 
process which cannot be made abstract. It takes place not only within the context of 
material social forces but also within a linguistic and cultural context. The fact that people 
are bom into a community which they did not choose has great significance in shaping 
their sensibilities. We are all, as Michael Howard (1991) explains, ideologues despite 
ourselves. Heidegger in Being and Time argues that all reflection is preceded by pre­
reflexive lived experience and that the logical order of timeless clear and distinct ideas 
can not be considered primary, for it presupposes a saying which presupposes a 
community of speakers. Consequently, our being in the world is revealed historically as a 
dialogical existence with others. Accordingly, consciousness must undergo a hermeneutic 
dialogue in which it comes to know itself through the mediation of signs, symbols and 
text. It must thus interpret itself by entering into a dialogue with the texts or traditions of a 
historical community or tradition (Kearney: 127-33). Human beings do not develop in a 
vacuum, but are born into a linguistic community which was not chosen; a fact which has 
great significance in shaping sensitivities. By speaking any national language we are 
participants in the history of a civilisation, shaped by the past and yet persistent into the 
present. As Jean-Paul Sartre stated, "existence precedes essence" (Sacks 1992: 227) so 
that even "common sense is a cultural construction, as distinctive as different languages 
but invisible" (Little 1990: 39). But the emphasis on uniform, implicit unconscious 
knowledge as a frame for political culture does not exclude the conscious, contested 
elements within it. Rather as MacIntyre (1985) explained, “A living tradition is a 
historically extended socially embodied argument, precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.” To a certain extent, political culture is prescripted as it is 
inherited from others who have thought, spoken and written previously. Yet it is the 
living who recreate this meaning according to their own projects and interpretations. 
Political culture then, can be said to develop through a process of interpretation.
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Nonetheless, the approach adopted here does not accept a pure discursive autonomy for 
political culture, rather it sees it as part of the social process. Thus, while positivists have 
developed quantitative analysis through survey methodology in an attempt to measure 
attitudes and political culture, interpretivists reject this approach. For such an approach, 
based purely on interviews, would not fully reveal whether these meanings are rooted in 
social practise, which can only be done by interpreting social practise as a whole. 
Otherwise, one would not be able to tell whether the people interviewed believed to the 
point where it was a significant factor in their behavioural calculations. For example, 
missionary school pupils may say they believe in certain things but it may not effect their 
behaviour (Welch: 5). The approach adopted here analyses both the construction of 
political culture and the feedback of discursive practises into social action (Welch: 108).
The Construction and Development of Political Culture
Both material factors and cross-cultural dialogue act as catalysts within the construction 
and development process of a political culture. As Hall noted, “cultural identity is a 
matter of becoming as well as being. It is not something which already exists 
transcending place, time, history and culture...Far from being fixed in some essential past, 
they are subject to continuous interplay of history, culture and power”. Political culture, 
“is the constant reconstitution of selves and other through specific exclusions, 
conventions and discursive practises” (Silberstein: 11-12). It is defined through a process 
of opposition, in which a network of meaning is created through the articulation of self­
definition and difference. This process of differentiation is driven both by social and 
discursive practise.
No society is completely hermetically sealed from the outside world, especially not in the 
modem era. Either reluctantly or enthusiastically, societies engage in a cultural dialogue. 
This may be over issues of meaning and identity directly or just related to their 
preconceptions of one another. But the act of dialogue can call into question current self 
understandings and suggest different interpretations of reality. Thus, a cultural dialogue in 
which an Islamic culture is challenged by a liberal-atheist culture over human rights, will 
cause the Islamic culture to try and locate the term within its structure of meaning. It will
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relate to the concept in a positive or negative way. But such a process is not merely an 
extrapolation of a belief system. The dialogue has altered the initial belief system which 
has been forced to define itself against this foreign concept, emphasising elements within 
the tradition which either promote or denigrate human rights, or as is more likely 
generating diverse interpretations.
Social process and events such as wars, will also act as a serious challenge to the previous 
assumptions that made up a political culture. For example, a political culture may be 
liberal-nationalist, concepts which may hold together well until a nation-state with an 
empire is confronted with demands for independence from the native population. At this 
point the political culture has to be re-interpreted in order to confront the new reality. 
There are a number of potential solutions provided by the culture and the debate over 
which to chose will take place within the context of the 'original' political culture. This 
debate will itself produce cleavages within the political culture expressed through 
alternate interpretations. Political culture can thus adapt itself to help people adapt to their 
environment. But it must adapt itself to changes in that environment in order to remain 
pertinent and resonate, or else be challenged and replaced by an alternative political 
culture.
This process of opposition and definition is especially influential when a great sense of 
grievance and upheaval are experienced, which is especially high during wartime. As 
Anthony Smith (179-80) noted, “the more violent the experience, the deeper it is etched in 
the memory and the memory of these common historical experiences are thus seen as vital 
in shaping identity and culture”. Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals stressed that a 
community of pain and suffering provide a very strong basis for identity. Both Michael 
Howard (1991) and Lucy Davidowitz (1975) have pointed out the experience of the 
Napoleonic wars was a major catalyst in the formation of German national identity. 
Germany defined itself in opposition to France and its universal rationalistic notions. 
Instead it emphasised a particularistic, mystical German identity of a Teutonic volk tied to 
the soil. Similarly, Fouad Ajami (1992) has charted the impact of the Six Day War in the 
fall o f Arab nationalism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
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Adaptation and Change at Different Levels of Political Culture
Although levels of analysis are usually set against agency-structure as modes of 
explanation (Wendt 1987), it possible to make use of the notion of levels of political 
culture from within our model. Political culture comes about through the interpretation of 
common experience. These interpretations provide the intersubjective meanings which 
constitute a society's identity and without which there can not be shared attitudes or 
disagreements. Some of these meanings do not just facilitate social life, but make it 
distinctive for the society by expressing common values. Still within a political culture 
there will be many sub-cultures, held together by a common source of values which 
inform those beliefs. The presence of sub-cultures mean that a political culture is not 
homogeneous in the sense that diversity does not exist, but it does mean that there is an 
irreducible core to which most, if not all, make reference. Since early in the nineteenth 
century this "irreducible core" has been associated with a strong sense of national identity 
which large numbers of individuals have been able to share. This sense of belonging is the 
key to what Brian Girvin has termed a macro-political culture. This allows conflict, often 
serious conflict, to be mediated without the break up of the political culture or the 
common sense of identity. Thus, serious political upheaval such as experienced in the 
United States during the 1960s did not entail the break up of the system, whereas in other 
places without a shared identity, such as Northern Ireland, political order may collapse 
(Girvin 34-5).
Within the macro-political culture there will also be beliefs and orientations that have a 
long-term impact and help to define key sub-cultures. Such beliefs refer to assertions 
about the nature of society, the individuals obligations to society, the relationship of 
society to other societies, and the significance and meaning of the society. They include 
culturally defined concepts of causality, historical progress and perceptions of the way in 
which the world works. Such beliefs have also been referred to as latent attitudes, 
superordinate values, cultural referents or rockbed sedimentation (Seliktar: 7-10). It is 
through these beliefs that a society comes to understand itself and the world around it. It 
will include both beliefs explicitly held and the implicit beliefs which underlie them 
(Little 1989: 5). The macro-level also establishes the rules of the game that prove
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acceptable to most participants. This macro-level of political culture is the least 
susceptible to change or adaptation especially in the short to medium-term(Girvin 34; 
Breslauer and Tetlock).
Macro-level beliefs also provide the basis for contested values, where values are defined 
as a kind of enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief, “wherein some means or ends of 
action is judged desirable or undesirable.” As such they act as, “guides to and 
determinants of social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and of social behaviour on 
the other” (Rokeah: 7). In this thesis I shall be using two terms; existential values and 
instrumental values. Existential values inform the content of overarching political goals 
and also play a part prioritising those goals. Instrumental values inform thinking about the 
preferred methods for pursuing goals (Rokeah 24).
Because values have a behavioural component, it is at this level that the macro-political 
culture and the micro-political culture begin to interact, at what Girvin called the meso- 
level. While the macro-level is fairly static, the meso-level is open to influence from the 
ongoing political debate and struggle at the micro-level, where normal political activity 
such as elections take place. The nature of political and economic power at this level will 
have an important effect on how a political culture, especially the contested elements 
within it, develop. These changes can create a climate where new ideas of what is possible 
and necessary emerge, these new ideas may well be consistent with traditional values, an 
adaptation of the macro or meso-level making them better equipped to respond to 
everyday political requirements. Alternately, they may eventually cause a major shift in 
political culture at one of these levels. However, given the malleability of the most basic 
concepts such as national identity, it is highly unlikely that these will be entirely swept 
away. Often the process of the rise and fall of various elements within a political culture 
can be equated with the rise and fall of the use of common myths and symbols (Liebman 
and Don-Yehiya: 7, 149) which express and elucidate core beliefs and values.
Myths and Symbols
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Values derived from a political culture are expressed in myths and symbols. A myth is a 
story, that may or may not be true, but which is believed to be true. It evokes strong 
sentiments and serves to, “objectify and organise human hopes and fears and 
metamorphasises them into persistent and durable works” (Liebman and Don-Yehiya: 7). 
A myth, “is a device men adopt to come to grips with reality” (Tudor: 17). “It serves to 
explain circumstances to those whom it is addressed. By rendering their experience more 
coherent, a myth helps them to understand the world in which they live.” But it is, “not 
only an explanation but a practical argument” that both transmits and reinforces basic 
existential and instrumental values (Tudor: 139). It is not just a story, but a story to be 
enacted. In this sense, myths provide rallying signs and inspiration to action. For example, 
the ‘Stab in the Back’ myth which asserted that the German political elite had sold 
Germany out by agreeing to the armistice in 1918 when military victory was still 
attainable. This myth, prevalent in Germany in the Weimar period, was instrumental in 
denigrating the prestige of democracy while sustaining the prestige of the military and the 
belief in the utility of military force. As such it contributed to the legitimacy o f the para­
military style of the Nazis and fuelled their belief that they could win another round of 
war as long as the politicians were restrained.
Symbols are also vehicles for cultural expression. “They stand for patterns of meaning but 
unlike signs, they also shape these patterns because symbols are perceived as part of the 
reality they signify...They are built into man's experience as such... an attempt to get 
beyond the empirical to meaning and value” (Liebman and Don-Yehiya: 2) Thus, 
symbols such as a cross or a crescent store meaning for a culture. They are felt to sum up, 
for those whom they are resonant, what is known about the way the world is and the way 
one ought to behave in it. Their power comes from a profound ability to identify fact with 
value at the most fundamental level, to give what would otherwise be merely actual, a 
comprehensive normative support (Geertz 1973: 127). They have the ability to explain 
identity and mission, making nobodies into somebodies, organising people together in a 
community.
Political Culture and Foreign Policy Analysis
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Until quite recently International Relations theory tended to ignore issues of agency- 
structure, culture and political culture, as the discipline tended towards a positivist bias. 
But analysis of the international system is now beginning to take on board issues of 
culture, as demonstrated in the writings on nationalism and the writings of post-modern, 
critical and social-constructivist theorists. In contrast, the term political culture rarely 
surfaces as a vantage point from which to analyse foreign policy. Nonetheless, similar 
concepts have been used which closely resemble at least elements contained within the 
concept of political culture defined above. Yet with few exceptions (Howard 1991; Coker; 
Katzenstein), FPA has lagged behind the development of an understanding of the agency- 
structure debate in international relations, remaining within the positivist, or modified 
positivist paradigm (Little and Smith, Carlsnaeas, Keohane and Goldstein).
Steve Smith grouped these studies into six approaches. All adopted the modified 
positivist approach, which presented beliefs as a filter between the stimulus: the 
international environment, and the response of the policy maker (Little and Smith: 5-17). 
The majority of such studies tended to propose partial bridging theories, similar to 
theories of cultural lag (Welch). Cognitive or psychological approaches were utilised to 
explain beliefs and misperceptions that prevented the enactment of ‘rational policy’ 
(Little and Smith 27, 40). Smith helped to identify three main shortcomings with these 
approaches. First, they emphasised individual decision makers, whereas policy is usually 
made in groups (Little and Smith: 31) Second, they ignored the connection between the 
policy maker’s attitudes and those of the wider society/culture of which s/he was apart. 
Third, the values systems they used were static, encapsulated in the use of the word 
‘mindset’. These approaches ignored changes, by-passed the debate within and across 
societies which informs the interests and values of both the public and the policy elite and 
which also forms the structure of political institutions within which decisions are made. 
Overall, these criticisms mirror the criticisms made earlier of the non-interpretative 
epistemologies. Consequently, the resolution of Smith’s criticisms can be achieved using 
the concept of political culture outlined above. With its concept of political culture as a 
process it avoids the static problem while, by taking into account the mutually 
constitutive framework, the constraining/enabling features of agency-structure and the 
individual-society issues are also dealt with.
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Elite and Mass
Of course it is all very well to recognise the mutually reinforcing roles of individual and 
collective in the formation both of political culture and foreign policy, but where in 
practise shall we focus most of our effort? Any survey of the literature on political 
culture or belief systems, would register the overwhelming conclusion that elites have a 
particularly central role in the creative synthesis of political culture (Seliktar: 22; 
Habermas: 105). As Philip Converse asserted, “The shaping belief systems o f any range 
into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of 
creative synthesis characteristic of only a minuscule proportion of any population” 
(Converse: 211). In this vein, Gellner argued that meaningful national identity emerged 
out of an elite high culture of which the masses were passive recipients. This elite group 
is both highly educated and politically active. Ideas, as Max Weber insisted, must be 
carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects. In practise then, the 
elite refers to the policy-making elite, those actively engaged in political lobbying and 
those journalists, intellectuals or religious leaders that partake in the cultural dialogue out 
of which the relevant values and attitudes are developed. It is this elite that attempts to 
resolve the dissonant elements within the political culture which are continually arising as 
a result of new realities. It is they that lead the process of reinterpreting symbols and 
myths in a 'transvaluation of values'. It is therefore to their discourse that one must turn in 
order to gain an awareness of this process.
Nevertheless, one cannot wholly detach the elite political culture from the larger cultural 
environment. According to Arian (1988:16), politicians and citizens usually emerge from 
the same political culture. National traumas and collective memories are shared by all 
members of the group. At least at the level of general orientation when viewing 
international problems the same basic dispositions will be salient for the elite and the 
mass. Thus, no elite can simply manipulate the mass and impose its values; rather its 
values must resonate with the broader public in some sense. As Aldous Huxley noted, 
“Propaganda... may give force and direction to successive movements of popular feeling 
and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man
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who canalises an already existing stream, in the land where there is no water, he digs in 
vain.” (Welch: 7).
Pathways to Policy
Building on the concept of a role identified by Hollis and Smith (143-170) we can say 
that political culture helps to constituent foreign policy in three ways: as an enabler, a 
constraint, and as a driving force. It will perform this role through the pathways of public 
opinion, elections, domestic political coalitions and the policy-making elite (Goldstein 
and Keohane: 12). A political culture will set the terms of the legitimate discourse for 
various policy options and make some more favourable than others. It will define the 
range of options placing some outside of legitimate use. This identification of the terms of 
definition is culturally contingent, a bounded debate. Firstly, political culture will affect 
policy by shaping the policy agenda, reducing the number of alternatives and thereby 
putting ‘blinders’ on people. Political culture informs decision-makers aiding them in an 
evaluation of what is desirable and possible in the operational environment, providing 
them with a mindset through which to interpret the outside world. Max Weber described 
this as the process whereby, “...the world images created by ideas, have like switch men 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed.” (Goldstein and Keohane: 11). 
Moreover, political culture can act not only as a track switcher or track obscurer, but also 
as a track creator. This occurs when it provides regimes with what Nietzsche termed, 'a 
will to power', a strongly directed motivation for foreign policy activity.
The most important way in which political culture will filter into policy is through the 
consciousness of the decision-making elite. Leaders such as Churchill, Hitler, Napoleon 
and Kissinger clearly played central roles in the conduct of their state’s foreign polices. 
The conglomeration of their existential and instrumental values informs a policy strategy 
that is used to define objectives and outlines a strategy for implementation. This strategy 
may be constrained by outside factors and eventually abandoned, but it remains the guide 
to action. Within any elite, different strategies will exist representing different emphases 
and different values within a political culture. The domination of one strategy over 
another will depend not only on the official power wielded by the various members of the
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elite within the policy-making structure, but also on their ability to make their strategy 
appear successful in achieving common overarching goals and values.
Political culture will also impact on foreign policy through its role in legitimisation of the 
policy making elite and their policies (Bar Simantov 1994). Fukuyama (15) explains that 
in order to act effectively, even an authoritarian regime requires legitimacy, if  not from 
the whole population then at least from a group of subordinates. Such people are 
necessary to maintain the dictatorship in power and enable it to carry out its policies. In 
relation to foreign policy this means that political culture helps the elite to legitimise its 
foreign policy to the mass of the population or at the very least to its active political 
supporters and domestic political allies. Although the elite may be viewed as the most 
important element in the generation and construction of political culture, their innovations 
will not successfully legitimise policy to the attentive public unless they resonate with 
that public by tapping into pre-existing themes. The most successful examples of this, 
according to Eric Hobsbawm, exploit practices which meet a genuinely felt, though not 
necessarily clearly understood need (Hobsbawm: 123). In other words, the mass is 
attracted by what the elite appears to stand for rather than the actual rationale behind its 
actions. Thus although policy flows from election results because the elections empower 
those who make policy, elections are only the beginning of the process of setting policy 
for the nation. Indeed, because decisions are specific and elections diffuse, it is usually 
incorrect to view elections as a referendum on a given issue (Arian 1995:129). In any 
case, public opinion has often been shown to be highly malleable by the elite. Yet, 
sometimes public opinion can be an important constraint on policy, at least in the short­
term, either in of itself, or because policy makers themselves see it as such1. “A minimal 
statement widely accepted in the discipline is that public opinion delimits the option 
parameters of decision makers...especially in democracies, even though it clearly does 
not dictate their moves” (Arian 1992: 317). The policy-making elite’s perception of the 
British public as highly pacifistic and likely to rebel against any moves towards standing 
up to Germany in the 1930s, was a significant factor moving them towards pursing the 
option of appeasement with Hitler especially in the early 1930s. It took the British
1 Comment by Alan Baker, Chief Israeli Foreign Ministry Legal Advisor to the Israeli-Palestinian talks 
1991-, in private conversation, June 1997.
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government several years of psychological re-armament before it felt ready to 
contemplate resistance to Nazism (Wilson and Pronay).
Political culture can also impact on foreign policy by forming the focal point or glue for 
domestic political coalitions and through its embodiment in political institutions or 
norms. These cultural codes may then remain embedded within institutions or codes of 
conduct long after their initial rationale could have made them redundant. Thus, the 
imperial values of Britain continued to be expressed in the large size of the Foreign Office 
long after the interests of Britain ceased to demand such resources. In the case of 
coalitions, as will be examined in the body of the thesis itself, the underlying 
particularistic orientation of the religious parties in Israel during the 1980s meant that 
they continually preferred coalitions with what they perceived as the more particularistic 
Likud, as opposed to Labour, despite the fact that they were generally relatively agnostic 
as regard the key issue dividing the two parties namely their attitude towards the peace 
process. As a consequence of this, as Labour leader in the National Unity government, 
Peres’ foreign policy options were limited by the fact that it was unlikely that he would be 
able to form a narrow coalition government including the religious parties which could be 
more forthcoming in the peace process.
Occasionally, all these factors can combine to produce a major shift in political culture at 
the macro-level which will have enormous ramifications for foreign policy, as for 
example with the end of the cold war. The end of the cold war posed a problem to neo- 
Realist observers. They assumed that all states seek to maximise their power to protect 
their security in the anarchic environment of international relations. However, the Soviet 
Union did not seek to maximise its power as a state but rather abdicated its superpower 
position because it lacked the will to continue to exist. Realists tried to counter this charge 
by explaining Soviet behaviour as a rational response to SDI and America's technological 
superiority in the military sphere. It was this which supposedly made the Soviets give up. 
However, in the 1940s the Soviets had found their way around the problem of lagging 
behind in technology, by using espionage. Moreover, when the Soviet position in Eastern 
Europe collapsed and the Union itself imploded, it was not for want of Soviet military 
power. Rather, in the eyes of both the leadership and the people, communism had lost its
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driving force and legitimacy. “It was the T-shirt and the supermarket, not the gunboat... 
that destroyed the Soviet system” (Halliday: 97). With this loss came changed concepts of 
identity and security. 'New thinking' turned the Brezhnev doctrine into the Sinatra 
doctrine, as a result of which the Soviets told the Eastern Europeans to “Do it your way.”2 
Forty-five years earlier, after World War Two, the Allies recognised the crucial role of 
political culture in foreign policy and consequently had sought to “stamp out the whole 
tradition on which the German nation had been built” through political re-education 
(Wilson and Pronay: 18).3
Moreover, the impact of political culture is not something that is confined to the domestic 
policy-making process. It is also something that can affect policy through the nature of 
the relationship that a state has with other states. In a relationship between two states, the 
ability to find allies, not purely on the basis of narrow interest denoted in terms of a 
balance of power, but rather on the basis of shared values or a sense of common identity 
can be highly significant. If a state can make itself resonate in terms of another’s values 
and crucially link that association to powerful political forces, then it will gain a lever 
through which to advance its policy agenda. In its relations with the US, Israel succeeded 
in taking advantage of this concept by playing on certain sympathetic strands within the 
Western, especially American, political culture. First, Israel sought to present the itself as 
deserving of US support because of its uniqueness and its moral affinities with the US. As 
Abba Eban explained, “We based our claim on the uniqueness of Israel, in terms of the 
affliction suffered by our people, and in terms of our historical and spiritual lineage. We 
knew we were basically appealing to the Christian world for whom the biblical story was 
familiar and attractive, and we played it to the hilt” (Friedman 1990: 428). Israel also 
promoted itself as a modem technological country similar to America in that they had 
common roots, as immigrant societies trying to secure frontiers, as well as common 
democratic values (Eban 1993: 596). Later, during the Reagan era, guilt over not having 
done enough to prevent the Holocaust, was a powerful weapon in engendering American 
political sympathy for the Israeli government. Nonetheless, without the support of 
American Jewry which identified on a much more fundamental level of political culture
2 Phrase coined by Gennadi Gerasimov, Mark Steyn, 'Frankie Goes To Moscow', The Independent 25 
Novem ber 1989. For further exploration o f  this thesis see (Fukuyama: 29-32).
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with Israel, this cultural resonance between Israel and the US may have been of only 
peripheral importance politically.
Thesis Outline
In order to assess the role of political culture in foreign policy, it is necessary to chart its 
historical development and account for major shifts in it. Through this process, it is then 
possible to identify the main identities, sub-cultures, values and myths relevant to foreign 
policy. One is then able to look at foreign policy for a particular issue over a period and 
discover the role of political culture, through the pathways identified. When these 
analyses are complete, it will be possible to ascertain the degree to which changes or 
adaptations in a political culture have affected policy.
The question remains as to which aspects or motifs of a political culture, or indeed sub­
cultures, should be focused on when studying on the impact of political culture on foreign 
policy. In the research process of this thesis I used some of the categories used by FPA 
theorists, such as Alexander George who looked to perceptions of the purpose of politics, 
the nature of politics, the self and other, role in world affairs and control over history. 
Later, in light of my research into Israeli political culture and foreign policy, I organised 
these general categories and identified the particular motifs and orientation which were 
most vital to understanding the Israeli case on the three levels of political culture 
identified earlier. This will be explored in the future chapters.
The first section of the thesis which deals primarily with Israeli political culture is 
contained within the next three chapters. Chapter 2 identifies the two main tendencies 
within Israeli political culture: universalism and particularism. It goes on to examine two 
sub-cultures within each tendency, their main beliefs and motifs. Chapter 3 analyses the 
attitudes and behavioural patterns of each sub-culture in relation to Israeli policy towards 
the Palestinian question and the relationship with the United States. Chapter 4 examines 
the development of Israeli political culture since 1967 and the political impact of these 
cultural changes as they affected Israel's relations with the US over Palestinian question.
3 Sir John Troutbeck, Head, Allied Post Hostilities Planning Committee.
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The second section of the thesis, chapters 5-10, deal with the empirical aspect of the 
thesis. It examines the impact of the various sub-cultures and the development of Israeli 
political culture overall on the relationship with the United States over the Palestinian 
question 1981-96. The last of these chapters deals with Israel’s relationship with Congress 
and the pro-Israel lobby in the US.
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Chapter 2: Universalism and Particularism in Israeli Political Culture
Introduction
In the 1990s, the national debate was really restricted to two schools o f  
thought: one... the pessimistic siege mentality... the other a modest almost 
minimalist approach towards Israel and the world, according to which all 
that Israel should ask for is to be granted unexceptional status as a nation 
like all others. Aaron Klieman (1994: 103)
Israel is a state created by a political culture, Zionism. Zionism, “was and is a programme 
to solve the problems of Jews and Judaism in the modem age by restoring the Jewish 
people to their ancient homeland in order to live as a modem nation in a political 
ffam ew ork”(Beilin 1992: 155). The onset of modernity and the emancipation provided a 
revolutionary challenge to the traditional Jewish political culture of the Diaspora. The 
question was how should Jews respond to the opportunities being presented to them? 
Should they accept the citizenship offered by the European states in return for giving up 
on the national component of Jewish identity? Should they amend their religious norms to 
fit into the emerging political system of Europe? To what degree were such changes really 
possible, let alone desirable? Some Jews took the most extreme path towards integration, 
normalisation and universalism by actively advocating assimilation. Others sought to 
reform the religion to fit in with their host societies, while the more conservative elements 
tried to accommodate Judaism to the new reality. All of them rejected the idea of 
conceiving of the Jewish people as a political entity. Zionism rejected this approach. At 
the minimum, Zionism was a rebellion against the quietistic Jewish political culture of the 
Diaspora, adopted by Jewry since the failure of the Bar Kochba revolt against Rome in 
135 CE, which relied on the non-Jewish authorities to protect Jewish communities within 
their jurisdiction. Zionism advocated political activism and a faith in the power of the 
collective will to overcome circumstance, summed up in Herzl's famous dictum, 'If you 
will it, it is no dream.' It was a movement which sought to resolve the problem of what 
seemed to be endemic anti-Semitism in Europe through the achievement of political 
sovereignty in the land of Israel.
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As such, the Zionist idea provides the basic legitimacy for the existence of the state of 
Israel and remains a core consensus value, despite the existence of substantial non-Zionist 
minorities within the state since 1948. Zionism assisted in the maintenance of the 
society's cohesiveness through the provision of common myths and symbols, as well as 
providing the grounds, terms and boundaries of political debate. Between the birth of the 
state in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967, this basic consensus was reinforced by an 
ethos of state building and the existence of implacable Arab enmity to Israel's existence 
embodied in the siege which surrounded the young state. The need to absorb over one 
million Jewish immigrants and create an economic and social infrastructure, helped to 
blunt deep differences within Zionism as to the character of the state, be they religious, 
liberal, or socialist. Similarly, the poor prospects for a genuine and secure peace, coupled 
with the cementing of the 1948 partition, kept the great differences between Revisionist 
Zionism and Labour Zionism over the boundaries of the state in abeyance. However, with 
the emergence of Israel as a developed state at the end of the 1960s, and particularly as a 
result of the capture of the territories at the core of the land of Israel (Judea, Samaria and 
Gaza) in the Six Day War, these fundamental cleavages within Israel's political culture 
began to emerge and assume importance. As a result, the consensus within Israeli political 
culture collapsed.
Broadly speaking, this dichotomy over the meaning of the state, as it applied to its 
boundaries and character, was divided into two conflicting tendencies: one towards 
universalism, the other towards particularism. In fact, the question of Jewish political 
independence and sovereignty has from the earliest times been understood in terms of 
universalism and particularism. On the one hand, a tendency towards normalisation, on 
the other hand, a tendency towards fulfilling as particular destiny. In the Bible (Samuel I: 
9) the prophet Samuel castigates the people for wanting a king, in order that they might be 
'like all the other nations’. In the end, Samuel informs the people of God's decision to 
allow Israel a king, but not in order that they may be like the other nations. Rather, the 
king would be required to lead the people in the ways of the Law and thus cement the 
particular covenant between God and the Jewish people. This tension over the purpose of 
sovereignty within the Jewish political tradition continued within Zionism and Israeli 
political culture, especially after 1967.
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The universal tendency in Israeli political culture aspires to normalisation: to be a nation 
like all other nations. This was one of the primary purposes of Zionism and the attainment 
of statehood. Normatively, it seeks for Israel to be a part of a world community, which is 
usually defined within Western cultural terms. It seeks to contribute and receive from that 
world both economically and culturally. Ontologically, it views the Jewish people and the 
Israeli nation as, in essence, no different to any other, so that the same universal rational 
economic, social and historical regularities that apply to the gentile world apply in 
essence to the Jewish world (Beilin 1997: 266). If this tendency aspires to a historical 
mission, it is one defined in universal moral-humanistic terms. However, increasingly it 
has no sense of collective mission, instead focusing on individualism. By way o f contrast, 
the particularistic tendency aspires for Israel to fulfil the biblical prophecy of Balaam that 
they should be "a people that dwells alone" (Numbers 22: 19), a prophecy which the 
universal stream sees as a curse (Leshem). On a normative level it aspires to singularity, it 
tends to see Israel as a purveyor of particularly Jewish values, which are more understood 
to be defined by unique mystical factors rather than by general rational ones. Israel is seen 
as central to a collective Jewish mission, often understood in messianic terms. 
Ontologically, the Jewish people and thus Israel, are understood as being subject to a 
unique reality of ever present anti-Semitism.
This basic lack of consensus within Israeli political culture is evident in the conflicting 
interpretations given to one of the most central symbols within Israeli political culture: 
the Holocaust. As Yossi Beilin (1992: 154)observed, “It is between two symbols, between 
the Holocaust which befell European Jewry and the fear of its recurrence, that Israeli 
society lives”. Yet although the importance of the Holocaust has never been in doubt, its 
meaning for Israelis has always been contested. As Jonathan Sacks (1990: 154) remarked, 
“The Holocaust does not point anywhere but everywhere”. Thus in 1983 when the 
Knesset (Israeli parliament) debated a memorial for Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish 
diplomat who saved Jews in Hungary during the Holocaust, the Likud emphasised the 
exceptional nature of Wallenberg's good deeds, whereas Labour emphasised that many 
gentiles had helped Jews, a fact which demonstrated that even in the Jewish people's 
darkest hour it had not stood complexly alone (Aronoff 1988: 9). Likewise, whereas the
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first Begin government sought to emphasis the Holocaust within the educational 
curriculum as particular to the Jewish experience, the second Rabin government tried to 
place the study of the Holocaust within a broader general context of genocide (JP 27 
January 1995: 7; Peres 1995: 39).
This chapter explores the two tendencies within Israeli political culture since 1967: 
universalism and particularism. It identifies two sub-cultures within each tendency. 
Within particularism: radicalism and conservatism, within universalism: mamlachtiut 
(statism) and progressivism. From each sub-culture core beliefs, values, myths and motifs 
are extrapolated and their political origins and current political expressions noted.
The Political Culture of Particularism
Two linked questions have always been at issue ... what was the true and 
desirable relationship between the Jewish people and other nations; and 
what was the true and desirable relationship between Jews and their own 
historical past David Vital (1986: 83).
The particularistic political culture that has dominated the right in Israeli politics is united 
by two underlying principles. First, a commitment to the value of ‘the land of Israel’ 
which has led to a consistent rejection of the partition of the country between a Arab and a 
Jewish state. Second, an ontology of international relations which understands violent 
competition between nations and states as the norm and hence adheres to hawkish foreign 
policy positions, which are deemed necessary in order to survive in such an environment. 
Within particularism, there are two dominant sub-cultures, conservatism and radicalism.
Conservatism
The conservatives see Israel as an expression of Jewish patriotism founded on the Jewish 
historical experience especially during the ancient period. Their collective identity and the 
meaning they attach to the state of Israel follows from this premise. They also identify 
themselves and Israel as part of a larger cultural unit, be it 'the West', in the case of the
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Revisionists, or the Middle East, in the case of the Sephardim. Either way, Israel's Jewish 
identity is held to be composite, in that it includes broader cultural elements of which 
Israel is understood to be a part. While valuing the historical continuity between Jewish 
history and the state of Israel, the state itself is not seen in terms of the particular 
messianic redemption of the Jewish people, nor are anti-Israel attitudes of non-Jews seen 
as proof of endemic anti-Semitism. Rather, Israel is understood as under siege in virtually 
the same way as any small nation would be within a tough world of nations competing in 
an anarchic environment for security. True, there are important historical reasons for the 
particular strength of opposition to the Jews and Zionism but most fundamentally, 
opposition is understood from a universally applicable Realist balance of power 
perspective. This Realist conception of international relations colours the outlook of the 
conservatives as to the necessary instrumental values Israel should adopt in foreign 
policy.
The conservative trend within Israeli political culture within the period under question 
was mainly represented by the pragmatic wing of the centre-right bloc: Likud. With the 
creation of the state of Israel, the conservative Revisionist tendency found expression 
within the Herut party led by Menachem Begin, which also contained elements of the 
radical Revisionist programme. Still, in contrast to radical Revisionism, Herut accepted 
the principles of liberal democracy. Hence its party platform stated: "man was not created 
for the state, but the reverse: the state was created for man." (Shapiro 1991: 128). In 1965, 
the Liberal party joined with Herut, on the basis of their agreement on economic issues. 
They formed a bloc called Gahal. After the Six Day War, they were joined by groups 
from within Labour such as Ometz which stood for a more liberal economy and a strong 
defence policy. Later it became known as the La’am faction, which merged formally into 
Likud in the mid 1980s. Moshe Dayan, himself a leader the hawkish Rafi faction inside 
Labour, moved to the Likud as Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1981. These groups, along 
with the Sephardim, formed the conservative tendency in the Likud, though the 
conservatives did not exist as a formal political faction.
The roots of conservatism lie in three places. First, among those who follow the 
Jabotinsky version of Revisionist Zionism, members of the successor to the Revisionist
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movement and the core political party within the Likud bloc, Herut. Second among the 
hawkish activist followers of former Labour Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan. Third, 
among the Sephardi elite who joined the Likud in the 1970s.
Jabotinsky and Conservative Revisionism
In 1925, Zev Jabotinsky formed the Revisionist Party. Two principles distinguished the 
Revisionist movement from other political movements within Zionism: absolute and 
unconditional territorial integrity of the whole land of Israel and, in the pre-state period, 
the openly proclaimed desire to establish a sovereign state on that territory by political or 
military means. Jabotinsky and the Revisionist tradition form one of the central 
foundations of the Israeli right. Yet paradoxically, the conservative Revisionist tradition is 
the least particularistic element on the Zionist right. Jabotinsky considered the Jews to be 
a part of a superior Western European culture and was particularly influenced by the 
romantic nationalism of Garibaldi (Avineri: 63). His concept of Zionism grew out of this 
affinity; fundamental traditional Jewish values were scarce and vaguely defined (Shavit: 
123). Thus in The Idea of Betar. Jabotinsky restated ideas borrowed from both Herder and 
Mazzini whereby every nation, including the Hebrew one, could only make its own 
contribution to universal human culture from within the concert of nations as a sovereign 
body. This was how the French nation had contributed to the world the principles of the 
revolution, and the English nation, the concepts such as democracy and parliamentary 
system (Shavit: 115). Indeed, the conservatives patterned their ideal Jewish state as a 
neutral framework above party influences, which imposes law and order in the socio­
economic struggle to enable the organic nation to lead its life. A state was considered the 
framework which fulfilled national expectations, as well as providing the required 
services to its citizens (Shavit: 84).
Unlike the founder of the Zionist movement Herzl, Jabotinsky thought Zionism was not 
simply the answer to the failure of assimilation and emancipation; it represented not only 
the path towards a universal goal but a valid expression of organic Jewish national 
identity. Zionism was not purely a means to an end, but an end in itself. For Jabotinsky 
regarded Zionism not only as a solution to the physical plight of European Jewry, but as a
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means to rehabilitate and express Jewish national pride and honour. Whereas Herzl was 
prepared to see the Jewish state set up in Uganda, as this would effectively resolve the 
Jewish problem in Europe, Jabotinsky demanded that a Jewish state should have control 
over both sides of the Jordan, as the land of Israel was the historic homeland of the Jewish 
people. This maximalist territorial position became a key existential value for 
Revisionism. In Hebrew, this existential value became known as Shlemut HaMoledet [the 
completeness of the homeland/birthright]. Jabotinsky saw Eretz Yisrael as the natural 
environment in which the national consciousness of the Israeli nation had to be shaped, 
and from this it followed that only in Israel could the Jewish nation renew and revitalise 
its singular national characteristics (Shavit: 112). Yet conservative Revisionism cannot be 
characterised primarily by a romantic or theo-geographic attachment to Eretz Yisrael. In 
contrast to the radical Revisionists, Jabotinsky’s objection to the 1937 Partition Plan for 
Western Palestine was not premised on the idea that a division violated the organic unity 
of the national homeland. His reasoning was pragmatic. He proclaimed a series of 
arguments of a geo-strategic and defensive nature. The main trust of his argument 
concerned the fact that partition would seriously impair the absorption capacity of the 
country to settle several million European Jews quickly, before the impending disaster 
which he predicted (Shavit: 124).
Although the conservative Revisionists viewed the nation’s existence as a natural organic 
phenomenon, they did not see the cultural content of that identity as closed off and 
separate. Indeed, although Jabotinsky venerated the national spirit, he was extremely 
contemptuous of Jewish religious culture in the Diaspora. "My treasure", he declared, "is 
not religion, but something else for which this ‘mummified corpse’ was supposed to serve 
as a shell and protection" (Shindler 1994:17). Like many of the early Zionists, Jabotinsky 
accepted some of the anti-Semitic critique of the Jewish people. Consequently, he sought 
to transform the mild mannered Jew into an upright, proud Hebrew. This transformative 
existential value was hadar [dignity/honour]. Hadar was supposed to empower the 
Jewish people to obtain sovereign equality with the other nations of the world. 
Consequently, Revisionism emphasised importance of Jewish self-assertion. As 
Jabotinsky wrote, "because the Yid [Yiddish for Jew] is ugly, sickly and lacks decorum, 
we shall endour the ideal image of the Hebrew with masculine beauty. The Yid is trodden
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on and easily frightens, therefore the Hebrew ought to be proud and independent. The Yid 
has accepted submission, the Hebrew ought to learn to command. The Yid seeks to 
conceal his identity from strangers, therefore the Hebrew should look the world in the eye 
and declare “I am a Hebrew" (Wheatcroft: 171). One of the keys to this goal was the 
veneration of military prowess as an existential value. Hence Jabotinsky’s support for a 
Jewish Legion in both world wars and the militaristic style o f the Revisionist youth 
movement Betar. In his novel Samson. Jabotinsky reflected on the redemptive quality of 
war, where military power is an aesthetic ideal, an expression of national virility (Seliktar 
1986: 81). In addition, the Revisionist belief in the need for national self-assertion and 
their belief in the importance of the will as an instrumental value led them to the view that 
the use of declarations and strong rhetoric are important political acts in themselves 
(Rowland 65-78). The romanticism of Revisionism and its veneration of might are central 
to an understanding of its instrumental values. In common with much of the European 
right, Revisionism combined a nationalistic romantic belief in the power of the national 
will, with a Realist view of the nature of international politics.
The classic rational realpolitik foundation for conservative Revisionism’s instrumental 
values can be found in Homo Homo Lupis where Jabotinsky identified international 
politics as comparable to an anarchic Hobbesian state of nature, a forever on-going war of 
all against all, contained by the balance of power. In this reality, political cunning and 
military might were deemed a universal rule, crucial to the survival of all nations 
including the fledgling Hebrew nation (Seliktar 1986: 81). Jabotinsky argued that "as with 
other nations also with us, our national future depends on arming ourselves...historical 
reality tells us: if you are educated, know how to plough and build houses, and if you 
speak Hebrew... But you don't know how to shoot, you have no hope. But if you know 
how to shoot - maybe there is hope." (Rael Isaac 1981: 139). Consequently, the 
Revisionist youth movement Betar received a paramilitary education, and the symbols 
and ceremony of military life were extensively employed.
Yet, conservative Revisionism augmented this pessimistic view of the international 
environment with a typically optimistic nineteenth century liberal belief in the power of 
public opinion to support moral courses, as Britain had done through the Balfour
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declaration. In order to change a policy one had to influence the group of opinion leaders 
who formed the cultural milieu of the policy elite (Shavit: 209). Indeed, Jabotinsky 
appealed to British public opinion that Zionism was a reliable ally of the Empire and a 
cultural outpost of the West (Sofer: 184). In addition, as compared to the twentieth 
century concept of ‘total war’, conservative Revisionism was more comfortable with the 
more limited nineteenth century conception. Thus, despite their seeming veneration of 
militaristic values, the conservatives preferred the use of military power primarily as a 
means of applying political pressure (Shapiro: 58). Overall then, conservative 
Revisionism was actually closer to understanding the world in terms of a limited version 
of an international society (Bull) as opposed to a pure Hobbesian war of all against all. As 
Jabotinsky argued to the radical Revisionists, "We are not living in a world of robbers, but 
in a world of law and justice where conscience still holds some sway"(Peleg: 18).
Dayan and the Labourite conservatives
Despite the fact that Labour Zionism was supposed to be progressive, there had always 
existed within it elements which fit more neatly into the conservative or radical right. 
Within Mapai1, Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defence 1967-73, Foreign Minister 1977-81 
and some of his supporters, had a lot in common with Jabotinsky. Dayan shared the 
conservative Revisionists strong attachment to the land of the Bible for nationalist and 
security reasons. After the Six Day War, Dayan could not envisage a safe2 and realistic 
territorial compromise and, in a eulogy to the defenders of the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem 
who died in 1948, he stated "we did not betray your dream, nor did we forget your legacy. 
We have returned to the mountains, to the cradle of our people, to our patrimony... to give 
life to Jerusalem we have to place our soldiers and arms on the hills of Shechem and at 
the entrances to the bridges of the Jordan” (Bar On 1996: 40). Indeed Dayan can be seen 
as a symbol of the heroic fighting Hebrew, that Jabotinsky had yearned to create. Dayan 
was one of the key founders of the “activist” strategy of retaliation in the 1950s which 
emphasised military self-assertion. He saw this strategy not only in instrumental terms, 
but as an important existential value for the new state of Israel. Similarly, Dayan and his
1 Mapai- acronym for the Israeli Labour party.
2 For a summary o f  the geo-strategic arguments against territorial concessions see (Wildanski: 31).
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followers shared conservative Revisionism’s Realist balance of power view of Israel’s 
position. As Dayan saw it, in such an international environment, Israel had no foreign 
policy, only a defence policy with international implications (Brecher). However, while 
conservative Revisionism emphasised Israel as part of ‘the West’ denigrating the culture 
of ‘the East’, Dayan saw Israel as returning to be a part of the Middle East region again. 
Despite this difference, both their notions of identity conceived of the national element, 
not purely as a thing in of itself, but as part of a larger cultural identity and this 
differentiated them from the radicals.
The Sephardim
Sephardi Jewry consists of a large number of Jews who came from Arab/Islamic countries 
and a small minority whose origins are in Mediterranean European countries. During the 
Middle Ages, Sephardi Jews were distinguished from their Ashkenazi brethren from 
northern and eastern Europe by a different rabbinical tradition. In modem day Israel 
however, the distinction is synonymous with geographical origin. By the 1970s, the 
Sephardim had come to make up about half of Israel's Jewish population. Aside from the 
importance of the Sephardi vote in the rise of the Likud to power after 1977, the Sephardi 
community also became increasingly active and important within the party itself. As a 
result, by 1986 Sephardim constitute the majority of the party's activists (Zuckerman). 
Several Sephardi politicians also became high profile party leaders including David Levy, 
Moshe Katzav and Meir Shitreet. This Sephardi group in the Likud tended to identify 
with the conservative tendency within the right.
The Sephardim were relatively more traditional and particularistic than Israeli 
Ashkenazim. For them Israel was first and foremost a Jewish state. They viewed the land 
of Israel as the traditional home of the Jewish people to whom it belonged and they 
favoured the Likud's tougher style in foreign policy as more likely to bring peace in the 
rough world of international politics (Roumani: 428). They were the least impressed of all 
the conservatives with the centrality of value of military force as a foreign policy tool3 and
3 David Levy was the only member o f  Herut in the Cabinet to vote against entering Beirut in 1982 and for 
leaving Lebanon in 1985.
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the least ideologically committed to the integrity of the whole land of Israel. As strongly 
traditional Jews, they tended to value the land of Israel and the ingathering of the exiles to 
Zion, but it was not their central political value. Hence, there were very few Sephardim 
among the settlers. Having been bypassed by the French Revolution and the subsequent 
age of ideology which gave birth to Zionism, the traditional Sephardi political culture 
continued to demonstrate its hallmark pragmatism, rather than any sense of ideology, 
Revisionist or otherwise. Indeed many of the Sephardi leaders in the Likud had only 
joined it after having failed to advance in the Labour party (Zuckerman).
Radicalism
Radical particularism conceives of Zionism and the state of Israel as an expression of an 
exclusively Jewish identity. The particularism of the radicals operates on two levels. First, 
it views Israel as "a nation that dwells alone" surrounded by existential enemies whose 
anti-Semitism is endemic and everlasting. This situation is viewed not within the 
universal system of a Hobbesian state of nature but as a specific reality for the Jewish 
people. Second, the radical right see Israel as being on a mission to fulfil its own 
particular destiny. The key particularistic value that it seeks to realise in this quasi- 
messianic scheme is to bring the ‘whole land of Israel’ under Jewish control within a state 
that will have a specifically Jewish culture. The territorial integrity of Israel serves as a 
focal point and as the absolute precondition for the realisation of all other Zionist 
aspirations. Between 1981-96, the radical sub-culture was represented strongly within the 
leadership and the rank and file of the Likud, as well as within the parties of the radical 
right: Techiya, Tzomet, Moledet and Kach. In addition, by the late 1980s most of the 
leadership and supporters of the National Religious Party (NRP) also came round to this 
outlook. Its roots lie within the radical factions of Revisionism, Labour activism and 
messianic religious Zionism.
The Radical Revisionist Trend
The radical Zionist right formulated itself ideologically in the inter-war period and it 
became a recognisable independent political force in Palestine after 1938. It was
particularly strong within Betar which later became associated with the Irgun,4 indeed 
both were led by Menachem Begin. The Irgun sought to mobilise the Yishuv5 in a military 
offensive against both the Arabs and the British with the aim of forcing an independent 
Jewish state. Begin argued for this ‘military Zionism’, while Jabotinsky argued that the 
balance of power and the need to retain British support dictated prudence. At this point, 
the radicals split from Jabotinsky and Begin led a military revolt against Britain and the 
Arabs of Palestine. With the onset of World War II, the radical Revisionist movement 
split again when the Irgun declared a ceasefire with Britain in order to make common 
cause against the Nazis, while the Stem Gang [Lechi] continued the war against the 
British in Palestine.
When Begin reinstituted the revolt at the end of World War II, the two groups remained 
organisationally and ideologically separate and in 1948 Begin formed the Herut party 
which did not initially include members of the Stem Gang. Despite the split in the radical 
right, gradually they too became associated first with Herut and then with Likud. For 
example, Yitzhak Shamir a former leader of Lechi, joined Herut in 1970. Nonetheless, 
after the withdrawal of Israel from Sinai, under Begin’s Likud government, some of the 
radical Revisionists split from Likud and formed Techiya and their influence was also to 
be found in the other parties of the radical right founded in the 1980s.
Radical Revisionism
Radical Revisionism had a highly particularistic concept of national identity, whereby the 
Jews were a people that dwelt alone both ontologically due to anti-Semitism and 
normatively because Western culture was corrupt and decadent, while the Arabic Middle 
East was considered barbaric. Europe was understood as the Christian continent, the 
embodiment of anti-Semitism. Its rationalism and emancipation were regarded as 
decadent, empty, anti-Jewish values. In reaction, they aspired to an autarkic Jewish 
culture, that would grow from the native soil and express the unique national spirit: the
4 The Irgun was a Zionist underground organisation, separate from the Labour defence organisation- the 
Haganah whose policy was havlagah [restraint] against Arab terror attacks.
5 Term used to denote the Zionist-Jewish society in modern Palestine pre-1948.
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Volksgeist (Shavit: 148-150). They did not recognise any universal element to Judaism. 
Judaism was a national concept, pure and simple.
Although radicalism rejected ‘the West’, like many other nationalist groups of the time, 
they were influenced by extremists on both the European right and left, drawing on the 
outlook of German and Russian idealism as well as Polish messianic nationalism (Shavit: 
24, 143). Prior to the Holocaust, Fascism was admired, while after 1945, Lechi attempted 
to combine Fascism and Communism into an ideology of national Bolshevism. 
Democracy and liberalism were seen as weak and corrupted systems. Nationalism was a 
supreme and total interest, politics a total pursuit. Political power was held to be 
legitimately attainable by convincing the masses to vote for one party or through a coup. 
There was no room for the niceties of liberal politics with its minimalist conception of the 
state and its restrained instrumental practices. Rather, it adhered to Millennialism 
(Kedourie), a kind of secular messianism, which inspired a commitment to self sacrifice 
and a belief that the end justify the means. Zionism had to be a totalitarian movement in 
the spiritual and cultural sense, devoted to one sacred purpose only.
The most elevated value of radical Revisionism and a touchstone of its whole ethos was 
the whole land of Israel. According to their conception, the Jewish people’s ties to the 
land of Israel could only be explained in theo-geographic terms. The land of Israel was 
not merely a piece of territory, but a land with a symbolic and mystical significance. The 
relationship of the Jewish people to it could not be compared to that of the various 
European nations to their countries. The connection between the people and the land was 
meta-historical. The longing for its soil was the longing for an independent and sovereign 
status in the face of the entire universe, anchored in the primordial spirit of Israel (Shavit: 
137). Abraham Stern’s Eighteen Principles of Revival \Techiya] asserted that the borders 
of the land of Israel included not only the territory allotted to Britain by the Treaty of 
Versailles as Jabotinsky held, but from the Nile to the Euphrates as stated in Genesis. 
Stem declared that Jewish ownership of the land was absolute and could not be rescinded 
(Shindler 1995: 176).
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The return of the Jews to their land and the conquering of that land was understood to 
signal the achievement of their particular historical mission. The Eighteen Principles of 
Revival declared the goals of the movement to be the redemption of the land and the 
revival of the nation. This Zionist messianism looked to the Second Temple period of 
Jewish history for inspiration perceiving Zionism as the organic continuation of the 
national messianic idea in Jewish history. Their early myths revolved around the heroic, 
but ultimately tragic, myths of Samson and the Jewish revolt against Rome which ended 
at Betar. Stern saw the Hasmonean zealots and the Bar Kochba wars not merely as wars 
of national liberation but wars with spiritual cause and significance. Consequently, the 
Eighteen Principles called for the building of a Third Temple, a symbol of complete 
redemption. All of this was in the expectation that it would be necessary to "fight a 
perpetual war with everyone who obstructs the realisation of the goal” (Shavit: 155).
This perpetual war dictated that force would be a key instrumental value. But military 
values were not seen as merely a necessary instrumental value; but as a positive virtue; a 
symbol of national sovereignty. In common with much of the European right, they 
combined a nationalistic romantic belief in the power of the national will, with a realist 
view of the nature of international politics. Radical Revisionism emphasised idealism and 
the dynamism of the will in combination with military power to produce the great epoch 
making event. Politics was construed as an either/or, 'to die or conquer the mountain': 
either the great victory or the terrible heroic tragedy (Harkabi 1988: 72). For radical 
Revisionism the crucial ingredient in the success of Zionism was not its realism, but its 
mysticism, its dynamic will and ability to endure, manifest through the exercise of 
military force at decisive turning points in history. As Israel Eldad explained, “Zionism is 
the process of turning a dream into reality... our existence and redemption reject 
everything that is real and rational”(Seliktar 1986: 81).
Neo-Revisionism
Begin and Herut took a position midway between Jabotinsky’s Revisionism and the 
radical Revisionists, termed by Ilan Peleg, neo-Revisionism. They adopted the formal 
liberal democratic constitutionalism and concern for Hadar of the conservative stream,
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while placing greater emphasis on Jewish uniqueness. Whereas, Jabotinsky’s 
conservatism was basically secular and even anti-religious, Begin’s viewed traditional 
religion in a positive light. Neo-Revisionists also identified with the mystical approach 
towards the central value of the whole land of Israel.6 In addition, while Begin shared 
Jabotinsky harsh vision of international politics, Jabotinsky understood it in universal 
terms, applicable to all nations, Begin understood the particularly harsh global 
environment for the Jewish people as having come about as a result o f endemic anti- 
Semitism, that is, it was peculiar to Jewish experience. As he explained in The Revolt “if 
the annihilated people happens to be Jewish, the world will be silent and behave as it 
usually behaves” (Arian 1989: 22). After the Holocaust this tendency was reinforced, 
such that the Holocaust became the image through which everything was interpreted.
Labour Activism
Labour activism originated around Yitzhak Tabenkin, the leader of Achdut HaAvodah, 
and can be identified with his general brand of Marxist-socialist Zionism. However, a 
significant number of Mapai activists shared his militancy without fully accepting his 
philosophy. In Tabenkin’s eclectic theory, true Jewish redemption was a particularistic 
enterprise and could take place only in the context of communal settlement in the entire 
land of Israel. In 1972 Eliezer Livneh, a member of Tabenkin's Kibbutz, published Israel 
and the Crisis of Western Civilisation. According to Livneh "The Jewish people is not a 
nation that belongs to one of the great civilisations - the humanist-Christian, Buddhist and 
Hindu - but is a distinct phenomenon. Israel determines its own modes of interaction.” 
For Livneh, Israeli control of the whole land of Israel after 1967 symbolised that, “Israel 
was now once again whole in both a spiritual and physical sense” (Sprinsak 58-9). The 
future model for Jewish living in Israel was to be a combination of Orthodox Jewish 
culture with a secular respect for the heritage of the nation. According to Livneh, Zionism 
before 1967 was mistaken in that it had detached itself from this genuine wellspring of the 
nation. Ariel Sharon, perhaps the most famous Labour activist, agreed (Sharon 531-542).
6 N onetheless, in 1969 Begin accepted that the conquest o f  the east bank o f  the Jordan was not a practical 
objective.
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However, this normative particularism was not adhered to throughout Labour activism. 
What united the grouping was a deep suspicion of the Arabs, the British, and the rest of 
the world, a view reinforced by the Holocaust. When coupled with a typical Labour 
Zionist belief in self-reliance, this led to a belief in military activism as the best strategy 
for Zionism. In the 1930s, faced by the Arab revolt and British restrictions on Jewish 
immigration, Labour activism concurred with the military Zionism of Begin and rejected 
mainstream Labour Zionism4s strategy of Havlagah (self-restraint). They advocated a 
constant expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine with or without official permission 
of the mandatory authorities. After the creation of the state, the activist strategy was 
adopted for a while by the Labour led government under Ben Gurion. Spatial defence of 
the country through a network of border settlements was combined with an aggressive 
retaliatory policy overseen by Chief-of-Staff Moshe Dayan and carried out by the head of 
the infamous Unit 101, Ariel Sharon.
Messianic Religious Zionism
Within religious Zionism there was always a tension between two versions of the 
ideology. The first doctrine was the political Zionism of religious Jews, associated with 
the first leader of the grouping Rabbi Rienes. He advocated a cautious politics as a 
pragmatic solution to the pressing problems of the persecuted Jews. The second school 
was messianic religious Zionism, associated with Rabbi Avraham Kook, the first 
Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the Yishuv. Kook held that secular Zionism indicated the 
beginning of the redemption promised by the prophets. His theology was quite 
revolutionary in that it allotted a sacred role in the messianic process to secular Jews who 
did not even believe in the Messiah, though, in the fullness of time he expected the 
secular pioneers to return to G-d and the observance of Torah7. The second pillar of his 
theology focused around the holiness of the whole land of Israel. Though concern for the 
territory of Eretz Israel never dominated Rabbi Kook’s teaching, he believed that full 
redemption could only take place in the whole land of Israel.
7 Torah- denotes observance o f  Mosaic law and way o f  life as interpreted by the rabbis over the 
generations.
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Following the capture of Judea and Samaria in the Six Day War, Kook’s son, Rabbi Zvi 
Yehuda Kook ruled that it was against Jewish law to surrender territory, even though this 
was out of tune with mainstream religious rulings. Kook's followers then came the 
spearhead of the movement to settle the new territories through the Gush Emunim [the 
block of the faithful] movement. They were inspired to such acts through the frequently 
employed myth of, 'Nachson the son of Aminadav'. Quoting from Midrash8 the Gush 
explained that God only split the Red Sea after Nachson the son of Aminadav went into 
the sea up to his neck, while the rest of the people were afraid. The moral of the story 
being that the Jews must act unilaterally with strength of will to acquire the Promised 
Land, for God will miraculously save them in the end, as long as they have enough faith. 
Thus, messianic religious Zionism also lauded the value of the unilateral initiative based 
on will power and mystical faith.
Moreover, for the followers of Zvi Kook, the territorial question was part of a broader 
cultural project to bring about a return to the Torah, the rebuilding of the Third Temple 
and thus full redemption. The whole land of Israel came to symbolise the entire conflict 
between Jews and non-Jews and between faithful Jews and those whose loyalties 
wavered. It was seen as a battle of the faithful Maccabees against the Hellenisers. 
According to messianic religious Zionist and settlement leader, Yehiel Leiter, “Holding 
on to Yesha9 and building it, forces a particular identity on the nation, one which 
emphasises the uniqueness of the Jewish people, one that many in Israel's left-wing are 
trying to escape... The issue is the character of the state: is the Jewish state the fulfilment 
of a continuum of Jewish history and destiny, which acknowledges and emphasises the 
presence of a distinctive Jewish nation, or is it merely a Hebrew speaking carbon copy of 
Canada?” (Leiter 1993: 28). This internal cultural particularism was reinforced by a 
perception of endemic anti-Semitism. Especially, after the Holocaust, messianic religious 
Zionism came to share the radical right’s conception of Israel as a people that dwells 
alone10. One major Gush Emunim Rabbi was wont to note, “There are two types of non- 
Jews those that simply hate us and those who attempt with all their power to destroy us”
8 Midrash- a collection o f  Rabbinical commentary on the Bible in the form o f  exegesis.
9 Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
10 In contradistinction, Rabbi Abraham Kook viewed the redemption o f  Israel as part o f  a universal 
redemption (Herzberg 1984: 423).
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(Liebman and Cohen: 59). The idea that Zionism could end this reality through 
normalising the position of the Jewish people, was considered unrealistic.
Techiya and the Parties o f the Radical Right
When in 1978 most of the Likud and the NRP supported the Camp David Accords, Zvi 
Yehuda Kook brought the Accords opponents together and formed Techiya. The party 
was made up of members of Gush Emunim, former members of Lechi such as Geula 
Cohen and Labour activists such as Yuval Neeman. The name Techiya appealed 
especially to former Lechi members for it also commemorated Abraham Stem's long 
forgotten principles of renewal [Techiya]. Techiya supported the whole land of Israel and 
settlement without regard to international consequences and was also emphatic that there 
was a need for a transformation of the entire education system to purvey more 
particularistic Jewish values (Sprinsak: 181). In 1987, former Chief- of-Staff Eitan split 
from Techiya to form Tzomet. which appealed to hard core Labour activists, members of 
the Kibbutz and Moshav movements, who opposed the religious ideals of Gush Emunim. 
They were strong supporters of the greater land of Israel idea who believed that military 
force could solve political problems (Sprinsak: 189). For many Israelis, Eitan was 
perceived as the model of the farmer-fighter who had never abandon the appeal of 
pioneering Zionism, that of a proud, productive and self-sufficient working Hebrew. 
Rehavam Ze'evi a legendary fighter in the Labour movement’s elite force, the Palmach, 
caused another split on the far right when he set up Moledet. It publicly recommended 
‘transfer’: an ‘agreed on’ removal of all the Arabs of the occupied territories to the 
neighbouring Arab countries.
On the outer fringe of the radical right was Meir Kahane and Kach. Ideologically, Kahane 
was greatly influenced by Revisionist Zionism and was especially taken with its attitude 
towards Jewish self-defence and dignity. He had a highly particularistic normative 
message, considering equal rights and humanistic principles as essentially non-Jewish. To 
Kahane, Jewish violence to protect Jewish interests was never bad. He was also obsessed 
with the Holocaust, which formed a foundation of his ‘catastrophic Zionist philosophy’, 
that predicted a new Holocaust and called upon the Jews of the Diaspora to return to
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Israel before it was too late. In parallel, he argued that if the Jews did not expel the Arabs 
first, the Arabs would wipe them out or evict them from Palestine (Sprinsak 50-56).
The Political Culture of Universalism
The universal tendency in Israeli political culture aspires to normalisation: to be a nation 
like all other nations. Normatively, it seeks for Israel to be a part of a world community. It 
seeks to contribute and receive from that world, in economic and cultural terms. 
Ontologically, it views the Jewish people and the Israeli nation as, in essence, no different 
to any other so that they the same universal rational economic, social and historical 
regularities that apply to the gentile world, apply in essence, to the Jewish world (Beilin 
1997: 266). If this tendency aspires to a historical mission, it is one defined in universal 
moral - humanistic terms. There are two sub-cultures within universalism: mamlachtiut 
[statism] and progressive Zionism.
The Socialist-Zionist Precursor
Socialist Zionism had a universal vision which conceived of Zionism as the source for the 
normalisation of the Jewish people. The Socialist Zionist thinker, Syrkin, argued, 
“Socialism will do away with wars and the conflict of interest among civilised peoples...it 
will pave the way for the uniting of separate histories.” Yet although socialism bore, “the 
seeds our of which internationalism, that is cosmopolitanism would develop,” it would 
not do so for the Jewish people in the foreseeable future due to anti-Semitism which 
resulted from the particular economic and social position of the Jews and not the inherent 
wickedness or folly of the Gentiles”(Hertzberg: 75-6). The socialist Zionist version of 
normalisation incorporated socio-economic imperatives as well as political imperatives. 
In order to be a part of the universal triumph of social justice, the Jews had to first 
become productive and thus be removed from their ‘parasitic* economic position in 
Europe. According to this thesis, it was the parasitic existence of the Jews which caused 
anti-Semitism. Hence, in order to end anti-Semitism and bring about the economic and 
the political normalisation of the Jews, a pioneering socialist community in Palestine had 
to be created. Once the Jews had their own state and society, their diaspora weak ‘Jewish’
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characteristics would be transformed into proud ‘Hebrew’ ones and anti-Semitism would 
disappear. To achieve this it argued that first of all the Zionist movement had to establish 
an economic and social base before statehood could be conferred. The first necessity was 
to change the occupational structure of the Jewish people so as to build the homeland. 
This school argued that achievement do not come as a dramatic event, but from a process 
of incremental actions ‘Acre after acre, goat after goat.’ Despite these pragmatic 
instrumental values, the Socialists retained the messianic idea in Judaism in its universal 
form. Thus. Syrkin saw Israel’s mission as the creation of a classless society in Palestine 
that would serve as a light unto the nations (Rael Isaac: 20).
Socialist Zionism succeeded in creating the dominant political force in the Yishuv: the 
Labour movement. The emphasis within the Labour movement in the pre-state period was 
on the ideal collective settlement in Kibbutzim for society at large and sought a total 
integration between the political party and the Histadrut, which was not just a trade union 
but a future socialist state in embryo consisting of businesses, industries and a health 
service. After statehood, the Socialist Zionist stream was represented within Mapai and 
especially within the more left wing Mapam, which merged with Mapai on an off until 
1984 when it regained its independence.
M amlachtiut
Gradually after statehood, the leader of Mapai, Ben Gurion, came to de-emphasise 
socialism and collective settlement and instead promote the fulfilment of the Zionist 
dream through Jewish immigration and absorption, a goal facilitated by the ethos of state 
building. Normalisation was still the objective, but no longer through a change in the 
Jewish people’s class structure, but through statehood. For mamlachtiut’s chief theorist, 
Ben Gurion, anti-Semitism did not result from an abnormal class structure but “from the 
Jews peculiar status which does not accord within the established framework of the 
nations of the World” (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983: 104). In order to resolve that 
problem, the exiles had to be ingathered to a Jewish state.
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Mamlachtiut expressed the centrality of the state and its superiority to any other factor or 
value. But it was not etatism. Rather, mamlachtiut was a means to save the Jewish people 
rather than a goal in of itself The ingathering of the exiles was a core value, a sovereign 
state was a precondition to that and thus its survival became the main operational goal 
(Teveth 1985: 183). Thus, after the state’s foundation, Mapai moved increasingly away 
from Labour Zionism. Ben Gurion redefined chalutziut [pioneering] so that it could be 
any kind of pioneering, not just settling on a Kibbutz (Liebman and Don Yehiya 1983: 
84). Mamlachtiut made great efforts to transform the state and its institutions into the 
central locus of loyalty and identification. It affirmed the centrality of state interest at the 
expense of non-governmental groups and institutions, even those of Labour Zionism. 
Labour trends in the education system were eliminated and an attempt, although it failed, 
was made to create a health insurance programme separate from the Histadrut. The 
ideological militias of the right and the left were demobbed, leaving a unified Israeli 
Defence Force in their place.
But mamlachti normalisation was not only about state structures. Mamlachtiut was 
hostile to traditional Judaism. It was viewed religion as a symbol of unproductive, 
uncivilised diaspora weakness, which had to be overcome in order to normalise the 
Jewish people. Thus, those espousing mamlachtiut preferred to disregard Jewish history 
in the Diaspora, drawing their myths and symbol from previous periods of Jewish 
statehood. Mamlachtiut raised the Sahra [the native bom Israeli] to the rank of hero who 
was portrayed as the inverse image of the exilic Jew. Unlike the Diaspora Jew, the Sahra 
had no fear, no materialistic appetite. He was destined to bring an end to the humiliation 
of his parents. All that the diaspora Jew lacked, the Sahra had: strength, health, physical 
labour... rootedness. Designated as it was to cultivate feelings of strength, self-confidence 
and national pride, mamlachtiut represented a stark contrast the conditions of weakness 
and humiliation that found their most extreme expression in the Holocaust. In an article 
entitled ‘Israel's security and her international position,’ Ben Gurion aptly summarised the 
ideology of mamlachtiut vis-a-vis the Holocaust. According to Ben Gurion, the legacy of 
the Holocaust was to prevent such a disaster. The lesson deduced from the entire course 
of Jewish history in exile taught to the need to accumulate Jewish strength through the 
establishment of a state and become a sovereign people, equal in rights in the family of
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nations (Don Yehiya 1993: 147). Only thus would the normalisation of the Jewish people 
be complete.
The relationship between the goal of normalisation and Zionism’s sense of historical 
mission was a central concern to Ben Gurion. In 1961, he expanded on this distinction 
between ideals and political priorities. He stated that he did not recognise a Jewish 
‘nationalism’ only Judaism; which was not a series of commandments, but a ‘spiritual- 
moral destiny.’ As he understood it, the concept of ‘a state’ in the English sense of the 
word did not exist in the Hebrew at all, only the concept of a people. Thus, he explained 
that as a Jew, he had no need for the concept of sovereignty, but was in need of 
redemption and freedom for the whole Jewish people. Did this mean that he was ready to 
sacrifice sovereignty, political interest, raison d'etat, statism? No. Ben Gurion did not 
state how he thought the Jewish people could fill their ‘spiritual-moral destiny.’ But it is 
clear that he did not link it to the nation-state. This was the reason he stated that Hebrew 
had no word with the exact meaning of state in the English sense. For Ben Gurion, 
generally speaking, Israel’s destiny as a nation state moved on a different, though parallel, 
track from that of the "spiritual-moral destiny" of the Jewish people (Leshem 1989: 194). 
Ben Gurion went to great effort to encourage this spiritual-moral approach within Israeli 
society and among its intellectuals (Keren 1983). However, politics consisted of 
modernisation and pragmatism: mamlachtiut. As we shall see later, this became extremely 
relevant as regards mamlachtiut and the value of the whole land of Israel. We can suffice 
for now with a statement by Ben Gurion during the 1937 debate over partition: "Eretz 
Israel from the Red Sea in the south and the Lebanon and Herman the North, and between 
the Mediterranean in the West and the Syrian desert in the East... I believe today, no less 
than I did 35 years ago, that this land will be ours. But in the present conditions it is 
necessary to accept that the unity of the land is a spiritual and not a political fact. One 
should not mix spiritual concepts with political” (Sandler 1993: 61).
In 1965 the mamlachti [statist] wing of Labour split from Mapai temporarily to form the 
Rafi party. Rafi adopted a technocratic programme which called for a modem, 
industrialised Israel as an alternative to outdated socialist vision. It campaigned for a 
strong defence establishment and was seen by some as more hawkish than Mapai. The
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resemblance between some of the aspects of mamlachtiut and conservatism led some of 
its adherents to move across to the Likud after 1967, most notably Moshe Dayan, while 
others such as Shimon Peres gravitated towards the progressive stream. Nonetheless, the 
true heirs of mamlachtiut, were those created in its image, high ranking army officers, 
such as Yitzhak Rabin. They were socialised within the most highly regarded arm of the 
state, the armed forces and not within the Labour party, which they tended to join after 
completing their military service.
Progressive Zionism
Being Jewish means belonging to a people that is both a chosen people 
and a universal people... continuing to plough the historic Jewish furrow in 
the field o f the human spirit Shimon Peres (1995: 358)
The progressive stream of Zionism has always been the most universalist with the most 
positive assessment of the ontology of international relations. One of the main themes of 
its history has been the tension between whether to regard a state as an end goal, the 
fulfilment of normalisation and the resolution of the Jewish question, or whether 
statehood is just a step on the way to the broader fulfilment of a universal human 
progressive agenda that requires going beyond the framework of the nation-state. The 
roots of the progressive trend derived from four sources: socialist Zionism, mamlachtiut, 
spiritual Zionism and liberal Zionism.
Spiritual Zionism
Spiritual Zionists wanted Zionism to represent the universal moral vision of the Biblical 
prophets and liberal Western ethics. Ahad Ha’am, the founder of this school of Zionism, 
was not primarily concerned with the need to resolve the problems of the Jews caused by 
anti-Semitism through the creation of a Jewish nation-state in Palestine. Rather, the aim 
was to create in Palestine a cultural Jewish centre which would help sustain Jewish 
cultural life worldwide and provide the grounding for the Jewish people to play the role of 
being a moral light to the nations. In the inter-war period, intellectuals who held similar 
views banded together to form Brit Shalom and the Ihud, its members included Martin
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Buber and Judah Magnes. They favoured a binational state in Palestine and accepted Arab 
supervision of Jewish immigration, believing that another nation-state would just cause 
more political strife. Instead, the Jews had to merge into a new ‘civilised community’ of 
free men to raise the level of human culture throughout the Middle East, thereby paying 
homage to the highest of human ideals (Ellis: 47). Therein they saw the only possible 
justification for Zionism in universal terms. The ideas of Spiritual Zionism influenced the 
progressive stream of Israeli political culture, but they had no formal political base.
Liberal Zionism
Liberal Zionism saw a state as a solution to the Jewish question in Europe. They saw two 
sides to the problem which Zionism was to cure; the physical persecution of the Jews and 
the inner problems of the Jewish character, the neurosis implanted as a result of this 
persecution. Zionism was to lead to external and internal freedom for Jews: normalisation. 
Yet one of the questions which liberal Zionism was unclear about was whether or not a 
Jewish state was a permanent or temporary answer to the problem.
Initially, this affirmation of Jewish particularity was seen as a concession by the highly 
acculturated and assimilated liberal European Jews, such as Theodore Herzl, who made 
up the early leadership of Zionism. They held to the ‘ideology of emancipation’ the 
system of thought which, in the wake of the Haskalah [Jewish enlightenment], began to 
affect the integration of Jews into the modem world. Originally Herzl saw the solution to 
the Jewish problem as the creation of an atmosphere of tolerance that would precede the 
mass conversion of all Jews to Christianity. Herzl and his ilk only turned to Zionism after 
perceiving that it was impossible for individual Jews to assimilate into West European 
society due to the persistence of anti-Semitism in spite of the emancipation. Thus, Herzl 
wrote in Per Judenstaadt: "we are a nation, one nation. The enemy, by no volition of ours, 
forces us to be a nation" (Evron 1995: 44). So instead of becoming a person like all 
others, they “decided that the only way out was to become a nation like all others. They 
felt they had to return to their home, and acquire what any nation has: territory and 
sovereignty.” (Oz 1994: 38). According to Leo Pinsker, the creation of such a Jewish 
nation-state would put Jewish-Gentile relations on the basis of self respect and equality,
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such that anti-Semitism would disappear. This was the core of political Zionism. Given 
this fact, territory was primarily of instrumental value in the Zionist equation. 
Consequently, Herzl had been prepared to accept Uganda as the foundation for a Jewish 
state in 1903, since his political priority did not attach any intrinsic importance to the 
territory of Palestine, though obviously its historical resonance meant that it was the 
preferred territory for the Zionist movement. Ultimately, the Zionist movement rejected 
the offer of Uganda, feeling not only that they did not want Uganda but that their only 
legitimate claim was to Palestine. For liberal Zionists also saw Zionism as a means to an 
‘inner freedom’ which allowed true integration into the world without compromising 
one’s identity.
True integration meant that the state of the Jews was conceived not only a practical refuge 
for the Jewish masses, but as a way of resolving the moral imperative of leaving the 
ghetto, that is of fully joining with mankind, fulfilling the promise of the emancipation. 
Normalisation represented the antithesis of the concept of a chosen people. As the writer 
and Peace Now activist A.B. Yehoshua (21) argued, “the demand to be different, singular, 
unique, set apart from the family of nations, is a neurosis of Galut [the Diaspora], to be 
cured by Zionism.” Liberal Zionism was thus not only an attempt to escape from external 
persecution, but also an attempt to break down the internal obstacles, the invisible walls 
of the ‘new ghetto’ which were deemed to have prevented Jews from being honourable, 
happy, morally proper, self- respecting human beings.
As to the character of this state, they wanted to see a large measure of freedom from 
monetary and bureaucratic restrictions while adhering to the progressive objectives of 
social justice. Individual freedoms were to be protected by a constitution and religion was 
to be limited to the private sphere. Although liberal Zionism aspired to this kind of 
normalisation, it had a dual sense of mission: first to save Jews from anti-Semitism and 
second the more universal goal that Israel be in the ‘vanguard of human liberation’, a 
model liberal state at the forefront of social and technological progress, not only for self­
emancipation of the Jews, but the emancipation of mankind itself (Beller: 45-61). Liberal 
Zionism wanted Israel to be a model of tolerance, freedom and humanity; the 
achievement of what the emancipation tried, and failed, to do in Europe. This was what
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would define the Jewishness of the new society. As Herzl urged his fellow Jews, “...hold 
fast to the things that have made us great, liberality, tolerance and a love of mankind, only 
then is Zion truly Zion.” (Rubinstein 1984: 139).
From the pre-state period until the mid 1970s liberal Zionism was of peripheral 
importance. Then the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) emerged inspired by the 
ideas of Herzl’s liberal Zionism (Rubinstein). Its primary targets were to anchor civil 
rights in a written constitution, to reinforce the responsibility principle in the public 
administration, and to incorporate the values of "good and active citizenship in a 
democratic society" (Barzilai 1996: 120). Although the party disintegrated by 1981, out of 
it grew Shinui, an avowedly middle class liberal party with a dovish foreign policy 
agenda.
Growing out o f  mamlachtiut
Within Mapai, Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister 1948-55, Prime Minster 1954-5 
was the most influential early representative of the progressive stream. He wavered 
between the idea that the Jews were cast in a biblical role as the guardian of universal 
values, and the idea that they were just another normal Middle Eastern people (Brecher 
1972: 262). However, aside from Abba Eban, he had no real proteges. On the other hand, 
from out of the group which had sided with Ben Gurion on the issue of mamlachtiut, the 
Tzi'irim [young ones], emerged a leading Progressive of the 1980s and 1990s, Shimon 
Peres,. The Tzi’irim were known as Bitzuistists [doers] technocrats. They had no patience 
for the abstract ideological hair splitting of the older generation. They emphasised 
scientific development and technological expertise. In the 1950s they sharply criticised 
the socialist pioneering ethos symbolised by the Histadrut for its inefficiency and argued 
that the state should be the vanguard of pioneering. In the early 1970s, the Young Guard 
within Labour, which included Yossi Beilin and Chaim Ramon, proposed a move away 
from statist socialism to ‘market socialism.’ In line with changes across the progressive 
stream of politics in the West, they placed increased emphasis on society while de­
emphasising the collective, the state and social control. At the same time another group 
emerged out from Labour touting a more liberal politics; the Citizens Rights Movement
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(CRM). It sought to promote individual rights, feminism, the separation of religion and 
state and a more dovish foreign policy. At the end of the 1980s, a post-Marxist Mapam 
joined with Shinui and the CRM to form Meretz, a progressive party based around a 
dovish approach to the peace process. More importantly the ideas and policies proffered 
by these parties began to seep their way into the mainstream Labour Party. Since 1989, 
Yossi Beilin and Chaim Ramon have called for an alliance between Meretz and Labour. 
The party was to be based on a belief in peace, civil rights, increasing the well being of 
individual citizens, bridging the social gap and decreasing the size of the government 
bureaucracy (YA 11/10/89: 19).
There were two versions of this progressive Zionism. The first version advocated by 
Yossi Beilin, takes a national-liberal view. It values Zionism as a particular manifestation 
of a universal human right to form of collective identity. National self-determination and 
national identity are not only a human right but also a human necessity, not something to 
be transcended." Although nationalism has been a potent destructive force in the world 
and in Israel, it is not seen as rotten to the core because it serves to give a sense of 
belonging, meaning and continuity in individual lives that is vital to the existence of any 
society. As such, national identity helps to combat individual anomie and provide the link 
between individual egoism and the ability to sacrifice for the collective good (Beilin 
1997: 226-30). However, for liberals, if Zionism is to remain worthy of support it must be 
an authentic expression of an individual’s identity and social preferences. In this vein, the 
continuing existence of the Jewish people is a value not for collective, mystical, objective 
historical or religious reasons, but because individual Jews feel it is an important part of 
their self-definition. Jewish continuity is a value because through it the individual Jew can 
sense their own individual continuity (Beilin 1997: 253). As a consequence of this 
valuing of national identity, they argue that Israel should retain its Jewish identity12, while 
guaranteeing the rights of minorities, thereby opposing the post-Zionist call for Israel to
11 According to Beilin the expansion o f  the state system to include many new states in Eastern Europe 
including the new republics o f  the former Yugoslavia, demonstrated the continued power o f  the nation-state 
as the organising unit o f  international relations (Beilin 1997: 26-7).
12 Although Beilin advocates a separation between religion and state, he seeks to promote the existence o f  a 
majority Jewish culture in Israel through the strengthening o f  the teaching o f  Jewish tradition among 
secular Israelis (Beilin 1997: 254, 303).
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become “a state purely of its citizens”13 Finally progressivism retains a historic universal 
mission, expressing its Zionist, Jewish and universal values by seeking to play a role in 
international mediation and the promotion of liberal causes in the way that other states 
such as Norway and Denmark have (Beilin 1997: 226-30).
The second version of progressive Zionism prevalent in this period is the European neo- 
functionalist approach of Shimon Peres, which emphasises technological and socio­
economic instrumental values, as opposed to Beilin’s concern with psychological issues 
of identity, culture and recognition. Peres’ conviction, fully shared by Ben Gurion in the 
days of their association, was that the nation's future depended upon skilled manpower 
and the imaginative exploitation of technology, upon the ‘scientification of Israel’. In 
1984, Peres told the Knesset that he aimed at bringing Israel "into the forefront of the 
advanced nations in the skills of science, technology, education, industry, agriculture, and 
tourism" (Keren 1995: 7). Indeed, from his early days as Director-General of the Ministry 
of Defence, Peres took a strong interest in technological development based on the 
mobilisation of professional knowledge as a means to overcome the external and internal 
forces opposing a danger to Israel. In particular through his involvement in helping to 
create Israel Aircraft Industries.
Like Herzl, Peres has a profound faith in science, technology and progress, arguing that 
they will carry the enlightenment to success. Whereas the enlightenment’s failure in the 
nineteenth century led Herzl and many Jews to Zionism, Peres predicts that its success 
this time will lead to the end of the Zionist era. As he put it, “Universalism is succeeding 
nationalism... Today, science has no national identity, technology no homeland, 
information no passport. ...National cultures and heritage must compete for man's 
attention with the mind-absorbing advances of universal science.” (Peres 1995: 356).
13 Post-Zionism views the Jewish people and the Israeli people as two distinct notions. The Jewish people 
are understood as a religious community which was born and flourished in the Diaspora, while the 
Israeli/ancient Israelite nation is understood to be and have been a multi-cultural grouping defined 
territorially, according to those living under Israeli/Israelite jurisdiction in the land o f  Israel. According to 
post-Zionist theory, Zionism arose under the specific circumstances o f  Eastern European Jewry at the end 
o f the 19th century. Zionism was not about normalising the Jewish condition but about transforming it to a 
new Hebrew/Israeli nation (Evron, B. 1995). On a normative level, post-Zionism sees Zionism as having 
been legitimate and necessary to solve the Jewish problem in Europe. However, now that anti-Semitism no 
longer threatens Diaspora Jewry’s survival, it argues that the state o f  Israel should become purely the state 
of its citizens, on the US model.
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According to Peres the “Seventeenth Century concept of sovereignty is disappearing
because economy does not know sovereignty” (Peres 1995a). He argues that self reliance
cannot supply Israel's vital needs and that the “ultimate goal is the creation of a regional
community of nations, with a common market and elected centralised bodies, modelled
on the European community” (Peres 1993: 62). Thus:
“The social group has expanded, and today our health, welfare, and 
freedom can be insured only within a wider framework, on a regional or 
even an ultra regional basis. One day our self-awareness and personal 
identity will be based on this new reality, and we will find  that we have 
stepped outside the National arena. Western Europe is already showing 
signs of this... In the Middle East... people are not yet ready to accept an 
ultra national identity. (Peres 1993: 81, 98)
This progressive vision does not accept the divorce between Israel and the Jewish people 
or seek to curtail the right of any Jew to immigrate to Israel. It seeks to protect the Jewish 
majority in the state and hence its Jewish/Zionist character, nonetheless, it aspires to post- 
Zionism in at least one sense. For a key element in post-Zionist thinking is that the era of 
the nation-state is over. As Evron explains, “The absolutely sovereign nation state, a 
phenomenon of the post-renaissance era, has outlasted its usefulness and is slowly being 
phased out from the advanced areas of the world. A revision to separatist nationalism in 
the age of the new expenses technologies, the multinational corporations, and the new 
capital structures is inconceivable (Evron 1995: 92).” Shimon Peres, especially in his 
book The New Middle East, but also earlier (Peres and Eshed 258), exemplifies this 
approach.
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Chapter 3: Political Culture into Foreign Policy, the nexus:
Israeli attitudes to the Palestinian Question and the United States
Hawks and doves are divided over much more than boundaries and 
territories. They disagree about the very purpose and character o f a 
Jewish state... the philosophical significance o f Jewish history. Whereas 
the hawks are convinced that the Jews are liable to some mysterious 
primeval curse, the doves maintain that there is no such mystical verdict 
and that there is a correlation between Israel's actions and the Arab and 
world response. Amos Oz (1994: 5)
This chapter examines the connection between each sub-culture, its beliefs and values 
presented in the previous chapter, and their respective attitudes and approach towards the 
Palestinian question and relations with the United States.
Introduction
In the early years of Zionism there was a general blindness to the existence of a 
Palestinian question. Most of the early Zionist pioneers put Arab opposition to Zionism 
down to either violent gangs of criminals or the class based opposition of the Arab land 
owners. However, after a series of major Arab riots against Jewish immigration 
particularly in 1929 and 1936, the Yishuv as a whole came to recognise the existence of 
nationalist based opposition to Zionism among the Arabs of Palestine (Gomy 1987). 
Subsequently, the Yishuv armed itself and the majority led by the Labour movement 
accepted the partition of Palestine between an Arab and a Jewish state as a solution to the 
problem, while a minority led by the Revisionists opposed partition. In the event the Arab 
states and Palestinian leaders rejected the 1947 UN partition plan, as a result of which the 
1948 War of Independence was fought. The war resulted in a more generous partition for 
Israel than that envisaged by the UN and the partition was between Israel and Jordan 
rather than between Israel and the Palestinians. Between 1948-67 the Palestinian 
movement was subsumed within Arab nationalism and was under the control of the Arab 
states. For Israel, the Palestinian question had become a question of the fedayeen, 
Palestinian refugees who carried out attacks on Israeli border settlements.
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In 1967 when Israel captured the rest of mandatory Palestine- 'the territories', in the Six 
Day War, the Palestinian question was again transformed. From the Israeli point of view 
the question became whether to agree to pursue peace in exchange for partition or whether 
to carry out the more maximalist version of Zionism. A related question for those who 
sought some form of compromise was the identity of any future negotiating partner. From 
1948 until 1974 both Israel and the international community looked to Jordan to fulfill 
this role. As far as Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was concerned the Palestinians did 
not exist (Sunday Times June 15 1969) and the majority of Israelis concurred. However, 
after the Arab League summit in 1974 recognised the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate 
representative’ of the Palestinian people, the question arose as to who to turn to for 
negotiations: Jordan, the PLO or the Palestinian Arabs of the territories. In any case, from 
1967 onwards the Palestinian question gradually assumed greater prominence in Israeli 
politics. Following the peace with Egypt and the withdrawal from Sinai completed in 
1982, it moved to the top of the foreign policy agenda.
Zionism had always looked to at least one great power to help it secure its primary 
objectives. After the Second World War the United States replaced Britain in this role and 
Zionist lobbying of Congress and President Truman was crucial in obtaining American 
and hence United Nations backing for the creation of the state of Israel. Following 
independence, Israel looked to the United States as a potential ally. However, the United 
States refused to supply Israel with weapons until the 1960s and it was not until the 
Jordan crisis in 1970 that the strategic relationship that Israel had sought, began to reach 
fruition. At the same time American political support was becoming increasingly 
indispensable to balance Soviet backing of the Arab states. During the War of Attrition 
Israel not only needed US military supplies to match the Soviet resupply of the Arab 
states but also sought a US deterrent against direct attack from the USSR. The US became 
Israel's only major arms supplier. After the 1973 War, Israel's military budget soared and 
it became increasingly dependent on US aid to pay for these weapons. In addition, in the 
wake of the Arab oil embargo, Israel became increasingly isolated and thus diplomatically 
reliant on the US. Subsequently, the United States took the leading role in mediating the 
ceasefire agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria. Under Carter, the United States 
expanded its mediating role and succeeded in brokering peace between Israel and Egypt.
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As a result of both sets of negotiations American aid to Israel rose to approximately $3 
billion a year. This level of aid has been maintained since then. The United States also 
became involved in the Palestinian question. In 1975 in a secret annex to the Sinai II 
agreement, the Israelis managed to secure Kissinger's assent that the United States would 
not negotiate with the PLO unless it recognised Israel's right to exist and renounced 
terrorism. In the 1979 Camp David agreements, Carter succeeded in getting Menachem 
Begin to agree to a five year interim period of autonomy for the Palestinians in the 
territories [Judea, Samaria and Gaza], the terms of which were to be negotiated and then 
followed by final status negotiations.
By 1981, Israel’s relations with the United States and the Palestinian question had 
become entwined at the top of its foreign policy agenda. The question was how to deal 
with this issue. Most Israelis agreed that all of the territory captured in 1967 formed part 
of the land of Israel to which the Jewish people have a historical right. But the question 
remained as to whether the territories represented an absolute core value, an instrumental 
strategic value or just a bargaining chip for peace? Related to this question were others: 
did the Palestinians also have a claim to the Land and if so, was it equally valid? 
Similarly, virtually all Israelis agreed that Israel benefited from the support of the United 
States. The question was in what form should Israel seek to elicit American support? How 
reliant should it allow itself to become and at what price? These questions were answered 
in different ways by the different sub-cultures identified in the last chapter. All of these 
sub-cultures produced elite groups that were heavily involved in the formation of Israeli 
policy 1981-96. Below, each of their approaches to relations with the United States and 
the Palestinian Question are explored.
The Conservatives, the Palestinian Question and the US 
The Conservative Decision Makers
The leading figure among this grouping was Moshe Arens. Arens had a life long 
association with Revisionist Zionism beginning with his links to Betar. He was Israeli 
Ambassador to Washington 1981-3, Minister of Defence 1983-4, 1990-92. During the
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national unity government (NUG) 1984-90, he was a key player in foreign policy, 
especially as Foreign Minister 1988-90. Most1 of the younger conservatives in the Likud, 
such as Dan Meridor, Salai Meridor, Binyamin ‘Bibi’ Netanyahu and Roni Milo were 
known as ‘the princes’ as their parents were members of the 'fighting family' of 
Revisionist Zionism. Although they were not of crucial importance in determining policy 
between 1984-92 they did play a role both as advisors and go-betweens for Shamir and as 
the public face of Likud foreign policy in America. After 1988, Dan Meridor, previously 
Cabinet secretary to Begin, and Ehud Olmert were quite close to Shamir and were 
important figures in the mechanics of the US-Israeli relationship regarding the peace 
process; while Salai Meridor and Netanyahu were in the Foreign Ministry and more 
associated with Moshe Arens.
Zalman Shoval was a Likud MK who was important as Ambassador to the US 1990-92, 
while Eli Rubinstein was Cabinet Secretary 1985-1992 and chief Israeli negotiator with 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at Madrid 1991-93. Neither of this two figures had any 
independent power base, although both were crucial components in Israel's relationship 
with the United States regarding the Palestinian question during this period. Both Shoval 
and Rubinstein were former associates of Moshe Dayan. David Levy was an important 
member of the Cabinet ffom 1981-92 and as Foreign Minister 1990-92. He was an active 
participant in the relationship with the US over the Palestinian Question though he was 
always on the outside of the major decision-making groups. He became a member of the 
Likud, not because of any strong ideological commitment to Revisionist Zionist ideology, 
but primarily as a reaction against the way the Labour party treated Sephardim and 
Oriental Jews.
The Palestinian Question
Jabotinsky was one of the first to recognise the reality of a specifically Palestinian Arab 
nationalism (Brenner: 74). He argued that, "They [the Arabs] look upon Palestine with the 
same instinctive love and true fervour that any Aztec looked upon Mexico, or any Sioux
1 One ‘Prince’ Zev ‘Benny’ Begin was closer to the neo-Revisionism o f  his father, while Ehud Olmert who 
was not formally a ‘Prince’ nonetheless belongs to this conservative grouping.
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looked upon his prairie". Therefore Jabotinsky argued that even if  the Zionists were able 
to convince the Arabs of Baghdad and Mecca that Palestine was a territory of marginal 
significance, "Palestine will still remain for the Palestinians not a backwater, but their 
birthplace, the centre and basis of their own national existence" (Peleg: 8). Consequently, 
he accepted that the land of Israel would always be the home of two nations (Evron: 148). 
Dayan too recognised the existence of a Palestinian people (Bar Zohar: 208) and used to 
talk openly to Palestinian-Arab nationalists including the Fatah people, much to the 
aggravation of the Israeli public.
Nonetheless, the Palestinian Arabs were to have no national, the state was to be purely an 
expression of Hebrew sovereignty. Indeed this was the underlying message within 
Jabotinsky comparison of Palestinian national sentiment and the national sentiment of the 
Aztecs and the Sioux. The point was that the mere existence of ethno-nationalist 
sentiment was not a sufficient moral reason for the creation of another nation state. After 
all neither the Aztecs, the Sioux or for that matter the Basques in Spain had their own 
state. The Jews on the other hand, had an excellent case for sovereignty. Not only did 
they possess an ancient national identity but they were also part of the a higher Western 
culture that did not incorporate the above mentioned ethnic groups. Moreover, given the 
objectively desperate situation of European Jewry before 1948 and the profusion of Arab 
states, Jabotinsky viewed the Jewish claim to the land of Israel as objectively superior to 
that of the Palestinian Arabs. Contemporary conservatives continue to understand Israel 
in the same manner. Thus, Dan Meridor asserted that, in essence, the Jews had a superior 
right to the land than the Palestinians, whose right derived purely from their residency in 
the land (Frankel 248). For conservatives, Israel is primarily the expression o f Jewish 
nationalism, the state of all the Jewish people, a state which remains of crucial 
significance to Jewish survival worldwide (Simon: 129).
However the conservatives sought to reconcile these convictions with their belief in 
liberal-democracy, this was to be achieved through the idea of autonomy. Jabotinsky 
made a distinction between national self-determination and sovereign nationality (Shavit: 
258). The national minority would have a right to regional self-rule in religious and 
cultural matters, as well as the right to unite on a country-wide basis to safeguard its
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rights and organise its education, the provision of health services, employment and 
internal taxation. The Arabs in a Hebrew state would also be granted full civil rights. The 
state would have two national parliaments and a rotation of the Prime Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister between Jewish and Arab representatives (Sofer: 131-4). 
Nonetheless, Jabotinsky thought that the constitution would be in effect Jewish, "for the 
entire spirit of the constitution directing the lives of the citizens, with the exception of the 
narrow framework of schools, religion, family and philanthropy, the entire social regime 
of the state, their kind of social struggle that is fought with in it... All of these, as well as 
the very rhythm of life, will bear the fundamental imprint of the independent Jewish 
society" (Shavit: 260)2.
After 1967, the then Chief-of-Staff Moshe Dayan essentially adopted a similar approach, 
which allowed for maximum co-existence and freedom within a conflict situation. The 
Palestinians from the West Bank were allowed to run their own affairs and maintain 
connections with the Arab world while Israel maintained control over security. After 1977 
the Likud officially adopted the general idea of autonomy as a basis for the solution of the 
Palestinian question. The Arab population of the territories were supposed to be given the 
option of becoming Israeli citizens or retaining their Jordanian citizenship and staying in 
the territories (Simon: 100, 106). Dayan opposed annexation of the West Bank, looking 
instead to a ‘functional compromise’ in which Jordan was to be Israel's partner. Following 
the Camp David Accords, the Likud effectively accepted Dayan’s position. At the time, it 
represented the best means available, given the balance of power, to reconcile the 
maintenance of a Jewish state, liberal-democracy and the value of the whole land of 
Israel.
Opposition to partition had formed one of the main pillars of the conservative approach to 
the Palestinian Question and hence the conservatives were opposed to territorial 
concessions by Israel in the territories after 1967. But, like Jabotinsky, they based their
2 Jabotinsky completely opposed the idea o f  expelling the Arab population, although he did not oppose 
voluntary transfer. One o f the reasons he advocated a Jewish state on both banks o f  the Jordan was so that 
there would be room to incorporate the Jews o f  Europe without having to displace the Arabs in western 
Palestine (Shavit: 262). As to the question o f  how Jewish supremacy was to be maintained in this relatively 
open and liberal political system Jabotinsky posited that Jewish immigration would solve the problem by
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opposition not simply on Jewish historical rights but to a great extent on statist security 
considerations which flowed from a Realist reading of international relations (Simon: 
101-06; Netanyahu 1993: 154-60; Shapiro 1991: 138). Consequently, after the Intifada, 
the Gulf War and the end of the cold war, when the state of the demographic balance and 
the balance of power demanded it, the conservatives were reluctantly prepared to move 
beyond the traditional model of autonomy as an interim solution (Arens 1995: 278). For 
Arens, “the borders of the League of Nations mandate over Palestine...were not 
sacrosanct” (Arens 1995: 210). Both Arens and Milo favoured a unilateral Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza (Arens 1995: 209, 268; Avnery 1993:11). In fact, Dayan had 
already contemplated an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza during the Camp David 
negotiations. Such proposals were a clear indication that the existential value of the whole 
land of Israel was not of singular primary importance to them. Indeed, to the 
conservatives, the existence of 'red lines' on security matters was more important than 
exactly who or what replaced Israel in the West Bank (Arens interview). Nonetheless, 
they still wanted to maintain control over as much of the land as possible. Hence, they 
continued to advocate settlements, albeit limited to blocks away from dense 
concentrations of Arab population (Arens interview). Again, this represented the best way 
to reconcile the maintenance of a Jewish state, liberal-democracy and the value of the 
whole land of Israel. Ultimately, the conservatives also envisaged Jordan as being part of 
the solution, particularly in Jerusalem (Gold 1995). There would be some sort of Israel- 
Jordanian-Palestinian condominium in the West Bank, involving partial territorial 
concessions, rather than a fully fledged Palestinian state (Arens 1989; Dan Meridor 1991; 
Salai Meridor interview; WJW 19 November 1991, 30 January 1992:9).
The Palestinian Question, instrumental values and strategy
From the earliest times, unlike most of the early Zionists, Jabotinsky did not expect the 
Arabs to welcome Zionism as the bearers of modernity and civilisation. “There is no 
precedent in history”, he observed, “for a native population accepting a colonial project 
by foreigners" (Peleg: 8). Given this fact, Jabotinsky advocated an ‘Iron Wall'. Zionism
creating a permanent Jewish majority (Rael Isaac 1981: 11). The difference between Herut after 1948 and 
Jabotinsky was that the former sought to integrate the Arabs into Israel.
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had to be resolute until the Arabs recognised the reality of a Jewish state. This would only 
occur when the Arabs accepted they were unable to destroy Israel. Military deterrence 
was the mechanism by which Jabotinsky sought to achieve this goal. Dayan applied 
Jabotinsky’s analysis to the post 1967 situation. He expected that his generation and some 
others to come were destined to live without peace and that therefore if Israel wanted to 
continue to exist, it would have to do so in contradiction to the Arab will (Bar On 1996: 
40) His followers continued to adhere to the old Labour concept from the early years of 
the state ein brairah [No Choice] which dictated an ‘Iron Wall’ strategy based on military 
deterrence.
However, the peace with Egypt moderated this approach. A pure ‘Iron Wall’ was relevant 
to a Hobbesian state of nature, however, conservatism posited that once the strategy 
succeeded, Israel would find ‘its place among the nations’ and no longer be a people that 
dwelt alone. Arens explained that such a situation had began to be brought about through 
the peace with Egypt. In such an environment limited concessions were legitimate and 
even necessary(Arens 1995: 223). Subsequently, Arens supported the Israeli withdrawal 
from the disputed enclave of Taba (Arens 1995: 234). Nonetheless, in the absence of a 
deeper acceptance of Israel by the Arab world, Arens and the conservatives continued to 
see the Arab-Israeli conflict primarily through the prism of the Iron Wall, (Simon: 4; 
Netanyahu). But, building on their underlying perception that the world and the Arabs 
were not endemically hostile to Zionism and Jews, and influenced by the optimistic 
Republican ethos in the US, they argued that while the Iron Wall would bring a balance of 
power peace, true peace would come about through the Westernisation and 
democratisation of the Arab world (Simon 152; Netanyahu). In the absence of this 
genuine peace and given the gap between the maximum concessions they were prepared 
to envisage and the minimal concessions that the Palestinians were prepared to accept on 
final status issues, the conservatives envisaged only the possibility of coming to an 
interim agreement with the Palestinians (Olmert, Arens interviews).
The role o f  relations with the United States
Like Jabotinsky, the conservatives felt a part of the West. Some looked to Western 
Europe as a political model, where the state is more closely linked with a particular
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dominant culture (Meridor interviews) but many of them looked to the US as a political 
model (Arens interview; JR. 14 February 1991: 10; 27 July 1991: 16; Netanyahu: 121). 
However, such thinking was only a minor consideration in their conception of the 
American role in Israeli foreign policy.
Given Zionist weakness before 1948, the role of Britain, the great power, in Jabotinsky’s 
strategy was to help bolster Zionism in the face of Arab opposition, a crucial component 
to the Iron Wall. Due to Israel’s increased reliance on the US after 1973, the Israeli 
conservatives saw the US in the same light. They understood Israel as being besieged by 
undemocratic, totalitarian, intolerant regimes (Arens 34), but the idea that this was due to 
endemic anti-Semitism particular to the Jews was rejected. As Netanyahu wrote, “Israel 
must resist the... immature conception of the Israeli right that nothing we will say or do 
will make a difference to an implacably hostile world” (Netanyahu: 395). The Arab- 
Israeli conflict had to be viewed in balance of power terms (Dore Gold interview). Israel 
had to act in the international arena as any normal state (Arens, Dan Meridor interviews). 
Central to this concept was a belief in the need to use military force to maintain Israel's 
deterrence capability. In this spirit, they attached great importance to the advances in US- 
Israeli strategic co-operation that happened in the 1980s. As Arens asserted, " the first 
objective of Israel's defence policy is to attain the kind of posture that will deter 
aggression. There is little question that the US-Israeli relationship is a very important part 
of that posture... It is important that a country such as Syria... see strategic co-operation 
between the United States and Israel. They will then see clearly the consequences, both 
from Israel and her allies, of planning an attack on Israel" (Simon: 152).
In the conservative mind, America and Israel could co-operate as equal allies based on the 
common components in their national interest which consisted of opposition to the Soviet 
Union and its radical Arab allies in the Middle East. They were reluctant to recognise the 
reality of the lopsided nature of the relationship, as it infringed on their self image and the 
core values of hadar and self-reliance. As a consequence of these values, conservatism 
was more inclined than mamlachtiut to favour the use of military power for purposes of 
deterrence, in instances when there was likely to be a political price in terms of relations 
with the US. For example, once the Gulf war was drawing to a close and it was clear that
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Israeli involvement would not have detrimental affects on the American led war against 
Iraq, Arens favoured a retaliatory strike against Iraq irrespective of America’s opposing 
wishes (Arens 205-10). Similarly, the conservative preference for ‘self reliance’ and the 
Revisionist value of hadar expressed through the symbols of Israeli power, was evident in 
their unflinching support for the Lavi fighter project, a project Yitzhak Rabin and the 
mamlachti ’im [statists] opposed, for pragmatic reasons (Zackheim).
With regard to the American role in the peace process, the conservatives argued that the 
United States as Israel’s ally, should back the Israeli position whatever. Nonetheless, 
when this did not happen, they were not quick to abandon the US and endanger relations 
with Israel's strongest ally by adopting an unfettered policy of ‘self reliance’ based on 
retaliation, as the radicals wanted. Israel deterrence posture was greatly strengthened by 
its association with the United States and this had to be taken into account. They 
recognised that the policy positions of the United States were of great significance in the 
peace process and that Israel could not simply ignore the United States and act 
unilaterally. Self reliance had to be tempered by the instrumental values of realism. Thus, 
after the announcement of the Reagan plan in 1982, which was a clear indication of US 
opposition to the Likud agenda on the Palestinian question, Arens suggested to Begin that 
Israel should at least agree to a 3 month settlement freeze in order to sustain Israel’s 
credibility in Washington; a suggestion Begin and the radicals utterly rejected (Blitzer 
58).
Given the conservative’s recognition that the US opposed their conception of an 
acceptable compromise in the territories, they tended to want to minimise the role of the 
Americans on the Palestinian track of the peace process to that of facilitator only (Dan 
Meridor 1991). Moreover, following Jabotinsky’s line of thought, they were quick to 
exploit the instrumental value of public opinion in a liberal-democracy to their cause. 
They promoted Israel as a sister democracy sharing a biblical and democratic heritage, 
one that was fighting the same enemies as the US (Dan Meridor interview; Shindler 
1995: 215-224). Like Jabotinsky before them, they were effectively arguing for Israel as a 
cultural and strategic outpost of the West. As Netanyahu explained, "we tried to put the 
(Israeli) relationship with America into a larger context... i.e. the threat of the Soviet
61
Union or radical Soviet regimes in the Middle East. When we did this the West Bank and 
Gaza took on a much smaller perspective" (Friedman 1990: 485).
Radicalism, the United States and the Palestinian Question 
The Radical Decision Makers
The most important radicals members of the policy making elite were Menachem Begin, 
Yitzhak Shamir, Ariel Sharon, Raful Eitan and Yossi Ben Aharon. Begin was the leader 
of the Revisionist youth movement Be tar in Poland during the 1930s, the head of the 
Irgun and Likud Prime Minister 1977-83. Shamir’s formative years were spent in Lechi 
He became Likud Foreign Minister in 1981 and was Prime Minister 1983-4, 1986-92. 
Sharon was brought up in a household sympathetic to Revisionist ideas but was not an 
original member of Herut. He is closest to the Labour activist tradition with Zionism. He 
was Minister of Defence 1981-3 and Minister of Housing 1990-92. Raful Eitan was also a 
Labour activist and was head of the far right party; Tzomet. He was Chief-of-Staff during 
the Lebanon War. Yossi Ben Aharon was a top aide to Shamir. From 1986 onwards he 
was Head of the Prime Minister’s office and was heavily involved in the direction and 
execution of policy relating to the peace process between 1989-92. As a religious 
nationalist, Ben Aharon believed firmly in the 'whole land of Israel1 as a central existential 
value. He viewed the Arabs as essentially fanatical and treacherous. Indeed, his view of 
Israel fitted closely the paradigm: 'Israel are a people that dwelt alone' (Frankel: 126; JR 
20 December 1990: 8-15).
For all the radicals, the concept of Zionist normalisation and the idea that it had been 
achieved in 1948 with the foundation of the state of Israel, was anathema. The Zionist 
mission was an ongoing mission to ingather all the Jews to Israel and settle the whole 
land of Israel (Frankel: 39). As Shamir explained on his last day in office:
“We will not exist for long if we become just another country that is 
dedicated to the welfare of its residents... The Jewish state cannot exist 
without a unique ideological content.” (Frankel: 330)
In this vain both he and Sharon bemoaned the increased materialism and lack of idealism
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in Israeli society, which they argued was detrimental to the cause of Zionism which 
required self sacrifice and toughness (Shamir interview; Sharon: 531)
The Palestinian Question
To the radicals, the land of Israel was a core existential value. As Begin declared to a 
group of settlers in 1981,"I, Menachem, do solemnly swear that as long as I serve the 
nation as Prime Minister we will not leave any part of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza strip." 
(Sofer: 127). Similarly, Shamir’s commitment to the land of Israel was brought home by 
his refusal to countenance the conservatives call for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, on 
the grounds that it was part of the land of Israel (Arens 1995: 21, 209 294). However, 
neither Begin or Shamir were overly impressed by the strategic-instrumental value of 
territory captured by Israel in 1967. Thus, Begin felt able to return the whole of the Sinai 
peninsula to Egypt in return for peace, while Shamir hinted to Baker (Baker: 424) and 
stated explicitly to David Kimche (interview) that he would be prepared to withdraw from 
the Golan in exchange for a peace treaty with Syria.3 Nonetheless, radicals from the 
Labour activist tradition, while advocating the retention of the West Bank because it was 
the “core of historic land of Israel, the cradle of the Jewish people” (Sharon: 359), were 
primarily concerned with the security value of the territories based on their inherent 
endemic pessimism as to the chances of peace for the Jewish people. As Sharon 
explained, “I cannot see any political agreement that can put a stop to terror, therefore 
Israel must retain security control here (in Judea and Samaria). Everything starts from 
that” (Sharon: 551-2).
The absolute commitment to the retention of the core areas of the land of Israel captured 
in 1967 i.e. Judea, Samaria [West Bank] and Gaza, provides one of the key factors 
defining the radical approach to the Palestinian question. By adhering to territorial 
maximalism, the radical camp ruled out the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the 
Palestinian question based on territorial compromise. Their moral particularism 
emphasised the particular historical right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel over 
and above the universal juridical right. As a result, to them there were no occupied
3 See also Rabinovitch (1998: 63-4).
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territories, only liberated territory. The 1947 UN Partition Plan and the subsequent 
partition of Palestine in 1949 had no legitimacy in their eyes (Sofer 137). This contributed 
to the tendency on the radical right to refuse to accept the existence of an authentic 
Palestinian nationalism (Shavit: 266). Begin and Labour activists like Yisrael Galili were 
able to recognised the existence of Arab nationalism in general, but not the existence o f a 
specific Palestinian nationalism (Sofer 125; Bar On 1996: 39).4 For Begin and his 
followers, the Munich Myth helped to explain this situation. Just as Hitler used the 'right' 
of Sudet Germans to self-determination as a cover to hide his real intention of destroying 
Czechoslovakia, so the Arab world used the Palestinian question as a cover to hide their 
real intention to destroy Israel (Peleg: 58-9).
Moreover, to the radicals the conflict with the so called Palestinian national movement 
was not about land but about the struggle for existence (Shamir: 182; Shavit 248). To 
them, a genuine peace was an impossibility because, in Shamir’s immortal words, “the 
Arabs are the Arabs, the Jews are the Jews, and the sea is the sea.” (Bar Zohar: 125). 
Because they saw Israel as the key to Jewish survival in the shadow of the Holocaust, 
they presented the PLO as a modern day SS and the Palestinian National Covenant as an 
up to date version of Mein Kampf. "Since the days of the Nazis," asserted Begin, "there 
has not arisen a organisation as barbaric and anti-human as the PLO" (Sofer: 131).
Nonetheless, at least formally, the radicals within the Likud were committed to autonomy 
for the ‘Arab residents’ of the territories. Begin accepted that individual Arabs in the 
territories had civil rights. However, his view of autonomy was far more limited than 
Jabotinsky’s. It applied only to autonomy for people and ruled out Arab control over land. 
Sharon’s autonomy plan further constrained self-rule by limiting Arab control to detached 
cantons which covered less than half the area of the West Bank (Sharon: 259). Moreover, 
in practise, Begin hardly showed enthusiasm for implementing autonomy. He was not 
concerned when talks over autonomy with Egypt broke down, while Shamir abstained in 
the Knesset vote over Camp David. For some among the radicals the solution was not 
autonomy but the ‘voluntary transfer’ of the Palestinians from the territories, an idea
4 Sharon acknowledged the separate national identity o f  the Palestinians on both banks o f  the Jordan river 
(FBIS 9 April 1976). Indeed, on occasion Begin expressed anger at both Shamir and Sharon for admitting
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favoured by the radical Revisionists from the late 1930s onward (Shavit: 267). In the 
1980s and 1990s, the transfer solution was primarily associated with Rehavam Zeevi and 
Meir Kahane though it was popular among all sections of the radical right. Michael 
Dekel, a Likud MK and a confidant of Shamir, made a declaration in favour of the idea, 
as did Yuval Neeman the head of Techiya and the NRP’s Yosef Shapira (Sprinsak 175; 
Shindler 1989: 53-55). Their fundamental disbelief in the possibility of peace coupled 
with moral particularism permitted the radicals to ignore the common rules of the 
international system5.
Two Radical Approaches to Policy
Within the radical camp there were essentially two approaches as to how to deal with the 
Palestinian Question and for that matter, the relationship with the US. The first approach 
represented by Begin, Sharon, Yossi Ben Aharon and Raful Eitan within the policy 
making elite was radical in both the style and substance of its policy. The parties of the 
radical right also supported this approach, usually with greater fervour and consistency 
than the policy makers themselves. The second approach identified with Yitzhak Shamir 
was radical in substance but pragmatic in style.
The Radicalism of Style and Substance
This approach sought to incorporate the whole land of Israel to the state of Israel: the 
radicalism of substance. It also sought to achieve that aim through the mechanisms it 
valued for existential reasons such as hadar, self-reliance, the military offensive and 
settlement activity throughout the whole land of Israel: the radicalism of style.
the existence o f  the Palestinian people (Sofer: 30).
5 Instead some radicals looked to justification in what they understood as Judaism’s own system o f  
morality. Yisrael Eldad, radical Revisionist and Techiya member, looked to the Bible as a guide for 
nationalist and militant values and rejected any moral scruples in the conquest o f  the land, which he saw as 
a moral be mandated by the Bible. Since an opponent existed that interfered with the fulfilment o f  the 
divine command, the Arab population o f  Israel, this opponent had to be viewed as an enemy which would 
have to be dealt with as the Canaanites o f  old by Joshua, meaning that they would have to be either 
subjugated or eliminated (Shavit: 157-8). Most figures in Gush Emunim saw Arab rights in terms o f  the 
Halachic [Jewish religious legal] concept o f  Ger Toshav, which allowed for civil, but not political, rights. 
Others like former Chief Rabbi Goren argued that the Arabs did not even have these rights (Sprinsak: 122).
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Radical Revisionism split with conservative Revisionism in 1938 over the use of force as 
an instrumental value. While Jabotinsky advocated Zionism backed by force encapsulated 
in the Be tar slogan “I will lift my sword only in defence”, Begin advocated military 
Zionism and proposed adding to the slogan the phrase Mof my people and the conquest of 
my homeland” (Shapiro: 58). The radicals’ idealism, their belief in the power of the 
collective will, drove them to assert that military force could be used not just for survival 
purposes or deterrence but for Clausewitzian goals: Machtpolitik. Herut ideology justified 
the extensive use of military initiatives in order to redeem the whole land of Israel 
(Barzilai 1996: 30). Their ‘event mentality’ led them to believe that military activism was 
a key instrumental value relevant to foreign policy. Sharon shared this Revisionist 
romanticism regarding the use of military force as an instrumental value. One 
commentator referred to him as the 'Napoleon Bonaparte of Israel' (JR 9 May 1991: 10- 
13); a masterful military tactician, a 'realist' on the tactical level, but an idealistic on the 
strategic level.
Another reason for their preference for a ‘military’ solution to the Palestinian problem 
was the refusal to accept the legitimacy the Palestinian national movement’s political 
claim and the fear that the movement represented a ‘Nazi type threat’ to Jewish existence. 
As Sharon explained, “With the Lebanese nothing ever comes to an end... but with the 
Jews it can come to an end, a bitter end” (Friedman 1990: 128). Begin justified the Israeli 
bombardment of West Beirut by explaining, "If in World War Two Hitler had taken 
shelter in some apartment along with a score of innocent civilians, nobody would have 
had any complaints about destroying the apartment even if it had endangered the lives of 
the innocent as well (NYT 20 September 1982). The radicals were determined that the 
Jews should never again be the powerless passive victims going like lambs to the 
slaughter. By way of contrast, the daring frontal military assault of Sharon, as leader of 
Unit 101 that carried out retaliatory raids in response to fedayeen attacks, represented the 
approach of the ‘New Jew’.6
6 In 1971 Sharon demonstrated his belief that military force was the best method o f  dealing with terror 
attacks when between July and December 1971 his forces staked out the Gaza Strip killing 742 suspected  
terrorists and reducing terror raids from over 30 a month to 1 a month (Benziman).
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To Gush Emunim and Labour activism, settlement in the whole land of Israel, even in 
areas of high Palestinian population density, represented the classic existential and 
instrumental values of Zionism. To Labour activists like Sharon, settlement was 
“Zionism’s true banner"7 (FBIS 6 April 1976). While the Revisionists had always laid 
more emphasis on military activity and rhetoric, they came to appreciate very quickly 
after 1967 the value of the settlement plan formulated by Sharon and the Gush, which was 
designed to create 'facts on the ground1 that would rule out any possibility of a territorial 
compromise. The combination of military power and settlement represented the key 
instrumental values for radicalism, as Sharon explained, “In the precarious and violent 
world, Jewish existence can not be left to trust or paper agreements. Survival depends not 
on faith in someone else's goodwill, but on facts, actually building the land and defending 
it”(Sharon: 210).
The Role o f Relations with the United States
The radicals understood the global environment as particularly harsh for the Jewish
people, the result of endemic anti-Semitism, a defining feature of Israel’s existence as a
people that dwelt alone. “We”, Sharon declared, “the people of Israel, are a small and
isolated people against the entire world.” (Chomsky: 31). To Begin the Holocaust was the
most potent symbol of this reality, after all, "the good offices of the West had not been
used to save them [the Jews] from Hitler's ovens." (Rowland: 5). Indeed, for Begin and
the radicals, the Holocaust was explained precisely by an over reliance on outside powers
and an inability to act forcefully and independently. As he declared:
“Our scourge was the defencelessness of the Jewish people. And that 
defencelessness which became helplessness was the real provocation... A 
cruel man is a coward. If he sees no resistance... then he doesn't have any 
limits” (Rowland: 60).
Self reliance and military force were the only answer. Thus, explaining the bombing of 
the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, he declared, “there won't ever be another Holocaust in 
history again. Never again, never again!” (NYT 10 June 1981:1). As with the Holocaust 
symbol, so with the particularists central myth, Munich; the lesson was self-reliance. For
7 Sharon saw the ideal group o f  Israelis as the religious pioneers o f  Gush Emunim, fiercely patriotic, 
prepared to make material sacrifices for a vision and strongly nationalistic (Sharon: 534).
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Begin there was simply “no guarantee that can guarantee a guarantee!” (Sofer: 65). 
Begin's political maturity had been reached just after the Munich Conference in 1938 
when the radical Revisionists broke with Jabotinsky because of his continued preference 
for entente with Britain (Peleg: 18). In place of reliance on outside powers, they 
postulated military self-reliance, political independence, greater unilateralism in the realm 
of foreign policy, combined with a more defiant overall approach to the world.
Subsequently, these values characterised the radical approach to relations with the US.8 
The radicals were concerned that reliance on the US would damage the self image of 
Israelis as being capable of defending themselves and that in turn this would weaken 
Israel's deterrence posture vis-a-vis the Arabs (Sharon: 345). They feared the 
‘Vietnamisation of Israel’ and becoming an American "protectorate." (JR 7 August 1997: 
19). Such fears were evident after the US suspended the recently signed Memorandum of 
Strategic Understanding (MoU) in response to the radicals unilateral extension of Israeli 
law to the Golan in 1981. Then Begin’s response to this action had been to tell US 
Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, "We have no reason to get on our knees... Are we a 
vassal state, are we a banana republic?!" (Lewis 1988: 236). Similarly, Begin told the 
Knesset "the people of Israel have lived for 3700 years without a strategic memorandum 
with America and will continue to live without it for another 3700 years" (Melman and 
Raviv 1994: 209). Certainly, the radicals wanted Israel to retain American support, but 
not at the price of a free hand. Outside powers such as the US were always of secondary 
importance to Israel's ability to act directly with force. Maintaining good relations with 
the United States was not worth sacrificing for Israel's tactical room for manoeuvre on the 
battlefield, let alone its political objectives. So for example, during the 1970 Jordan crisis, 
Sharon had advocated using force to help the PLO overthrow King Hussein and set up a 
Palestinian state there, despite the fact that by aiding King Hussein who was an American 
ally, Israel greatly enhanced its own standing in the US (Sharon 246, 356-7).
What went for US-Israeli relations in general, went for US-Israeli relations over the 
Palestinian question too. For Begin, the myth of Munich was dominant in explaining the
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need to stand firm and act independently with regard to territorial concessions and 
pressure from even a' friendly' government as he opined in response to American 
Secretary of State Rogers, 1970 peace plan, "What is Munich?... There stand a cruel 
aggressor... Pretending to seek peace and threatening a war of attrition, a bloody war, if 
his wishes are not fulfilled. In the face of this aggressor, the friend of the small state and 
even its allies who are committed to its defence tell it: surrender, save peace, give up part 
of your territory” (Sofer: 123). Consequently, Begin did not try and co-ordinate positions 
with the US in the peace process. As he declared after meeting President Carter for the 
first time in 1978, “we acted in accordance with a new strategy... we did not try and reach 
agreement with the US on the critical issues of the peace negotiations” (Sofer: 121).
Despite a seeming willingness to go it alone, Begin and Sharon felt that they could retain 
American support and even equal status as an ally, and still maintain a free hand to act on 
issues of vital interest such as the Palestinian Question. The romanticism of the right 
suggested that Israel could, as an act of will, get what it wanted from United States 
through the forceful presentation of its case (Sofer: 130) or through the presentation of a 
military fait accompli. Intoxicated with the belief that he had the ‘truth in his back 
pocket9’, Begin was certain he could convince America of the rightness of their 
ideological cause. Accordingly, on coming to power Begin announced, “President Carter 
knows the Bible, that will make it easier for him to know whose land this is” (Sofer: 150). 
In addition, Begin argued, even in the early 1960s, that Israel could be a strategic asset to 
the US, if it demonstrated its power and usefulness. Although this was a widespread view 
across the Israeli establishment, the radicals’ idealism led them to overestimate the 
importance of Israel to the US and underestimate the importance of the US to Israel10. As 
Begin put it after the 1973 war, “citizens of America ask not what your country has done 
for Israel, asked what Israel has done for your country" (Sofer: 146). In return for services 
rendered to the US as an ally, the radicals assumed that the US would agree not to
8 Gush Emunim was also extremely opposed to the intervention o f  the United States in the peace process, 
both because the US favoured territorial compromise and because compromising with Washington was 
seen to detract from the spirit o f  the nation (Aviad 1991: 209).
9 Comment by Ezer Weizmann, Minister o f  Defence in Begin’s first government (Silver: 186).
10 For example, when Begin initially turned down an American offer o f  grants to compensate Israel for the 
loss o f  its airfields in Sinai. Instead he asks for loans, which he considered the more honourable 
independent course. However, once his advisors had explained to him the enormous cost o f  his suggestion  
Begin was forced to review his suggestion (Schoenbaum).
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interfere in Israel’s vital interests; which meant a free hand regarding the Palestinian 
Question.
Radicalism of Substance, Pragmatism of Style
For Shamir, peace was not the most important objective of policy, far more important was 
the fulfilment of the Zionism as he saw it, by ingathering all the Jews to Israel, the 
settlement of the whole land of Israel (interview) and its eventual incorporation into the 
state of Israel. Although Shamir greatly valued ideology he also greatly valued 
pragmatism and was critical of both Abraham Stem’s and Begin’s excessive concern with 
ideological rhetoric at the expense of coming to grips with applying their ideology as best 
as possible, given the circumstances (Shamir: 30). In this vein, he expressed admiration 
for Mao and Lenin as ruthlessly pragmatic ideologues (JP 7 April 1992). Unlike Begin 
and Jabotinsky, he lacked a belief in liberal values and was not as concerned as Begin was 
that things were done according to legal procedures (Shamir: 80). His only concern was 
whether the action served the ideological purpose(Shamir interview).
Shamir recognised the political utility of force. It was a necessity given the inability of the 
Jews to rely on anyone but themselves to survive; it was also part of the Zionist 
revolution, necessary in order to transform the historic weakness of the Jewish condition. 
Yet, he did not value the use of force to the extent that others on the right, such as Sharon, 
did. He did not believe that military might alone could decisively secure Israeli interests. 
Indeed, he was concerned to keep Sharon’s rather reckless maverick approach away from 
the Defence Ministry (Arens 24). He recognised that often the excessive use of force 
hindered advancement towards Likud goals. In this context, he was reportedly unhappy 
with the Lebanon War (Shindler 1995: 172; Dan Meridor interview). Shamir thought that 
the use of force had to be subjugated to political prudence, no matter how radical the 
objective. Consequently, in his eyes, while the heart of the Jewish underground which 
attacked Arab mayors in the mid 1980s, was in the right place, their actions did not serve 
their puipose. Shamir told them, "I love you with all my heart and I have expressed it, but 
I also know your mistakes. The history of the people of Israel is full of examples. The
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best people with the best intentions have sometimes harmed, out of miscalculation, their 
own ambitions” (International Herald Tribune 1 February 1985).
For Shamir the territorial status quo was favourable, so there was nothing to be gained in 
warfare, the use of force would not advance the overall ideological goal in concrete 
political terms. In Shamir's long-run scheme, a large immigration from the Soviet Union 
and eventually even from the West (Shamir interview) would enable Israel to obtain 
permanent control of the territories. However, Shamir thought that this objective would 
probably not be possible in his own life time. Consequently, his objective was merely to 
take advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves and at the very least, 
“hand over the banner to the next generation without a change in the situation” (HA 2 
February 1989: 33). On this basis he had opposed the Camp David Accords and was 
extremely reluctant about any concessions to the Palestinians including schemes put 
forward by loyalists who worked with him such as Dan Meridor and Ehud Olmert 
(interviews). The main thrust of the long-term strategy to incorporate the land of Israel 
into the state of Israel focused on settlement activity. For Shamir, unlike for the early 
Labour Zionists, settlement was not an existential value in its own right. Rather, as 
Michael Dekel. Shamir's advisor on settlements, explained, "Shamir's settlement policy 
was designed to prevent the possibility of territorial compromise by denying the 
Palestinians territorial contiguity and instead creating islands of autonomy as in the 
Sharon Plan" (JP 28 July 1992:1). Shamir’s diplomatic strategy towards the Palestinian 
question, was simply to protect the settlement programme and prevent any erosion in 
Israel's position which could undermine its control of the territories. Ultimately, what 
determined Shamir's diplomatic tactics was a calculation as to whether a particular move 
enhanced or reduced the possibility of success for the achievement of the Likud's overall 
objectives through the settlement strategy. One of the major factors for Shamir in this 
calculation was the attitude of the United States.
The Role o f  Relations with the United States
Shamir had no intrinsic admiration for the US. In his early years he expressed praise for 
the Soviet political system (Shindler 1995: 183). Later, Shamir came to appreciate
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Shultz's special concern for Israel and he was particularly touched by sincere efforts on 
behalf of Soviet Jewry. Indeed he even referred to the Americans as “the best goyim 
[Gentiles] in the world” (interview). But these acts were seen as exceptions. Shamir 
shared with the radical Revisionists a conception of the world as an inherently hostile 
place. Shamir himself referred to the American Secretary of State, James Baker as, “a new 
hangman for the Jewish people” (Arens 1995: 60) and remarked, “We have plenty of 
'friends' in the world who would like to see us dead, wounded, trampled, suppressed-and 
then it is possible to pity the wretched Jew. When Jews are killed in this country does the 
United Nations discuss it? It has never yet happened” (Friedman 1990: 449).
Shamir recognised that the United States supported Israel because of common strategic 
interests in the Middle East (JP 17 April 1992). Nonetheless, he gave the impression that 
he did not think that US-Israeli strategic agreements had much value vis-a-vis the ‘Soviet 
threat’ to Israel (Shamir interview). Far more meaningful, was the symbolic value of close 
bilateral ties afforded by the US-Israeli Strategic Memoranda in deterring the Arabs from 
attacking Israel. As he explained, “... Arab aggressive intentions towards Israel begin to 
surface as soon as they see cracks or breaches in the wall of friendship between Israel and 
the United States. If one can characterise the 1980s in the Middle East as years of a 
certain measure of moderation, at least as far as tactics are concerned, it is because this 
period was characterised by strong progress in the friendship and co-operation between 
the two countries. It is only natural, therefore, that the Arabs convince themselves that the 
United States is backing Israel, and the liquidation of Israel is an absurd notion” Shamir 
feared that, '...giving emphasis to any distancing between Israel and the United States 
almost automatically generates dangerous tension in the Middle East for Israel' (JP 5 May
1990). Consequently, Shamir was always cautious about opening a breach in US-Israeli 
relations.
This was not the only reason that Shamir was cautious about opening a breach in 
American-Israeli relations. Shamir recognised that the United States was the most pivotal 
international actor as regards the peace process. Like Begin, Shamir was concerned with 
maintaining Israel’s independence. In order to protect it, Shamir forbade discussion of 
tying the Shekel to the Dollar in 1983-4 (Schiff 1987/8: 7). But unlike Begin, Shamir
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accepted that the ultimate American position on the future of the territories did not 
conform to the particularist vision. For this reason Shamir always sought to minimise any 
American mediatory role in the peace process, especially regarding the Palestinian 
question. Ultimately, Shamir believed that Israel could maintain control of the territories 
without an open breach with the US because the balance of interest, both domestically 
and internationally, on that particular issue lay with Israel (Shamir interview). Therefore, 
he reasoned that so long as Israel did not cause too much commotion, it could quietly get 
on with the business of Jewish settlement (Frankel: 38-9).
In order to achieve this, it was necessary to try and keep the United States from actively 
opposing his long-term plan for the territories. It was important that Israel should not be 
seen as the cause for a breakdown in the peace process in American eyes (HA 11 October 
1989: 9). In that event, the Likud's public relations position: that Israel needed territory 
for security reasons, would be severely weakened. Subsequently, processes could be set in 
motion which could impair Israel's ability to hold on to the territories, by damaging the 
crucial domestic balance of interest in the US, between Israel’s supporters in Congress 
and the executive which was more resolute in its support for Tand for peace.’ 
Consequently, although Shamir had originally opposed the Camp David Accords, once 
they were adopted he accepted them pragmatically as the Likud negotiating stance. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, as far as Shamir was concerned, such a stance had the 
advantage of keeping Israel on reasonable terms with the United States, without 
threatening real concessions, as no Arab party appeared willing to negotiate on that basis.
Mamlachtiut. the Palestinian Question and the United States
Mamlachtiut implied a conception of a normal state that interacts like any state, 
promoting its survival over all other values and interests. As Ben Gurion proclaimed:
"There is nothing more important, more precious and more sacred than the 
security of the state." If all the great ideals of the world are placed on one 
side of the scale and Israel's security on the other, I would choose without 
any hesitation the security of Israel." (Liebman and Don Yehiya 1983: 86).
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As a result of this security emphasis there developed an elite group of army officers who 
attained high positions within the Labour Party especially regarding the formulation of 
foreign policy. Among these were: Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister 1974-7, 1992-5, 
Minister of Defence 1984-90. 1992-95, Ambassador to the US 1968-72, and Chief-of- 
Staff 1964-68, and his political allies within Labour, such as, Motta Gur another former 
Chief-of-Staff and deputy Defence Minister 1992-4, Brigadier-Generals ‘Fuad’ Ben- 
Eliezer and Efraim Sneh Minster of Health 1992-6, both of who had been military 
governor of the territories during the 1980s, Major-General Ori Orr and Ehud Barak, 
Chief-of-Staff 1991-4, Foreign Minister 1995-6 and leader of the Labour party 1996-. 
They were all products of Labour Zionism, mcimlachtiut and Israel’s professional military 
elite, disciplines of Ben Gurion and Yigal Allon. By far the most influential and important 
of these figures was Rabin, the first Israeli Prime Minister to be bom in the land of Israel. 
Rabin, following mamlachti doctrine, saw the primary purpose of the state of Israel was to 
normalise the position of the Jewish people by providing them peace and most 
importantly security in their own state. Indeed, Rabin became known in Israel as 'Mr 
Security'.
Partition and the Palestinians
Mamlachtiut was differentiated from particularism by its consistent acceptance of the 
partition of the land of Israel as part of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ben 
Gurion recognised a spiritual-ideological element to Zionism which valued the whole 
land of Israel, but this was only minor consideration in the formation of foreign policy. 
Rather, mamlachtiut accepted partition for two main reasons:
1) The threat to the core value of mamlachtiut, the maintenance of a democratic state 
with a Jewish majority, posed by the incorporation of the Palestinian population of the 
territories into the state of Israel. This was the reason Ben Gurion gave for not taking 
the opportunity to conquer the West Bank during the War of Independence (Bar 
Zohar: 18-21).
2) The constraints of the balance of power, as understood primarily in terms of the
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military and political power of states. Thus, in 1958, when Israel assisted in helping 
prevent a Nasserite take-over in Jordan, Ben Gurion resisted the desire of two Chiefs 
of Staff (Dayan and Laskov) to take over the West Bank. He preferred a weak Arab 
state on the eastern border to a strong state and the West Bank, following the 
disintegration of Jordan (Sandler: 114).
Considerations of security and demography overruled considerations of history.
Consequently, after 1967 when Israel captured the Golan Heights, the Sinai, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Ben Gurion and the Labour party were generally prepared to 
exchange the vast majority of the territory captured in return for peace (Schoenbaum: 
160). The unofficial map of the Labour party regarding territorial compromise 1967-93 
was the Allon Plan (Allon 1976). The most distinctive element of the plan was the 
proposal for a security zone along the Jordan river and the western shores of the Dead 
Sea. These two regions of the West Bank were not densely populated by Arabs and they 
constituted a natural barrier between Jordan and Israel. In exchange for a peace treaty 
with Jordan, Israel would return most of the West Bank and the Gaza strip to Jordan. The 
plan thus reconciled the desire that Israel remain a Jewish and democratic state. It also 
demonstrated the value Labour attached to territory, perceiving Jerusalem as a existential 
value", but the rest of the West Bank in instrumental strategic terms. As Allon explained, 
“If I endorse compromise it is for realistic politics and humanistic Zionism. A territorial 
compromise is designed to promote self defence borders from the strategic perspective 
and the prominent Jewish features of the state from the national perspective” (Yishai
1991). As a disciple of Allon, Rabin continued to favour a territorial compromise on the 
West Bank which would leave the Jordan valley as Israel's security border if  not as its 
sovereign political border (Divrei HaKnesset 18 October 1982: 41; HA 21 April 1989; 
Medzini 1993: 112-4). He was also prepared for a territorial compromise even if this 
involved the abandonment of Jewish settlements established after 1967 (Slater 232).
11 Thus while Ben Gurion favoured returning the territories after 1967, he advocated mass Jewish 
settlement in East Jerusalem (Gilbert: 300).
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Palestinians and Jordanians
Despite a refusal to accept Palestinian nationalism as equally valid in moral terms to 
Zionism, by at least 1929 Ben Gurion had recognised the reality of a particular Palestinian 
national movement (Teveth 1985: 80-83, 170). However, despite this recognition and the 
acceptance of partition as a cornerstone of policy, mamlachtiut was unclear about whether 
to partition the land between Israel and a Palestinian entity or between Israel and Jordan. 
As with the question of partition itself, the mamlachti attitude was determined primarily 
by pragmatic balance of power considerations. This led to a flexible attitude towards the 
question of Palestinian representation and statehood. In December 1948 prominent 
Labour leaders, notably Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, 
had favoured an independent Palestinian state over the annexation of the Arab parts of 
mandatory Palestine to Trans-Jordan for statist geo-strategic reasons. In Ben Gurion's 
words: "An Arab state in Western Palestine is less dangerous than a state that is tied to 
Trans-Jordan, and tomorrow, probably to Iraq”12. However, after the War of 
Independence, Israel would have been very content to sign a peace treaty with Jordan 
which effectively recognised its control over the West Bank, thereby forestalling the 
possibility of a Palestinian state13.
Immediately following the Six Day War, the dilemma re-emerged and once again statist 
balance of power considerations determined attitudes. Members of the Cabinet including 
Yigal Allon, Levi Eshkol and Rabin spoke favourably about an intermediate period of 
autonomy followed by the setting up of an independent Arab state with United Nations 
representation in an enclave surrounded by Israeli territory. It would have an independent 
foreign policy, but be connected to Israel economically and by a mutual defence pact 
(Pedatzur: 271-8). Subsequently, the Cabinet allowed for many meetings with Palestinian 
notables to discuss these ideas. But according to then military governor of the territories, 
Chaim Herzog, it was unclear as to whether their loyalties lay primarily with Jordan or 
with some sort of Palestinian entity. There was also reluctance to come to an agreement 
with Israel, without a parallel deal being done with the Arab states (Avineri 1971). 
Subsequently, (Kimche: 239-249; HA 2 November 1997) Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
12 Ben Gurion, Yoman HaMilchmah [War Diaryj, Vol III, 18 December 1948: 885, cited in (Karsh 1997).
13 For the debate on this subject see Shlaim (1990) and Karsh (1997).
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ignored the tentative proposals of Palestinian leaders who were ready to negotiate with 
Israel. Instead, following the statist bias inherent in mamlachtiut, they insisted on 
negotiating only with sovereign nations.
The Israeli elite had good pragmatic statist strategic reasons for favouring Jordan over the 
Palestinian alternative, which, by the early 1970s, was the PLO. First, Jordan had 
considerable support among the residents of the territories up until the Intifada. The two 
countries shared a threat from radical Pan-Arabism and in practise the Zionists 
consistently found that the Jordanian state was more reliable and less of an ideological 
and irredentist threat that the Palestinian national movement. In contrast, the PLO showed 
no signs of accepting the legitimacy of the state of Israel, it carried out terrorist activities 
and was rife with internal dissent. This made it difficult to see how the PLO could deliver 
peace even if it had desired it. Moreover, the PLO represented primarily the Palestinian 
diaspora, the refugees of 1948 and while some Israelis sought to exchange land for peace 
on the basis of the results of the 1967 war, few Israelis thought it at all advantageous to 
open up questions relating to the right of return for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 
war. Such a move would flood the Jewish state with Arab refugees and thus threaten its 
existence. For these reasons Rabin and the mamlachtVim opposed negotiating directly 
with the PLO until 1993 (Medzini 1993: 120-1,163; WP 4 June 1985; Aronson: 319).
The Palestinian Question: Instrumental Values and Strategy
By at least 1955, Ben Gurion had concluded that the Arabs had not reconciled themselves 
to Israel’s permanent existence (Teveth 1985: 198-9). The Arab states were perceived as 
holding the strategic desire to wipe out the state of Israel, and hence any agreement could 
have only been of a tactical nature. Israel was in a state of siege. Subsequently, Labour 
adopted a Hobbesian view of the international environment, summed up in Rabin’s 
description of Israel as involved in a continual ‘dormant war’ (Horowitz 1993: 11). Its 
central concept was that of, ein brairah, that Israel had 'No Choice1 but to pursue a foreign 
policy based around the use of military force for the purpose of deterrence. Military force 
was perceived as having very limited political utility. As Israel was incapable of imposing 
on the Arab states by military force its political goal of peace and recognition. For despite
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its short-run military superiority, Israel was at a long-term strategic disadvantage to its 
enemies, being inferior in terms of physical size, population and material resources 
(Sandler 1993: 119). Hence war could not have a political purpose in the Clausewitzian 
sense (Barzilai 1996: 23). As a direct outcome of this thinking, from the early 1950s 
onwards Israeli policy was guided by the attitude that, due to implacable Arab hostility, 
Israel had to stand firm and demonstrate to the Arabs through military action that it was 
here to stay, in the hope that through this the Arabs might become reconciled to its 
existence. In the short-term Israel opted for a policy of deterrence.
However, support for the deterrence strategy was not fixed but contingent, flexible both 
tactically and strategically. Thus in the later 1930s, for tactical reasons, Ben Gurion and 
Labour had favoured a policy of self restraint, havlagah, over a retaliatory policy in order 
to try and maintain the support of the great powers for Zionism (Teveth 1985: 76-9). 
Proponents of mamlachtiut preferred to picture the Arab-Israeli conflict as a conflict of 
interest, such as those that flared up not infrequently among sovereign states, rather than 
yet another battle in the all out war between Jews and Gentiles (Don Yehiya 1993: 146). 
Thus, Ben Gurion never thought the Arab masses were intrinsically warlike and always 
asserted that ultimately the conflict could only be decided politically, even if in the short 
to medium term only force could really make a difference (Karsh 1997: 57). Accordingly, 
in the long-run Ben Gurion argued, "we should not place our trust on force alone, we 
should seek a way for [reaching] an understanding with the Arabs" (Karsh 1997: 199). 
This attitude led to a major change in policy strategy towards the Palestinian Question 
after 1967.
After the Six Day War, both Ben Gurion and Rabin reckoned that force could be used, not 
only for purposes of deterrence but also, to soften Arab hostility through a 'diplomacy of 
violence'. As part of this strategy, Israel would use the territories as a bargaining chip in 
exchange for a full contractual peace, security guarantees and normalisation (Auerbach). 
The degree to which the adherents of mamlachtiut perceived their Arab counterparts as 
willing to accept 'land for peace’ in a strategic rather than a tactical sense (Harkabi 1988: 
57-61) combined with the conduciveness of the international and regional environment to 
such a peace, established the degree to which the mamlachtVim determined the
78
instrumental-strategic value of most of the territory they captured in 1967. Thus, the 
majority of the Labour party voted in favour of the Camp David Accords, despite the 
cession of the Rafiah salient in Gaza which had previously been central to the Allon Plan. 
As Rabin explained:
“There is a difference between military options and political strategic 
assessment and policy. The more you have of the Golan Heights the better.
The question is how much can you compromise to achieve peace” (JP 5 
September 1994: 5).
“For me peace is a more important value for the future of Israel's security 
than one group of settlements or another...Let’s put things once and for all 
in the context of the new reality of a great and strong country. This is not 
the eve of the War of Independence when every settlement was vital” (JP 
27 January 1995:1).
This willingness for compromise did not cany equal weight at all times and on all fronts. 
The representatives of mamlachtiut were always more concerned with the diplomatic 
priorities dictated by the immediate exegesis of the balance of power between Israel and 
the Arab states, than with the essence of the Palestinian question itself. Thus, following 
the Yom Kippur War, rather than deal with Jordan over the West Bank, Rabin preferred 
instead to concentrate on disengagement agreements with the Arab states who posed the 
greatest military-strategic threats to Israel, Syria and Egypt. Coming from this 
perspective, prior to the Intifada, Rabin was not an active proponent of the need for an 
immediate diplomatic initiative regarding the Palestinian question. Although Rabin spoke 
about the national aspects of Palestinian identity, recognising it as a component of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, in general he persisted in the belief that the conflict was primarily 
between the Arab states and Israel and not between the Jewish people and the Palestinian 
nation (Divrei HaKnesset 21 October 1985: 75).
The Role o f Relations with the United States
After independence Mapai had sought non-alignment. But despite being avowedly 
socialist, generally Mapai felt a greater kinship with the liberal West than the communist 
East and even feared Communist infiltration (Bialer: 278). Rabin, in particular, had a
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great admiration for the United States, its political system and, despite his origins within 
the Labour movement, the vibrancy of America’s free market economy (Slater: 428; 
Horowitz: 140-144). However, images of America were of peripheral importance in 
policy attitudes. Rather, it was the statist security requirements of Israeli policy that drew 
it seek a strategic association (Sandler: 111) with the US. It was clear that only the West 
could provide Israel with the economic and military aid which the state needed. Hence, as 
the state of siege solidified and the cold war globalised, Israel tilted to the West.
Yet Ben Gurion and his followers were reluctant to pursue too close a relationship with 
the United States. Mamlachtiut taught that all states had to be self reliant. Hence, the 
doctrine of self reliance took precedence over an American guarantee as this would have 
meant curtailing Israel’s military freedom of manoeuvre (Bialer: 268). Thus, Rabin, who 
did most to strengthen US-Israeli relations in the 1970s, always argued against a defence 
pact with the United States (Schiff 1987/8: 5; HA 3 December 1995: Al). However, 
unilateral deterrence was not at the core of mamlachtiufs approach to the US. It attached 
great importance to US approval for its major military actions. They knew Israel needed 
American understanding, if their military operations were to be successful in political 
terms (Barzilai 1996: 106). This was especially the case after 1967 due to Israel’s 
increased dependence on the US. Hence, they were particularly careful to obtain at least 
minimal US acceptance of Israeli military action in 1967 and 1973 (Schoenbaum: 210). 
While in 1982, Rabin supported the thrust into Southern Lebanon until he felt that its 
continuation was causing great damage to US-Israeli relations (JP 10 November 1995: 6).
Given the change in circumstances after 1973, the mamlachti reading of the balance of 
power dictated a smaller role for Israeli military initiative and a larger role for the 
association with the United States. Subsequently, according to Joseph Sisco, former 
Under Secretary of State, “For Rabin, the survival of Israel was inextricably linked to the 
United States” (Horowitz: 47). The US strengthened Israel's ability to deter a major 
conflict through the supply of the arms and technology necessary for the maintenance of 
Israel's 'qualitative edge'. The existence of a close political relationship provided Israel 
with a kind of'extended deterrence'. According to this concept, Israel's enemies, including 
the Soviet Union, would be deterred from attempting to destroy Israel by virtue of the fact
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that they would not want to come into conflict with the United States at the same time. 
Rabin advocated a closer strategic relationship with the US by tying Israel's existence to 
America's national interest and its prestige, thereby ensuring its support for Israel. Rabin 
recognised that the institutionalisation of the process of strategic co-operation could 
develop a rationale of its own that would secure a continued American commitment to 
Israel's security. Even if the US wished to go back on co-operation, there would be a great 
risk of undermining both deterrence in the region and American credibility to its allies 
and commitments (Puschel: 26-7). Rabin succeeded in moving from tactical to strategic 
co-operation with the US by institutionalising routine consultations and a strategic 
dialogue (Schiff 1987/8: 5).
After the Yom Kippur War, Rabin was relatively quick to recognise that new realities 
meant that Israel could no longer obtain the benefits of a burgeoning relationship with the 
US without paying a political price. Thus, in conversation with Kissinger on the 
disengagement treaties with Egypt and Syria, Rabin accepted that, in future, the US would 
make friends in the Arab World, but in return he explained that Israel would expect 
compensation (Slater: 172). Subsequently, unlike Begin in 1981, Rabin, who was 
unconcerned with issues of hadcir, was against using the pro-Israel lobby to prevent the 
supply of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, preferring instead compensation in the form of 
military hardware for Israel (Melman and Raviv 1994: 103, 192-3). This approach had the 
advantage of enhancing Israel's qualitative edge without threatening its closeness with the 
US executive.
Relations with the US, the Peace Process and the Palestinian question
“The central line of Rabin's foreign policy is co-ordination with
Washington and acceptance of the American position on every issue that
does not effect the security of Israel directly” (MM 26 January 1996)
Traditionally mamlachtiut had been keen to prevent the possibility of a superpower 
imposed solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this, Israel needed to avoid dependence 
on the US (Inbar 1996a: 11). While sticking to this objective and generally opposing the
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introduction of American positions into the negotiations, after the Sinai II agreement, 
Rabin came to accept and even began to view positively a US role in the peace process. 
Moreover, Rabin advocated the intertwining and co-ordination of US-Israeli positions, as 
a means of strengthening the Israeli bargaining position. He recognised that US policy on 
the Palestinian question could be as important to Israeli security as its military 
deployment on the West Bank (FBIS 13 March 1989: 30). The relationship with the US 
was a political-strategic tool to demonstrate to the Arabs that they had no military option 
to resolve the conflict and hence it was worth their while to negotiate peace. 
Consequently, he generally favoured co-ordinating strategy on the peace process with 
Washington. For example in 1975 one of the secret annexes of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Israel and the United States, dictated that the US would not open 
negotiations with the PLO so long as that organisation refused to accept Israel’s right to 
exist and continued to practise terrorism.
Moreover, Rabin did not believe that the peace process could succeed without a major US 
role (JP 12 March 1993). Only the US could offer the necessary inducements to 
compensate the parties to the conflict, to counter-balance the risks of pursuing peace 
(Inbar 1996: 12). Hence, Rabin was looking to further institutionalise the strategic 
relationship with the US (JP 24 July 1992) in return for Israeli territorial concessions. 
Basically, the US was to compensate Israel for doing something which it wanted to do for 
existential value reasons, to preserve the Jewish and democratic character of the state; but 
only felt it could do, in terms of the balance of power, with compensation from the US. 
Efraim Sneh even went so far as to suggest that for Rabin the actual peace negotiations 
were of little value unless this co-ordination was in place (JP 8 July 1992: 1). The 
mamlachti’im also recognised the value of the US as mediator/facilitator reassuring the 
Arab side, keeping them in the peace process, sounding them out on ideas that might be 
more acceptable coming from an American mediator rather that the Israelis themselves. 
This was particularly the case on the Syrian track of the peace process 1992-96. Yet 
despite this enhanced role for the US in mamlachti policy, ultimately the foundations of 
mamlachtiut remained the same; co-operation did not imply regional integration or 
reliance on a great power guarantee. Thus in April 1993 speaking publicly about the 
Holocaust, Rabin asked, “What will we learn from it? We will learn to believe in a better
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world. But most important, we will not trust in others any longer, generous as they 
maybe: only us, only ourselves. We will protect ourselves” (Arian 1995: 175). The 
recognition of that ‘better world’ by the adherents of the mamlachtiut paradigm, led them 
to believe that their goal of normalisation was within reach, if Israel could successfully 
adapt to that better world. But such opportunities were understood to be built ultimately 
on the bedrock of independent Israeli state power.
The Progressives, the United States and the Palestinian Question
The peace movement in Israel is an expression o f the universalistic aspects o f  Judaism 
Amos Oz (1994: 69)
Shimon Peres is associated with technocratic tradition of the young followers of Ben 
Gurion. Indeed Peres himself was often referred to as 'the arch technocrat' (Brecher 326, 
344). Apart from being Director-General of the Defence Ministry in the 1950s and 
Defence Minister in the 1970s, he was Head of the Labour party 1977-91, Prime Minister 
1984-86, 1995-6, Foreign Minister 1986-8, 1992-5 and Finance Minister 1988-90. Like 
one of the founding fathers of the European functionalism he adopted, David Mitrany, 
and his mentor Ben Gurion, Peres gathered around himself young, highly educated and 
cosmopolitan technocrats. These aides worked closely with professionals, scientists and 
heads of universities. “A knowledge-power nexus was formed, comprised of formal and 
informal contacts centred mainly in the Prime Minister's Office” (Keren 1995: 8). 
Michael Keren views them as representatives of Israel's professional knowledge elite, 
who took over the reigns of power from Labour party apparatchiks in the 1980s (Keren 
1995: 8-23). At the core of this group were "the Blazers": Yossi Beilin, Nimrod Novik, 
Avi Gill and Uri Savir. Novik was a particularly important advisor and political fixer for 
Peres 1984-90, co-ordinating relations with Egypt and the US, often without reference to 
the Foreign Ministry and its officials while Labour was part of the NUG (Keren 1995: 
67). After gaining a doctorate in the US and working at an influential think tank, Novik 
had strong connection with the policy elite in Washington (Bar Zohar: 131). Uri Savir,
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who became Director-General of the Foreign Ministry in 1992, was a key figure in the 
Oslo talks (JP 17 November 1995: 9). Of the Blazers, Beilin was the most important. He 
was a founder of the Mashov faction in Labour, served as Head of the Prime Minister’s 
Office 1984-86 and then followed Peres to the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry 
before becoming a minister in his own right after 1992. While Beilin was a publicly active 
member of the Labour party, the others were career professionals who had no power base 
independent of Peres. Their vision was of an economically successful society to be built 
on Western models based on the achievements of science and universalist ethics. Finally, 
sharing the general ethos of this group without formally being a part of their decision 
making activities was Ezer Weizman and his advisor Avraham Tamir. Weizman had been 
Head of the Israeli airforce, then joined the Likud becoming Minister of Defence under 
Begin, before switching to Labour following his conversion to a dovish approach in the 
wake of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. They favoured talks with the PLO in 1985 and met 
PLO officials unofficially. For all of them the era of Zionist constructivism was over; 
politics was primarily about promoting Israel’s interests in a normal manner.
The progressives argued that if Israel wished to retain its Jewish and democratic 
character, it must make territorial concessions, or else the higher birth-rate among the 
Arab population of the territories would mean, in the long-run, that Israel will be forced to 
choose between these two values (Peres 1980: 891). Neither did they wish to rule over 
another people (JP 7 August 1992). To them, the value of the whole Land of Israel was 
unimportant in both existential and instrumental terms. Within this progressive stream of 
Israeli political culture there were two different approaches to the Palestinian question. 
The first approach was associated primarily with Shimon Peres, the second with Yossi 
Beilin and the Blazers. The second approach also had the support of Peace Now and the 
small parties of the Zionist left, but it was Peres and Beilin who were most influential in 
policy. The main difference between Beilin and Peres was the former’s belief in the mid- 
1980s that only the PLO and a Palestinian state could deliver peace and that the 
diplomatic sphere, rather than the functional sphere, was the place to start. However, as 
regards the role of the United States in the Palestinian question, the progressive stream 
was imited in its approach.
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The Traditional Doves: Yossi Beilin, and the Palestinian Question
The Six Day War was a military success but a moral disaster. Amos Elon (186)
The traditionally progressive Zionist elements had always been most sensitive to 
Palestinian self-determination. Prior to 1948, Hashomer Hatzair had favoured a binational 
state, while after the War of Independence, Sharett lamented, “We were so filled with the 
sense of the historical justice of our claim that we did not consider how this justice looks 
from the other side... Nor did we realise the depth of the nationalist consciousness in the 
Arab world. We offered the Arabs economic advantages and social progress with total 
disregard of the national question and expected them to sell their national birthright.” 
(Brecher 1972: 285). Similarly, after the Six Day War, because of their universal 
understanding of nationalism, the progressive stream was quickest to recognise the 
existence of a Palestinian nation. Thus by 1974, Mapam, and the progressives in the 
Labour party such as Lova Eliav (Oz 1987: 205; Bar On 1996: 47) and Yossi Beilin, 
recognised a Palestinian right to self-determination and advocated negotiations with the 
PLO under certain conditions (Yishai: 144). Beilin and his supporters in Labour and 
Meretz saw the resolution of Palestinian question premised, first and foremost, on the 
recognition by Israel of a Palestinian right to self-determination and the recognition by the 
Palestinians of a parallel Israeli right. Consequently, their address for peace negotiations 
was the Palestinians and the PLO and not in the first instance Jordan. They proposed a 
demilitarised Palestinian State, preferably but not necessarily in confederation with 
Jordan (Beilin 1997: 232).
Progressive Zionists have been particularly concerned with the abuse of individual human 
rights that has resulted from the Israeli occupation since 1967. They perceive such abuses 
as wrong in themselves and believe that, as a result of continued abuses, the democratic 
character of Israel itself could be threatened14 (JR 29 December 1994: 12-17); hence they 
favour withdrawal. More fundamentally, for them the right of self-determination is 
universal and thus the Jewish claim to the land is no more or less legitimate than the 
Palestinian claim. Since self-determination is the main collective political value of 
progressive Zionism, Palestinian self-determination is understood as a higher value than
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control of the whole land of Israel. Land is viewed as merely an instrumental value 
necessary for the actualisation of self-determination. In contrast, previously mainstream 
Labour Zionism had recognised the Palestinian problem as of a practical demographic 
nature for Israel and not in terms of universal rights. As Amos Oz (1994: 69) stated:
“The conflict between Israel and Palestine is a tragic collision between 
right and right... A Zionism which asks for a part of the land is morally 
justified; a Zionism which asks the Palestinians to renounce their identity 
and give up the whole land is not justified...All these considerations lead 
me to accept the moral (and not merely pragmatic) rightness of 
partitioning the land between two nations”.
Thus, the existential values of progressive Zionism tend towards support for an Israeli 
withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian state.
Moreover, the main goal of the universal stream of Israeli political culture is 
normalisation and the progressive stream believe that normalisation is only possible 
through the achievement of peace, and peace is only possible through the resolution o f the 
Palestinian problem. On this view, the political question of recognition associated with 
the Palestinian Question and not the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states 
was at the centre of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Avineri 1971: 60). Recognition was seen as 
a central policy tool, on the basis that it can satisfy the legitimate appetite of a nation for 
self-determination. Since non-recognition is assumed to be among the main sources of 
international conflict, it follows that removing it will bring peace. Political stability 
resulting from a comprehensive peace settlement will reinforce security in the region and 
the promotion of economic prosperity and interdependence will, it is thought, ensure a 
common interest in maintaining a lasting peace (Chazan: 66).
Given Palestinian self-determination and mutual recognition, Beilin argued that it would 
not be so difficult to resolve the core final status issues of refugees, Jerusalem, and 
borders as people commonly made out. Regarding borders, land was only minimally 
conceived of as an instrumental value let alone as an existential value. Thus Beilin did not 
even envisage an Israeli presence in the Jordan valley as crucial to Israeli security in the
14 As Director-General of the Foreign Ministry Uri Savir set up a Human Rights division.
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long-term (JP 22 October 1993: 3; 25 November 1993). Indeed the value of territory to 
Israel in existential or instrumental terms in Beilin’s eyes was so limited that for the sake 
of a stable peace based on universal liberal nationalist principles, he was prepared to cede 
sovereign Israeli territory next to the Gaza strip in order to provide the future Palestinian 
state with room to develop (Beilin 1997: 232).
Beilin recognised that tension and dangers would remain after the creation of a 
Palestinian state but, in line with the progressive ethos, he looked to a co-operative multi­
lateral security framework in order to deal with these problems. Beilin’s lack of emphasis 
on the Holocaust allowed him to by-pass the mainstream Israeli ‘lesson’ of the Holocaust- 
self reliance- and instead advocate the multi-lateral security model of ASEAN as the 
solution to Israel’s security problems. In the model, Israel served as the parallel to 
Australia; a country with an essentially Western culture co-operating and integrating 
economically and strategically in a region of non-Westem powers (Beilin 1997: 25). 
Beilin believed that if  the Palestinian problem was resolved in this manner, then the Arab- 
Israeli conflict would have effectively ended allowing Israel to concentrate on domestic 
problems (Inbar 1996: 46). What was required was an Israeli peace initiative, aimed at the 
Palestinians, designed to bring about this state of affairs. Given the lack of contact 
between the two sides and the mutual demonisation, Peace Now and Beilin began by 
pioneering meetings between mainstream Israelis and Palestinians in an effort to facilitate 
mutual recognition.
Peres and the Palestinian Question
Peres supported the idea of a functional compromise on the West Bank. In part, his 
support stemmed from his association with Moshe Dayan, one of Peres political allies 
from his days with Ben Gurion in the Rafi party. The difference between Dayan’s version 
of a functional compromise and Peres’, was that while for Dayan a functional 
compromise was the final status solution, for Peres it was part interim solution, part tool 
towards building the possibility of a negotiated final status agreement and peace, as well 
as, part of a final status solution itself. Peres vision of the potential for functional co­
operation as a foundation for peace also stemmed from his adherence to the progressive
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European vision of neo-functionalism espoused by Jean Monet. According to Peres, the 
reason Western Europe has been so peaceful since 1945 was that peace was not made 
dependent simply on military arrangements and border delineation but on the 
institutionalisation of economic and social co-operation (Peres and Eshed 258). Building 
peace in the Middle East meant following that European example.
Peres neo-functionalist rationale was particularly apparent in his approach to the 
Palestinian question. In the 1970s, Peres preferred a functional compromise with Jordan 
rather than an territorial compromise. He argued that a straight separation without 
economic integration and open borders would only increase radicalism in the West Bank 
(Peres and Eshed: 258). In one outline of his ideas, Peres saw this as involving a three tier 
system of government including three regional parliaments in the territories and a 
Jordanian-Israeli condominium in the West Bank on issues of defence and currency, 
possibly involving joint Israeli-Jordanian units on the Franco-German model (Elazar 
1984). Later on Peres compared the future situation between Israel, the Palestinians and 
Jordan to the Benelux model (Peres 1993: 173). As far as Gaza was concerned, Peres 
wanted it to follow the rapid economic development model of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
He suggested to Egypt the unilateral implementation of self-administration there, even 
under Egyptian sovereignty (MECS 1985: 64).
Within this model Peres generally saw the Palestinians expressing their political rights 
within some sort of Jordanian federation. Still, he accepted, even in the 1970s, that a 
genuine lasting peace in the Middle East was impossible without a resolution to the 
Palestinian problem (Peres and Eshed: 226). Peres acknowledged the legitimacy of 
Palestinian national aspirations (Divrei HaKnesset 12 March 1979: 1837; 6 March 1980: 
2202), however, he did not favour the foundation of an independent Palestinian state in 
the territories for one fundamental, and two transient reasons.
First, Peres initially supported the Jordanian option because until 1974 Jordan, and not the 
Palestinians, was recognised internationally as the address for negotiations on the future 
of the West Bank. Even after 1974, Jordan retained significant political influence in the 
West Bank. In any case Peres argued that the connection between Jordan arid the
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Palestinians was not only political but ethnic and historic to the point where it was 
difficult to talk of a separate Palestinian nation. The fact that the Palestinians in the 
territories had always proven incapable of providing their own independent leadership and 
that neither Jordan nor Syria recognised the legitimacy of a separate Palestinian nation­
state, strengthened Peres argument in his own mind (Peres and Eshed: 281).
Second, Peres supported the Jordanian option because the alternative to Jordan was the 
PLO. The PLO was extremist both in its objectives and in its terrorist methods and in any 
case was incapable, given its internal structure, of making and keeping a meaningful 
agreement with Israel (Peres 1980). Still unlike Begin, Peres criticised the PLO for its 
lack of realism and pragmatism rather for than their inherent moral deficiencies. This 
difference was significant as it left open the door for future PLO involvement in the talks, 
should the PLO accept Israel’s right to exist and demonstrate a propensity to deliver 
peace. Thus even while ruling out negotiations with the PLO, Peres accepted that in the 
highly unlikely event that the PLO recognised the existence of Israel, abandoned 
terrorism, and declared its readiness for peaceful negotiations, it would have to be 
accepted as a legitimate negotiating partner (JP 7 October 1983).
However, the fundamental reason for Peres’ opposition to a Palestinian state was his neo­
functionalism. After World War One the European states had tried and failed to prevent 
war by allowing for national self-determination and rectifying the borders of various 
states including Germany. The failure of this scheme to prevent a general war, contrasted 
clearly in Peres’ mind with the success of the post World War Two European structures 
(Divrei HaKnesset 30 October 1967: 159; FBIS 5April 1977). Learning from the 
European experience, Peres argued that peace in the Middle East was dependent on 
raising the level of economic, social and technological development in the region (Peres 
and Eshed 219) through increased integration including a regional security framework 
(Peres 1993: 76).15 This approach led to a distinction between national self-expression and 
territorial sovereignty. Thus, even after he negotiated the Oslo Accords with the PLO, 
Peres retained his belief in a neo-functionalist approach to the future status of the West
15 Avraham Tamir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's Office under Peres, 
also subscribed to this vision see (WINEP 1988).
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Bank. Although the Oslo Accords opened the way for an independent Palestinian state, in 
Peres’ conception this seemed to apply primarily to Gaza, while the West Bank was to 
retain a stronger link with Jordan and Israel for the final status (HA 15 December 1995: 
B3; WP 28 May 1995: C2). Indeed, one of the reasons he opposed a document of 
understanding on final status issues reached between his protege Yossi Beilin and Abu 
Ala, was precisely because it envisioned the creation of a Palestinian state without strong 
enough ties to Jordan (MM 22 February 1996).
To Peres, speedy progress towards this goal was essential and as such required Israeli 
initiatives16. War was no longer a rational instrument of policy17. First, because in the 
modem world, economic prosperity was primarily achieved through trade and 
technological development, as opposed to conquest. Second, in any case the threat of 
mutual assured destruction, through the of escalation of any military conflict in to a 
nuclear confrontation, made war irrational and detente a necessity. In the case of the 
Middle East, Peres argued that the Arab states would come to the realisation, due their 
failure in past wars and Israel’s enhanced deterrence capability, that they could not 
achieve their maximalist goals vis a vis ‘the Zionist entity’. Moreover, the economic cost 
o f maintaining such a military posture was high and came at the expense of socio­
economic development, a fact which would, in Peres’ opinion, present political problems 
for Arab regimes from the disgruntled masses. For these reasons, Peres thought peace 
would become a rational interest for Arab regimes. Nonetheless, without a peace initiative 
Peres thought that a terrible war could still breakout for ‘irrational’ reasons. For Peres, the 
progressive rationalist, the main enemy was not Egypt or the Palestinians, but all forms of 
irrational fundamentalism. Without a peace initiative, fundamentalism would make
16 In common with classic Zionists instrumental values, Peres and the technocratic strata valued the taking 
of the initiative and activism. Consequently, Peres became known as a [doer] bitsuist who believed that a 
great amount of initiatives and activities would allow him to overcome political constraints” (Sacher: 218).
17 Up to the mid-1970s Peres argued in favour of concentrating on strengthening Israel deterrence posture 
and its ability to achieve victory in war. This gave him the reputation for being a hawk. However, as early 
as the 1950s Peres had expressed the belief that deterrence was only the starting point for peace and 
security, the foundation for greater regional economic and technological advancement that would provide 
deeper foundations for peace and security. Thus, in 1955 as Director General of the Defence Ministry,
Peres favoured the launching of a preventative war in the Sinai as an act of deterrence. But he also talked of 
the operation as a mechanism to advance economic and technological co-operation and progress across the 
Middle East in general (Teveth 1972).
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further strides and fundamentalist regimes with non-conventional weapons would 
seriously threaten both Israel and the whole Middle East (Peres 1993: 39; 1995: 317-320).
The Role o f Relations with the US
For the progressives, the basis of the special relationship that developed between the US 
and Israel was not common strategic interests and a common enemy but rather common 
values (Peres and Eshed: 218-222; Peres 1995: 85). Although they recognised that 
American "credibility", a crucial commodity in the cold war, was closely tied to Israeli 
security, they never believed that the United States needed Israel on its side in the global 
confrontation with the Soviet Union nor that Washington sought a place alongside Israel 
in its conflict with the Arabs (Peres 1995: 85).
The idea of an American guarantee for Israel had been popular in dovish circles in the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry in the 1950s but it had been opposed by the activists who 
preferred 'self reliance' (Bialer: 268; Shlaim 1983: 184). In any case, the Americans were 
not interested then, and could not guarantee Israeli security until the state had agreed 
borders. With the prospect of a final settlement on the horizon, the idea of a US 
guarantee/alliance was revived. Some doves, such as Yossi Sarid and Amnon Rubinstein 
of Meretz, resurrected Moshe Sharett’s idea of a defence treaty with the United States, 
following an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, as a guarantee for peace and security 
in the future (JP 1 March 1991: 6; 8 March 1991).18 Another figure close to Peres 
supported the idea of a formal security pact in the context of an Israel-Syrian peace treaty 
linked to a comprehensive regional peace. He felt it would add immeasurably to Israel's 
deterrence posture). The idea of such an alliance fitted the Peres image of post 1945 
European Security where the US had played a leading role in regenerating European 
economies through the Marshall Plan and then guaranteeing the freedom of the 
democracies through a multi-lateral alliance, NATO (Peres and Eshed). However, for the 
progressives the relationship with the US was not the cornerstone of Israel’s security 
policy. Peres put far more stock in Israel’s non-conventional deterrent than did Rabin. In
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any case, for the progressives, deterrence was only the starting point of security. They 
asserted that the region should not aim at a system for defence against a common enemy 
but rather a security system aimed at intra-regional security (Peres 1993: 67; Peres and 
Eshed: 217; Beilin 1997: 25). For them, the key to peace was not a militarily strong Israel 
backed by the US, but direct reciprocal political and economic arrangements with Israel's 
immediate neighbours and all states in the region. Nonetheless, they were always 
interested in the American potential to help underwrite their vision through diplomatic 
and economic support (SWB 29 July 1995).
In distinction to the Likud, the progressives were open to, and even at times in favour of, 
an American mediatory role in the resolution of the Palestinian question. They were not 
overly concerned with issues of hadar and independence. For example, during in the 
1950s Moshe Sharett, preferred to respond to fedayeen raids by using diplomatic 
connections with the great powers, especially the United States, as a means to encourage 
the Arab states to prevent border attacks, while Ben Gurion and Dayan preferred 
unilateral acts of military retaliation (Brecher 1972: 287). Similarly, while Shamir had 
forbidden the tying of the Israeli Shekel to the American dollar to preserve its 
independence during the economic crisis in the mid-1980s, Peres accepted an American 
plan which had conditions attached, in order to resolve that economic crisis (Lewis 1987: 
588-593). Moreover, because Labour and the United States had a much closer 
understanding as to how the Palestinian question would be resolved than did the 
Americans and Likud, Labour was keen to work with the most important external actor in 
the region in order to advance their similar agendas. The progressives appreciated that, as 
an external mediator, the United States could do things that were very helpful to 
brokering an agreement, that Israel itself would find difficult to do, especially during a 
period of Labour-Likud national unity government 1984-90. Hence they were prepared 
for, and often argued forcefully in favour of, American pressure on both sides in order to 
produce the compromises that would push the peace process forward, as Kissinger had 
done in the mid 1970s (WP 17 August 1986). Many progressives nurtured the belief that 
American pressure could bring a lasting peace and 'save Israel in spite of itself albeit at
18 For the contours of the Israeli debate on this subject See (MM 12 March 1996 10,51,24 April 1996 10, 
80; HA 26 March 1996: B l, 9 January 1996: Bl; 13 March 1996:B1,2 February 1996: Bl; JP 8 December
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the expense of Israel's freedom of action. When Labour was either out of power or sharing 
it with the Likud, the US appeared to be critical in facilitating peace. Hence, progressive 
politicians tried to get the US Administration to facilitate peace by pressuring the Likud. 
In the early 1980s a US official claimed that a Labour politician had asked him to cut US 
aid to help break Begin's political power (Shindler 1989: 106) and in November 1983 
Labour politicians met the US Ambassador in order to Israel, Sam Lewis, to get the US to 
make aid conditional on a settlement freeze (NYT 16 November 1983; MA 18 November 
1983).
1995: 5, JR 2 May 1996: 59).
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Chapter 4: The Development of Israeli Political Culture since 1967
Great Revolutions which strike the eye at a glance must have been preceded 
by a quiet and secret revolution in the spirit o f the age Hegel
Introduction
The previous chapters identified the different strains within Israeli political culture and 
their various approaches towards the Palestinian question and relations with the United 
States. However, the model of Israeli political culture presented thus far is incomplete in 
that it has been presented as a diverse but essentially static construct. This chapter will 
analyse the development of Israeli political culture since 1967. This enables us to identify 
which political sub-cultures and approaches were dominant at particular times and why. 
In turn, this allows us to begin to get an idea of the role of Israeli political culture in 
policy making, because which ever sub-culture(s) was politically dominant also 
succeeded in gaining control over foreign policy and, by extension, relations with the US 
over the Palestinian question. Consequently, in the second half of the chapter, the impact 
of the development of Israeli political culture on this process is analysed through the 
mediums of elections, coalition building and the rise of elites in internal party politics.
Broadly speaking, this chapter will argue that Israeli political culture since 1967 became 
increasingly polarised between particularism and universalism. Yet, the split was not 
precisely fifty-fifty, nor was it stable. The political culture of particularism was dominant 
from 1977 until 1992. While from the mid-1980s onwards there was a gradual shift 
towards universalism and dovishness culminating in the Labour election victory in 1992. 
The turn towards particularism was brought about by a combination of the exhaustion of 
Labour Zionism, the rise of a new civil religion, and the experience of war in Israel 
between 1967 and 1973. While the turn towards universalism was brought about by the a 
combination of the exhaustion of Labour Zionism and the Israeli experience of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict since 1973.
The Rise of Particularism
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Israel would inculcate a fierce national pride...while imparting at the same 
time respect for universal humanism that transcended national 
boundaries... The dichotomy was accentuated after 1967. Nationalist 
Israel pushed for the annexation o f the territories, Humanistic Israel for 
their return. The rise o f the Likud and messianic religious fervour led to a 
greater sense o f national particularism. In its nationalist form, it fuelled 
parochialism and a 1world is against us ’philosophy.
Leslie Susser (Butt: 79)
After 1967 a new civil religion (Liebman and Don Yehiya) became the most powerful 
political sub-culture in Israel. In contrast to the dominant political sub-culture since 1948, 
mamlachtiut, its goal was not normalisation. The new civil religion accorded respect to 
Diaspora Jewry and it recognised the past and present Diaspora as intimately connected to 
and integrated with the Jewish state. This contrasted strongly with the original Zionist 
notion of rejecting the Diaspora which emphasised the ‘new Jew’, the Hebrew identity of 
Israel, as opposed to its ‘Jewish’ identity. It also resurrected the traditional Jewish view of 
Jewish-gentile relations which found anti-Semitism to be the norm, the natural response 
of the non-Jew. In this scheme it was the absence of anti-Semitism that required 
explanation. The concept of a people that dwells alone, and the interpretation of the 
Holocaust in this light were central to this new civil religion.
Parallel to these developments, concern about the weakness of mamlachtiut prompted a 
move towards greater identification with Jewish particularism. The collective leadership 
of the Labour party were worried by the rise of Canaanitism which sought to sever all ties 
with the religious-historical Jewish culture and rejected identification with Jews outside 
the land of Israel. In order for Jewish national potential to be realised, the early secular 
Zionist argued that a complete disassociation from the old Jewish framework was 
required. Subsequently, the Zionists used the term ‘Hebrew’ to define the Jews who had 
undergone a transformation thereby ceasing to be Jewish in the former sense. The term 
Hebrew did at least imply a connection with the pre-exile Jewish past, yet when the 
leaders of Israel after 1948 saw the rootless Sabra they had created, they feared he would 
become a Canaanite, reject his Jewish identity totally and relate to himself as merely a 
native of the Levant. Responding to this challenge, in 1957 the Israeli education system
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began an initiative to increase the amount of time devoted to the study of Jewish tradition, 
Jewish history and Diaspora Jewry (Liebman and Don Yehiya: 171).
This rise of particularism was also underwritten by the exhaustion of mamlachtiut and the 
impact of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War on Israel. By the 1970s there were 
no more swamps to drain, Israel was no longer considered a developing country by the 
IMF. The mamlachti elite had become associated mainly with the trappings of power and 
was saddled with an image of corruption. The challenges which had fired Labour to create 
and build up the state had been achieved and its ideology had trouble articulating a 
message for a more mature society which was become increasingly bourgeois in its 
outlook. Into this vacuum moved a more particularistic political culture, abetted by the 
experience of war. Before May 1967, Nasser had been generally portrayed in Israel as a 
‘paper tiger’. This illusion was shattered when he moved his troops into Sinai blatantly 
violating the understanding reached in 1957. The UN willingly agreed to withdraw the 
UN troops, leaving no buffer between the Israeli and Egyptian armies. The Soviet Union 
backed its Egyptian ally, very few European nations were willing to risk any involvement, 
and an American proposal to reduce tensions failed miserably. No nation was willing to 
help Israel in her predicament. Abba Eban described the sensation of isolation in those 
days: "As we looked around us we saw the world divided between those who were 
seeking our destruction and those who would do nothing to prevent it" (Eban 1977: 392). 
Israeli self confidence was severely eroded. An immense sense of national vulnerability 
and memories of the Holocaust filled this period prior to the outbreak of the war.
Suddenly, within a week all the Arab armies had been defeated and Israel had returned to 
take control of much of its biblical territory. The spectre of destruction that Israel had so 
forcefully banished served to reinforce the determination that another Holocaust would 
never happen again. Following the Six Day War, political rhetoric became increasingly 
laced with the heady word ‘never’. A new sense of history began to permeate the public 
debate and the words ‘Jewish fate’ became almost ubiquitous (Rubinstein 1984: 77; 
Sprinsak 36-8). The strength of solidarity with the Jewish world was also strengthened as 
world Jewry, many of whom as non-Zionist Jews had never identified with the Jewish 
state before, now appeared as Israel’s only ally. Before 1973 this tendency was counter
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balanced by an optimism regarding Israel's new found strength and security. However, 
after the Yom Kippur War, when many countries broke off diplomatic relations with 
Israel, and the UN declared Zionism to be Racism, the sense of Israel as an isolated state 
became ingrained in Israeli consciousness. One of the most popular songs of the period 
declared, “the entire world is against us, its an ancient melody, that we have learned from 
our forefathers” (Rubinstein 1984: 80). The Yom Kippur War also marked a sharp 
increase in the cultural penetration of traditional religious symbols (Liebman and Don 
Yehiya: 168). Zionism had not apparently normalised the position of the Jewish people 
and consequently the particularistic stream within Zionism gained ascendancy. Israelis 
identified with the Jewish fate they had sought to escape when they came to Israel. It 
seemed that anti-Semitism had not disappeared with the creation of a Jewish state, it had 
merely been transmuted into a new form, anti-Zionism. Israel was a people that dwelt 
alone.
This new sense of isolation manifested itself in the resonance and centrality in Israeli 
consciousness of the Holocaust. As an expert in Holocaust education in Israel explained, 
“No one will ever forget that month before the Six Day War... We had this feeling of 
being caught in circumstances beyond our control just like the people in the Holocaust” 
(Friedman 1990: 279). Early on in Israel's existence the Holocaust was virtually ignored. 
Even when the genocide did get an official mention in 1950, the particularly Jewish 
experience of Nazism was not explicitly mentioned. This was a reflection of the 
government's attempt to demonstrate that even the Holocaust did not set the Jewish 
people apart from other nations. For Ben Gurion, anti-Semitism even after the Holocaust 
was a natural universal reaction to the Jews’ unnatural situation, a position statehood 
resolved. Others stressed that there were other victims of Nazi brutality, which was 
directed not especially against Jews but against humanity or that the Holocaust was not a 
unique phenomena, comparing it to the Turkish crime of genocide against the Armenians. 
This virtual disregard for the most horrendous tragedy ever to befall the Jewish people 
was, to a significant degree, prompted by shame, disapproval and anger, at the behaviour 
of those who had gone, in the commonly held view, Tike sheep to the slaughter’. Israelis
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did not identify with the victims of the Holocaust, only with the small minority that had 
fought back (Don Yehiya 1993).1
The Eichmann trial began a shift in Israelis attitude towards the Holocaust. Instead of 
seeing the victims of the Holocaust as weak Diaspora Jews, the Israelis began to identify 
with the Diaspora and cast the meaning of the state of Israel in its terms. The Holocaust 
became, “a collective pathology affecting the entire nation.” A pathology which perceived 
the country as having, “a one year guarantee that no one is sure will be honoured” 
(Friedman 1990: 278). This resurgence of the Holocaust symbol tended to reinforce both 
an Hobbesian image of international politics and consequently an emphasis on the use of 
force that spread wider than purely right-wing circles.2 Thus, in the early 1970s future 
dove Amnon Rubinstein argued that the Arab world would become reconciled to the new 
reality. “Territory”, he argued, provided Israel, “...with a degree of security not known 
before. Who could assure Israel that any agreement following a withdrawal, would not be 
violated as were the ceasefire agreements” (Keren 1989: 83). The 1967 victory appeared 
to demonstrate that military might was the crucial policy instrument, self-reliance had 
apparently proved its worth and the geo-strategic value of territory was also rated very 
highly. Israel’s successful use of force in 1967 and Arab rejectionism at Khartoum3 
strengthened this hawkish tendency, as did PLO terrorism (Stone 38; Seliktar 165). When 
Israelis began to become victims of Palestinian terror in the 1970s, notably at Munich in 
1972, they collectively conceived of the Palestinian problem primarily as one of 
terrorism: a military and strategic problem and did not perceive its political dimension. As 
Harkabi put it at the time, "where the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned, there may be no 
absolute distinction between politicide and genocide” (Harkabi 1972: 93). Certainly at the 
time there was good reason to think in those terms, after all the PLO's declared aim was 
the destruction of Israel. This was an image that would become central to the mass 
political culture in Israel, an image reinforced by the tendency among the older generation
1 Between 1948 and 1967, twice as much space was given over in Israeli textbooks to anti-Nazi resistance 
as to accounts of Nazi atrocities. The official Holocaust memorial day was deliberately fixed on the date of 
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the day itself is referred to as the memorial day for not only for victims of 
the Holocaust but for gevurah [bravery] and fighting heroes.
2 In a 1988 survey, 3 1% of Israelis thought that all non-Jews were anti-Semitic and in a 1986 survey, 58% 
thought criticism of Israel was due to anti-Semitism (Liebman and Cohen: 62-3).
3 Following the Six Day War, the Arab League held a summit in Khartoum in which it refused to recognise 
Israel or negotiate with it.
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of Israelis to find it difficult to believe that the Arabs of Palestine shared their emotional 
attachment to the land (Harkabi 1971: 6).
The other factor promoting this tendency was the growing ideological attachment to the 
land of Israel engendered by the victory of 1967 which had reunited Israel with old 
Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter, the Wailing Wall, Judea and Samaria - the sites and places 
whose very names had biblical connotations and ancient memories. These fruits of victory 
made the Six Day War particularly congenial to the messianic nationalism of religious 
Zionism. Subsequently, the followers of Rabbi Kook's ideology became dominant in 
religious Zionist educational institutions and the NRP moved towards the territorial 
maximimalist position of the right in Israel. Many of its members were involved in the 
settler movement Gush Emunim. The Gush filled the void left by the erosion of the 
pioneering ideology which had hitherto dominated the religious Zionist movement 
(Medding 1995). It also replaced a basically pragmatic or even dovish approach to foreign 
policy with a hawkish approach. This too was a wider phenomenon, such that in 1974 the 
majority of Israelis recognised Begin's Likud, and not Labour, as the true heir of Zionism 
(Seliktar: 181).
Towards Normalisation
Israel is no longer trying to create a 'new man' to extol the dignity o f  
Labour... or obey the Biblical injunction to be ’a light unto the nations.'
The yearning o f Israel today are a lot more modest: for a normal life, a 
modern country, freedom from dangers and levels o f consumption that 
resemble those in the West. These are deep changes for a nation that was 
born and raised in war (Economist 1994: 2).
By the 1960s, social prestige had moved away from the agricultural pioneer to the 
professional. There was a clear erosion of ascetic-collectivism together with an increase in 
individualism and consumerism. A pattern had emerged which was similar to those 
generated in other post-industrial societies which was reflected in the emergence of a ‘me- 
now’ mentality in Israel. From the 1980s onwards, the mass of the secular population of 
Israel increasingly identified the good life with American culture and consumerism (JR 10 
March 1994: 10-16; 18 May 1995: 12-22). This trend was evident in the food and
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restaurant industry, television and in the greater use of English phrases in spoken Hebrew, 
even in instances when Hebrew words to exist. According to Ha’aretz columnist Gideon 
Samet. “The new Israeli majority is... a quiet, secular and maybe a little tired majority, 
that is mostly busy with its own affairs... all this majority wants is the assurance that at 
long last they will be able to live in quiet. Nobody would have to take it away from its air 
conditioners, cable television...It does not want the mysticism of land or the sanctity of 
hills and tombs” (Frankel: 368). Economic well-being and the standard of living have 
become more important as generators of political interests and cultural and social attitudes 
than ideology (JR October 6 1994: 18; 2 May 1996: 36-41). Kibbutzim are more 
concerned with profit and they function less as a true collective (Melman 1992: 181- 206) 
and even many of the settlers in the territories are increasingly non-ideological and 
prepared to leave their settlements in return for financial compensation (JC 26 July 1996: 
2).
Within the political system, the trend towards normalisation has been marked by greater 
concern over liberal issues such as the abuse of state power and demand for a liberal 
constitution (Guttman 1993). The State Comptroller Miriam Ben Porat, expanded the role 
of the Government watchdog. The Supreme Court also became increasingly active on 
political issues, protecting the rule of law from governmental abuse; for example, it 
required the Israeli government to hand out gas masks in the territories during the Gulf 
War. All this is symbolic of a greater scrutinising of the government characteristic of a 
liberal, as opposed to a majoritarian, democracy. Along these lines the press has 
developed greater independence from political parties. Symbolically, Davar. the Labour 
party newspaper and the Mapam paper A1 HaMishimar were forced to close due to their 
inability to be run at a profit. This signifies the parallel shift in the Israeli economic 
culture from collectivist-statism to free market liberalism (Keren 1995: 89). Following the 
1984 economic crisis, the reform programme adopted then brought a big cut in the state 
role and a move away from a protectionist mentality. Subsequently in 1992-3, revenue 
from sales of government privatisation reached approximately $5.6 billion (Israel 
Almanac 1994: 148). The most powerful example of this change was Chaim Ramon's 
success in capturing control of the Histadrut on a Meretz-Shas-Arab party ticket, thus 
wresting control of the Histadrut from Labour for the first time in its history. In its own
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backyard Labour Zionism has been superseded by a combination of liberal Zionists, quasi 
Zionists and non Zionists. Health insurance cover was finally separated from 
membership of the Histadrut, a symbol of the end of the Zionist-socialist state. The new 
consensus agreed on the need for the further privatisation and deregulation in the Israeli 
economy (Landau 1993a: Lehman-Wilzig 1992: 42-6). Indeed, with the expanding 
consumer economy, both political blocks now war for the middle-ground, middle class 
votes in Israeli society (Arian 1995: 19). One partial consequence of this has been the 
lowering of defence expenditure in Israel, as the willingness to divert resources to 
national expenditure at the expense of its standard of living decreased.
As part of this normalisation process, individualism has crept into what had been a highly 
collectivist political culture. Ezrahi (1997) has traced the slow rise of individualism in a 
society that started out as an ideological orientated state where the need of the community 
took precedence over individual choices. He cited the ruling of the Supreme Court in 
1994 that for the first time permitted the bereaved families of slain soldiers to break the 
uniformity of official inscriptions on grave stones in military cemeteries. The army saw a 
dead soldier as a martyr to the cause and an inspiration to others to serve, while the family 
saw a dead child with an individual distinctive personality and dreams. There are signs 
that this process has also affected attitudes towards military service. “There's been a big 
shift in attitudes among the young,” said Itamar Lurie, a Hebrew University psychologist 
who for six years has surveyed Jerusalem high school students about the army. “Once, the 
socially desirable response was, ‘I want to serve, I want to be a fighter’, not any more.” In 
the 1990s Aviv Geffen, Israel's most popular rock star, boasted onstage about his 
avoidance of military service (WP 5 Aug 96: Al).
The flip side of increased individualism and consumerism has been a decreased 
attachment to core Zionist positions, though without abandoning the belief that Israel 
should be the state of the Jewish people. One manifestation of this trend is the increasing 
suggestion that aliyah should be de-emphasised (JP, 14 October 1994: 6, 26 October: 6). 
In the 1990s, with statehood achieved and most of the world’s Jews safe, the mission of 
Zionism is more or less complete. Jews in Western countries have successfully integrated 
into their respective pluralistic societies without having to surrender their particular
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identity. Jews have ceased to be ashamed of their Jewishness and even display of their 
Jewishness may be taken as a sign of successful assimilation. This has been brought about 
by the opening up of national societies and the recognition of the legitimacy of cultural 
difference within the modem state. Hence, Herzl’s original premise of the need to solve 
the Jewish problem in its physical and psychological manifestations can no longer be said 
to exist on a large scale. As a result there is no longer perceived to be such a duty to 
absorb all aliyah. Labour Minister for Absorption, Ora Namir, stated that Israel should 
select immigrants on the basis of their utility like any other state and not simply allow 
them to make aliyah on the basis of their identity (JR 11 August 1994: 18, 3 November 
1994: 28). Paradoxically, over half a million Russian immigrants who arrived in Israel 
since the late 1980s had no desire to be a part of any Zionist mission in any case. Possibly 
more than any other group of immigrants in Israel's history, the Russians were driven to 
Israel by the desire to improve their individual material welfare. Indeed for many, Israel 
was a second choice after America. Certainly, unlike the famous Refuseniks Sharansky 
and Yosef Begun, these immigrants were not driven to Israel by Zionist ideology or a love 
of Jewish culture. Indeed most of them knew very little of Jewish culture, if indeed they 
were Jewish at all!
Another manifestation of the loss of interest has been the increasing numbers of secular 
Israelis emigrating to the United States and the increasing tolerance of the Israeli elite for 
their behaviour. Perhaps the most telling statistic in this regard is that by 1988, an 
estimated 300 000-400 000 Israelis had emigrated to the US compared to around 50 000 
moving the other way (Don Yehiya 1991). Whereas in 1976 Rabin referred to emigrants 
as, 'the dregs of society', in 1991 he reversed his position and in an interview with the LA 
News stated, “What I said then does not apply today” (JC 7 October 1994: 16). At the 
least, this demonstrates the way in which individual choice has began to be seen as more 
compatible with Zionism than previously. But it is also part of a tendency towards post- 
Zionism which found clearer expression in 1996 when the Attorney General decided that 
non-Zionist youth groups would be able to obtain government funding, along with their 
Zionist counterparts for the first time (JP 23 August 1996). More poignantly still, the Oslo 
II agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority only passed in the Knesset 61- 
59, with the help of the Arab Parties. One of the most important decisions taken in the
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history of the Zionist enterprise had not been agreed upon by a Jewish/Zionist majority in 
the Knesset. The vote had starkly presented Israeli political culture with the dilemma of 
whether 'normal democratic' procedures were sufficient and legitimate or whether, on 
these central questions of Israeli existence, the 'Jewish' character of the state was more 
important than its democratic character. Israel had chosen the first option. Another factor 
reinforcing this post-Zionist tendency has been the increased integration and importance 
of the non-Zionist Arab and ultra-Orthodox minorities in the Israel political system. In 
1996 the result of the Prime Ministerial election were decided by the ultra-Orthodox vote 
for the Zionist Likud Candidate combined with the relatively low Arab turn out to vote 
for Peres.
The decline of Zionism as a motivating factor in Israeli culture has also been apparent 
through a return to Jewish tradition and religion. The gap left by secular Zionism is being 
filled in: ‘the new Jew’ is being superseded. 17% of Israeli citizens reported that they 
have come significantly closer to religious faith in the last six years according to a Yediot 
Achronot poll (Mideast Dispatch 16 May 1997). Even the supposedly anti-religious 
Meretz group held a traditional Jewish studies evening on the night of the Jewish festival, 
Shavuot (HA 10 June 1997). Within the religious Zionist community there has been a 
tendency to move towards an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle coupled with a tendency towards 
adopting the Haredi sector’s negative view of secular Zionism. This process has been 
termed 'Haredisation'. Most of this group continue to see the land of Israel as an important 
political value, but more from within a traditional Jewish perspective than a Zionist- 
pioneering perspective, as previously (JR 16 July 1997). They have become known as 
nationalist-ultra-Orthodoxy: Hardal [Haredi Leumi].
A similar process has taken place in the intellectual world, where the deconstruction of 
Zionist myths is dominant (JC 10 March 1995: 35). The founding myth of Tel Chai is no 
longer taken seriously and even the Masada myth is being challenged (JR 16 June 1994: 
42). Joshua Sobol's play 'Ghetto' and Motti Lemer's play 'Hannah Senesh' destroy the 
mythical character of Zionist heroes and question the correctness of the Zionist response 
to Nazism, indirectly challenging the contemporary value of Zionism (JC 9 November 
1994; MA 9 November 1994). Moreover, those symbols that remain have become
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privatised with soccer replacing Zionist ideology as a focus of collective value (Keren 
1989: 91). As Tammy Schatz, creator of the 'What is a Hero exhibition' put it, “There is a 
turn away from the specifically Zionist or national idols of the old generation and towards 
American spawned cultural heroes like Batman, Ninja turtles, Madonna, and Michael 
Jackson.” (JR 29 December 1994:17).
In contemporary Israeli literature too, Zionism is no longer portrayed as a guide to life; 
heroes are no longer stoic pioneering Sabras (Jacobson: 151). David Grossman clearly 
prioritises the individual over and above ‘Zionist ideals’ in his own values system and his 
work4. He was one of the only Israelis to predict the Intifada’s immanent explosion in his 
1987 book The Yellow Wind, which examined life in the territories. Popular 
contemporary Israeli authors such as A. B. Yehoshua and Amos Oz have also examined 
sympathetically the Arab perspective on the conflict (Elon: 268-279). In recent years a 
revisionist history (Benin, Heydemann) of the formative years of the state which in its 
own way ‘deconstructs the Zionist narrative’ has gained prominence and, as Israeli 
Philosophy professor Eliezer Shweid pointed out, “There is a direct connection between 
what the new historians are doing and what is going on at a cultural level” (JR 29 
December 1994 : 14). These historians have sought to undermine the founding myths of 
the state of Israel. They argued that contrary to Zionist myth the Palestinian Arabs did not 
flee Palestine voluntarily in 1948, rather Israel was partly responsible for the exodus of 
the Palestinian Arabs. Secondly, they argue that Israel could have made peace in the early 
years of the state, as it did have policy choices prior to 1956 and was not in a situation of 
TSfo Choice.' As Calev Ben David has written, “The argument about Israel's past is also 
very much a debate about its future. Many of the creative artists and historians involved in 
myth breaking are strong supporters of the peace process and see their work as relevant to 
it.” (JR 29 December 1994: 17).
Indeed, this new critical approach to Zionism and the Israeli past among second and third 
generation Israelis, has helped develop an increased openness to the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian identity (Elon 268-279). As an Israeli army colonel noted in 1975:
4 Discussion with Israeli author David Grossman at Yakar Institute for Jewish Studies, London, 1994
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“One gathers the impression that the younger generation of commanders is 
immersed in a set of questions regarding our national existence which 
previous generations viewed as self-evident. The most prominent example 
is the question concerning our right to the land of Israel and the Palestinian 
question. This does not stem from their loss of self- confidence, but from 
the fact that they are in general more sceptical and unwilling to accept even 
the most basic topics in dogmatic fashion” (Liebman and Don Yehiya 
128).
Amos Elon (268-729) viewed this ideological disarmament, which is at the core of the 
ethos of normalisation, as a necessary prerequisite to any settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Indeed, it was the representatives of this approach, the younger generation of the 
Labour Party led by Yossi Beilin, Chaim Ramon and the Mashov faction which decisively 
pushed Labour’s policy position on the Palestinian Question and the peace process in a 
dovish direction (Inbar 1991: 39). It was also Mashov that was pushing hardest for other 
key elements of the normalisation agenda including a separation of religion and state and 
the separation of the Histadrut from the provision of health care.
The Rise of a Dovish Tendency
Although the preference for a Palestinian state was strongest among those most 
committed to normalisation on the progressive model, most Israelis only came to accept a 
Palestinian state reluctantly as an acceptable, rather than a preferred option (Falk; Shamir 
and Shamir). Israelis who expressed a preference for the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state at Israel's side remained stable at around 8% from 1967-94. However, the 
percentage of Israelis willing to agree to the establishment of the Palestinian state has 
changed significantly. Until the Intifada, agreement to a Palestinian state fluctuated 
around 20% with very little variation. Since then, the willingness to accept this option has 
grown. By 1994 over 37% agreed to this option and 74% thought a Palestinian state in the 
territories would be eventually set up (Arian 1995: 105). This change resulted from a 
decreased belief in unilateral military force and the retention of territory as the keys to 
security, as well as a decreased threat perception. These changes represented a move away 
from the core attitudes of particularism. In turn, these developments stemmed partly from 
the experience of war since 1973. Nonetheless, without the growing trend towards the 
understanding of Israel as a country primarily interested in security and a quiet life, rather
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than the fulfilment of Zionist goals, such dovish trends in Israeli political culture would 
not have developed, as indeed they have not among the most ideologically committed 
sector of Israeli society: the religious Zionist community.
The Impact o f War and Peace
According to Arian’s surveys of Israeli public opinion, the relationship between the 
negotiation choice and the perception of low threat was very high. The lower the 
perceived threat, the greater the willingness to cede land and grant the Palestinians rights 
(Arian 1995: 28-9, 193-4). For second and third generation Israelis, anti-Semitism and 
Nazism were not concrete personal realities Their cultural baggage, unless exposed to 
traditional education, was usually poorer in Jewish content than their predecessors. For 
them, the state of Israel is taken for granted as a reality. Symbolically, by 1986 over 80% 
of the Israeli public thought there was no chance that the Jewish people would face 
another Holocaust (Arian 1995: 27). Such an outlook opened the way for greater 
dovishness based on a lower threat perception of the Arab states’ behaviour towards 
Israel. In this regard, the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem was a watershed. Prior to Sadat's 
arrival, several key figures still believed that the visit might be some clever trick to catch 
Israel by surprise in another war and 90% of Israeli's were against surrendering the Sinai. 
After Sadat's visit, 90% of Israel's were prepared to surrender Sinai in return for peace 
with Egypt. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty provided Israelis with the strongest 
evidence yet that ‘the siege’ was not a permanent condition (Real Isaac 1981: 207). This 
tendency was backed up by the growing perception that the Arab secular elite shared 
Israeli apprehension about Islamic fundamentalist groups and the emergence of an Iranian 
nuclear arsenal. This concerns represented a common interest that bound them all to the 
peace process (Peres and Eshed: 218-9,251; Inbar 1996).
In this vein there has been an interesting reversal of interpretation o f the Bar Kochba 
Myth. For most Israelis, but especially for the right, Bar Kochba's ultimately unsuccessful 
revolt against Rome was a symbol of Jewish heroism and of the heroic idealist military 
spirit required in the conduct of foreign policy. Prior to 1973, as was noted previously,
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Israel put an emphasis on the military aspect of foreign policy at the expense of any 
diplomatic element of policy. But it was Begin who had the supposed remains of Bar 
Kochba reburied in a ceremony befitting a national hero. However, Yehoshafat Harkabi in 
his influential book, The Bar Kochba Syndrome (1981) branded Bar Kochba as an 
irresponsible, unrealistic leader who bears a responsibility for the decimation of Jewish 
life in Palestine which resulted from the crushing of his revolt. Drawing from this lesson, 
Harkabi argued that the actions of the Israeli government can serve to moderate the 
foreign policy behaviour of its enemies. Indeed, Labour figures such as party leader Ehud 
Barak, Chief-of-Staff 1990-94 and a close confident of Rabin, have begun to laud the 
political realism of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai, who opposed the revolt and cut a deal 
with the Romans which allowed Judaism and the Jewish people to survive. They now 
admire political and diplomatic skill of Ben Zakkai in dealing with great powers over the 
futile military heroism of Bar Kochba (Lanzman).
Equally important to the dovish trend has been the Israeli experience of war since 1973. 
The 1967 victory appeared to be a victory for the deterrence strategy. The idea that 
military might was the crucial policy instrument was reinforced, self-reliance had 
apparently proved its worth and the geo-strategic value of territory was also rated very 
highly. It was expected that the Arab world would become reconciled to the new reality 
imposed by Israeli force. The Yom Kippur War shattered these and other long held beliefs 
about security (JR 7 October 1993; 13). After the war the illusion that Israel was 
invincible, that military power deterred and that geography, in the form of strategic depth 
provided sure fire security were shattered. The Yom Kippur War began the process 
whereby security came to be seen as containing a political dimension. For all their geo­
strategic advantages, Israel's new borders had not prevented the outbreak of hostilities. 
Israeli deterrence strategy had proved to be of limited value, based as it was on the 
mistaken assumption that the enemy would not open hostilities as it knew it could not win 
a military encounter. What the Israeli ‘concept’ failed to recognise was that military 
victory and political victory were not one and the same thing. Sadat knew he could not 
win on the battlefield but still had a rational strategy to extract a political victory from the 
opening o f hostilities, which he succeeded in achieving. The Yom Kippur War thus 
demonstrated to the Israelis the need for greater concern for political aspects to security
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policy (Perlmutter; Klieman 1990; Wald). Chaim Zadok, a Labour MK, noted in January 
1974, "Peace will not come by our gaining military supremacy. There can be no more 
crushing military defeat than the one we inflicted in the Six Day War; but it did not bring 
peace. Peace will be achieved only through an agreement” (Barzilai 1996: 193).5 The 
failure of the Lebanon War to achieve its political aims and the inability of the Israeli 
army to crush the Intifada, reinforced this realisation. Gradually an increasing proportion 
of the Israeli public were persuaded that military force could not resolve all o f Israel's 
security problems6. The ill-fated Lebanese campaign also served as a clear lesson on the 
limits of Israel military power. The Israeli army had captured Beirut, but could not 
translate its military superiority into the achievement of its political goals (Falk). 
Subsequently, the legitimacy of concessions such as a settlement freeze and political 
dialogue with the enemy increased if only for want of alternatives and, in 1983, the first 
public meeting between self-defined Zionist and Yasir Arafat occurred (MECS 1983: 
284).
The decisive event in this chain was the Intifada. The Intifada, which started in 1987, 
educated the Israelis about how difficult it was to capitalise on superior military power 
and territorial control against a civilian uprising (Arian 1995: 24). 55% of Israelis 
admitted their opinions regarding security changed as a result o f the Intifada (Arian 1992: 
318). Chief of Staff Dan Shomron stated publicly that the Intifada could not be solved by 
military means but only through political compromise (JP 22 February 1988: 1) and most 
Israelis agreed. For, while retaining a short-run belief in the use of force against the 
uprising, they too were becoming increasingly dovish on the long-term settlement of the 
conflict (Arian and Shamir 1988a, 1990; Arian and Ventura 1991; Goldberg, Barzilai and 
Inbar 1991; Arian 1995). This position was reinforced by the experience of the Gulf War, 
when Israel had proved vulnerable to missile attack despite holding the territories. 
Consequently, the idea that territory equalled security was further weakened in the public 
perception (Makovsky: 133).
5 According to Peres, the Yom Kippur war should have been Israel’s last war because it “made a few hard 
truths apparent to both Israel and its neighbours: war is futile, and neither the balance of power between 
warring factions nor the balance of power among international interests is a guarantee of total victory... 
Total war - on a scale of the 1948 War of Independence - is not feasible...’’.(Peres 1993:49-53).
6 By 1985 only a minority of respondents took the Begin government side in the debate surrounding the 
Lebanon war. Only 15% supported the actions taken (Arian 1995:76).
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Correspondingly, the 'land for peace' formula became more credible to Israelis, in security 
terms, following the Intifada and the Gulf War. Between 1973 and 1989 the overwhelming 
majority of Israeli Jews favoured returning nothing or only a small part of the territories 
(Arian 1995: 95-100) By 1991, only 5% expressed this opinion (Inbar 1995: 6).7 Since the 
Intifada the status quo became a less and less acceptable option (Shamir and Shamir: 10). 
The status quo could no longer be seen as advantageous, as the moral, political, military 
and economic costs of keeping the territories rose. Previously, territory had been 
associated with security but following the closure of the territories much of the population 
had come to equate separation from the territories rather than nominal control of the 
territories as enhancing security (Frankel, Kimche). By 1994 the public thought that the 
chances of war were highest in the event that the territories were annexed or if  the status 
quo was pursued, rather than in the event that a political compromise was pursued (Arian 
1995:56).
Finally, the impact of all the wars had a cumulative effect on the willingness of Israelis to 
continue confrontation when a settlement appeared to be an option. The strongest social 
dynamic restricting the use of force was this general fatigue (Golan 1993). Israeli society 
showed signs of being increasingly weary and impatient for a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Studies showed that war had a psychological toll not only on the Israeli soldiers 
who participate in battle, but on their families as well. Veteran soldiers are increasingly 
sensitive to the price of protracted conflict as a result of their experiences in war (Pines; 
Inbar 1996: 55). This fatigue was first evident in 1973 and became more pronounced after 
the 1982 war in Lebanon. Following the 1982 invasion, the Labour party included in its 
manifesto a clause requiring a large consensus before force was to be exercised. The elite 
came to recognise the cumulative weariness of Israeli society as a factor which needed to 
be taken into account in their security calculations (Maariv, 16 April 1994; Inbar 1996: 
26) Fatigue from policing the territories and confronting hostile civilian populations 
increased after the Intifada. As one Labour MK put it, “I represent the Israeli who does not 
want to serve in Gaza; but wants to sit and watch the World Cup” (JP 5 September 1994: 5).
7 This tendency was coupled by an erosion in the amount of people arguing that the Jewish right to the land 
was the primary reason for retaining territory (Arian 1995:30-1).
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On the elite level in particular, the major changes in the local, regional and international 
environment since 1987 had a major impact on attitudes. It was recognised that the 
experience of the Intifada and the results of the Gulf war had led the Palestinian camp 
more strongly in the direction of negotiations. With the political support of Arab radicals 
devalued after Saddam Hussein's defeat and the withdrawal of financial aid from the Gulf 
states and Saudi Arabia, the PLO was in a weak position. Similar changes throughout the 
Arab world did not go unnoticed in Israel. These changes at the local and regional level 
were accompanied by an extremely important change at the global level; the end of the 
Cold War. This had a dramatic effect on the region as a whole, unlocking one of the main 
factors had prevented movement towards peace since 1967. Without Soviet military and 
economic support, confrontational states such as Syria had no short-run option to achieve 
strategic parity or seriously threaten Israel militarily. Moreover, being seriously in debt, 
they needed American support which meant entering the peace process. However, the 
spread of non-conventional weapons and missiles in general gave the Arab States a 
greater ability to inflict damage on Israel’s small and concentrated population centres, 
meaning that any future war would entail a large number of Israeli civilian casualties. 
Whereas, prior to the Gulf War the IDF divided Israel up into three fronts, northern, 
central and southern commands, after the war a fourth front was added to the equation: 
the home front. This decreased the strategic utility of the use of force from the Israeli 
perspective and pushed the emphasis further in a political direction. Subsequently, by the 
early 1990s, both the mamlachtVim and conservatives recognised a 'different' Middle East 
(JR 11 July 1996) which required a greater degree of political-diplomatic initiative and 
where military force would be of less utility.
Evidence of this increased emphasis on diplomacy in Israeli foreign policy is provided by 
the initiating role played by the Foreign Ministry in the Norway negotiations. Uri Savir 
the Director General of the Foreign Ministry was not merely 'explaining' policy but 
responsible for major decisions8. The erosion in the doctrine of self-reliance has also 
become more apparent. Israel's security concept appeared to be evolving away from
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military deterrence and self reliance, towards a multi-lateral security regime that is 
sensitive to their neighbours’ security needs. Examples of this new approach outside the 
peace process include a more co-operative attitude towards regional arms control and the 
UN arms registry. Israel realised that it cannot alone deal with the challenge of weapons 
of mass destruction in the Middle East and that international co-operation was needed to 
address this issue (Inbar and Sandler 1995: 53) Hence, in 1991, Israel accepted the missile 
technology control regime (MTCR). Another example of this approach has been the 
desire for the greater involvement of third parties in the peace process. Rabin explicitly 
expressed his desire for "active American participation in the security of Israel" (YA 21 
January 1993) and Israel was also interested in the stationing of American troops on the 
Golan Heights as part of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty.
Religiosity and Particularism
Despite this trend towards normalisation, society at large remains polarised, with the 
religiously observant population retaining a greater commitment to the political culture of 
particularism and its hawkish positions (Arian 1995: 21, 178, 182, 266). 71% of the 
Orthodox Jews in Israel objected to territorial concessions compared to 38% secular Jews 
(Liebman 1993). The most extreme opposition to the Oslo Accords came from the 
religious sector. In the eyes of Gush Emunim, the agreement was illegitimate because it 
gave up Jewish control over parts of the land of Israel. Due to this, a group of Rabbis 
including the former Chief Rabbi Goren, and Rabbi Drukman ruled that according to 
Jewish law soldiers were forbidden to take part in the withdrawal from Jewish settlements 
and military bases in Judea and Samaria. This represented a challenge to the authority of 
the Israeli state which, in the eyes of many messianic religious Zionists, lost its legitimacy 
when it turned against the vision of'the whole land of Israel' (JP 11 February 1994: 6, 11 
August 1995: 10; Horowitz 1996:180; JP 25 January 1996: 6).
But not all religious opposition to Oslo stemmed from valuing the land of Israel above all 
else. Traditionally, religious Zionist had admired and co-operated with the secular
8 At a conference for Foreign Office professionals held in Israel in April 1995, Uri Savir referred to the 
changing role of the Israeli foreign ministry away from explaining policy, towards the formation of policy
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majority in Israel on the basis of the shared belief in Zionism and a recognition of the 
importance of building a Jewish presence in the land of Israel. Messianic religious- 
Zionists tolerated the secularity of mainstream Israeli leaders believing that it was all part 
of a divine dialectic leading to redemption. The agreement with Arafat called into 
question secular Zionism’s credentials. In religious eyes, Labour represented post- 
Zionism and a culture of clubs, discos, materialism and drugs. There was a sense in which 
they felt this Americanisation of Israel was endangering the Jewish as well as the Zionist 
character of the state. Consequently religious Zionists began to replace respect for the 
achievements of secular Zionism with scom for the lack of values of the secular majority 
in Israel. This represented a move towards the attitude of the ultra-Orthodox towards 
Israeli society. Most fundamentally, the legitimacy of the Oslo II agreement was 
challenged as it was only passed with the support of the Arab parties, meaning that a 
majority of Jews did not favour the move. Already in 1988, 52% of religious Israeli as 
opposed to 21% of secular Israelis questioned, thought Israel was too democratic 
(Shindler 1989: 43, 67). This, to them, was the end of Zionism. When this sensibility was 
crossed with the signing of the Oslo II agreement in the wake of terrorism, within the 
religious community, newspapers referred to the government as ’the Judenrat' and the 
police as 'Capos', denoting that they regarded Rabin and Peres as equal to those Jews who 
collaborated with the Nazis in the murder of Jews during the Holocaust (HA 1 November 
1995: 5). Extreme rabbis began to be questioned as to whether Rabin came under the 
Halachic [Jewish legal] category of Din Rodef [someone who it is permissible to kill to 
prevent him murdering someone he is pursuing], or a Moser [informer] whose 
information threatens the life of the Jewish community (HA 13 November 1995: 6A; 
Horowitz 1996:181; NYT 19 November 1995:1).
The Political Impact of the Development of Israeli Political Culture
These developments within Israeli political culture had an impact on Israel's relations 
with the United States over the Palestinian question, albeit indirectly. They were very 
influential in determining which political sub-culture governed Israel and thus which of 
the approaches described in the previous chapter was applied in practise. The impact took
as a pressure group within the policy process (JC 7 April 1995:2)
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effect through three pathways: the rise of different elites within political parties, elections 
and coalition negotiations.
The Rise of the Tendency Towards Normalisation Among the Policy Making Elite9
Changes in Labour
The Yom Kippur War was the formative event in Yossi Beilin's life. It made him lose 
faith in the Labour party’s founding generation of leaders. His anger at the government’s 
inability to grasp an opportunity for peace with Egypt in 1971 triggered Beilin’s 
involvement in politics. In particular, he rallied against Golda Meir’s concept that there 
was no such thing as the Palestinian people and that there was no opportunity for peace. 
On becoming a member of the Young Guard in Labour, he argued in favour of a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank (Beilin 1997: 21-23). Subsequently, due to his 
marginalised position, he and Chaim Ramon set up the dovish Mashov circle within the 
Labour party in 1981. It sought to break the classic political culture of Israel by proposing 
three separations: between religion and state and between the Histadrut and Kupat Cholim 
(the national health care scheme); and between Israel and the Palestinians.
Since the mid 1980s the Mashov agenda became increasingly mainstream and influential 
in the Labour party. At its party conference in 1991, Labour abandoned the red flag and 
the celebration of May Day. The party platform also backed the creation of a constitution 
for Israel which would guarantee individual rights and sought to promote a separation of 
religion and state. All the reforms greatly annoyed the Labour old guard. In particular 
they were angered by Chaim Ramon's success in reforming Health insurance, a measure 
which they thought would liquidate the Histadrut. The rise of this group of politicians 
provides the personal, institutional and ideological link between the trends toward 
normalisation, liberalisation and increased dovishness towards the Palestinian question.
9 The rise of particularism among the policy making elite is not dealt with here both because, it occurred 
mainly in the period 1967-80 and because it involved, primarily, the rise of politicians whose ideas were 
formulated in the 1930s and 1940s, that have already been described in the previous chapter.
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Mashov proposed that peace negotiations be founded on the principle of a two state 
solution involving the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories. In 1977, the Labour 
party officially decided that it would only hold negotiations with sovereign states, i.e. 
Jordan, over the future of the territories, but agreed to accept residents of the territories as 
part of any future delegation (Inbar 1991: 66). Their influence over Labour’s platform, 
especially its foreign and economic policy grew significantly after 1981. According to its 
party platform in 1984, Labour announced that it would hold negotiations with bodies that 
renounced terror and recognised Israel's right to exist, a clear reference to the PLO. In 
1986 at the Party Congress, Shimon Peres became the first Israeli Prime Minister in office 
to refer to the Palestinians as a people (Inbar 1991: 69). One of the first results o f the 
democratisation of the selection of the party list for MKs in 1988, was an increase in the 
number of doves represented among the higher echelons of the party such that, by the end 
of the 1980s, many figures within the party had become reconciled to the creation of a 
Palestinian state, while nearly all others accepted it within the confines of a Jordanian 
Confederation (Inbar 1991: 195). Indeed, this shift reflected a move which had been 
occurring within the party since 1977. Thus, whereas after 1967 the Allon Plan was the 
position of party doves and did not even become Labour's official policy until 1977, after 
then it gradually became the position of the Hawks (Inbar 1991: 92).
Changes in the Likud: Conservatism, not Radicalism
The rhetoric of Likud’s new leader Binyamin Netanyahu, owed more to the American 
neo-conservative hawks than it did to Begin's 'Holocaust' Zionism. There was no mention 
of endemic anti-Semitism. Rather, as Netanyahu wrote, “Israel must resist the... immature 
conception of the Israeli right that nothing we will say or do will make a difference to an 
implacably hostile world” (Netanyahu :359, 395). Netanyahu felt that Israel was 'part of 
the West' (Netanyahu: 121). Dore Gold one of Netanyahu’s key advisors (interview) 
stated that Netanyahu aspired to a conservative outlook and on this basis was seeking 
connections with the Christian Democrats in Germany; not something it would have been 
easy seeing Begin or Shamir doing. Indeed, this thinking represents a return to the more 
cosmopolitan approach of Jabotinsky. Thus, some of the Likud’s younger leaders have
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expressed rather liberal views about improving the position of the Israeli Arab minority in 
Israel (JR 8 September 1994:12).
Moreover, due to the influx of Sephardi Jews into the Likud, there has developed a 
conflict in the party between those interests associated with political jobs as well as social 
issues of concern to their constituents, and the ideological demands of the party 
(Zuckerman) which came to the fore in the 1990s. After the Oslo agreement, Meir 
Shitreet, a leading figure in the Likud called on the party to drop its complete land of 
Israel ideology (Economist 1994: 9). In a 1991 Maariv poll o f the Likud Central 
committee, a majority of its members were ultimately prepared to exchange some land for 
peace. 53% were prepared to withdraw from part of the Golan, 44% were prepared to cede 
parts of the West Bank and Gaza, 20% said they could accept the existence of a 
Palestinian state, while a further 34% favoured a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation 
(WJW 10 October 1991). By 1996, Netanyahu policy adviser David Bar-Ilan stated 
publicly that a Palestinian state with strictly defined limited sovereignty, including 
demilitarisation, was something Israel might be able to accept (JP 20 December 1996).
Elections and Coalitions
Polarisation and the Palestinian Question
The polarisation within Israeli political culture has been reflected in the central political 
division in Israel since 1977. In 1977 for the first time in the history of the state of Israel, 
the Labour party was in opposition and the Likud formed the government. Israeli 
commentators referred to it as a mahapach [a major turnabout], for it symbolised the end 
of Labour Zionism’s dominance of Israeli politics. The Likud never commanded the same 
degree of dominance associated with the years of Labour rule. Although it maintained a 
central position in all governments until 1992, it had to share power with the Labour party 
or former Labour politicians who did not share its vision or values in all administrations 
other than those between 1981-84 and 1990-92. This polarisation was symbolised in the 
1981 election by the fact that the Likud received 48 seats to Labour's 47, while 
subsequently Begin was only able to form a coalition government, initially, with a 
majority of one. This phenomena was also given expression through the increased support
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for fringe parties, so that while in 1981 the two largest parties obtained 95 seats, in 1988 it 
was down to 79 seats.
Increasingly in the 1980s, this polarisation came to be delineated along the question of the 
territories (Eisenstadt 1992: 109; Arian 1990: 84-7). The political homogeneity of voting 
groups in Israel increased from the 1970s through 1984 in terms of ethnicity and social 
class indicators. Since 1984, the correlation of the territories issues with the vote has been 
very high. Almost two thirds of the respondents in 1981, 1984, and 1992 thought the 
differences between the two main parties on this issue were big or very big. In 1992, even 
more than in previous elections, Israelis said that the territories would be an important 
consideration their vote (Arian 1995: 142-157). This dichotomy reflected the deeper 
underlying differences identified in the previous chapters. Along Israel's political parties 
left-right continuum there was high degree of correlation between policy approach and 
what Arian termed the people apart syndrome (Arian 1995: 178). In his study o f Israeli 
attitudes towards the future of the territories during the 1980s and early 1990s, Arian 
detecting the existence of this syndrome which contained many elements associated with 
the particularist tendency within Israeli political culture identified here (Arian 1995: 174). 
According to his analysis there was a high correlation between adherence to the people 
apart syndrome, high threat perception, and hawkish attitudes towards the Palestinian 
question. Correspondingly, those who preferred more conciliatory policy positions 
regarding the territories had high negative correlation with the people apart syndrome 
(Arian 1995:181). This correlation worked in unison with attitudes towards the respective 
values of the whole land of Israel associated with particular Jewish values, and democracy 
associated with universal human rights, to help delineate left from right in Israeli politics 
(Arian 1995: 33).
In the Israel of the 1980s and 1990s there were two powerful opposing tendencies, one 
more militant, one more conciliatory. But there was a third, middle ground group. It is 
hard to give precise estimates of the size of these groups, but it is more useful to 
understand Israeli politics by thinking of a 30 - 40 - 30 division. About one third of the 
population was convinced of the militant position, another third of the conciliatory, with 
the rest of the population floating in the middle (Arian 1995: 266). Events such as Sadat
116
coining to Jerusalem, the Intifada, and the Gulf War affected opinion generally across all 
groups the change of policy decision had an impact on all groups in the same direction. 
The shift seemed to be along the spectrum of more or less, with few individuals changing 
previous positions in a radical manner. Events often produced polarisation, but this took 
place most noticeably at the extremes of the continuum; the bulk of the population moved 
in tandem according to a more universal calculus (Arian 1995: 3). Between 1981 and 
1992 despite the polarisation and power sharing, the right-wing block maintained the 
upper hand within government policy. Correspondingly, it was their particularistic vision 
which set the agenda for debate to which other groups reacted. However, gradually, 
between 1987 and 1993 while there was a short-term tendency towards hawkishness. This 
was balanced by a long-run tendency towards dovishness, which helped Labour (Arian 
1995: 20).
The Rise of Particularism
The rise of particularism brought the Likud led coalition to power in 1977 allowing it to 
retain control of government and foreign policy until 1984. Even after that date until 
1992, the Likud was part of the government either as the dominant factor in a unity 
government including Labour (1984-90) or at the head of in a right-wing coalition (1990- 
2). The collapse of the political sub-culture of mamlachtiut was the first factor which 
provided the Likud with the opportunity to attain power. Politically, the fortunes of 
mamlachtiut, were tied up with the Labour party and with the decreased attractiveness of 
its values, the last bastion of Labour legitimacy lay in its successful foreign policy. After 
the embarrassment of being 'surprised' by the Yom Kippur War, even this legitimacy 
dissipated. The Labour party had become associated mainly with the trappings o f power 
and was saddled with an image of corruption. When the Prime Minister's wife was found 
to have an illegal bank account in 1976, this only confirmed what most Israelis already 
knew. In contrast, the entry of Herut into the national unity government in 1967 had 
increased the legitimacy of the previously unacceptable face of Israeli politics. 
Nonetheless, many of the voters who wanted to punish Labour for its failures switched to 
the Democratic Movement for Change and not to the Likud. While this grouping stayed in 
the Likud coalition until its disintegration in 1980, most of its voters returned to the
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Labour Party in 1981. The key to Begin's success lay first with the fact that the great 
majority o f Sephardi voters supported the Likud throughout the period and second in the 
fact that the religious parties, with whom any governing party needed a coalition in order 
to gain a majority in the Knesset, generally preferred coalition with the Likud, or at least a 
national unity government, over coalition with Labour.
The Sephardim
By the 1970s the Sephardim, who had come to make up about half of Israel's Jewish 
population, reached political maturity. By switching their vote from Labour to Likud, they 
helped bring about the downfall of Labour dominance and throughout the 1980s, their 
vote was crucial in maintaining the Likud in power. 70% of Sephardim supported the 
Likud in the 1977, 1981 and 1984 elections (Shindler 1989: 145). This shift of the 
Sephardi vote to the Likud, which was dramatic in 1973 and continued in 1977 was in 
part a reaction against the Labour party whom they blamed for creating the social gap and 
treating them with contempt. Under Labour with its modernising ethos, the traditional 
Sephardi culture was accorded an inferior status and the aim was to assimilate the 
Sephardim into the secular Zionist ethos. Subsequently, the Sephardim blamed Labour for 
creating the social gap and treating them with contempt. Begin appealed successfully to 
this sense of alienation. Moreover, in practical terms, the Likud offered a means of 
political and social advancement for Sephardim who had found their way blocked in the 
Labour Party (Zuckerman; Arian 1986). Nonetheless, the Sephardi vote for the Likud was 
not simply due to political alienation but also cultural alienation.
Many Sephardim never really identified with the political culture of mamlachtiut in the 
first place. Sephardim were much more traditional and thus particularistic and they 
resented the way the Labour establishment in the 1950s had ridiculed their culture and 
actively contrived to deprive of their religious traditions. They identified with the new 
civil religion, a fact which linked them to Begin, his more traditional outlook (Lewis 
1984: 31) and his more hawkish approach to foreign policy. Thus, during the 1970s and 
early 1980s polls demonstrated that Sephardim were more hawkish than Ashkenazim on 
the issues of territorial compromise and the restriction of Palestinian rights in the
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territories. The polls also demonstrated that Sephardim were more inclined to believe that 
every Arab hates Jews (Roumani: 424). Sephardim, and not only those who voted Likud, 
more than Ashkenazim continued to believe that Likud's tougher style of foreign policy is 
more likely to bring peace (Elazar: 220, Sacher: 128, Roumani: 428).
The Religious Parties
The election results in 1981, 1984 and 1988 gave both Labour and Likud a theoretical 
possibility of forming a majority coalition government of at least 61 MKs, but left the 
religious parties holding the balance of power. Although all the religious parties could go 
with either party, in practise the religious parties had a strong preference for the Likud, or 
a national unity government (NUG). The Likud's ideological commitment to the 
settlements and the whole land of Israel was an important factor in the National Religious 
party’s (NRP) preference for the party over Labour. Up to 1977 the NRP had been in 
every Labour government. But, since the Yom Kippur War the party had come under the 
increasing control of the Young Guard and the rabbis such as Chaim Drukman. Both 
these groups were strong supporters of Gush Emunim as indeed was the national religious 
public and they, and not party old guard leader Yosef Burg, had the determining say in the 
coalition negotiations. The pro-Likud position was even more strongly echoed by their 
spin-off Parties, Matzad and Tami. As far as the ultra-Orthodox10 political parties were 
concerned, the future of the territories was not the defining issue. In theory they adopted a 
flexible line, selling their political support to the highest bidder. But in practise they too 
had a preference for the Likud. To begin with, Labour had stressed its secular credentials 
and its opposition to increasing the role of religion in state and society (Elazar 1986: 6). 
In contrast Begin portrayed the image of a traditional Jew. He used traditional Jewish 
terms like the 'land of Israel' 'God willing' and 'With God's blessing' that made the ultra- 
Orthodox feel at home (Friedman 1993: 9). Thus despite their generally dovish
10 Ultra-Orthodoxy began in Eastern Europe as a reaction to the Enlightenment and modernisation, which 
they saw as a great threat to Judaism. The ultra-Orthodox reaction to this threat was to closet themselves 
away from the modem world in communities that concentrated on the study of Torah. Although the ultra- 
Orthodox were extremely factionalised, they were united by strict observance of Jewish Law and by their 
negative stance towards modernity. Initially, they opposed Zionism, both because it was a 'new' secular 
phenomena, and because they believed that the Jewish people were forbidden to return to Zion en masse as 
this would constitute an attempt to bring the Messiah without God's sanction. However, after the creation of 
the state of Israel such opposition moderated.
119
inclinations they tended to support Likud over Labour in coalition negotiations (NYT 20 
December 1988 Al).
As a consequence of the religious parties preference for Likud, Labour’s foreign policy 
options, as part of the NUG 1984-90 were limited. Without the ability to at least threaten 
a narrow coalition government including the religious parties, they could not adopt a more 
forthcoming approach to the peace process. Never was this brought out more clearly than 
in 1990 when the ultra-Orthodox parties determined not only who would govern Israel, 
but as a result of that choice, whether or not to agree to an American proposal for direct 
negotiations over the Palestinian question in Cairo. Then, the spiritual leader of ultra- 
Orthodoxy, Rabbi Shach preferred coalition with the Likud on the basis that it and its 
supporters were perceived as being more traditional and 'Jewish' than Labour. Labour 
with its universalist humanist ideology, was seen as having no interest in tradition 
whereas, Likud supporters, although they were mainly unobservant of the Torah, were 
understood to believe in a G-d and value the Jewish tradition (HA 28 March 1990: 1). 
Rabbi Shach felt that the Haredim [ultra-Orthodox Jews] had to take sides with those who 
they felt were closest to them in the Kulturkamf for the soul of Israel (JP 6 April 1990).11
Security and Territory
Another the key reason for the Likud's dominance during the 1980s was that the 
mainstream electorate did not perceive the need to choose between security, ideology and 
economic well-being. Until the Intifada most of the public preferred the status quo or 
annexation to territorial compromise (Arian and Shamir 1986: 10). Throughout the 1980s 
there was not seen to be a contradiction between settlement activity and the higher 
standard of living which most Israeli increasingly sought These tendencies were clearly 
reflected during the 1981 election campaign when Likud overtook Labour during the
11 This outlook was also reflected after the 1993 Knesset vote ratifying the Oslo Accord, when Rabbi Shach 
criticised the Labour government as, “a government whose intention it is to turn the nation of Israel into 
just another nation" (Peres 1995:286). Nonetheless, Labour would still have been able to form a narrow 
Labour government in 1990 if the two MKs from the Ultra Orthodox party, Agudat Yisrael, which opposed 
Rabbi Shach, would not have abandoned an agreement with Labour at the last moment. They refused to 
support a Peres government due to their messianism, support for the whole land of Israel and general 
hawkishness. For an analysis of this pro-Zionist grouping in the Ultra-Orthodox world see (Friedman 1985: 
208; Ravitsky 1989: 114).
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course of campaigning. Days before the election, Begin launched a successful air-strike 
on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor. Labour leader, Shimon Peres', criticism of this act 
alienated a large segment of the public which favoured such unilateral pre-emptive 
military strikes as the key to its security (Arian 1988). Also crucial was the manipulation 
of the economy by the Likud which cut import duties on items such as colour televisions 
and raised subsidies on basic goods thereby raising the 'feel good factor' among the 
electorate (Arian 1986:129; Greilsammer 1986: 88-95).
In terms of Israeli political culture, the Likud was better able to appeal to a general 
Zionist consensus which valued the use of force over diplomacy as a means of defence. 
Begin was also able to successfully suggest that one of the main aims of those who 
favoured Zionist normalisation, i.e. economic improvement, was possible while retaining 
a commitment to the particularistic Zionist ideological mission. It was only as a medium 
term result of the Intifada that the left benefited from the tendency towards normalisation, 
described above, in the 1992 election. By then the belief that commitment to a whole land 
of Israel ideology came at the expense of peace, security and economic well-being was 
becoming increasingly ingrained in the flexible centre of Israeli politics.
The 1992 election: Towards Normalisation
Within the Labour led coalition, the Jewish parties, Shas, Meretz and Labour did not 
relate to the land of Israel as a core value or to the state of Israel as part of a messianic 
process. Moreover, for the first time in the history of Israel, the Arab parties determined 
the nature of the Israeli government. For only when Labour (44 seats) and Meretz (12 
seats) combined with the Arab parties (5 seats) did the left have the blocking majority 
necessary to prevent a right-wing coalition. The fact that the Arab vote was crucial in 
determining the thrust of Israeli policy symbolised well the trend towards normalisation. 
Thus according to many commentators, the 1992 elections signalled a critical development 
in Israeli politics, a move as important as the shift from Labour to Likud in 1977. In this 
vein Leon Hadar commented that Begin's ethnonationalist Second Republic had fallen to be 
replaced by a Third Republic based on a coalition of “traditional Ashkenazi voters, secular 
Russian immigrant and disgruntled Sephardi voters who chose the Westernised secular
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progressive vision of Zionism" (Hadar 1992: 616). Indeed according to Mordechai Nisan, 
Rabin's victory symbolised the new Israeli Zeitgeist of Americanisation, individualism, 
consumerism and pragmatism, all at the expense of collectivism and Zionist ideology 
(Nissan, Lehman-Wilzag 1995). Certainly this is what the religious parties suspected, given 
that all of them supported Shamir for Prime Minister over Rabin prior to the election (Inbar 
1995: 3). Yet this analysis is somewhat exaggerated. The left in Israel obtained 61 seats in 
the Knesset to the right's 59, which hardly constituted a massive swing towards a new Israel, 
especially given that just 8 months before the election the Likud was a long way ahead in 
the polls. Nonetheless, Rabin's election victory did symbolise a trend in Israeli political 
culture towards the idea of Israel as a normal country, the state of its citizens, and away 
from the idea of an Israel still on an ideological mission to fulfil the Zionist goal of 
controlling all of Eretz Israel.
In 1992, economics and personal security were the issues that made at least some former 
supporters of the Likud amenable to changing their vote (Arian 1995:138). Rabin's 
campaign slogans related to these core issues and hence tapped into this stream within 
Israeli political culture. It was this that enabled him to win over the crucial middle ground 
from Likud to Labour. One of Labour's key election slogans called for a 'reordering of 
national priorities.' In particular, Labour criticised the Likud for spending vast sums of 
money on settlements instead of using the funds inside Israel to help under privileged 
development towns or Russian immigrants. In fact, since 1983 (Falk) a clear majority of 
Israelis selected the budget for settlement in the territories as the sector which should be cut 
first in any austerity programme. However, it was not a practical political question until the 
Likud's refusal to acquiesce to American demands for a freeze in settlement activity in 
return for $10 billion in loan guarantees that would have gone towards helping the 
absorption of Russian immigrants. As a result, Russian immigrants voted 3-1 in favour of 
Labour over the Likud, with 47% of immigrants voting for Labour and a further 11% for the 
left wing coalition Meretz (Reich and Wurmser: 141). Initially the Russians had favoured 
the Likud, perceiving Labour as an ideological remnant of socialism. However, by the 
elections, the Russians had come to see the Likud as the party of an outdated ideology 
which was preventing them from leading a life at a higher standard of living in Israel. After 
all, the vast majority of Russian immigrants came to Israel for a better material life and not
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out of any ideological conviction. Thus despite the fact that 46% of Russian immigrants 
opposed territorial compromise, nearly 60% of Russians voted for parties who favoured it 
(Reich and Wurmser: 141).
Winning the nucleus of Sephardim away from the Likud was crucial to Labour's success 
in 1992 (Arian 1995:135). Among Sephardi voters in development towns Labour also 
increased its vote, from 23% to 31% while the Likud's share fell from 35% to 30% (Smooha 
1993a: 453). It was the Sephardim who had brought the Likud to power and now they 
played a crucial part in the Likud's downfall. Labour's argument for a change in national 
priorities resonated with Sephardim in development towns who felt that they were losing 
out at the expense of ideological settlements, a feeling compounded by the way in which 
David Levy was seen to be treated within the Likud hierarchy (Inbar 1995: 5; Frankel 325). 
Already in 1984, Torgovnik (74) noted that Sephardim who were bom in Israel and who 
were better educated were less inclined to see the Likud as the party best able to handle 
the economy and hence as less able to govern. Similarly, the same group of Sephardim 
showed twice the likelihood of identifying with Labour's attitude to the territories than 
their less educated brethren. This tendency provided the foundation for the Sephardi 
swing towards post-Zionism and Labour in 1992.
Rabin's security position also resonated with the core consensus among the electorate. 
Rabin's approach was one which put the security of the state of Israel and its citizens above 
all other considerations, such as the morality of the left 'not ruling over another people' or 
the ideology of the right, 'the whole Land of Israel."2 The group that shifted to Labour from 
1988 to 1992 was much more conciliatory regarding the future of the territories and were 
other groups of voters (Arian 1995:137). Prior to the 1988 election a significant amount 
of the electorate remained undecided and Labour party pollsters believed that there was a 
close correlation between the amount of terrorist attacks during the campaign and support 
for the right or the left. Significantly, Labour's projected share of the vote was falling in 
1988 as the election took place in the wake of terror attacks. By 1992, the public’s
12 Thus, in 1994 the public was less concerned with symbolic issues of Palestinian national identity than 
with security issues. Thus 67% supported the issue of Palestinian money and stamps 67% associated with 
Palestinian sovereignty; whereas only 20% favoured giving the Palestinians control over border crossings 
20% (Arian 1995:108).
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perception had changed. As one Likud minister put it, “The public doesn't want to be 
knifed. It cares less about where the border is than the fact that it exists and the Arabs are on 
the other side” (Makovsky: 89). Subsequently, Rabin’s idea of 'separation' as the basis for 
an Israeli-Palestinian peace carried with it great resonance. Rabin’s security orientated 
campaign tapped into these changing mainstream attitudes by accentuating the difference 
between, retention of territory and ideology on the one hand, and security on the other. 
Unlike the Likud, Rabin contrasted his support for security settlements with his opposition 
to 'ideological settlements'. These, he suggested, endangered Israeli security by causing an 
unnecessary strain in US-Israeli relations. As Rabin declared "I am unwilling to give up a 
single inch of Israeli security, but I am willing to give up many inches of settlements and 
territory, as well as 1 700 000 Arab inhabitants, for the sake of peace. We seek a territorial 
compromise that will bring peace and security; a lot of security." (JP 1 June 1992). In his 
television debate with Rabin, Shamir's declared his opposition to a withdrawal from Gaza 
on the basis it was part of 'the Land of Israel'. Such positions lost the Likud votes they had 
won in 'yuppie' North Tel Aviv area during the local elections and in 1988 (Makovsky: 86). 
In contrast, one of Labour's slogans declared, 'For the sake of Israeli security, the Likud 
must go' (Inbar 1995: 32). While another showed Rabin flanked by five ex-Generals on the 
Labour list, entitled 'Security is us.' (MECS 1992: 507).
Conclusion
The swing towards universalism thus permitted a more dovish foreign policy to be pursued 
in the 1990s. Nonetheless, Israel remained a polarised culture caught between the universal- 
particular dichotomy. One of the key developments in the last 30 years has been that the 
nature of this dichotomy has changed. Previously, the Zionist mission provided the 
framework for political discourse. Interests were defined in terms of classical Zionist ideals 
such as settling the land of Israel, state-building, or being a light unto the nations. Recently, 
political discourse has been set in a post-Zionist framework. Israeli interests are now 
generally defined in terms of economic well-being and security. The word Zionism in Israel 
has taken on a connotation of empty rhetoric. That is not to say that the majority of Israelis, 
including the elite, no longer think of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, rather it is a
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symptom of the fact that that goal has been achieved and that consequently attention has 
turned to more mundane matters.
This chapter identified the indirect influence of Israeli political culture on Israel's foreign 
relations. It examined the impact of cultural trends on elections and the process of 
coalition-building which defined who rules and thus who sets the policy agenda and 
conducts foreign relations. The second section of this thesis will examine the direct 
impact of the existential and instrumental values of the Israeli political elite, whilst in 
government, on relations with the United States over the Palestinian question 1981-96.
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Chapter 5: ‘The Radicalism of Stvle and Substance’ in Israel’s
Relations with the US over the Palestinian Question 1981-83 
Introduction
This chapter will focus on the impact of the political sub-culture of radicalism through the 
values of the main policy makers, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, on Israel’s 
relations with the United States over the Palestinian question. From the election in 1981 
Prime Minister Begin and Defence Minister Sharon backed by Chief-of-StafF Raful Eitan 
were the key foreign policy actors until Sharon’s resignation as Minister of Defence in 
February 1983 and Begin's resignation in September of that year. With the resignations of 
Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman from their respective posts as Foreign Minister and 
Minister of Defence at the end of Begin's first term, Begin lacked any military advice of 
high standing from within the Cabinet other than from the radical Sharon. As a result, 
Sharon was able to play on Begin's high regard for the military, his predilection for the 
use of force, his unilateralism and his hatred of the PLO in order to gain Prime Ministerial 
support for his ambitious policy design in Lebanon. Consequently, Israeli policy in this 
period reflected a combination of the values of Labour activism associated with Sharon 
and the those of neo Revisionism associated with Begin, which added up to the 
‘radicalism of substance and style’. The key existential value within this approach, which 
brought Israel into conflict with American policy, was the belief in the whole land of 
Israel. Similarly, the existential and instrumental belief in the use of military force, in 
defiance and unilateral action, also played a large role in defining the nature of Israel's 
relationship with the United States.
The Background: Camp David and the Autonomy Talks
Unlike Judea and Samaria, Sinai was not considered by Begin or the Likud as part of the 
historic land of Israel. Thus, the withdrawal from Sinai did not impinge on their core 
values. Indeed, one of the key objectives of negotiations with Egypt was to advance the 
integration of Judea and Samaria into the state of Israel in the future (Weizman: 151). At 
Camp David, the US was particularly keen to link any peace treaty with a resolution of
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the Palestinian problem including an eventual Israeli withdrawal. But Begin succeeded in 
preventing this. Nonetheless, Begin still had to deal with the Palestinian question in some 
way or form. True to his ideology he suggested autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea and 
Samaria, a version of which was included in the Camp David Accords. According to the 
Accords, Egypt, Israel and Jordan would lay ground rules for Palestinian elections to a 
self-governing authority and lay down guidelines for defining the authority's powers. 
Once the authority was established, a transitional five year period would ensue during 
which Israel would withdraw to specific security locations and dismantle the military 
government. Third, not later than three years after the interim period had commenced, 
Israel, Egypt, Jordan and elected representatives from the territories would enter talks on 
the final status of the territories.
The Accords left the Likud in a strong position to pursue its territorial goals. Since there 
was no compulsion for the sides to reach agreement on final status issues after five years 
of autonomy, Israel could simply refuse Arab demands and continue to control the 
territories. As Eliyahu Ben Ellisar, the director-general of the Prime Minister's office at 
the time explained, "we can live very comfortably with the current situation till the end of 
days. There will be a de facto annexation. That is after five years when both sides will 
disagree, the situation would mean that things stayed the same in Israel's favour” (Quandt: 
136). Two months after the ratification of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in March 1979, 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt over autonomy commenced. But by early 1982 
negotiations had collapsed. As a result of Begin's overall approach to autonomy, Foreign 
Minister Dayan and Defence Minister Weizman resigned from the government, thereby 
severely weakening its centrist component. While the new Reagan administration did not 
want the talks to collapse, the priorities of Haig and Reagan lay elsewhere. Unlike for 
Carter, for Reagan, Middle East peace, was not a policy priority. Consequently, despite 
the State Department’s continued efforts to bring the PLO (Sicherman: 55) and Jordan 
into the peace process, the new administration did not invest a lot of effort into this. It had 
a more limited view of the autonomy negotiations between Israel and Egypt, whereby 
they served as a means to strengthen the Egyptian-Israeli pro-American axis. For Reagan 
and Haig, the building of a strategic consensus against the Soviet Union in the region was 
a priority, not peace. This emphasis proved a good environment for the Begin government
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to pursue its own agenda over the Palestinian question.
Israeli Radicalism and American Neo-Conservatism 1981-83
Both Begin and Sharon considered unilateralism as a legitimate and correct policy 
strategy. They expected the US to toe the line and let Israel get on with pursuing its own 
interest, in the belief that this was ultimately in the American interest too. In this sense, 
they were both prisoners of their values system. As a senior US official commented, "if he 
(Begin) did something outrageous and we kept quiet, he would say, ‘obviously the 
Americans don't object or they would have said something.' If we did protest, he would 
throw a tantrum and complain loudly about American interference in Israel's affairs... 
Begin was constantly breaking the outer limits of how far he could go in trying 
Washington patience. But he still operated from the premise that there were limits. Sharon 
seems to believe that no matter what he does, the United States will have no choice other 
than to go along" (WP 7 January 1986). Nonetheless, they recognised, at least formally, 
the need to obtain US support and acceptance for their plans.
The Begin-Sharon concept of US-Israeli relations hinged on tapping into streams of 
American political culture to sell the idea of American support for Israel. The first idea 
Begin and Sharon sought to sell was that Israel was the most reliable US ally in the 
Middle East; a strategic asset in the cold war. In return for unshakeable Israeli support on 
East - West questions globally and in the region, they expected American ‘understanding' 
regarding Israeli policy in the peace process. They hoped this deal would ensure non­
interference by the US in Israel's attempt to gradually incorporate the territories into 
Israel. This was the Israeli concept of the strategic memorandum of understanding signed 
in 1981. Begin and Sharon assumed that the United States would be prepared to supply 
Israel with military hardware, political support and economic assistance, while allowing 
Israel to basically pursue its foreign policy without interference.
Fortunately for Begin and Sharon, the new American President was receptive to this idea. 
Thus Ronald Reagan, during his election campaign (WP 15 August 1979) referred to 
Israel in the following terms: "The fall of Iran has increased Israel’s value as perhaps the
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only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely. It 
has the democratic will, national cohesion, technical capacity and military fervour to 
stand firmly as America's trusted ally." President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig 
looked at the Middle East primarily through East-West lenses. For them, the containment 
of the Soviet Union in the region took precedence over the need to advance the Peace 
Process. Haig sought strategic consensus among American allies in the region prior to any 
peace agreement. He hoped that states such as Saudi Arabia and Israel could form part of 
an containment strategy prior to peace agreements. From the American point of view, 
Haig saw Israel as performing a proxy role for US interests in the Third World in a 
similar manner to the role that the Cubans played for the USSR (Melman and Raviv 1994: 
200-2; Novik 1984). Moreover, this cold war perspective led Reagan towards Begin’s 
analysis of the Palestinian question. Thus during the 1980 election campaign, Reagan 
referred to the PLO as a terrorist organisation, opposed to the West through its ties to the 
USSR, which did not really represent the Palestinians (Peck: 16-7).
Apart from attempting to build a strategic relationship with the United States, the Begin 
government tried to build on Labour's success in linking Israel to American values. In 
Reagan and the neo-conservatives the Likud found an audience which identified with the 
Likud’s tendency towards conservative realism and professed economic liberalism. More 
importantly, however, was the cultural affiliation. In the neo-conservative image, liberal 
democracy was a product of a particularly Western culture of which not everyone could 
easily and quickly become a member. Neo-Conservatives identified Israel as part of the 
West, part of the civilised Judeo-Christian tradition, in contrast to the backward dictatorial 
Arab regimes. Israel was regarded as 'us', the Arabs as 'them'. As Reagan put it, "there is 
no nation like us except Israel" (Golden: 424). Most of all Begin was able to gain a 
special relationship with the US and in particular President Reagan due to their shared 
obsession with the Holocaust (Melman and Raviv 1994: 189). Reagan shared the neo­
conservative belief that the West had let down the Jewish people during World War II. 
Consequently, he felt a particularly strong personal and political commitment to the 
security of Israel. As he explained, "My dedication to the preservation of Israel was 
strong. The Holocaust I believe, left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that 
what happened to the Jews never happens again" (Reagan: 410). As a result, Reagan was
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particularly susceptible to Begin’s Holocaust rhetoric and hence was disinclined to 
pressure Israel. This tendency, combined with his cold war view of the Middle East, 
worked to the benefit the Likud, shielding it from the opposition of members of the 
administration such as Secretary of State for Defence Casper Weinberger (Melman and 
Raviv 1984: 221).
The Radicals, Reagan and Settlement Activity
In the pre-state period, the Labour movement had used settlements as a means of 
establishing the borders of the state of Israel, while the Revisionists had been scornful of 
such tactics. This traditional indifference towards settlement as a tool of foreign policy 
was reflected in the fact that Herut were not the progenitors of the expansion of 
settlements during this time, nor did Likud voters make up the body of settlers between 
1977 and 1981. In fact, the two major forces behind the expansion of settlements in the 
years 1977-84 were the messianic religious Zionists of Gush Emunim and their mentor in 
the government, Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon.
Between 1967 and 1977, under Labour, the population of the occupied territories reached 
3200. The vast majority of these settlements where situated along the Jordan Valley or 
around Jerusalem, in areas deemed crucial to the security of the state of Israel by the 
Allon Plan. Regions such as Samaria, where there was a high population density of Arabs, 
where ruled out of bounds to Jewish settlement. Labour’s limited settlement activity was 
predicated upon future territorial compromise whereby the majority of the territory would 
be returned to Arab control (Efrat: 141). By way of contrast, Minister of Agriculture 
Sharon and the Head of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) Matti Drobles, adopted 
the Gush Emunim settlement plan which aimed to settle 750 000 Jews all over the 
territories. The plan was aimed to prevent territorial compromise and to ensure Jewish 
sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, rather than obtaining additional security for 
the state of Israel within its 1967 boundaries. Begin signalled the government's intention 
when in 1977 he visited the illegal settlement Elon Moreh, and declared, "there will be 
many more Elon Morehs" (Peleg: 113). As a result, forty settlements were set up with 
Cabinet help by Amana, the settlement wing of Gush Emunim. All of these were located
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in the central massif of Samaria where the bulk of the Arab population resided 
(Efrat:141). By 1981 there were an estimated 16 119 settlers in the occupied territories 
(Sandler: 212). Sharon, who had taken charge of the Settlement agenda 1977-81, had 
succeeded in virtually tripling the settler population. Subsequently, in 1983 the WZO 
came up with a new plan over which Sharon had significant influence. The plan aimed to 
increase the number of settlers by building dormitory towns close to Israel proper, 
providing cheap housing for non-ideological Israelis. This type of suburban settlement 
differed from early agricultural and communal settlement. Sharon hoped that the 
expansion of infrastructure linking these settlements to Israel would further strengthen 
Israel's grip on the territory. Under this scheme the number of settlers in the occupied 
territories increased to an estimated 44 146 by 1984 (Efrat: 148).
Although historical right was the driving force behind settlement, traces of the Labour 
activist security approach were evident in the pattern of settlement. Sharon argued that his 
preference for the expansion of settlements in Western Samaria was predicated on two 
security considerations. First, the need to control the strategic high ground in the 
territories. Second, the need to stop the linking up of Israeli Arabs with Palestinians in the 
West Bank (Sharon: 356-7). In order to help facilitate this vision, Sharon greatly 
expanded land expropriation in the West Bank such that between 1977 and 1984 500 000 
dunam of land were expropriated by the Israeli government, compared to 35 000 dunam 
under Labour 1967-77 (Sacher: 97).
United States policy on Israeli settlements in the territories was clear and consistent under 
the Carter administration. The settlements were considered illegal under international law 
as well as harmful to the peace process. In contrast, President Reagan asserted that 
settlements were not illegal and that consequently the West Bank was open to all people - 
Arab and Israeli alike (Peck: 33; Quandt 1993: 377). The State Department tried to 
balance this by adding that it did not consider the building of settlements to be helpful to 
the peace process. But, as distinct from the Carter administration, there was an absence of 
any comment by the administration about Israel’s settlement policy during its first year 
and a half of office. On being questioned about this, Haig replied that he wanted to 
emphasise that the policy of the Reagan administration was not to indulge in public
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criticism of long standing friends and allies (Peck: 33). Indeed, “according to American 
officials, Mr Haig was said to feel that, strategic reality made local issues such as 
problems of Israeli settlements on the West Bank... of secondary importance" (NYT 23 
February 1981). Thus, the administration did little to dampen the Begin government's 
enthusiasm for building settlements and when the final Sinai withdrawal took place in 
April 1982, Defence Minister Sharon was able to pledge a new scheme to expand West 
Bank and Gaza settlements, safe in the knowledge that his government did not have to 
worry seriously about how the United States might react (Peck: 35).
The Village Leagues: Autonomy Minus
On November 8 1981 the Begin government took one step closer to the annexation of the 
territories. Military order 947 established a civilian administration in the territories in 
place of the military administration. The civilian administration was an attempt to 
transform the temporary system of occupation into a permanent one. The new 
administration was the brainchild of Menachem Milson, a Labour activist and former 
member of Sharon’s Unit 101(Sacher: 59). He sought to counter the threat of increased 
support for the PLO in the West Bank. Whereas the Dayan system of administration had 
been predicated on minimal interference in the affairs of the Arab population, Milson’s 
approach called for greater intervention via a carrot and stick approach which sought to 
encourage a new rival leadership in the West Bank through the Village Leagues. 
Subsequently, Sharon and Milson implemented a crackdown against West Bank 
universities and dismissed most of the mayors elected in the 1976 election. The PLO’s 
national guidance committee was outlawed and the harassment and humiliation of the 
population increased dramatically (Sandler: 223-8; Peleg: 129). The implementation of 
Milson’s plan was thus a reflection of the instrumental values of Labour activism which 
saw such forceful means as the key to any political settlement.
Although the administration complained to Israel about some of the excesses involved in 
carrying out this policy it ultimately defended Israel against criticism in the UN Security 
Council, thereby enabling Israel to carry out its objectives without interference. Thus, 
after the riots which followed the Israeli authorities dissolution of the town council of El
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Bireh on the West Bank, in which three Palestinians were killed, the administration, while 
deploring the loss of life, placed part of the blame on the government of Jordan (Peck: 
36). On 2 April the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution which called on 
Israel to rescind its decision on the El Bireh Council and on the removal of the mayors of 
Nablus and Ramalah who sympathised with the PLO. The United States exercised its veto 
against this resolution. Again for Haig, Israel's activity in the territories were secondary to 
the need to obtain strategic consensus against Soviet infiltration into the region. From this 
perspective what Israel did or did not do in the territories was not of vital importance to 
the US. While American indifference to the Village Leagues scheme allowed it to 
function, it could not ensure its success. The radicals belief in the scheme was a symptom 
of the leadership’s belief in the shallowness and weakness of Palestinian nationalism. To 
them the Palestinian movement was not a must and could be replaced. When the scheme 
failed due to lack of Palestinian support (Peleg: 129-133), Begin did not abandon this 
position. Instead, the radicals attributed its inability to take hold to a lack of power on 
Israel’s part vis-a-vis the PLO. Consequently, the attractiveness of a war in Lebanon as an 
alternative means to crush the PLO (whose headquarters were in Lebanon) rose 
substantially.
The Invasion of Lebanon: Elite Values. Plans and Objectives
Since the relocation of the PLO from Jordan to Lebanon in the early 1970s, the population 
of the north of Israel had been subjected to a near continuous barrage of rocket attacks 
from PLO forces operating with virtual impunity from Lebanese territory. In 1978, Israel 
undertook a limited reprisal action called 'Operation Litani' which sought to sweep PLO 
Katusha launchers out of south Lebanon and thus out of range of Israeli towns and 
villages in the northern Galilee. The operation was only a limited success and the rocket 
attacks continued to keep Israeli citizens of towns like Kiryat Shmoneh in their bomb 
shelters for long periods of time. On 28 July 1981 Israel renewed air strikes on PLO 
strongholds in southern Lebanon. The PLO responded with a barrage of Katusha rockets 
that temporarily depopulated the north of Israel. Subsequently, Begin agreed to a ceasefire 
brokered by the American State Department’s Special Envoy, Philip Habib. As it turned 
out, the terms of the ceasefire contained the seeds of war. First, the terms of the ceasefire
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were interpreted differently by both sides. The PLO saw the ceasefire as demanding only 
a ban on cross-border attacks. Israel interpreted the ban as covering an attack by any PLO 
faction worldwide. Second, the terms of the agreement, far from removing the PLO threat 
to Israel, actually increased it because it did not call for the removal of PLO artillery from 
southern Lebanon. Worse for the radicals, by being party to an agreement with the PLO, 
they had helped to increase the prestige of the PLO internationally. Subsequently, Begin 
and Sharon became convinced that Israel had no alternative but to use military force to 
drive out Palestinian terrorism from Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 35-8).
Two invasion plans were put forward. ‘Little Pines’, called for an Israeli invasion of up to 
40 kilometres of Lebanese territory, in order to push Palestinian Katusha rockets out of 
range of Israeli settlements in the north of the country. ‘Big Pines’, already favoured by 
Sharon when he entered Office as Minister of Defence in August 1981, called for a much 
larger military offensive and entry into Beirut; a policy Dayan and Weizman had opposed 
(Peleg: 147). The plan (Benziman:231-2) was based, in part, on logistics for such an 
attack drawn up by the Chief-of-Staff Raful Eitan. As early as 25 June 1982 Sharon 
defined the aims of ‘Big Pines’ as: the elimination of the PLO, the removal of the Syrian 
army from Lebanon and a peace treaty with Lebanon (Silver: 28). Sharon sort to help 
Israel’s Christian allies, the Phalange, set up a new government in Lebanon that would 
sign a peace treaty with Israel. This was also supposed to lead to the evacuation of Syrian 
troops from the country (Benziman: 231; Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 42). As Labour activists 
Sharon and Eitan believed firmly in the power of the daring military offensive to 
restructure political reality. Such thinking had been apparent in the Likud from the mid 
1970s. Limited military operations, it was argued, neither deterred the PLO from 
attacking Israel not prevented it from planning and organising attacks. Instead, the Likud 
called for military force to be deployed against terrorists at all times, and not just in 
response to attacks; they also argued that Israel's military might should be used in a broad 
gauge operation designed to put a stop, instantly and for long duration, to the problem of 
PLO terrorist activity emanating from Lebanon (Barzillai 1996).
But the focus of ‘Big Pines’ was not simply aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and the 
Lebanese sphere. Rather the radicals saw an invasion as an opportunity to crush
134
Palestinian nationalism and ensure Jewish control of Judea and Samaria. In this vein, in 
early July 1982, Eitan told officers at the front line, “Our war here is a war over Eretz 
Yisrael, not over Beirut and not for the Christians...The fighting has created a once in a 
generation opportunity to change conditions in our favour in the struggle over Eretz 
Yisrael” (Sofer: 229; Barzilai:143). Following Camp David, the Palestinian question had 
received heightened international attention and the PLO was receiving greater 
recognition, for example from the EEC in the Venice declaration of 1980. As a result of 
this process radicals like Sharon saw, "a distinct danger that UN resolution 242 would be 
modified as demanded by the PLO. Instead of talking about refugees, it would talk about 
the ‘legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Operation peace for the Galilee will 
remove this menace" (Hart: 445-7). Thus the Operation aimed at crushing the PLO not 
only militarily, but politically too. Indeed, as a result of the Operation, it was expected 
that the PLO would fall under Syrian control and lose independence or possibly turn its 
attention towards turning Jordan into a Palestinian state. Sharon sought to facilitate such a 
policy turn by promoting the depopulation of the territories in an attempt to create an 
influx of Palestinians into Jordan that would cause King Hussein’s regime to fall 
(Garfinkle 1992: 102). Taken together these measures would, it was hoped, relieve 
pressure on Israel to create a Palestinian state in the territories (Peleg: 149; Schiff and 
Ya’ari 1985: 260, 267-8, 300; Naor: 274). Subsequently, this defeat was supposed to 
trigger a loss of support for the PLO in the territories, facilitating the emergence of a more 
pliable leadership that would accept the very limited form of autonomy on offer. This 
would provide Israel with 30 years of supremacy in Judea and Samaria in which it could 
take the opportunity to establish enough settlements to make annexation a forgone 
conclusion (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 43).
Furthermore, as Israeli academics Avner Yaniv and Yehoshua Porat have argued, the 
invasion of Lebanon was actually designed to strengthen the hand of the extremists in the 
PLO, in an attempt to destroy the PLO as a potential diplomatic partner for Israel. By 
adhering to the 1981 ceasefire the PLO had enhanced its potential as a possible 
negotiating partner. Consequently as Porat wrote, "If the PLO has agreed to and 
maintained a ceasefire it might agree in the future to a more general political settlement 
and maintain this agreement too” (Peleg: 153). Obviously, the terms of such an agreement
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would involve territorial compromise and probably the setting up of a Palestinian state in 
those territories, both of which contradicted the government’s existential and instrumental 
values. As Joel Marcus a journalist for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz put it, "As Israel does not 
want the PLO as a partner for talks, the supporters of confrontation with the PLO hold 
that the logical continuation of the struggle in the occupied territories, is in Lebanon" 
(Ball and Ball: 120).
But for the radicals it was not only about restructuring the Middle East and annexing the 
land of Israel, but also about securing Jewish survival and exorcising the ghosts of the 
Holocaust. Instinctively, Begin conceived of the invasion of Lebanon through the 
Holocaust symbol. In the summer of 1982 in an address to the Israeli national security 
College, Begin declared that Lebanon was a,' war of choice' a preventative war against the 
PLO (Sofer: 202). He equated it with France's failure to engage in a war of choice against 
Nazi Germany in March 1936 over the German re-militarisation of the Rhineland. Israel, 
he asserted, should not make the same fatal mistake. As he explained, "It is by no means 
imperative that war should only be waged only out of want of alternative. There exists no 
moral precept whereby a nation must or may fight only when it has its back to the sea. 
Such a war is liable to precipitate a disaster, if not a Holocaust, on the entire nation, 
causing a terrible loss of life" (Barzilai 1996: 143). The alternative to the war, Begin told 
the Cabinet, was another Treblika (Segev 1993: 399).
For Begin, the war was an attempt to destroy an existential threat to Israel and the Jewish
people, as well as a kind of opportunity to re-fight the Nazis and win, or at least avenge
the victims of the Holocaust by defeating what he saw as their modem day incarnation:
the PLO. Thus, during the siege of Beirut, Begin reportedly told President Reagan:
"I feel as a prime minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing 
Berlin, where, among innocent civilians, Hitler and his henchmen hide in 
the bunker deep below the surface. My generation, dear Ron, swore on the 
altar of God that whoever proclaimed his intent to destroy the Jewish state 
or the Jewish people, or both, seals his fate, so that what happened from 
Berlin - with or without inverted commas - will never happen again" (JP 3 
August 1982).
The analogy between the Holocaust and the war went still further. Begin claimed that
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Israel had a moral obligation to enter Lebanon and protect the Maronite Christians, “I 
want to tell you", declared Begin, "that we are a Jewish state, with our experiences and 
under no circumstances are we going to acquiescence in the Syrian attempt to reduce the 
Christians in Lebanon in the 1980s to the state of the Jews of Europe in the 1940s" (Schiff 
and Ya’ari 1985:25, Yaniv: 29).
There is much evidence to suggest that the real architect of the invasion of Lebanon was 
Sharon1. Yet although Begin lacked a formal military training, the plan resonated well 
with Begin's value system. The neo-Revisionist preference for the use of military force for 
existential and instrumental reasons fuelled Begin's enthusiasm for Operation 'Big Pines'. 
Already in the 1950s, Herat believed that an Israeli initiated war could enable Israel to 
quash the Arabs states and achieve three principal aims: Arab regimes would be toppled 
and a political alliance formed with minorities, such as the Christian Maronites in 
Lebanon; Israeli sovereignty would be extended over more of Eretz Israel, and the Arabs 
states would have to consent to peace with Israel (Barzilai 1996: 30). For this policy to 
succeed, they argued that Israel must be prepared to pay a high price, both in terms of loss 
of life and in terms of the US reaction (Barzilai 1996: 129).
The Role of the United States; Israeli-American Collusion
Sharon seemed to have a compulsion to humiliate the United States
Former US Ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis, (Puschel:
65)
According to Schiff and Ya’ari (1985: 63),"Washington's most bitter and consistent 
complaint was that the Begin government had the infuriating habit of pulling surprises." 
This time however, both Begin and Sharon recognised, at least in a formal sense the need
1 During several key stages of the war Sharon managed to direct policy without previous reference to the 
Prime Minister or Cabinet. The Cabinet opposed ‘Big Pines’ and Begin appeared initially committed to 
‘Little Pines’ only. In contrast Sharon unswervingly adhered to the big plan. It has been suggested that 
Sharon deliberately misled the Cabinet and Begin over the launching of the war by suggesting they were 
only implementing ‘Little Pines’ (Benziman 232; Melman and Raviv 1994:219; Naor: 29,308; Schiff and 
Ya’ari 1985: 37; Silver:226-231; Sofer 230-232; HA 5 November 1997).
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to inform Washington of their intentions in Lebanon. For Israel would need American 
support as an insurance policy against the fighting spreading to the Golan Heights which 
would involve Syria and thus possibly Soviet forces. Moreover, Begin was aware of the 
importance of great power support. Without it in 1956 Israel had to return the Sinai, while 
with it in 1967 Israel was able to retain the territories. Indeed, just prior to the invasion 
Begin noted Ben Gurion’s dictum that it was essential for any Israeli government to have 
a great power on its side if it intended to launch a war (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 27).
Nonetheless, the Likud government was not looking to co-ordinate policy with 
Washington, it merely sought to receive a green light to act unilaterally; American 
insurance, without American interference. As Sharon explained just prior to the war, "I 
came to Washington not to get American approval for whatever we decided to do, but to 
let them know as friends and allies exactly where we stood” (Sharon: 451). Begin made it 
even clearer to the Americans that their political interference was not wanted. After 
Sharon had informed the Americans of Israeli intentions, Haig wrote to Begin urging 
Israel to exercise 'complete restraint'. Begin responded in a manner that epitomised his 
proud and defiant approach to relations with America, "Mr Secretary", he wrote, "the man 
has not been bom who will ever obtained from me consent to let Jews be killed by a blood 
thirsty enemy" (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985).
Initially, Sharon hoped that the Memorandum of Understanding would serve as the form 
whereby Defence Secretary Weinberger and the Pentagon would come to accept Israeli 
freedom of action in Lebanon, in return for strategic co-operation in Africa (Schiff and 
Ya’ari 1985: 64; Schoenbaum: 274; Sharon: 408-414). However, there was strong 
opposition to such thinking in the American State Department and the Defence 
Department (Weinberger: 98; Haig: 341). When this tactic failed, Sharon switched his 
target to winning over Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Sharon tried to tap into Haig’s 
cold war hawkish mindset by arguing that the weakening of the PLO and Syrian forces in 
Lebanon would be a victory for the United States against Soviet backed forces in the 
region. According to a member of the National Security Council, Haig already saw things 
in these terms in May 1981 when he had spoken about the desirability of'neutralising the 
PLO' in Lebanon (Melman and Raviv 1994: 216). Haig was also favourably disposed to
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using Israel as a strategic surrogate as Sharon suggested. Moreover, like Sharon and 
Begin, he saw military force as the key instrumental value (Silver: 225; Schiff and Ya’ari 
1985: 71). Consequently, the Israeli effort to obtain American acquiescence for their plan 
to invade Lebanon focused around obtaining cover in Washington from Alexander Haig.
Between October 1981 and May 1982, the Israeli government made numerous efforts to 
clear the way for the invasion primarily by briefing Haig.2 In late May, Sharon was in 
Washington when he told Haig using defiant language, "we cannot hold back anymore... 
War could break out at any minute. We cannot live under the threat of Palestinian 
terrorism from Beirut. It is a dilemma for us, but we don't see any other way of handling it 
than going in and cleaning them out.” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 103). Haig replied that he 
expected Israel to show restraint, to which Sharon responded, "no country has the right to 
tell another how best to protect its citizens" (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 73). Haig then said 
that if Israel went in it would have to be quick and in response to an internationally 
recognised major provocation. Sharon was happy with this outcome as it represented the 
cover he was looking for. Realising he had given the Israeli the impression that they could 
act with impunity, Reagan made Haig write a letter on 28 May in which he spoke of 
‘absolute restraint' as a necessity. But it was understood by all in the know that such 
warnings actually constituted tacit approval for Israeli actions as there was no threat of 
sanctions against Israel in the event of war (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 75). As Haig told 
Sharon later, "we understand your aims. We can't tell you not to defend your interest" 
(Kimche: 145; HA 4 Jan 1998).
Begin and Sharon did not need more than that, they were not concerned with the lack of 
clarity. Nor did they need the whole administration support as all they wanted was cover. 
Indeed, it was partly to hedge against the possibility of opposition within the
2 In October 1981, Begin had informed Haig of ‘Little Pines’ to which Haig responded, "if you move, you 
move alone... Unless there is a major internationally recognised provocation the United States will not 
support such an action” (Haig: 326-7). In December 1981, Sharon presented ‘Big Pines’ to a shocked Habib 
and William Brown, the American charge d’affairs in Israel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 66-7). In January 
1982 the chief of military intelligence, General Saguy, tried to get the US to recognise the PLO ceasefire as 
pertaining not only to the Israel-Lebanon border, but a worldwide ceasefire applicable to any PLO related 
group.. Haig accepted a midway definition of the ceasefire whereby it applied to any military action 
undertaken by PLO forces from a border adjacent to Israel, but not to action undertaken outside the Middle 
East. Haig added that Israel should do nothing until after it completed its withdrawal from Sinai, in order 
not to endanger the Israeli-Egyptian peace (Haig: 326-32).
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administration that could lead to pressure on Israel, that Begin decided that the invasion 
should occur well before his scheduled visit to Washington set for 21 June 1982 (Naor: 
276). Subsequently on 6 June 1982, after the shooting of the ambassador of Israel in 
London, which the Israeli government viewed as a violation of the PLO Ceasefire, Israel 
carried out a retaliatory strike against PLO forces in Lebanon. It did not concern the 
Israelis that the attack had been carried out by the Abu Nidal group which opposed 
Arafat’s PLO, with whom the ceasefire had been signed. The shooting was merely the 
necessary pretext for action. It constituted the ‘internationally recognised incident’ that 
Haig had stipulated would have to occur before the US would back Israeli action. In 
response to the Israeli bombardment the Palestinians fired Katusha rockets into the 
Galilee and then Israel launched an operation known publicly as ‘Peace for the Galilee’ 
and privately as ‘Big Pines’.
The Evacuation of the PLO from Beirut
For the first three days of the war it seemed as if the extent of the incursion was only forty 
kilometres, as envisaged in the ‘Little Pines’ plan. However, by 13 June Israel having 
gone well beyond the 40 Km confines of ‘Little Pines’ and reached the outskirts of East 
Beirut. Here Sharon met up with the Phalange and together they besieged the city. During 
the early part of the war, Haig provided Israel with the necessary cover in Washington. He 
defended Israel from those within American policy-making circles who wanted to impose 
sanctions on the Jewish state. Against their opposition, when Begin came to Washington, 
Haig was able to secure him an audience with Reagan. Haig’s public briefing echoed the 
Israeli position of seeking to limit the military operation to forty kilometres (Schiff and 
Ya’ari 1985: 152). Even when Israeli actions contradicted this, Haig supported the Israeli 
position which opposed the lifting of the siege of Beirut until the PLO was ejected from 
the city (Schoenbaum: 284; Quandt: 342; Novik 1984: 49-50; Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 
203). In this way, Haig allowed the Israelis to keep up the pressure on the PLO through 
the siege of Beirut.
From the inception of the siege, the United States had become involved in attempts to 
mediate PLO evacuation from the city. This was something to which Sharon and Begin
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were opposed. Begin was concerned about the prospect of officially negotiating with the 
PLO as this increased the organisation’s international standing. He only accepted the idea 
for American-PLO proximity talks on condition that the US officials were at least 300 
yards apart from PLO representatives! (Shultz: 456, 68). Sharon feared that the existence 
of a US headed multi-national force in Beirut prior to the evacuation of the PLO, as the 
Americans suggested and the PLO demanded, would allow the PLO to simply redeploy 
elsewhere in Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 209). In any case, Sharon’s instrumental 
values pushed him towards favouring the use of military force to which diplomacy had to 
be subordinate. Begin was more prepared for a diplomatic solution, but he was captivated 
by the idea of destroying, 'Arafat in his bunker' and in any case did not expect diplomacy 
to yield results (Shultz: 56, 68). Either way, their perception of the American role was 
minimal. The US was simply there to provide cover for Israeli military activity. They* saw 
no need to co-ordinate actions with the US and were even prepared to misinform the US 
of Israeli intentions. Thus, while both Haig and US mediator Philip Habib followed Israeli 
advice and declared to the American people and President Asad of Syria respectively that 
Israel had no intention of attacking Syria (at the beginning of the invasion), the Israeli 
army was already in the process of cutting the Beirut-Damascus road (Schiff and Ya’ari 
1985: 152). The Israelis were not that concerned about embarrassing their American 
allies, to the point at which even Reagan was livid when Israel leaked his offer to put a 
multi-national force in place before he had informed Congress (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 
209).
Begin’s and Sharon’s sense of belief in their own cause and their simplistic perception of 
US interest, whereby America should simply allow Israel to bleed the pro-Soviet PLO and 
Syrians, made them unable to recognise why the United States should want to limit Israeli 
military operation, despite the fact that these operations were damaging American 
prestige in the Arab world. When the US did intervene to try and secure a ceasefire, Begin 
and Sharon felt indignation. Sharon’s contempt for American diplomatic efforts was total: 
he referred publicly to Habib’s plan for the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut as a 'fraud' 
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 223) and was so angry with Habib that he ruffled him up at one 
meeting so severely that Habib required medical attention! (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 221). 
Following a significant increase in Israeli bombing of Beirut, on 1 August 1982 the
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United States joined the UN Security Council in calling for a ceasefire. Israel opposed 
this fearing it would let the PLO off the hook. By then, President Reagan asserted that it 
was imperative that a ceasefire remain in place otherwise it would endanger Habib 
attempts to find a diplomatic solution (Ben Zvi 1993:141). By August 3 Habib was able 
to secure a ceasefire, but when the PLO refused to move Sharon broke the ceasefire. At 
this point Shultz wrote, "Israel in its official voice was either uninformed or deliberately 
trying to mislead us" (Shultz: 59). Reagan then wrote to Begin telling him the 
bombardment was disproportionate (Shultz: 61). A credibility gap between the United 
States and Israel was growing (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 222). Begin responded with 
typical defiance. In front of 190 American Jewish leaders he declared that, "no one should 
preach to us. Jews kneel only before God!" (Ball: 125). Begin virtually told Reagan to 
mind his own business.
Meanwhile, Sharon continued to believe that the Americans were setting a trap for Israel 
that would enable the PLO to simply relocate inside Lebanon. But the rest of the Cabinet 
accepted the Habib’s plan with some amendments. Despite this, on 12 August 1980 
Sharon, 'contrary to any scrutable logic' (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 225) ordered the air 
force to mount its most fierce attack yet on Beirut. Reagan then called Begin demanding 
an immediate ceasefire, referring to Israeli actions as another Holocaust. He informed 
Begin that, "the ceasefire must be kept, our entire future relationships are at stake if this 
continues” (Shultz: 71). By then the Cabinet was equally appalled at Sharon actions and 
had already put a stop to it. Even Foreign Minister Shamir criticised Sharon’s Activist 
logic. Sharon answered his critics by declaring "any decision not to attack is a bad one" 
(Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 226).
Eventually a deal was struck and PLO's withdrawal began on 21 August 1982 two days 
after US Marines had to begun deploy in Beirut. Bashir Gemayel was then elected 
President of Lebanon, and another piece of the radical’s strategic puzzle fell into place. At 
that point, Begin drunk a toast to Haig (Shultz: 46). Still, before the evacuation of PLO 
troops there was one further crisis in America-Israeli negotiations. During the final stages 
of the PLO evacuation, Sharon noticed that the PLO were evacuated with jeeps contrary 
to the American brokered agreement. Subsequently, he ordered Israeli units to halt the
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evacuation. Morris Draper then suggested to Sharon turning a blind eye to this as the 
Americans had already removed the RPG rocket launchers from the jeeps. Two American 
ships offshore had orders to break into the harbour by force if the evacuation was halted. 
They also had orders to fire back at the IDF if necessary (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 228). 
For once, Begin backed down in the face of a potentially armed confrontation with the 
United States. Even Begin then was prepared to be pragmatic on such tactical questions. 
The same, however, could not be said when the question of the land of Israel came up in 
connection with the Reagan Plan.
The Reagan Plan
After Haig’s enforced resignation, other forces within the administration more hostile to 
Israel sought to move policy to a more ‘even-handed' approach (Novik 1984: 50-1). 
Subsequently, on 1 September 1982, President Reagan made his only significant speech 
on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The United States sought to take advantage of the 
weakened position of the 'pro Soviet’ PLO and Syria, to propose its own peace plan. If 
successful, such a plan would form the basis of a ‘Pax Americana’ in the Middle East and 
even if it was not totally successful it would at least demonstrate to the Arabs that 
America was the only broker available, the only actor capable of pressurising Israel 
(Shultz: 87-100; Ben Zvi: 142; Novik 1984: 47).
Although Reagan emphasised his commitment to Israel’s security, the unity of Jerusalem, 
no return to the pre-1967 boundaries and his opposition to a Palestinian state, the plan 
was regarded as disastrous by the Israeli government. To begin with, Reagan called for a 
settlement freeze. Moreover, in a significant departure from Camp David, the Reagan 
Plan spoke of a final status solution in which a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation 
would come into existence. This implied territorial compromise, an anathema to the 
Israeli government. Worse still, the Reagan Plan improved the political position of the 
Palestinians. In contrast to the Israeli government position, Reagan asserted that 
Palestinian rights were political in character, "more than a question of refugees". Reagan 
declared that "the Palestinians must take a leading role in determining their own future." 
Camp David had only stated that they would have a role, not necessarily a leading role
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(Sicherman: 68). The American logic sought to bring in a Jordanian-Palestinian 
negotiating team in order to advance a peace based on territorial compromise, whereas 
Israel saw the whole point of the Lebanon War as a means to avoid such a peace! In this 
regard Sharon's complained, "is it the proper time now when we destroyed the PLO and 
the process of expulsion is proceeding and the PLO threat to the residence of Judea and 
Samaria is removed to raise new ideas!... The invasion of Lebanon aimed to prevent the 
imposition of such a plan on Israel" (Wright and Nakleh: 44-46).
This was but one reason for the Israeli government feeling a sense of betrayal. 
Ambassador Lewis had only informed Begin of the Plan a day before it was publicly 
announced, leaving him with the sense that he had been bypassed. Begin declared to 
Cabinet, “we have been betrayed by the Americans, the biggest betrayal since the State 
was established! They have stabbed us in the back!" (Kimche: 157). Begin then compared 
the American plan to the plan of Haman (the biblical enemy of the Jewish people who 
tried to penetrate a genocide against the Jewish people in ancient Persia) (Shultz: 96). In 
addition, he and Sharon could not understand how the United States did not realise that its 
interest lay in supporting the Israeli government position. Thus Begin wrote to Reagan 
explaining that the consequences of his plan would be a PLO-Soviet base in the Middle 
East (Naor: 328). Begin expressed his indignation at the American attitude: “we handed 
Lebanon to Washington on a silver patter and it wants to take Judea and Samaria!” 
(Sacher: 191). He was convinced by the righteousness of his own cause and thus preceded 
in his reply to the Reagan plan to give the President a history lesson (Reagan: 433- 
4)."What some call the West Bank, Mr President, is Judea and Samaria. And the simple 
historical truth will never change.” (JP 6 September 1982:1). Begin then informed the 
Cabinet, “the battle for Eretz Israel has begun" (Schiff and Ya’ari 1985: 337).
In that battle, Begin's defiance and unilateralism again found expression. Begin rejected 
the Plan outright and informed the Knesset "we have no reason to get on our knees. No 
one will determine the borders of Eretz Israel for us" (JP 9 September 1982:1). He added, 
"the creation of settlement in Judea and Samaria and Gaza is an inalienable right" and that 
"Israel should continue to establish them” (Tessler: 604). This defiance was not only 
rhetorical but also practical. Hence on 5 September, Israel demonstrated its unilateralism
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when the Cabinet approved $18.3 million worth of aid for settlement activity including 
the immediate establishment of three new settlement in the territories. For the radicals, 
settlement activity and not smooth US-Israeli relations were the key to policy success, as 
Sharon explained, "no-one will stop us from settling the strategic areas of Israel. Israel 
alone is responsible for its security. We will not rely on anyone else, even our best friend 
the United States" (MA 6 January 1983).
While Israel and US exchanged pleasantries over the Reagan plan, Sharon once again 
demonstrated his preference for the direct use of force over the US-Israeli co-ordination 
by agreeing with Bashir Gemayel to allow the Phalange into East Beirut to finish off the 
estimated 2000 PLO terrorists who remained, despite the fact that this was expressly 
forbidden under the terms of the US sponsored evacuation. When Bashir was 
assassinated, Sharon with Begin’s approval, invaded East Beirut and discussed with 
Chief-of-Staff Eitan the possibility of allowing the Phalange to ‘mop up’ the situation. On 
16-17 September the Phalange massacred 700-800 Palestinians in the refugee camps of 
Sabra and Shatilla, in an area under control of Israel. Eventually due to internal pressure, 
Begin allowed a full inquiry known as the Kahan Commission. This inquiry found Sharon 
indirectly responsible for the events and he was demoted from minister of defence to 
minister without portfolio. Nevertheless, Begin’s initial response to the news was to 
compare the blame for the massacre being laid upon Israel to the blood libel against Jews 
in the Middle Ages. "Goyim kill Goyim and they blame the Jews,” he declared (Silver: 
236).
From the Reagan Plan to the Resignation of Prime Minister Begin
The American promotion of the Reagan Plan had demonstrated that Israel and US logic in 
Lebanon were opposed. Although the Americans expected Begin to reject the peace plan, 
they hoped that if they could get King Hussein to the table as a credible peace partner for 
Israel, this would place public pressure on the government to at least test his sincerity. In 
the event that the Likud did not do this, Shultz was an least aware that the Israeli 
opposition was more than prepared to co-operate (MECS 1982-3: 156; Novik 1984: 47). 
The Americans were relying on King Hussein to be able to negotiate an agreement with
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Israel based on their Plan. They urged him to endorse the Plan formally and publicly and 
indicate a willingness to negotiate with Israel, even if not authorised to do so by the PLO.
It became apparent that US-Israeli disagreements on the Palestinian question fed into US- 
Israeli disagreement on the future shape of Lebanon. American credibility in the peace 
process and Arab acceptance of the Reagan plan depended on America being able to 
secure a relatively rapid Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. King Hussein had pointed out 
to the US that if they could not get Israel out of Lebanon, how likely was it that they 
could get Israel out of the West Bank! (Ben Zvi: 142). Under Habib, the United States 
was not really interested in a formal peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon nor in the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops, as Israel desired. Rather Habib sought informal 
arrangements between Israel and Lebanon to be put in place as quickly as possible in 
order to get the peace process back on track (Kimche: 163).
As a result of these differences, Sharon's distrust of the Americans grew still further and 
he tried to bypass American mediation (Kimche: 165). Begin and Sharon tried to slow 
down the US-sponsored negotiations for a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon (until 
April 1983) as they feared a linkage whereby Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would 
increase American pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian question and stop 
building settlements (Ben Zvi: 143). Thus Sharon added two procedural conditions that 
even Israel's top negotiator, David Kimche, who was highly critical of Habib, thought 
would scupper any chance of a peace agreement. Sharon's tactic was to insist on Minister 
to Minister public talks in the capitals, Beirut and Jerusalem. It was as if Sharon and 
Begin did not want an agreement (Kimche: 163). The delaying tactics managed to hold 
back the start of the peace talks until January 1983. In order to increase pressure on Israel 
to withdraw and freeze settlements, the Reagan administration held up technology 
transfers and military equipment. The limited sanctions were unsuccessful, as the Begin 
government was able to use Congress to reverse the administration’s attempt to pressurise 
it. In any case the Reagan Plan fell apart when the King Hussein-Arafat dialogue 
collapsed in April 1983, due to Arafat caving in to pressure from PLO radicals.
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Conclusion
On the surface, Israel had achieved most of the aims that Begin and Sharon set out to 
achieve in Lebanon. The PLO had been expelled from the country, a Lebanese Christian 
had been installed as President of Lebanon and had signed an agreement with Israel. The 
Syrian presence in Lebanon had been greatly weakened and then in May 1983, a mutiny 
took place within the ranks of Fatah the largest and most powerful PLO faction in an area 
controlled by Syrians. Division and political weakness within the PLO seemed also to 
have been achieved. Ultimately however, although successful in the short-run, the 
inadequacies of the operation soon became apparent. The Lebanese President Bashir 
Gemayel was assassinated. The agreement between Lebanon and Israel fell apart as Syria 
regained its pre-eminent position in Lebanon. The Americans refused to sit back and just 
support Israel and in the process moved closer, in the Reagan Plan, to the Arab position or 
at least the Labour position in Israel. The paradox of the Likud policy in Lebanon was 
that, rather than destroying the chances for a negotiated settlement based on territorial 
compromise, the war invoked moderation in the West Bank in the short-run, not for 
Sharon's version of autonomy, but for a renewed Jordanian role. This was precisely the 
sort of moderation Likud leaders most feared and Jordan and the leader of the Labour 
Party, Shimon Peres, most sought. Most importantly, in the long-run, although the PLO 
had been militarily weakened, politically the Palestinian national cause gained, rather than 
lost, momentum. The results were seen in the Intifada. Israel may have succeeded in 
weakening the PLO but it failed in imposing the Village Leagues on the West Bank and 
once the Palestinians in the territories became disillusioned with the outside leadership of 
the PLO, Israel was left to face the genuine national sentiment of the Palestinians in the 
Intifada.
Clearly the character of Israel's relations with the United States over the Palestinian 
question in this period were dominated by Holocaust imagery, defiant rhetoric and Israeli 
unilateral acts of pique, all of which have their origins within the particularistic stream of 
Israeli political culture represented by Begin and Sharon. However, it would be logical to 
suggest that the substance of Israel's relations with the United States over the Palestinian 
question in this period should have rested in the final analysis, with the American 
superpower. Consequently, Israeli political culture could then only be said to play a
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subordinate role in explaining the relationship and Israeli policy. It is certainly true that, 
to a large degree, US-Israeli relations in this period were defined by the extent to which 
American policy makers saw a good relationship as being in the American interest. When 
America saw strategic co-operation with Israel as more important than a progress in the 
peace process, relations were good. Indeed, even when the peace process took a higher 
priority, when reality dictated the impossibility of progress on the terms acceptable to the 
US due to the lack of a moderate Arab peace partner for Israel, relations improved.
Yet even here, political culture played a significant role in defining the substance of the 
relationship in regard to the Palestinian question. The extent to which Israel was able to 
play on the neo-conservative bias of the administration and its values strengthened the 
American tendency to see support for Israel as an American interest and moral duty. 
Moreover, because the Palestinian question was something that Israel had a greater 
interest in than the United States, and because Israel had greater leverage over the 
situation on the ground, there was room for Israeli values to define, to a significant 
degree, the nature of the relationship.
As a result, the Israeli government's belief in unilateralism and its strong self- 
righteousness were significant factors effecting the substance of the relationship. In 
addition, the guiding values of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian question, namely the 
existential value of the whole land of Israel, the instrumental value of military activism, 
belief in the power of the will and the event mentality, all of which underlay the 
demonisation of the PLO and the Palestinians, defined the relationship over the 
Palestinian question to a large degree. Always wary of the need for hadar, Begin and 
Sharon's tendency was to act defiantly and unilaterally whenever and wherever possible. 
However, Begin was prepared to back down and concede tactical concessions to the 
United States, for example on the withdrawal of PLO troops from Beirut, despite all his 
and the government's bombastic rhetoric. Yet this acceptance of the need to make 
reluctant concessions did not extend to issues which could threaten Israeli control over the 
territories; Israeli control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza were non-negotiable for Begin 
and neo-Revisionism; whatever the consequences for Israel’s relations with the United 
States.
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Chapter 6: Progressive Zionism Frustrated: The National Unitv
Government 1984-88
Introduction
Owing to the balance between left and right in 1984 neither Likud nor Labour were able 
to form a working coalition government. Having exhausted any possibility of getting a 
narrow coalition, Shamir and Peres finally accepted a national unity government (NUG). 
A broad coalition government was set up including Labour, Likud, the religious parties 
and the small centrist parties, with only the fringe parties not included. The most novel 
feature of the coalition was the agreement to rotate the office of Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister between Peres and Shamir half way through the life of the Knesset in 
October 1986. It was also agreed that Rabin would serve as Minister of Defence, directly 
responsible for the territories, during the whole term of the Government. Major decisions 
were taken in the inner Cabinet which consisted of five Labour and five Likud ministers. 
This situation allowed each party to veto any action by the other that ran counter to its 
vital interests or the limits of the coalition agreement.
This arrangement had important ramifications for foreign policy. The basic policy 
guidelines of the government ruled out Israeli annexation of additional territory, 
negotiations with the PLO and the establishment of a separate Palestinian state. Parallel to 
this it allowed for the establishment of 5-6 new settlements within a year. In addition, the 
government agreed to implement the decision of the previous government to establish 
twenty-six new settlements, however the actual building of each new settlement would be 
decided by the inner Cabinet. The government agreed to continue the peace process along 
the lines of Camp David. It was further agreed that Israel would call on Jordan to begin 
peace negotiations and that the Israeli government would consider proposals raised by 
Jordan in the negotiations (Medzini 1992: 1-3).
The agreement put enormous strain on the coherence of Israeli policy. It allowed Labour 
to pursue a diplomatic initiative founded on the ‘Jordanian option’, while permitting the 
Likud to simultaneously limit the potential for a territorial compromise through continued
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settlement. Furthermore, the rotation agreement and the division of Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister exacerbated the situation to a point at which two foreign policies often 
ended up being pursued simultaneously. Not for nothing was there a political crisis 
between Labour and Likud over the appointment of a new Ambassador to Washington. 
Both parties recognised how crucial Washington’s role was to the fulfilment of their 
objectives regarding the Palestinian question. Indeed for much of the period Shultz had to 
act as intermediary between Labour and Likud (HA 31 July 1985). If ever there was a 
symbol of the polarisation of Israeli political culture, this was it.
As a result of this split, Israel effectively had two competing groups of foreign policy 
makers acting simultaneously between 1984-88. The Labour group was led by Peres who 
was aided by ‘the Blazers’. The Likud team was controlled by Shamir, who was aided by 
minister without portfolio Moshe Arens and to a lesser degree by some of ‘the young 
princes’ and key aides Eli Rubinstein and Yossi Ben Aharon. Between 1984-6, Peres and 
the Labour party had the edge so far as foreign policy was concerned by virtue of the fact 
that Peres was Prime Minister. Similarly, after the rotation Shamir and the Likud had the 
stronger position. On the ground in the territories Labour’s position was helped by the 
fact that Rabin was Defence Minister for the government’s complete term of office. 
However, Labour’s acceptance of the Likud settlement agenda in the coalition agreement, 
limited significantly Labour’s ability to attain the good will it sought in the territories in 
order to advance its diplomatic initiative. The picture was complicated further by virtue of 
the fact that even when Peres was just Foreign Minister 1986-88 and Shamir Prime 
Minister, it was Peres who took the diplomatic initiative working closely with the State 
Department. Consequently, even though Shamir and the Likud retained an objective 
power of veto, the analysis will focus more on Peres’ diplomatic activities.
Peres and the Progressive Strategy 1984-7
For Peres and the progressives, peace was a primary existential value and the region's 
politics and threat of fundamentalism meant that time was of the essence in the search for 
peace. This need to push the peace process forward combined with two other factors to 
push Peres to constantly take the initiative. First, to Peres the bitzuist [doer] taking the
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initiative represented a classic Zionist value. Second, because Peres was only Prime 
Minister for the first two years of the coalition government, there was an added sense of 
urgency surrounding his actions. In contrast to the Likud, Peres aimed to heavily involve 
the US in his peace strategy. This approach had its roots within two elements of the 
progressive sub-culture. First, Labour's positive attitude towards land for peace brought 
them closer to the American vision for peace and hence made it easier for Peres to work 
with the US, than for the Likud. Indeed, the Peres outlook which deemed peace an Israeli 
policy priority, positively required American mediation, since only the US had the 
necessary influence in the Arab world to help bring about the reality that the progressives 
desired (Peres 1980: 896). Second, unlike the radicals, the progressives were far less 
sensitive to the value of 'independence', as a symbol of sovereignty and national virility 
within the context of foreign policy. This made it much easier for Peres to work in tandem 
with any power including the US.
There were two main axes for Israel-US relations in regard to the Palestinian question 
between 1984-7 under the direction of Shimon Peres: the diplomatic attempts to move 
towards opening peace negotiations with Jordan, and the functional attempts with Jordan 
to build an Israeli-Jordanian condominium on the West Bank. In Peres’ scheme, the US 
was designated a crucial instrumental role on both these tracks. Labour looked to the US 
to play an instrumental role in four ways. First, it sought to improve its bargaining 
position by co-ordinating policy with the US. Second, Labour actively sought American 
mediation with Jordan in order to forward the prospect of peace talks. Thirdly, Peres 
looked to the US to help lead an international effort to help with the economic 
rejuvenation of the Middle East, as they had done in Europe with the Marshall Plan after 
1945.1 Finally, Peres wanted the US to help him push forward a peace policy based on 
land for peace inside Israel. This would involve the US in either pressuring the Likud to 
move forward on the basis of land for peace, or as was deemed more likely, helping Peres 
to break up the NUG and go for elections on the peace issue, under favourable 
circumstances, before Peres had to hand over the office of Prime Minister to Shamir.
1 Peres wanted the US to lead the international community to make $20-30 billion available to advance the 
economy of the region. The seven major economic powers would invest in projects in the moderate Arab 
states and the territories. The size of the investment would be made in direct proportion to the willingness 
of the recipients to make concessions for peace (WP 23 April 1986).
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Shamir and the Likud Strategy
For the radicals, unlike for Peres, peace was not the most important objective of policy 
Far more important was the fulfilment of Zionism which as Shamir saw it involved: 
ingathering all the Jews to Israel and settling the whole land of Israel in order to ensure its 
eventual incorporation into the state of Israel. Shamir diplomatic strategy was simply to 
prevent any erosion in Israel's position which could undermine its control of the 
territories. For Shamir the territorial status quo was favourable, so there was nothing to be 
gained by diplomatic activity. Time was on Israel’s side. Shamir recognised that the US 
was the most pivotal international actor in the region, whose support was extremely 
important to Israel. He accepted that the US position on settlements and territorial 
compromise opposed the Likud’s position and was content for the Likud and the US to 
‘agree to disagree’ (Shamir interview). Consequently, he concentrated his effort not on 
reversing this position but trying to prevent the US from actively damaging the Likud 
vision for the territories. This was possible so long as the Likud at least appeared willing 
to compromise for peace. Hence, to maintain credibility as Prime Minister, Shamir 
adopted the Camp David Accords as the Likud’s negotiating stance. Moreover, he was 
generally careful to cast his opposition to any American proposals in procedural or 
security terms and unlike Begin and Sharon, his quieter pragmatic style, certainly helped 
smooth relations with the Americans.
The US: Policy and Strategy
Despite Israeli fears to the contrary, like Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz had a special 
admiration for Israel. This had been triggered by the bravery and patriotism of an Israeli 
student of his who had returned home just prior to receiving his degree, to fight in the 
Yom Kippur War in 1973. The student died in the war and later Shultz went to visit the 
family and was shown round the country, after which he developed a special regard for 
Israel as a sister democracy under siege (Lewis interview). Subsequently, in 1986 Shultz 
felt so strongly about Israel's security that he wanted to build institutional arrangements so 
that "If there is a future Secretary of State who is not positive about Israel, he will not be
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able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the United States that 
we have established" (Puschel: 94-5). Hence an additional codification of the relationship 
occurred on 21 April 1988 when a further memorandum of agreement on US-Israeli 
strategic co-operation was signed.
Yet while sympathy for Israel in the administration transcended Israeli party lines, the 
Reagan administration's most favourable final status outcome to the Palestinian question 
was almost identical to Labour's official position. Unlike the Likud, Labour had taken a 
positive approach to the Reagan Plan (Nakleh and Wright: 49; Sicherman: 68).2 
Subsequently, when Peres became Prime Minister in 1984 there was an extremely close 
relationship between the US and Labour when it came to discussing strategy and tactics in 
the peace process. As Ambassador Lewis put it, "Peres succeeded in raising the US-Israeli 
‘unwritten alliance’ to unprecedented heights of intimacy (Lewis 1987: 633)". Whereas 
with Likud leaders though relations were solid, it was more a matter of the US informing 
Shamir of its policies rather than high level of collaboration. However, while the 
administration’s position on final status issues favoured Labour, its overall foreign policy 
agenda and its strategy for dealing with the Middle East peace process favoured the 
Likud.
The failure of King Hussein and Arafat to come to an agreement to allow Jordan to 
negotiate on the basis of the Reagan Plan signalled a sea change in US-Israeli relations 
and in the saliency of the role of the Palestinian question in those relations. Following the 
failure of the dialogue, Shultz saw no point in pressuring Israel when there was no 
credible Arab partner able and willing to deliver peace. Consequently, a week after King 
Hussein declined to take up the Reagan Plan, the US agreed to allow Israel to buy 
American designed components for it Lavi fighter plane, reversing the previous position 
(MECS 1982-3: 26-7). This change of approach was reinforced by Shultz's experience in 
negotiating the Israeli-Lebanese agreement and then in seeing its abrogation due to Syrian 
opposition and the weakness of the Arab moderates. Syrian influence in Lebanon had 
increased in 1983 and was widely held to have been behind the terrorist attacks on the 
American marines and the US embassy in Beirut. In March 1984 the Lebanese President
2 Labour may have influenced the terms of the Reagan Plan (Golan 1989:223; Shultz: 68; 89).
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Amin Gemayel, visited Damascus, after which he announced the abrogation of the May 
17 treaty between Lebanon and Israel, which had been brokered by the Americans.
The weakness of the Arab moderates, manifested in their inability to move forward on 
peace, and the strength of the Soviet backed Arab radicals, led to a fundamental shift in 
US policy priorities. The global-strategic aspect of Middle East policy was upgraded, at 
the expense of the emphasis on the effort to move forward the regional objective: the 
peace process. Thus the US concentrated on supporting Israel against the Syrians, who 
they identified as Soviet clients. As its primary objective in Lebanon became the 
lessening of Syrian influence there, the US came to see Israel as useful ally. This had very 
positive results for the US-Israeli relationship. Subsequently, Under-Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger supported the re-instatement of the MoU with Israel as a means of 
trying to get Israeli help in Lebanon against Syria.3 Eagleburger was one of the most 
forceful proponents of the realpolitik strategy against Moscow, which included use of 
Israel as a strategic asset in the Middle East. In an address at that time, Eagleburger noted, 
"Israel stands as a bastion of Western interests and values in an area perpetually coveted 
by the Soviet Union... Its military power is seen by the Soviets as standing in the way of 
their expansionist ambitions in the Middle East. The security of Israel is a vital American 
interest, and we will not stand idly by in the face of the Soviet threat to that security." 
Similar remarks were made at the time by President Reagan and other senior 
administration officials (Puschel: 72, 83).
From this globalist perspective an Arab-Israeli peace agreement, while constituting an 
objective of American policy, was not as important as containing the Soviet Union in the 
region. In January 1984 King Hussein tried to convey to the US his renewed interest in 
the West Bank and his desire to negotiate with Israel over it, by reopening the Jordanian 
parliament. Hussein's litmus test for progress was the American ability to get the Israel to 
stop building settlements in the territories. If King Hussein could not stop settlement 
activity, then he felt his ability to negotiate peace with Israel under American auspices 
would be undermined, as his own credibility as protector of the West Bank would appear
3 The reconciliation had little to do with Israel, the reinstatement of the MoU was a surprise even to Shamir! 
(Melman and Raviv 1994: 232-49).
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hollow. But Reagan was unprepared to do this (Garfinkle 1992: 18-9). With no prospect 
of peace, Reagan could see no point in pressurising Israel and following King Hussein re- 
rejection of the Reagan Plan in March 1984 Shultz stated, "We have to get over this 
notion that every time things do not go just to everyone’s satisfaction in the Middle East it 
is the United States fault or that it is up to the United States to do something about it” 
(NYT 20 March 1984). Reagan then went on record, in March 1985 saying that the US 
did not want to participate in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations as a full partner (Shultz 
439). Basically, Shultz had decided (Quandt 1992: 349) that the US should not present its 
own peace plans but rather wait until the parties themselves came up with an initiative. 
Even in that event, there was a feeling that the US should only facilitate peace talks, 
rather than heavily pressure either side or seek to impose its own version of peace. Clearly 
then, the return to a cold war driven Middle East policy was advantageous to the Likud, as 
it kept the focus of American concern away from the Palestinian question. So long as 
there was no Arab partner with whom Israel could deal on terms acceptable to the Israeli 
public, Shamir was safe. For while Reagan and Shultz were prepared to work with Peres 
to facilitate peace, they were not prepared to act in a forceful manner pressuring those of 
its allies who opposed its vision.
Progressive Diplomacy and Functionalism 1984-87
Israel, Jordan and the US : ‘Quality of Life’ in the Territories
Peres’ progressive neo-functional values system made him look towards functional 
initiatives as a crucial element to building peace and economic prosperity for Israel. Peres 
hoped that progress ‘on the ground’ coupled with the opening of diplomatic negotiations 
would allow peace to take root, albeit ‘not in one jump’(FBIS 1 April 1985). He 
envisioned a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation, consisted of two independent states, 
Israel and Jordan, with the West Bank between them, controlled and run by both of them: 
a condominium. Neither of them would have sovereignty over the shared territory. 
Israel’s security border would be on the Jordan River, but there would be no international 
or economic boundary between Israel and Jordan. The Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank would remain where they were (MECS 1987: 90). The King, in talks with Peres,
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had put forward his vision of a confederation with one seat of government, one army, one 
diplomatic service that fitted neatly with Peres’ conception. The King also agreed that the 
West Bank and Gaza would be demilitarised (HA 18 March 1985; Shultz 452-3). Both 
viewed a Confederation as a way of preventing an independent Palestinian state that 
would threaten both Israel and the Hashemites.
Although Peres and King Hussein could not agree on the extent of territorial compromise 
in any final status arrangement, they did agree on functional measures to increase their 
joint control of the territories in the interim period. Israel would withdraw from populated 
areas and municipal authority would be broadened. They agreed that Israel and Jordan 
would share land and water administration, that there would be Jordanian police in the 
territories and Israeli police in the settlements and that Israel would allow a Jordanian flag 
to fly over the holy places in Jerusalem and Hebron (WP 29 April 1986, 24 July; 
Garfinkle 1992: 122- 3; Melman and Raviv 1989: 161-8). The conceptual link between 
these agreements and neo-functionalism was evident in one particular meeting with King 
Hussein, when Peres spoke about the possibility of a canal between the Red Sea and the 
Dead Sea, passing through both Israeli and Jordanian territory. Other than resolving the 
problem of the drop in the level of the dead sea, Peres argued that it would enable both 
countries to move their ports inland and free miles of beach for tourism which would 
bring them substantial economic benefits. He also suggested that it would make Israel and 
Jordan each other’s hostages, with a joint interest in preserving good neighbourly 
relations (Golan 1989: 314-5; WP 23 April 1986). This was an echo of the Franco- 
German European Steel and Coal Community if ever there was one.4
Peres also sought to co-operate with Jordan to improve ‘the quality of life’ in the 
territories. This involved using functional co-operation as a tool for increasing support for 
Jordan and reducing support for the PLO and terrorism in the territories (Melman and 
Raviv 1989: 188-200; Garfinkle 1992: 115-6). Thus, Israel discouraged development 
projects associated with the PLO, while encouraging development projects associated 
with Jordan. Without a strengthening of Jordan’s position in the territories, the PLO 
would retain a veto at the peace table, and the Jordanians would lack the backing
4 However, King Hussein was not at all as enthusiastic as Peres about the idea.
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necessary to open peace negotiations with Israel. As former US ambassador to Israel Sam 
Lewis noted, "When this effort was coupled with a de-facto freeze on new settlements in 
the West Bank and technical discussions to resolve functional issues along the Jordan 
boundary, such as water rights, these efforts added up to a persistent campaign to 
persuade Jordan that a wide ranging process of negotiations, which could then culminate 
in formal peace talks, was now possible (Lewis 1987: 599).
From February 1985 until February 1986, during the time when the Arafat-King Hussein 
agreement was in force, while Israel took such initiatives in the territories, Jordan was not 
that interested. But as the King’s frustration with Arafat grew on the diplomatic front, so 
functional co-operation with Israel on the West Bank expanded. Peres met the King in 
October 1985, just days after the Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis, and 
agreed to the King’s idea of an international conference at the level of high politics and 
the King agreed in return to step up co-operation with Israel on issues of low politics. 
Subsequently, Israel lifted all restrictions on money transfers across the Jordan River 
bridges and initiated joint projects in the fields of agriculture and industry (Bar Zohar 
143). Moreover, the King agreed to co-operate in Labour’s efforts to develop an 
Palestinian leadership in the territories that was independent of the PLO. Hence, in co­
ordination with Jordan, Israel appointed three pro-Jordanian mayors in the territories (WP 
29 September 1986) and 25 PLO-Fatah offices in Jordan were closed. The Israeli and 
Jordanian police also combined their efforts against the PLO (Melman and Raviv 1989: 
168-188). Meanwhile, in August 1986 and again in 1987, Peres met with pro-Jordanian 
Palestinians on the West Bank.
The US5 was heavily involved in all aspects of Peres functional initiatives in the 
territories. For Peres, the US was of great instrumental value given its financial resources 
and its connections with the Arab world. For example, the US ambassador to Israel, 
Thomas Pickering, helped broker the Israeli Jordanian agreement vis-a-vis the opening of 
the Cairo-Amman Bank and having been previously Ambassador in Amman helped Peres 
develop his contacts with Hussein (Melman and Raviv 1989: 171; Garfinkle 1992: 99,
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114). Despite this, these functional initiatives failed to significantly improve the quality of 
life in the territories or increase support for the Jordanian over the PLO. This became 
abundantly clear when the Intifada broke out. Part of the reason for the failure of the 
initiative was that it was outweighed in its impact by an increase in 'Iron Fist' policies. 
These were adopted by Israel largely in response to increased violence by the PLO in the 
territories, itself partly a response to the PLO’s exclusion from the peace process by Israel 
and Jordan (Tessler: 671; Lewis: 601). The attitude of the residents of the territories 
towards Israel was also hardened by continued settlement activity. Ultimately, the 
initiative failed because it was based on the faulty premise that it was possible to bypass 
the genuine expression of Palestinian nationalism in the territories. This was something 
that Israel in general only came to terms with, gradually, after the Intifada.
Peres’ diplomacy: Jordan and the US
The main aim of Peres’ diplomacy was to get the peace process moving by entering into 
talks with Jordan. His problem was that he lacked the ability to move forward on the 
peace process at home due to the Likud’s vetoing power in Cabinet and by the fact that 
the coalition agreement did not allow Peres to pursue a policy based on land for peace. In 
order to break out of this situation he sought to secretly obtain a significant breakthrough 
in the peace process with Jordan6, for which he needed American help. With the public 
backing of the US for any breakthrough, the Likud would either have to acquiesce or 
allow Peres to break up the government and go to the people on the issue of peace with 
Jordan which was thought to be popular. These were things that Peres, a member of the 
NUG could not be seen to be doing (NYT 12 October 1986: 22, 13 October 1986: 2; 
Garfinkle 1992:130,134).
As a result of the fundamental difference between Labour and Likud over the direction of 
the peace process and the American role within it, each party developed its own direct 
links with the American administration and Congress which bypassed the official lines of
5 During this period, Shultz moved beyond support for a straight ‘territories for peace’ formula to embrace 
the concept of a ‘mixed sovereignty’ in the territories very similar to the kind of functional/territorial 
compromise Peres envisaged (Shultz: 936,1023).
6 In contrast to Peres, the Blazers believed that only the PLO could deliver peace (Novik interview).
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communications that were available. This was especially necessary in Labour's case given 
the extent of the American involvement in their peace strategy. Thus, Peres specifically 
ignored the then Israeli Ambassador in Washington and instead worked through his own 
advisers, the Blazers (WP 4 June 1987). Subsequently, the “co-ordination of Peres’ moves 
with Washington became routine carried out by highly restricted channels... agreement 
about diplomatic strategy and tactics reach heights of intimacy not seen in US-Israeli 
relations for nearly a decade... Reagan and Shultz calibrated the visibility, style and 
timing of US diplomatic moves to fit Peres’ strategy” (Lewis 1987: 598).
In January 1985, Peres sent a message to King Hussein indicating that Israel was prepared 
to negotiate on the basis of a territorial compromise as set down in UN resolution 242. In 
sending this message Peres went well beyond the provisions of the coalition agreement. 
His problem was that King Hussein did not feel strong enough to move forward alone in 
the peace process through direct public talks with Israel. Instead, following the King’s 
agreement to co-ordinate diplomacy with Arafat, he proposed an international conference 
including the participation of Syria, the Soviet Union and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation. The Jordanian position not only ran counter to traditional Likud positions but 
also to traditional Labour positions on the peace process. Israel had always favoured 
direct negotiations arguing that conferences implied imposed solutions and as such did 
not encourage the Arab parties to come to terms with the need to make peace with Israel 
and accept it as part of the region in the long-run. In addition, both sides of the political 
divide in Israel recognised that an international conference involving China and the 
USSR, neither of which had diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as what was seen as 
the essentially pro-Arab European powers would only be a scene for international 
pressure against Israel. In taking these decisions Israel had the support of the US. The 
Reagan administration, being highly sceptical of the Soviet Union, was deeply opposed to 
allowing it a to gain a meaningful role in the peace process through an international 
conference. In addition, Reagan's personal commitment to Israel and his abhorrence for 
the PLO reinforced Kissinger’s 1975 agreement with Israel, which committed the US not
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to negotiate with the PLO in the absence of that organisation renouncing terrorism and 
recognising Israel right to exist.7
As a result of their agreed position on these modalities, the US and Peres worked together 
on numerous occasions to try and bring King Hussein into the peace process without the 
PLO or an international conference. But despite promises of agreement on this basis, by 
September 1985 King Hussein had backed away (Shultz: 440-51; Bar Zohar: 145). In any 
case, Peres recognised the need for a greater Palestinian role in the process than he ideally 
preferred (MECS 1985: 27). On the face of it though, this recognition, coupled with the 
knowledge that Shultz and especially Reagan, supported the Israeli position, could easily 
have led the Labour leader to the conclusion that Israel had no interest in pursuing the 
peace process vigorously at that particular juncture. However, in order to push the process 
forward, Peres moderated his position on Palestinian involvement in the peace process. 
From the progressive perspective, tactical concessions on the question of a Palestinian 
role in the peace process were acceptable even though they carry with them certain risks 
for Israel's interests which Peres himself had previously recognised. Peres felt it was 
possible to make certain practical concessions while retaining his basic position on the 
final status arrangements. His problem was not just finding a large enough role for the 
Palestinians to allow King Hussein to enter negotiations but also to keep the PLO and the 
idea of a Palestinian state far enough in the background so as not to lose public support in 
Israel, where both ideas were considered by the vast majority of the public as taboo. In 
any case, Peres opposed direct talks with the PLO as this would shift the discussions 
towards Palestinian statehood in the territories. This he opposed not only from a narrow 
Israeli perspective, but also in principle, as a danger to regional peace and stability which 
was to be build on the post-nationalist Monet model. Without public support on the 
opening of peace negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Peres strategy 
of calling an election on the peace issue would fail. Indeed, as if to prepare the ground for 
an increase Palestinian role in the peace process, in April 1986 at a Labour Party 
conference, Peres announced his recognition of the Palestinians as a people. However, he
7 Because the Palestinian National Council (PNC) had not formally endorsed these resolutions, the US 
refused to open a US-PLO dialogue (Quandt: 348-52; Tessler: 651-6). The PLO still had not renounced 
violence and refused to endorse direct negotiations with Israel. The PLO also continued to talk of
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was careful not to refer to Palestinian ‘legitimate rights’, a phrase which was commonly 
understood as referring to a Palestinian right to statehood. Instead he expressed his 
penchant for the expression of Palestinian rights to self-determination within a Jordanian 
setting. The new flexibility in the Peres position became evident in a series of vigorous 
attempts to start negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. These 
attempts became known as the Murphy Rendezvous, after Richard Murphy, the American 
diplomat assigned by Shultz’s to achieve this goal.
The Murphy Rendezvous 1985-6
Between February 1985 and February 1986 diplomacy focused on a way to find 
Palestinians acceptable to Israel to form part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation 
for formal peace negotiations. As far as King Hussein saw it, a Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation would initially consist of Palestinians chosen by/associated with the PLO but 
not the PLO leadership itself. This delegation would meet with American officials. The 
PLO would then meet the US conditions for a US-PLO dialogue. After this, a Jordanian- 
PLO delegation would attend negotiations at a substantive international conference. This 
formula became known as "out at the beginning and in at the end" (Bar Zohar). The 
American approach was to give the PLO a choice. Either Arafat could find some way for 
indicating his willingness to recognise Israel and renounce terrorism or he could designate 
pro-Arafat, but non-PLO, Palestinians to represent his interest in preliminary exchanges 
(MECS 1985: 25). The State Department was relatively optimistic about the possibility of 
the former choice, while Shultz and especially Reagan not only saw little prospect of this 
happening but were antagonistic to the PLO in any case. Aware of Peres’ and the 
President’s sensitivity to the issue, Shultz announced that the US would not agree to any 
American meeting with declared members of the PLO. Hence the US concentrated on the 
latter formula for Palestinian representation. The US also remained strongly opposed to a 
substantive international conference and hence demanded direct negotiations between 
Israel and any Arab delegation as a prerequisite for progress (Golan 1989: 303-5; Shultz: 
438-447).
confederation as referring to the existence of an independent Palestinian state prior to any confederative 
arrangement, a notion Israel and the US opposed (MECS 1985:21-4).
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On the Israeli side too, there was complete opposition to a substantive international 
conference. Publicly, Peres expressed concern that even the idea that Palestinian members 
of a joint delegation would be chosen by the PLO was dangerous as it could lead to a US- 
PLO dialogue behind Israel’s back (Medzini 1992: 166-7). Privately, he was prepared to 
work on the idea in co-ordination with the US. Peres conveyed his position to Shultz and 
suggested that the US send an emissary to the region to advance the idea of a meeting; 
which he did. At the end of May, Shultz himself came back from the region with a list of 
Palestinians from which members of the joint delegation could be selected by Israel. All 
of the names nominated by the PLO, however, were members of the PLO parliament, 
known as the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Whereas the US distinguished between 
the PLO and the PNC, so that non-terrorist elements in the PNC were deemed acceptable 
interlocutors, publicly both Peres and Shamir argued that the PNC, as the PLO’s highest 
representative organ was indistinguishable from the PLO. Consequently, in public, at the 
beginning of June, the Israeli government as a whole concentrated on preventing a US 
meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (MECS 1985: 73)8. However, privately 
both Peres and Rabin told the US that they would not necessarily rule out all members of 
the PNC on the basis of their membership in that body alone, should future names 
submitted to Israel be acceptable in other regards (JP 10,12 May 1985).
Weeks later, King Hussein handed the Americans another list of seven Palestinians, 
chosen by the Jordanians from the names of 22 PNC members, chosen by the PLO and 
from which they wanted the US to select four names. The new list contained two less well 
known people from the territories who were close to Fatah, Hanan Siniora and Abu 
Rahme. Peres accepted them, despite their PLO leanings, as suitable candidates for the 
joint delegation (Tessler: 660; Melman and Raviv 1989: 164-5). The third name, Sheik 
Saya was rejected because he was chairman of PNC9. Another two names were PLO hard­
liners both involved in terrorism and hence unacceptable to Israel and the US. In any case,
8 The slow progress towards a political approach in the PLO, was a threat to the Likud. Although 
Palestinian terrorism was deeply abhorred by the Israeli right, it strengthened their position amongst the 
Israeli electorate. The frequency of meetings between Israeli and officials of the PLO had increased, and 
the number of Israelis who recognise that Israel would eventually have to deal with the PLO had steadily 
risen since the Lebanon War (Bar On 1996:213; YA 21 June 1991).To combat this trend, in August 1986 
the Likud passed legislation that made unauthorised meetings with PLO representatives a criminal act.
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once Peres accepted the names of the two Palestinians, the PLO withdraw their names 
(MECS 1985: 26).10 Peres and the US pressed Jordan to name more acceptable 
Palestinians for possible peace talks. To try and make matters easier, Peres told Shultz, 
though not the Likud, that while he was not enthusiastic about a preliminary US- 
Jordanian-Palestinian meeting, he would not oppose it strongly so long as no PLO 
members participated (Shultz: 452-3).
In January 1986, Murphy tried and failed to find more candidates for a Palestinian- 
Jordanian delegation, despite lowering American preconditions for negotiations with the 
PLO. The American message to the PLO was ‘hang back’ (Bar Zohar 137) and let some 
Palestinians begin the talks with Israel. In return they guaranteed, at a later stage, that the 
PLO would get a foot in the door (MECS 1986: 17; Shultz: 461). While Shamir was 
unaware of these plans, Peres was fully informed (WP 21, 22, 24 February 1986). At the 
time, some of Peres aides even hinted to the Jordanians that Peres’ “no” to the PLO at 
present might mean "yes” in the future, if Arafat accepted the American conditions. The 
Blazers claimed that if the PLO repudiated terrorism and recognised Israel it would cease 
to be the PLO and could become a partner for negotiations (Bar Zohar: 137-141). Indeed, 
according to Yitzhak Shamir, Peres aides had been in contact with Arafat’s aides, 
presumably on this subject" (HA 1 August 1997). But given the PLO’s inability to meet 
the American conditions for entering the peace process (Rubin 1994: 66-85) there was no 
pressure on Peres forcing him to amend one of the core operating assumptions of Israeli 
policy.12
9 Later Peres thought his rejection was a mistake (Bar Zohar).
10 A pivotal name on the list was Nabil Shaath, Arafat’s representative in Cairo and a member of the PNC, 
on whom the PLO was unprepared to compromise. The Americans vacillated on his inclusion (Quandt 
1992: 570) while Israel ruled him out as he had been involved in semi-military activity in Lebanon (Bar 
Zohar).
11 Both Peres and Shamir maintained contacts with the PLO during the 1980s (Peres 1995: 303; Heikal 
1995: 368; Shindler 1995:211).
12 At this stage, the PLO still hoped that the US would ‘deliver Israel’ and was more interested in opening a 
dialogue with the US than with dealing directly with Israel (Rubin 1994). In any case, even if the PLO had 
wanted to move it would have had to overcome Syrian and Soviet opposition to anything other than an 
international conference that would impose on Israel a full withdrawal on all fronts. Given this international 
and regional constellation coupled with Jordanian weakness, there was little prospect for a major advance 
towards peace.
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Anyway, Peres was inhibited from taking such a move by internal constraints. The 
problem on the Israeli side was the nature of the NUG, coupled with Peres (correct) 
perception that Israeli public opinion would not move forward with the PLO. This was 
due to a number of Israeli myths surrounding the PLO and the Palestinian question, a fact 
appreciated by the Americans. The electorate preferred either annexation or the status quo 
to land for peace (Arian and Shamir 1987: 10). Moreover, support for negotiations with 
the PLO among Jewish Israelis was very low and even the Israeli doves felt the PLO had 
not done enough to warrant Israeli acceptance at the time (Bar On 1996: 188). In short, 
without a drastic gesture from King Hussein there was no legitimacy for a serious move 
towards territorial compromise (Falk; Lewis 1987: 585) and certainly no legitimacy for a 
policy that incorporated the PLO into the process. Given the polarisation of the political 
culture expressed in the Knesset, Peres could not make any bold moves which would lead 
to the break up of the NUG unless he could be sure of winning public support for his 
peace policy. Only this would allow him to set up a narrow coalition for peace which 
excluded the Likud. Thus Peres rejected Ambassador Lewis' suggestion of a Shultz 
shuttle. He felt that he could not be seen to make concessions on the Palestinian issue 
under American pressure13. The problem as Peres saw it was "Hussein can't get the 
support of his crowd and I can't get the support of mine" (Shultz: 462).
The London Agreement; April 1987
Despite this failure, as Matti Golan (1989: 307) noted, "There was only one thing that was 
completely alien to Shimon Peres political philosophy; a freeze, a standstill. He saw such 
a situation as more dangerous than any possible move, even an international conference to 
which he had been originally opposed." With the collapse of the Hussein-Arafat 
agreement in February 1986, Jordan stopped all political co-ordination with the PLO. To 
Peres, this opened up the possibility of his more favoured option, Israeli talks with Jordan, 
excluding the PLO. Without Arafat, Peres accepted that King Hussein would need extra 
international cover to move forward in the peace process. Consequently, Shultz and their 
advisors worked out and co-ordinated positions on finessing the issue of an international 
conference, whereby such a conference might be accepted on condition that it was a
13 The Israeli public had been strongly opposed to the Reagan Plan, despite Labour’s support for it (Falk).
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formality and lacked any real power (Shultz: 452-9, 939; Melman and Raviv 1989: 172). 
With Peres’ encouragement, Wat Cluverius an American diplomat, and Murphy were sent 
to the region to try and bridge the gap between Israel and Jordan concerning the 
modalities of a conference. Despite some indications to the contrary during 1986 King 
Hussein backed off from support for the US-Israeli concept of a conference and stated his 
support for the Syrian position in favour of a substantial international conference (Quandt 
1993: 361). Nonetheless, even after the end of his term as Prime Minister, Peres 
continued to take the diplomatic initiative.
Indeed, despite the change-over, the US continued both to mediate between Peres and 
Hussein and to co-ordinate its diplomacy with Peres, in an effort to forge a breakthrough. 
As a result, late in January 1987, Peres was able to announce details of a ten point 
agreement , with the US dealing with the composition and terms of an international 
conference (MECS 1987: 97).14 Subsequently, Peres received Pickering at his home and 
the Ambassador reported on a talk that Cluverius had held with Hussein, who was 
showing flexibility (Golan: 325). Shultz then sent Cluverius to London in the event that 
American mediation might prove useful to the parties when Hussein met Peres and Beilin 
in London, on 11 April 1987 (Shultz: 937).
In London, both sides agreed on a document setting out the nature of Palestinian 
representation15 and the procedural aspects of the international conference. The document 
defined the aims of the conference: to bring a comprehensive peace to the Middle East, 
security to its states, and respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people (Peres 
1995: 308). According to the agreement, (MECS 1987: 98; MA 1 January 1988; Peres 
1995; Garfinkle 1992: 207-8; Quandt 1988; Melman and Raviv 1989) the Palestinian 
issue would be discussed in the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli 
delegations whereby the criteria for participation would be based on the parties 
acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism 
(MECS 1987: 98). Arafat, Peres argued, would have no choice but to acquiesce (Peres 
1995: 306). Still, as a source close to Shamir suggested, the London document allowed
14 Amongst other things, the agreement stipulated that Israel would co-ordinate it moves with the US. The
question of which Palestinians would participate in the conference was to be agreed upon unanimously.
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King Hussein to invite the PLO to participate if it accepted UN resolution 242 and gave 
up terrorism, adding that a American official had confirmed to him that the PLO would be 
asked to join on that basis (WP 14 May 1987: Al).
The most important point that Jordan conceded in the negotiations was, as the text of the 
London document put it, "the international conference will not impose any solution or 
veto any agreement arrived at between the parties" (MECS 1987: 98). According to 
Melman and Raviv (1989: 176, 214), American mediation efforts were very much in 
evidence in London. The details behind the framework for the conference, mentioned 
above, required mammoth efforts by the American go-betweens and consumed most of 
the five hours of negotiations (Bar Zohar: 163; Peres 1995: 307). To protect King Hussein 
it was agreed that the document would be presented as an American paper and that section 
C, dealing with the limits on to power of the conference, would not be made public until 
after its opening. According to Peres, this idea had already been agreed in a prior 
understanding that Israel and Jordan had reached with Richard Murphy and Thomas 
Pickering. At that stage no one had anticipated that full agreement would emerge. The 
understanding was that if any substantial, though informal, points of agreement were 
made the US would take them up and work on them, before presenting them back to the 
sides as American ideas (Peres 1995: 308).
However, this plan was not only designed to ensure cover for King Hussein, but also, 
according to Shultz (939), Quandt (362) and Makovsky (75), in order to pressure Shamir 
to agree to it or, if not, to allow Peres to break up the NUG. Peres recognised the 
importance of the US not only for means of diplomatic co-ordination or mediation, but 
also as a salesman to the Israeli public. The public appeared to trust the US as a friend of 
Israel and thus as an honest broker. Consequently, Peres’ entourage felt that the public 
would accept compromises more readily in response to a US proposal than in response to 
Arab demands or unilateral Israeli concessions, both of which would appear as a sign of 
weakness. With an American plan backed by King Hussein, excluding the PLO, Peres 
could feel reasonably confident that the electorate would view the plan positively; a 
crucial factor if he was to break up the government and advance towards peace.
,s On 27 March 1987 Peres met for the first time publicly with pro-PLO Palestinians (JP 28 March 1987).
166
While Shultz supported the London agreement he was not prepared to play the role Peres, 
Hussein and other State Department Officials expected of him. As Shultz put it, "the 
Foreign Minister of Israel’s government of national unity was asking me to sell to Israel's 
Prime Minister, the head of a rival party, the substance of an agreement made with a 
foreign head of state - an agreement revealed to me before it had been revealed to the 
Israeli government itself! Peres was informing me, and wanting me to collaborate with 
him, before going to the Prime Minister!" (Shultz 939). Shultz therefore told Beilin that 
Peres had first to show the agreement to Shamir before he did anything. In fact, Peres had 
done so, but Shamir only received a copy of the text of the agreement to keep, a few days 
later, when Ambassador Pickering presented Shamir with it and declared, "I come to you 
not only as the American ambassador but also as a special envoy of the Secretary of State. 
The Secretary believes that an historic breakthrough has been achieved" (Bar Zohar: 165). 
In line with Peres suggestion (Peres 1995: 308), Pickering then told Shamir that Shultz 
wanted to come to the region to bring the parties together in May. Shultz then telephoned 
Shamir only to be told that he was dead set against it (Shultz: 940).
Throughout the period of Peres' term as Prime Minister, Shamir had remained quiet about 
Peres’ support for an international conference. He never thought that there was the 
possibility of it occurring (Shamir interview). But discerning a change in the US decision 
in favour of a limited conference, in February 1987 Shamir visited Washington and 
declared himself strongly opposed to such an event. On hearing of the London agreement, 
Shamir (Shultz: 940) sent Moshe Arens as a secret envoy to Washington to explain his 
opposition. Arens tried to play on the American administrations cold war credentials as a 
legitimate reason for opposing the London agreement. The heart of Arens objection was 
that almost all of the parties present at such a conference would take a position 
diametrically opposed to Israel. Such a gathering was too risky: real, direct negotiations 
might not take place; the conference could get out of control; it was too slippery a slope 
that would involve the building up of an international consensus in favour of a complete 
Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders for Israel16. Despite Shultz's efforts to explain to
16 Shamir, unlike Arens, did not subscribe to the traditional cold war approach to Moscow (Golan 1992: 
23). In 1987, Shamir expressed willingness for the Soviet Union to participate in sponsoring peace talks.
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Arens in "excruciating detail" exactly how a conference could be kept under control, 
Arens would not budge. "The fundamental problem”, Arens countered, “was that the 
Soviet Union, the United States cold war adversary, would always adopt the radical Arab 
position, and King Hussein would then be unable to take a moderate stance" (Shultz: 
942). This approach failed to convince Shultz in principle, but in practise he decided to 
stay at home and not pressurise the Likud or adopt the London agreement as an American 
plan.
Shultz did continue to try and convince the Likud to accept the agreement, but no pressure 
was applied. Shultz declared publicly at a meeting of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, 
AIPAC, with Peres in the audience that the US was open, though not committed, to an 
international conference in early May. Reagan wrote to Shamir trying to quell fears 
regarding PLO participation in the conference, but to no avail. Reagan went as far as 
praising Peres publicly as a man with a “vision for the future” who recognised the 
“increasing dangers of the status quo” (JP 17 May 1987). By way of contrast, with Shamir 
next to him and the whole world watching, Reagan condemned leaders who said “no” to 
peace as having to give an account to their own people about missing chances for peace. 
But he added that the Prime Minister has not used the word ‘no’(JP 20 May 1987; 
Rubinstein 1992). This gentle ticking off, served to reassure Shamir, as it meant there 
would be no American pressure on the Likud to compromise. Reagan and Shultz were not 
prepared to play the role Peres, Hussein and other State Department Officials expected of 
them (WP 30 April, 12,18 May 1987). In the absence of a stronger US role, Peres was 
unable to get any Likud cabinet minister to support the agreement and the plan failed to 
become Israeli government policy. By the end May, Jordan had disclaimed the London 
agreement and the opportunity had passed.
Shamir, the Intifada and the Shultz Plan
Despite the London agreement episode, Shamir did not want the Likud to be seen in the 
US as the reason for the breakdown of the peace process. Consequently, he undertook 
measures to demonstrate that Israel was serious about peace negotiations, while refusing 
to base negotiations on the ‘land for peace’ formula, a position which ensured that even
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King Hussein could not enter formal negotiations with him. On Shamir’s suggestion, 
Shultz arranged a secret meeting between Shamir and Hussein. Shamir tried to present the 
talks to Shultz as holding the kernel of progress, however Hussein, described the meeting 
as hopeless and added that he could not work with ‘that man’ (Shultz: 943). Peres then 
suggested that the up-coming Reagan-Gorbachev summit might substitute for an 
international conference. Reagan okayed it but added "The first guy who vetoes it kills it" 
(Shultz: 945). With detailed written American assurances, Shamir agreed to the Plan, 
though he described the idea as "mission impossible" (Shultz: 942). Indeed, although the 
Jordanians were stunned by Shamir's acceptance, King Hussein said no. He thought that 
Shamir would never permit negotiations to go beyond the issue of transitional 
arrangements for those living in the West Bank and Gaza. The King also thought that 
Syria would reject this approach and that the Soviet Union, whatever its publicly co­
operative stance with the US might be, would support Syria's rejectionist and violent 
opposition in the end (Shultz: 948; Golan 1989: 332).
In the wake of the Intifada, Shultz decided to launch a new peace initiative in 1988 
(Quandt 1993). The problem for the Likud, as one Israeli official noted was, "How can we 
get him [Shultz] to go home and stay home?" (Shultz: 1023). Shamir did not reject the 
proposal, instead he concentrated on raising procedural objections to it, while offering to 
negotiate on the basis of Camp David (Shultz: 1029; MA: 4 March 1988). Nonetheless, 
Shamir always tried to give a positive impression of his support for the Secretary of 
State’s effort. When Shultz left Israel to go to talk to King Hussein, Shamir asked him to 
tell the King that he was serious about final status negotiations. "And what does final 
status mean?", asked Shamir rhetorically, "it means sovereignty." Shultz noted that the 
last word came out with almost a strangled gulp (Shultz: 1026). Yet even this plan did not 
envisage an Israeli withdrawal or the cessation of Jewish settlement in the territories. It 
did not require Israel to abandon the land of Israel and it left open the possibility of future 
Israeli sovereignty once Israel had strengthened its hold on the area. As Shultz understood 
it, this was a reference to a careful talk he had had with Shamir earlier about the changing 
meaning of sovereignty whereby different attributes of sovereignty over territory could be 
treated in different ways. To Shamir, it just meant Camp David. In any case, Shamir was 
utterly convinced that the PLO, and the Syrians would not let King Hussein move (MECS
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1988: 106). Indeed, apart from Egypt, the reaction in the region was not positive. The 
PLO banned Palestinians from the territories from meeting Shultz. Hussein was not 
positive (Quandt: 366) neither was the Soviet Union and Syria was extremely cool to the 
Shultz proposal. Consequently, Shamir was able to avoid saying no directly to the Shultz 
plan, leaving the ball in the Arab court.
Conclusion
Peres’ progressive value system placed peace as the core political value. Given the 
external threat of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and the internal threat posed by the 
polarisation of the Israeli political system, he was driven to take the main initiatives for 
peace in the region. Following the neo-functionalism approach, he sought to institute 
functional co-operation with Jordan. In order to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough 
Peres looked to the US to help mediate and manipulate an opening with Jordan. However, 
while the US was prepared to help facilitate an Israel-Jordan agreement, it was not 
prepared to forcefully manipulate the recalcitrant parties to adhere to any breakthrough. 
Throughout the period, the progressives pressed for more forceful American involvement 
along the lines pursued by Kissinger (Lewis 1987: 599; WP 17 August 1986) and were 
very disappointed with Shultz for not adopting the London agreement in a full blooded 
manner (Golan 1989: 336).
As the Blazers saw it, Shultz was overly concerned with process, with doing things in the 
right way. As a result, he failed to secure the product which was the true American 
interest, that is, a clear advance towards peace. But Reagan and Shultz never saw 
advancing towards peace as their most crucial objective in the region. To them, cold war 
balance of power concerns in the region took precedence. As an Israeli diplomat 
intimately involved in talks with the US noted, “In the eight Reagan years you didn't have 
the feeling that he was a President who lost any sleep over the lack of a peace process in 
the Middle East" (Melman and Raviv 1994: 408). Unlike Reagan, key officials in the 
State Department generally tended to take an essentially regional view of America's 
interest, as Carter had. According to them, an Arab-Israeli peace was a core American 
interest. American pressure on the Likud would move the process forward and as such
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was worth the expenditure of prestige. Similarly, while Peres understood the cold war 
dimensions of American policy, he tended to think of the American, and indeed the 
Israeli, interest in the peace process in regional terms. For Peres, the American 
commitment to Israel needed to be understood primarily in moral and cultural terms, as 
opposed to strategic terms (Peres 1995: 85; Peres and Eshed: 218-222). Peres conceived 
of peace as a goal and an interest in itself, not as a function of the cold war. This was 
evident both in his diplomacy and in his concept of a European style-regional peace 
involving a Marshall Plan, which the US viewed with scepticism.
Thus, Reagan was never as keen as Peres, to move forward on the basis of an 
international conference including Soviet participation (Quandt 1993). In September 
1986, Shultz was concerned by a Peres-Mubarak joint declaration which mentioned an 
international conference with Soviet participation. In the President’s opinion, Soviet 
participation would have led to deadlock (MECS 1986: 69). Even when Shultz was 
comfortable with Soviet participation, he still refused to commit the US fully to the 
agreement. There were still too many question marks attached to the London agreement 
for American prestige to be connected with it. Soviet participation was not fully resolved17 
(MECS 1987 :94; Bar Zohar: 167) and there was the additional uncertainty as to whether 
Syria and the PLO would scupper the agreement. In the absence of a clear cut Soviet- 
Arab willingness to make progress, the administration would have been in a relatively 
weak position to pressure the Likud, even if it had wanted to do so. In similar 
circumstances in 1982, after the announcement of the Reagan Plan, the Likud had found it
17 Under ‘old thinking’. Soviet promotion of an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was largely a tactic designed to promote Arab unity. However, under Gorbachev the conference 
gradually changed from one designed to be coercive in nature, to a more flexible approach. The problem 
was that until 1988 Soviet policy was balanced by the continuation of old thinking within the elite which 
continued to supply weapons to Syria and support Arab unity. In October 1986, the Soviets wanted an 
active international conference (Golan: 322). However, during Shultz’s meeting with Shevardnadze just 
after he received word of the London agreement, he apparently attained initial Soviet approval for an 
international conference whereby the parties negotiated directly and bilaterally and that all the conference 
could do was to promote that (Shultz: 939). At the same time, after having met with two high-ranking 
Soviet officials in Rome, Peres leaked information that the Soviets had spoken against any ‘coercion’ by 
the superpowers in the context of an international peace conference, or by the conference itself; that 
Moscow had agreed to the idea of bilateral talks as part of the international conference, and that they had 
spoken of Palestinian representation at the conference in more general terms than just the PLO (FBIS 10 
April 1987:1-3; JP 10 April 1987). However, Soviet public statements did not move in this direction until 
after 1988 (Golan 1992; JP 11 May 1988:1; MECS 1988:112-3). Indeed, the Soviets appeared pleased 
when, after the London agreement, the PNC formally abrogated Arafat's pact with Hussein (Freedman 
1991b: 235).
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easy to defy the US, even gaining enough support in Congress to reverse an 
administration’s attempt to restrict aid. Given the fate of the Reagan Plan, which had been 
destroyed by the forces alluded to above, Shultz was not over keen to commit American 
prestige again without certain success.
Reinforcing the administration’s reluctance to take on the London agreement and pressure 
the Likud was their special regard for Israel in general. Thus Shultz, in contrast to Peres, 
held that peace could only be made if the polarised Israeli political culture developed a 
broad consensus (Golan 1989: 336). Seeing Israel sympathetically, Reagan and Shultz 
tended to accept the ‘procedural/security’ concerns of Shamir and the Likud as genuine, 
especially as these points reinforced their own feelings as to the unreliability of the Arab 
moderates. Moreover, the fact that in contrast to Begin and Sharon, Shamir and Arens had 
a pragmatic style and that Arens in particular was skilled at presenting the Likud case in 
cold war/neo-conservative terms, served to reinforce this tendency. Only when Shamir 
stated publicly that the exchange of territory for peace was foreign to him, in 1988, did 
Shultz came to the conclusion that the Likud were using procedure as an excuse (Shultz: 
1026). Only then was pressure considered, but it was too late. Rather than structuring a 
crisis scenario to shock public opinion in Israel, the Americans sought only to influence 
the Israeli debate so that the up-coming elections would become a referendum on peace 
(Quandt 1993: 367; MECS 1988: 106). The American intervention did not succeed in 
helping Labour to win the 1988 election in Israel. In any case on 31 July 1988, King 
Hussein had publicly relinquished all legal and administrative ties to the West Bank. The 
Jordanian option had disappeared. Labour had no credible partner for negotiations. 
Subsequently, as his last act as Secretary of State, Shultz opened a dialogue with Arafat 
and the PLO. The Likud had won the battle, but begun to lose the war.
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Chapter 7: The Collapse of the National Unity Government 1988-90
Introduction
As in 1984, the 1988 election produced a stalemate. The polarisation of the Israeli body 
politic left the religious parties holding the balance of power. Both Likud and Labour 
sought to entice them into a narrow coalition, with the Likud having the edge in the talks, 
but ultimately the stalemate produced a national unity government. However, with many 
members of the main parties unsatisfied with the coalition the national unity government 
was unstable. Both sides continued to court the religious parties with a view to a narrow 
coalition throughout the government's term in office. This domestic political reality had 
major ramifications. Not only were Labour and Likud actively pursuing different policies 
simultaneously, but within both parties different approaches were pursued. Within the 
Likud three different strategies were pursued: Shamir’s radical-pragmatic strategy, Arens 
conservative strategy and the 'constrainers' radical strategy. Within Labour two strategies 
were pursued: Peres progressive strategy and Rabin’s mamlachti strategy. As a 
consequence, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Moshe Arad admitted he, “had more 
problems with Jerusalem than with Israel's opponents” (JR 20 December 1990).
In this period Rabin was the crucial foreign policy actor so far as process was concerned. 
Both Shamir and the Americans recognised him as the key to sustaining the national unity 
government. In addition, Rabin, as Minister of Defence, had greatest access to 
information about potential Palestinian interlocutors from the territories for the 
negotiations under discussion. In contrast, despite being Labour leader, Peres was Finance 
Minister which meant he was less directly involved in the day to day running of foreign 
policy. Moreover, his standing had fallen substantially in Washington following the 
London Agreement debacle and the loss of the 1988 election. Nonetheless, despite the 
importance of all these strands of policy on the process of US-Israeli relations over the 
Palestinian question, the Likud was the dominant force as regard the end product of 
policy. The coalition agreement stipulated that there was to be no rotation of the Prime 
Minister, and with the Likud also controlling the Foreign Ministry through Moshe Arens,
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it had a clear edge over Labour, with the most important and decisive figure being Prime 
Minister Shamir.
Pragmatic Style, Radical Substance: the Shamir Strategy
Shamir’s basic strategy for dealing with the United States with regard to the Palestinian 
Question did not fundamentally alter during this period. Shamir was not at all enthusiastic 
about presenting a peace initiative which might set off serious talks and threaten the status 
quo. He wanted to appear open to peace, while in reality never being prepared to move 
beyond the Camp David formula which he knew was unacceptable to the Arabs. 
However, both Rabin and the Americans were demanding that Israel move beyond that 
formula in order to give them something to ‘run with’. Shamir’s realised that he needed 
Rabin's support if he was to retain a broad coalition in order to control his own radicals. 
Without it, Shamir would have to form a coalition with the far right. Their extremism at 
the level of instrumental values could cause the situation in the territories to explode. This 
would destroy the calm in US-Israeli relations that Shamir saw as an important factor in 
helping to maintain the status quo in the territories thereby limiting the possibility of 
greater American intervention (HA 31 January 1989:11).
Shamir and top advisor Ben Aharon were won round to the idea of an Israeli initiative to 
pre-empt any unwanted US interference. Given American opposition, they wanted to limit 
the US to playing a bridging role in the peace process after both parties had already found 
some common ground (WINEP 1988: 29). Ben Aharon did not think that the US 
sponsored peace process would really quell the Intifada (FBIS 3 April 1989: 27). As he 
explained, “I know it goes against the American nature to imagine that problem has no 
permanent solution, but there is none for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza” 
(WJW 21 December 1989: 25). For the radicals the whole American scenario for peace 
was hopelessly optimistic. They could appear moderate by talking about shared 
sovereignty and Benelux solutions (WP 26 March 1989: 1; WINEP 1988: 30). But they 
was not particularly interested in promoting a moderate leadership in the territories and 
thus was quite happy to see the Palestinian delegates appointed by Egypt or Jordan. As far 
as Shamir was concerned once the plan had been presented to the Americans, there was
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no need to promote it internationally. As Arens asserted, “for Shamir the plan itself was 
less important than American acceptance of it” (Arens 1995: 60-1). The bottom line for 
the radicals, as Ben Aharon later admitted, was that the Israeli peace plan of 1989 was 
merely a “ploy” (JR 20 December 1990:15).
Arens and the Conservative Strategy
The Likud was divided on the need for a genuine peace initiative. Differences between 
Shamir and Arens on the peace process had surfaced before during the Murphy 
Rendezvous (JP 28 February 1985: 2). However, these differences were minor and had no 
practical significance. In contrast, in this period a consistent and real difference of policy 
emerged between Arens and the conservatives on the one hand and Shamir and the 
radicals on the other. The Intifada was a turning point in the conservative attitude towards 
the Palestinian Question (Arens interview). It was then that the existential value of the 
whole land of Israel was cast in opposition to prudence. Compromise on territorial 
maximalism was necessary in order to sustain the compatibility of Zionism, liberalism 
and democracy and for pragmatic power political reasons. Unlike in the immediate pre- 
World War II world, one of Jabotinsky’s primary reasons for maximalism no longer 
existed as it was no longer considered necessary to control the whole land of Israel in 
order to provide room to save European Jewry. Moreover, in the new, more hostile 
international environment in which Israel’s position was weakened, Arens recognised that 
there was no way of stopping the Arab world from acquiring a nuclear capability within a 
few years. The Arabs were close to achieving a strategic parity with Israel which made 
war a far less attractive policy option (Arens 1995: 25). There was also increased 
sympathy for the Palestinians and the increasing moderation of the Soviet Union and the 
Arab states in the peace process, which affected the position of Israel’s key ally, the 
United States. As Arens (1995:278) explained:
“Just as after the Holocaust certain territorial claims had to be 
abandoned, so now Israel must maintain a reasonable correlation between 
concrete objectives and resources. As a nation dedicated to Western values 
and ideals, we must live by them not only in Israel itself, but also in our 
dealings with the Palestinian population. We cannot deny them 
participation in the political process that determines how they are
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governed. Autonomy will provide limited participation and is therefore a 
move in the right direction, but can serve as no more than a transition 
point to full participation which must be granted them sooner or later. ”
Until the Intifada, Arens was not primarily concerned with implementing autonomy 
(Arens interview) whereas after the Intifada a peace initiative became a priority. The 
seriousness of his desire to push forward diplomatically can be gauged by the fact that in 
the wake of the Intifada, Arens spoke with over 100 Arab leaders in the territories in an 
effort to move towards serious peace negotiations. These discussions brought him to the 
conclusion that in the short-run, Israel and the Palestinians could come to an agreement 
based on an interim solution even though the two sides were too far apart to advance on 
issues of final status (Arens 200). In the long-run, the conservatives advocated full 
withdrawal from Gaza and Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian condominium in the West Bank, 
involving partial territorial concessions. This pragmatic security orientated emphasis 
became most apparent in 1990 when as Defence Minister, Arens closed off territories 
from Israel. This act was of great symbolic significance as it demonstrated that he no 
longer believed that the myth of 'living together' under autonomy was really workable. 
Many ideologues in the Likud criticised him for this move for precisely that reason, for 
his action implied that Israel was better off without most of territories and the Palestinian 
population that came along with them.
In 1989, Arens’ concept of advancing the peace process hinged on the idea of negotiating 
with elected representatives from the territories, despite the fact that he harboured no 
illusion that the kind of leadership that would be elected would at least be affiliated with 
the PLO (FBIS 8 May 1989: 33). Elections were of crucial significance to the 
conservatives as they were seen as the best means of conferring a Palestinian leadership 
with the legitimacy necessary for serious negotiations. In addition, Arens banked on the 
elected leadership from inside the territories being more pragmatic that the PLO in Tunis 
as they had more of a stake in coexistence with Israel and would feel more of a sense of 
responsibility towards their constituents day to day concerns (Arens 1995: 120). Arens 
hoped that Egypt would use its influence to help quell the violence in the territories and 
organise support among the Palestinians for the elections idea (FBIS 23 January 1989: 
29). The introduction of Israel’s own peace plan would also help Israel to define the terms
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of negotiation rather than have to work within the categories put forward by others which 
would almost certainly be founded on principles they opposed. Arens also saw the 
elections as a means of sustaining Israel’s credibility with the US (Arens 1995: 25). From 
the Americans, Arens wanted a co-ordinated position or at least assurances that the Israeli 
position would not be continually eroded by Arab 'salami tactics' (WJW 10 February 
1989: 10). His basic strategy was to negotiate hard with the Americans in order to obtain 
a process as much to the benefit of Israel as possible, but ultimately to agree to make 
concessions to move the process forward, so long as Israel's minimum requirements were 
met.
Rabin and the Mamlachti Strategy
During the mid 1980s, while Peres pursued functional co-operation in the territories, more 
sceptical members of the government like Rabin, were more concerned to be seen to 
promote the “quality of life” initiative in Washington (Aronson: 313; JP 28-9 January 
1985). According to Efraim Sneh, “what changed Rabin’s attitude to the Palestinians was 
the fact that the Intifada moved the centre of political gravity to the occupied territories. 
Through their struggle, the Palestinians became partners” (Slater: 346). It was only with 
the Intifada that Rabin fully accepted the existence of a Palestinian partner with whom it 
might be possible to negotiate a settlement. To begin with, Rabin did not think anything 
unusual was going on and did not see any political significance in the ‘disturbances’. In 
the second stage, he came to see the Intifada as part of the more general traditional Arab 
struggle to destroy the state of Israel. Both these assumptions stemmed from a common 
mamlachti statist security assumption, whereby the Palestinians were not regarded as a 
serious factor in the political-strategic equation. As Minister of Defence, Rabin pursued a 
policy of beatings in the territories as part of an attritional strategy designed to 
demonstrate Israeli determination not to yield to force (Inbar 1996a: 18-20). It was only 
after 3 months that Rabin came to understand the Intifada as popular uprising. Only then 
he admitted, “I've learned something in the last two and a half months you can't rule by 
force over one and a half million Palestinians.”(JP 24 March 1988: 3). Subsequently, 
Rabin argued that Israel needed, “a military-political policy that stands on two feet. Any 
policy that stands on one foot will never lead to a solution” (JP11 January 1989). For the
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first time, Rabin felt the necessity to initiate a peace proposal on the Palestinian front. In 
January 1989, Rabin supported a meeting between Shmuel Goren the IDF's co-ordinator 
in the territories and Faisel Husseini a leading PLO moderate from Arafat’s Fatah 
grouping in the territories. Shortly afterwards Rabin floated his own plan to move the 
process forward. To begin with, he proposed regional elections in the territories to elect 
Palestinians with whom Israel would negotiate an interim settlement.
The new Rabin strategy towards the Palestinian question hinged on his belief that local 
Palestinians could break free of the PLO and negotiate a pragmatic agreement with Israel 
(FBIS 15 March 1989: 39; JP 21 February 1989). He felt that ultimately Palestinians from 
the territories would be more pragmatic than the PLO because their primary interest was 
in ending the occupation and not the return of the 1948 refugees to Israel (FBIS 23 
January 1989: 29). For Rabin, the Intifada was extremely significant because for the first 
time since 1948, the 'insiders' had taken control of the Palestinian movement (FBIS 18 
May 1989: 23). Consequently, he appealed directly to Palestinians in the territories to 
come forward and accept his election plan. The Rabin plan anticipated that the Palestinian 
insiders would gradually develop more and more independence from the PLO in Tunis 
until the PLO became as irrelevant to Palestinian politics in the territories as the World 
Zionist Organisation was to Israeli politics (FBIS 16 March 1989: 24). Nonetheless, 
Rabin recognised that in the interim Palestinians from the territories still required PLO 
approval to conduct negotiations with Israel and consequently he gave his approval to 
Rafi Edri a Labour Party member to meet PLO officials in Tunis to try and secure this 
(Horowitz: 99; Abbas 1995: 54-56). Rabin’s strategy was to try and work with Prime 
Minister Shamir to enter the negotiation process with the Palestinians. Rabin especially 
sought to work closely with the Americans. Co-ordination of policy with the US was a 
central strategic aim in of itself, a means to strengthen Israel’s bargaining position and a 
mechanism for helping to ensure that those who were reluctant to move forward on both 
sides would not block the process. Rabin felt that the US could use its influence in the 
Arab world to help give the Palestinian 'insiders' the necessary freedom to negotiate 
(FBIS 25 May 1989: 21; Bar Zohar: 217).
In many ways the conservative and mamlachti sub-cultures took a similar approach to
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foreign policy and in this period their strategies regarding relations with the US over the 
Palestinian question were almost identical. Both Arens and Rabin instituted a closure of 
the territories, supported only limited settlement in blocks, advocated withdrawal from 
Gaza and looked towards a genuine Palestinian leadership from the territories for 
negotiations. However, the conservatives still retained a greater sensitivity to the value of 
the whole land of Israel. Moreover, because of their position in the Likud, they were tied 
to a bounded political debate in which their liberalism and pragmatism put them at the 
margins of legitimacy. The mamlachti sub-culture, on the other hand, was not tied to the 
value of the whole land of Israel and from within the Labour Party was able to adopt a far 
more flexible approach.
Peres and the Progressive Strategy
Without a Jordanian option, Peres came to accept an expanded role for the Palestinians in 
the peace process. Peres adapted his long range plan to include the possibility of a 
demilitarised Palestinian political entity in the West Bank with Israel and Jordan 
responsible for security (HA 23 March 1989: l) .1 In diplomatic terms, Peres accepted that 
the Palestinian track now had to precede the Jordanian track. Peres had already accepted 
an indirect role for the PLO during the Murphy rendezvous negotiations. However, at that 
time Peres had sought to use the diplomatic process to marginalise Arafat. Now it began 
to appear as if  Peres was becoming reconciled to a growing PLO role in the long-run. 
During Sweden’s attempts, at the end of 1988, to get the PLO to recognise Israel and thus 
bring about a US-PLO dialogue, Peres told the Swedish Foreign Minister privately, "If 
you get the PLO to renounce terrorism and recognise Israel, I would respect them." 
(Gowers and Walker: 294). Indeed, in public Peres only mildly criticised the opening of 
the US-PLO dialogue as “premature”(MECS 1989: 111, ft 158). Peres wanted proof that 
PLO actions matched their declarations (FBIS 15 December 1988: 29-32)2. In the interim,
1 Nonetheless, Peres still opposed a Palestinian state, whereas Beilin proposed the idea of an independent 
demilitarised Palestinian state in 'Gaza First'. The idea was opposed by Peres who favoured just 'autonomy 
first' for Gaza (Peres 1980: 899; JP 11 December 1990).
2 Mainstream PLO figures were beginning to make moderate noises. Bassam Abu Sharif, a close adviser to 
Arafat, made a statement at the emergency Arab summit conference in Algiers in June 1988 supporting 
direct talks rather than a settlement imposed by an outside power or negotiations subject to international 
veto (NYT 22 June 1988). This statement contradicted the PLO’s continuing insistence on an effective 
international conference, and although Arafat did not disavow it, he did say it was not an official PLO
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Peres (and Rabin) expressed their desire to be briefed on the substance of US-PLO 
conversations (MECS 1989: 69-70; Medzini 1988-90: 197, 207, 225; FBIS 3 July 1989: 
25).
However, for Peres the US was by no means a central indispensable component of policy 
towards the Palestinian question. Regional political and economic arrangements and not a 
militarily strong Israel backed by the US, were the cornerstone of peace and security. 
Given this basis, Peres, unlike Rabin, did not prioritise co-ordination with the US in the 
peace process for its own sake. Thus, although he recognised America's pre-eminent 
position as a potential mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, once the Americans 
failed to deliver on the London Agreement in 1987, Peres looked to other mediators. As a 
result, in this period, Peres’ strategy was no longer focused on the US and instead worked 
closely with the Egyptians who represented the main channel of communication to the 
PLO. In any case, the thrust of the progressives’ strategy to break out of the constraints 
imposed by the NUG, involved setting up a narrow dovish government with the support 
o f the religious parties (FBIS 20 March 1989: 37). The US had refused to help Peres in 
such a venture in 1987 and it continued to oppose such an occurrence. Peres was backed 
by the most dovish elements within the Labour party such as Uzi Baram, Chaim Ramon 
and Ezer Weizman, all of whom had opposed the formation of a NUG to begin with as 
they felt that peace was impossible without talking to the PLO (NYT 17 November 1988: 
A3; 22 December 1988: A14).
Baker and the American Strategy
Neither James Baker nor George Bush shared Reagan, Shultz’s or Haig’s special regard 
for Israel as a sister democracy, a moral responsibility or a strategic asset. Bush's 
approach to world affairs was based on a state-centred balance of power system. Not 
sharing Reagan’s vision, Bush saw the Israelis more as a strategic irritant than as a 
strategic asset. He had urged Reagan to take a tougher line against the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 and was on good terms with the Saudis. Bush selected his close friend
document. In February 1989, Arafat gave his first press conference specifically for Israeli journalists and in 
May he declared the Covenant ‘Caduc’.
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and ally James Baker, formerly Reagan's Chief-of-Staff and Treasury Secretary, as his 
Secretary of State. According to Quandt and others in the State Department, Baker was 
essentially a deal maker. Certainly neither Bush nor Baker were cut from the neo­
conservative cloth (Quandt 1993: 384). During Baker's first visit to Israel after the Gulf 
War, the Likud government tried to encourage greater sympathy for their position by 
taking him on a helicopter flight which demonstrated the strategic importance to Israel of 
the Golan Heights and West Bank. This effort failed, while Baker's visit to the Israeli 
Holocaust Museum, Yad Vashem, had no recognisable political impact (Arens 1995: 219, 
Baker: 421). Shamir's top advisor, Ben Aharon, kept a copy of a 1989 Time magazine 
story on Baker in his desk drawer in which the Secretary of State had described his 
technique for hunting wild Turkey's. "The trick is in getting them where you want them 
on your terms. Then you control the situation, not them. You have the options. Pull the 
trigger or don't." Shamir and Ben Aharon thought they were Baker's prize turkey 
(Frankel: 289).
Still, even before Bush took office, Shultz and Reagan instituted a major about-turn in US 
policy by opening a dialogue with the PLO, without consulting Israel. The State 
Department felt that there was a chance of a useful Israeli-Palestinian dialogue being set 
up. The US accepted that given the mainstream Israeli opposition to dealing with the 
PLO, the organisation could not be directly involved in talks. However they also 
recognised that in order to work with Palestinians 'insiders' from the territories they would 
at least need Arafat's tacit approval. The channels for this effort were the US-PLO 
dialogue in Tunis and Egypt (Quandt 1993: 385-8). Rabin’s strategy dovetailed very well 
with American thinking. Although the State Department was sceptical about Shamir's 
desire to press forward in the peace process, they were persuaded that the possibility of 
progress existed by, amongst other thins, Rabin's attempt to open a dialogue with 
Palestinians (Baker 116-8).
Subsequently, the American administration worked closely with Rabin to engineer a 
breakthrough in the peace process. As noted previously, because Labour's positions on the 
'land for peace' issue were closer to those of the US, there was always going to be a 
greater probability of American administrations would work more closely with Labour
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than with the Likud. In the case of Rabin, this possibility was further increased, seeing as 
one of the main goals of his peace policy was to work closely with the US and his own 
positions on pertinent aspects of the Palestinian question fitted long-standing American 
preferences. Furthermore, in the short-run Rabin and the American administration shared 
the same strategic objective. Both wanted to start a dialogue between Israel and 
Palestinians from the territories which excluded the PLO from the negotiating process3. In 
addition, there was also a meeting of minds between Rabin and the American 
administration on the tactical level. The US was unprepared to help Peres bring down the 
NUG to advance peace. They saw the continued existence of the Israeli national unity 
government as the best means available of bringing Israel into the negotiating process; a 
narrow Peres led Labour government, it was thought, would not be stable enough to 
deliver peace. As a result, Baker and the State Department worked especially closely with 
Rabin during this period (Arens: 75; HA 12 September 1989:11).
The difference between Shultz and Baker was that Baker was prepared “to play the 
game”. Shultz had not wanted to intervene in Israeli politics, even to secure a peace deal 
he favoured. Baker, without concern for the ‘special relationship’ and only concerned 
with ‘doing the deal’ was prepared to pressure the Likud, albeit it subtly. He hoped to 
work closely with Rabin to box Shamir into the opening of an Israeli-Palestinian 
dialogue. Subsequently, according to a New York Times report “a senior administration 
official” felt that a serious Israeli proposal would have to define final status issues in a 
way that went beyond Camp David. To try an induce a positive Israeli response, Baker 
also told the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee that if the US could not 
get talks started between Israel and inside Palestinians, then the US might have to turn to 
the PLO (Arens 1995: 55-57). However, at this stage, the new administration did not feel 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict was 'ripe' for resolution (Ben Zvi 1993: 165). Given this 
perception, Baker was unprepared to put American credibility and his own reputation on 
the line to kick-start negotiations. US policy continued with the operational concept that 
the US should not play a major role in the peace process until the protagonists were ready 
and willing to compromise; only then could the US play a constructive bridging role in
3 Apart from anything else the US wanted to exclude Arafat for the time being as he was an unacceptable 
figure to the American public. However, in the long-run many in Washington felt that the PLO would
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the peace negotiations. Thus, despite the change in personnel at the top and their 
fundamentally different attitude towards Israel, Shamir could still count on his perception 
that the balance of interest on the Palestinian Question rested with Israel and not the US.
The Israeli Plan: The American Reaction
The government’s first draft of its peace plan was a compromise between the Arens and 
Rabin plans drafted by Eli Rubinstein and Dan Meridor (Frankel 119). The plan was 
basically a re-run of Camp David with some additional element involving the other Arab 
states. The fourth point of the proposal attracted most American and international interest. 
It called for elections in the territories in 'an atmosphere devoid of violence'. The plan 
went on to assert that the Palestinians elected would negotiate an interim settlement and 
only after the interim phase was in place would final status negotiations commence (JP 14 
April 1989: 8). In May 1989, after many prior discussions with the US, the NUG publicly 
presented its four point peace plan. The plan spoke of elections among the Arabs of Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza, a deliberately vague phrase. As always the real question was which 
‘Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza’ was Israel going to negotiate with, and who was 
going to decide the issue? The Americans had already spoken of the Palestinian elections 
having to be based on a mutually agreed formula. Clearly, this implied modifications to 
the Israeli plan and the involvement of the US as a mediator with Palestinians, (the PLO) 
in the negotiations over the election modalities. Baker also asked Israel to find a creative 
way to allow Palestinians from outside the territories and East Jerusalem Arabs to 
participate in the elections (Baker: 120-1). Nonetheless, Dennis Ross was one hundred 
percent embracing of the plan, as it gave the Americans something to work with. It was 
regarded in Washington as an exercise in 'constructive ambiguity' (FBIS 6 July 1989: 29). 
The rest of NUG was taken up with attempting to move beyond that ambiguity in a series 
of crises.
The Constrainers Crisis
Baker’s conditions on Palestinian representation were opposed within Likud circles. In
eventually have to be brought into the talks (JP 21 March 1989: 1,12; FBIS 23 January 1989: 31).
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contrast, Rabin was prepared to allow East Jerusalemites to take part in the elections, so 
long as they voted outside the municipal boundaries. Rabin argued that the process would 
set a precedent whereby the Arabs of East Jerusalem could express their political rights in 
the territories rather than in Jerusalem itself, which would remain in Israel (YA 11 April 
1989: 1). Shamir did not stress his opposition to the American suggestions. He hoped that 
the public presentation of the plan would put the ball in the Arab court, where the Arabs 
and not Israel would come under American pressure (JP 30 April 1989: 1). However, 
Shamir then made a speech which the State Department felt made the plan impossible to 
sell to the Arabs. In a speech to the Likud Knesset faction, Shamir ruled out the 
participation of East Jerusalemites in elections and declared that Israel would never cede 
even one inch of territory to the Arabs (MECS 1989: 71, 74). Consequently, Baker (121) 
felt the US had to do something to restore its credibility as an honest broker in the Arab 
world and that something turned out to be Baker's infamous AIPAC speech, which is 
remembered for its full frontal attack on the Likud's 'whole land of Israel' ideology and 
settlement policy.
In the face of such open signs of hostility to Likud ideology, three Likud ministers, Ariel 
Sharon, David Levy and Yitzhak Modai, tried to constrain the terms of reference of the 
Israeli peace plan to take away the "constructive ambiguity" that the Americans so valued. 
Sharon argued that Israel's answer to the Intifada should be military and not political and 
that Israel could crush the riots if  they followed the same tactics he had used in Gaza in 
1970 (FBIS 7 April 1989: 30). For Sharon, this policy strategy fitted well with his 
disregard of the importance of the relationship with the United States: a radicalism of both 
substance and style. However, the other two were not previously, or subsequently, known 
for their radicalism and correspondingly many commentators in Israel referred to the three 
ministers as 'the opportunists' rather than as 'the constrainers'. Nonetheless, they did tap 
into a strong body of opinion in the Likud, obtaining the backing of other radical Likud 
MKs in a 'Land of Israel Front'. At the Likud Central Committee meeting the constrainers 
demanded that Shamir attach the following four conditions to his plan: No East 
Jerusalemites should take part in the elections, the Intifada should be halted before any 
elections take place, Israel should continue settlement and not surrender any territory 
whatsoever (MECS 1989: 22). The conservatives, Arens, Olmert and Meridor were
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stunned when Shamir consented to these conditions thereby removing the little space the 
government had to manoeuvre towards genuine negotiations and endangering their 
credibility in the US (Frankel: 125). But as Likud MK Ben-Ellisar noted, “the 
constrainers merely helped Shamir to constrain himself!” (Shindler 1995: 256).
Publicly, the US concentrated on trying to paper over this setback by arguing that the 
position of the Likud party was not identical with the official position o f the government. 
Unofficially, “a senior administration official” upped the pressure on the Israelis by 
suggesting that if  no progress was possible on the election plan, the US might support an 
international conference: the Likud nightmare (MECS 1989: 22). However, the real 
problem was not American-Israeli relations but Labour-Likud relations. As a result of the 
constrainers actions, the hands of Labour Party doves was strengthened as even Rabin 
questioned the value of continuing in the NUG under the new conditions. Peres was 
privately sceptical of the Israeli Peace Plan, while Beilin actually voted against the plan 
(JP 3 April 1989: 1,10). Following the constrainers’ success, the Labour party voted to 
leave the NUG. But the Americans counselled the Labour Party not to leave the coalition 
(MECS 1989: 22). Dennis Ross threatened that if Labour bolted the coalition it would be 
accused o f sabotaging the government’s peace initiative (JP 12/7.89: 1). Eventually, in 
order to protect Israel’s dwindling credibility in Washington, Shamir resolved the crisis 
by letting the Cabinet adopt a resolution reaffirming the 14 May initiative 'without 
additions or changes' (MECS 1989: 74).4
The Ten Points Crisis
The second crisis of the period surrounded the 'Ten Points' put forward by Egypt in 
August. The Ten Points suggested that Arabs from East Jerusalemites should participate 
in elections, that there should be a settlement freeze, and that negotiations should be 
explicitly based on the concept of land for peace and an acknowledgement of Palestinian 
political rights. By the end of August 1989, despite the extreme resolutions passed by the
4 Again in early 1990, Sharon called a meeting of the Likud's central committee to try and get the party to 
reject Israel going to a Foreign Ministers meeting under conditions which would allow Palestinian 
deportees and East Jerusalemites to be included in the Palestinian delegation. Once again however, Shamir
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Fatah General Congress, Arafat had agreed to use the Ten Points as a basis for 
negotiations with Israel. However, along with other demands, he insisted that the PLO 
would only accept the Ten Points unequivocally if  Israel did too (MECS 1989: 24,90). 
Although this did not constitute acceptance in American eyes, it did enough to put the ball 
back in Israel’s court.
Peres and the Blazers were already working closely with Mubarak on their peace strategy. 
In early August, the Labour Party adopted 12 principles for the election which accepted 
all Ten Points. Commentators in Israel noted how well the Egyptian plan seemed to fit 
with the position o f the Israeli Labour, this was hardly surprising given that the Points 
were actually drafted by two of the Blazers, Avi Gill and Nimrod Novik! (Makovsky: 10). 
Subsequently while the Israeli Foreign Minister, Arens, went around the US promoting 
the Israeli Four Point Peace Plan, Peres followed him around the US promoting the Ten 
Points, which had not even been formally conveyed to the Likud (Arens: 75, 78). Clearly 
the introduction of the Ten Points fitted with the long-running Peres scenario for breaking 
up the NUG. Mubarak had little faith that Shamir was genuinely interested in forwarding 
the peace process (Baker: 441, 427) and consequently Egypt tried to help Peres. During 
July, Peres had helped set up the Shas leadership for meetings with Mubarak in Cairo, 
where he tried to get them to back a narrow Peres govemment(Frankel: 131). Shas was of 
potentially pivotal importance in any coalition and Peres hoped that it would help 
persuade the ultra-Orthodox parties to tip the scales on support for the Ten Points, if  it 
came to a vote in Cabinet (JP 20 August 1989:1,8).
However, the Americans did not support Peres’ attempts to break up the NUG (JP 28 
September 1989: 4; 13 October 1989: 2). Rather, Rabin and Baker were trying to use the 
Egyptian connection to the PLO to construct a compromise which would allow a Israeli- 
Palestinian meeting to take place within the confines of the NUG. Baker worked with 
Rabin, to the exclusion of Likud figures, in order to pressure Shamir to enter talks with 
Palestinians. Thus, without informing the Likud (Arens: 75) Baker met Rabin and handed 
him a document passed to him by Egypt from the PLO outlining its conditions for
outsmarted Sharon who felt he had the support of the floor on the issue, by making the issue one of 
confidence in the government and his leadership and thus easily won.
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entering talks. Rabin looked for ways to synthesis the PLO position with the maintenance 
of the NUG. He announced that the Egyptians could select the Palestinian delegation after 
consulting with whoever they wanted i.e. the PLO. He claimed that Egypt would not 
insist on mentioning the PLO by name in the invitation and would announce the names of 
the Palestinian delegation itself. Rabin conceded that the Palestinians could raise the Ten 
Points in the preliminary meeting with the Israelis and apparently agreed to accept two or 
three deportees in the Palestinian delegation as the 'outsiders' (MECS 1989: 74, 81). 
Baker then informed Rabin that the Egyptians had offered to host a meeting between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis to help iron out differences between the Israeli position and 
the PLO position laid out in the document (FBIS 21 September 1989: 35; 3 October 1989: 
29)5. Mubarak, encouraged by his meeting with Rabin, sent out formal invitations to talks 
that arrived in Israel on October 4.6
While Labour and the US were allowing the PLO a role in the process, the Likud was 
busy trying to find a way to end the US-PLO dialogue through Congress (see chapter 10). 
As Ben Aharon explained to US ambassador Pickering, “Our logic is completely opposed 
to yours” (Frankel: 123). Indeed, what concerned Shamir was not so much the Ten Points 
themselves as the American attitude towards them. The Americans saw the Egyptian 
proposal as a way to implement the Israeli plan and not a contradiction to it (MECS 1989: 
73; Arens 1995: 74). This undermined the purpose of the plan from the radical 
perspective. Consequently, inside the Israeli cabinet the Likud rejected the invitation and 
Rabin’s compromise suggestions.
Subsequently Arens and Rabin appealed to Baker to continue his efforts and on 8 October 
Baker's Five Points became public knowledge. Baker's Five Points were essentially 
conditions for the Israeli-Palestinian meeting to be held in Cairo, which he felt would be 
facilitated by a meeting of the Egyptian, Israel and US foreign ministers within two 
weeks. This gave the Likud the means to argue that they had not killed the peace process 
by rejecting the Egyptian proposal and this undermined Peres’ reason for leaving the
5 The PLO still wanted ‘outsiders’ as opposed to deportees in the Palestinian delegation and suggested
Edward Said a PNC member with a US passport, and PLO 'outsider1 and moderate Nabil Shaath (JP 28 
September 1989:4). Rabin rejected Shaath outright.
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government. The Americans agreed to try and find a way to provide the Likud with the 
assurances it demanded. Subsequently, Beilin blasted the US for intervening in Israeli 
domestic politics (JP 8 October 1989: 1). However, the Likud was still unhappy with 
many implications of the Five Points. But in order to put the ball back in the Arab court, 
they accepted them whilst attaching six assumptions to that acceptance. These 
assumptions focused on the Likud's previous demands on Palestinian representation and 
the agenda for talks at Cairo (JP 23 October 1989). Shamir explained privately that if  it 
was not for his fear of the damage to US-Israeli relations he would not have touched the 
proposal with a ten foot barge pole (HA 23 October 1989: 9).
To try and accommodate the Likud’s concerns, the administration demonstrated its 
opposition to increasing the PLO's public role by opposing the Arab states’ attempt to get 
the PLO's observer status at the UN upgraded from 'observer organisation' to 'observer 
state'. In addition, Baker offered the Likud some written assurances which he wanted tied 
up before the Foreign Ministers met (YA 5 January 1990: 1,5; Arens 1995: 93). The 
assurances gave Israel some concessions. However, Baker agreed only that, “it was not 
the US aim in the current effort to get Israel into a dialogue with the PLO” (MECS 1989: 
77). This wording only heightened Israeli fears about being locked into a process that 
would eventually lead to Israeli-PLO negotiations.
Frustrated with American tolerance of the Likud, the progressives sought direct links with 
the PLO in contravention of Israeli law. Beilin suggested to Peres that he meet secretly 
with PLO officials with the help of the Europeans. Peres agreed to allow Beilin and his 
assistant, Professor Yair Hirshfeld to do so. As a result, Beilin negotiated indirectly 
through the Dutch Foreign Minister, with leading PLO figures in Holland. A document 
was produced in which the PLO and Israel agreed to certain conditions for a final 
settlement and the PLO accepted the Shamir plan for elections in the territories in return 
for the inclusion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem in the proceedings. However, the 
PLO withdrew from this agreement (Beilin 1997 38, 53). Subsequently, on 31 December, 
Ezer Weizman was dismissed by Shamir from the inner Cabinet for talking to the PLO.
6 In fact the invitation had already been transmitted by the Egyptians to Labour the night before and Peres 
had already announced his acceptance of it (Arens: 86).
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The press had already reported that Weizmaris cohort Avraham Tamir had met PLO 
officials (Tessler: 730) and it had also been reported that other figures connected to the 
Labour party, such as Lova Eliav, had been urging the PLO to accept the Five Points (YA 
4 December 1990: 2). According to Ahmed Tibi, an advisor to Arafat, Weizman’s 
message to the PLO, helped soften its opposition to the Five Points (Abbas 1995: 83). 
Weizman was alleged to have reached an agreement with the PLO on the question o f the 
make up of the Palestinian delegation and promised that Labour would try and bring 
down the government if the Likud rejected the conditions for Palestinian representation. 
Commentators found it hard to believe that Peres was unaware of these talks (HA 1 
January 1990: 1). Subsequently, Peres threatened to withdraw from the government. But 
Rabin successfully negotiated a solution with Dan Meridor.
The ‘Question and Assumption’ Crisis and the Collapse of the NUG
Rabin met Baker in Washington on 18 January and suggested a compromise on the issue 
of Palestinian representation, whereby the 'outsiders' would be recent deportees and East 
Jerusalemites would have to have a dual address in the territories; thereby bridging the 
PLO's and the Likud's requirements (AH 12 January 1990: 1). Rabin had already put the 
idea to Shamir who had expressed reservations and stated that he wanted further 
clarifications from the US (FBIS 1 February 1990: 21). To this end Rabin met Baker 
again. Rabin's remit from the Cabinet was only to listen to Baker. However, he now co­
ordinated with Baker the make-up of the Palestinian delegation to the point of discussing 
the actual names (Baker: 126; Arens: 109). Following the meeting, as agreed, Labour 
publicly accepted the American terms and Baker called Arens and Shamir to press the 
Rabin compromise (FBIS 1 February 1990: 21). With Egyptian and thus PLO support 
seemingly assured, Baker wanted to tie the Likud down before the PLO extremists 
pressurised Arafat to change his mind, but the Likud stalled (FBIS 12 February 1990: 24. 
8 February 1990: 24; Baker: 127).At this, Peres tried again to break up the government 
offering a leading figure in Shas, Yitzhak Peretz, a Cabinet position in a narrow Labour 
led coalition (FBIS: 1 February 1990: 25; 16 February 1990: 25; 23 February 1990: 27). 
However, Rabin continued to work with Baker to drag Shamir into negotiations.
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Once again, Rabin put his compromise to the Cabinet adding that Egypt and not the PLO 
would announce the names of the Palestinian delegation, while Baker again pushed 
Shamir for a reply (MECS 1990: 105). Arens then suggested that Baker pose the 
following question to Israel: Is the Government of Israel prepared to consider as 
candidates for the Palestinian delegation, residents of Judea Samaria and Gaza on a name 
by name basis? (Arens 1995: 115). Baker agreed to the question but after long 
negotiations between Salai Meridor and Dennis Ross (Frankel: 128), he added an 
assumption which stated, 'There will be individuals in the list once it is agreed upon that 
will fit the categories of deportees and dual addressees- meaning people who are residents 
of the territories and have an apartment or office in East Jerusalem (JP 27 October 1995: 
2). Arens felt that this was the best Israel could do and he told Shamir that he was very 
much in favour of accepting the formula (Arens 1995:119), but Shamir was reticent.
So when on 3 March the Likud Ministers met to discuss the Baker question and 
assumption, Arens proposed accepting it subject to Likud and Labour agreeing to co­
ordinate their diplomacy from then on. This would include agreed steps should the 
delegation declare itself to be PLO and an agreement to discount the participation of East 
Jerusalemites in the future Palestinian elections (FBIS 5 March 1990: 25). Most of the 
Likud ministers agreed although Shamir kept silent (FBIS: 1 March 1990: 30). Shamir 
prevented a Cabinet vote on the subject, sensing the majority of Likud ministers favoured 
a compromise (Arens: 123). To try and ensnare Shamir, Rabin got the Labour Party to 
pass a resolution on the unity of Jerusalem and ruling out negotiations with the PLO 
(MECS 1990: 107). At the inner Cabinet meeting on 11 March, Rabin had been in a 
conciliatory mood. He agreed with Arens that if the Palestinian delegation at Cairo 
announced that they represented the PLO, Israel would walk out. He also stated that he 
opposed East Jerusalem being included in the area of Palestinian autonomy, as well as, 
East Jerusalemites being candidates in the elections and although he favoured residents of 
East Jerusalem voting in these elections he was prepared to let the Knesset decide the 
matter (Arens 1995: 124-5). Shamir knew that the majority of the Likud ministers 
favoured the Rabin compromise but he threatened to resign if  they did not support his 
decision to go with Nissim's proposal for a narrow government (Shamir interview). And 
so on 13 March Shamir sacked Peres. Peres then won a vote of no confidence, bringing
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down the NUG but it remained unclear as to who would form the new government.
Shamir had acted against the protestations of Meridor and Arens both of whom favoured 
the continuation of the NUG and felt that a compromise with Rabin was well within 
reach. Now Arens favoured the Likud swallowing its pride and recreating a NUG by 
accepting the Shas compromise (favourable to Labour) of going to the Cairo meeting first 
and then co-ordinating. However, Shamir was adamant and refused. As a result, Olmert, 
Meridor and Milo wanted Arens to take over the Likud and go to Cairo, but, Sharon stood 
behind Shamir and Arens refused to pick up the gauntlet (Frankel: 135). The 
conservatives lost their chance to take over the Likud. Subsequently, with the support of 
the ultra-Orthodox, Shamir succeeded in forming a narrow government. Thus despite the 
general shift within Israeli political culture towards normalisation and a dovish stance, the 
radicals held even more sway over policy in a narrow right-wing coalition headed by 
Shamir.
Conclusion
On reflection, the former US Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis felt that American 
provocation had pushed Shamir over the edge and made him oppose the Baker initiative 
and break up the NUG (NYT 23 March 1990). Shamir had suggested to Baker that the 
issue of Jerusalem would become the focus of the Cairo meeting and Baker refused to 
deny that might occur. This was supposed to have confirmed Shamir's fears and led him 
to postulate that Baker would “break our [Likud] bones” at the Cairo summit (Arens 
1995: 128; HA 9 March 1990: 1) While there is an element of truth in this evaluation, 
more fundamentally, as Shamir explained to Arens, a dialogue with the Palestinians was 
simply not essential (Arens 1995: 128). American behaviour simply furnished Shamir 
with a convenient excuse to reject the US initiative without paying to high a price in 
terms of the US-Israeli relationship. Thus the Shamir strategy- radical in substance 
pragmatic in style - achieved its objective. Israel continued to benefit from $3 billion of 
American aid a year and settlements continued to be built. Despite the change from a 
sympathetic neo-conservative administration to an ‘even handed’ Bush administration, 
American policy was still held in check by the Israeli political sub-culture of radicalism. 
Domestically, the particularism of the religious parties prevented Labour's attempt to
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counter this dominance. Regionally, with the PLO still equivocating about adopting the 
path of negotiations without resorting to terrorism and Syria still adopting an essentially 
rejectionist stance, Shamir was always able to put the ball back in the Arab court, thereby 
preventing any major opportunities for Baker to seriously pressure the radicals over their 
ideological commitment to settlements and the whole land of Israel. Without these 
supports, even the Bush administration did not want to risk its credibility by taking a 
more activist approach, especially when the pro-Israel lobby in the United States was still 
firmly behind the Israeli government.
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Chapter 8:Radical Pragmatism Defeated; 1990-1992
Introduction
The new government formed by Shamir was the most right-wing and particularist in 
Israel's history. Initially, it contained Techiya and Tzomet and later Moledet joined. The 
NRP was also part of the coalition, leaving Shas as the most dovish element in the 
government. The make up of the new government, allowed Shamir to pursue his preferred 
foreign policy objectives without pressure from Labour to advance the peace process. 
During this period, the key Israeli policy makers remained within the Likud. Prime 
Minister Shamir was the key player, while those close to him such as Ben Aharon, 
Rubinstein and Meridor continued to exert some influence over the mechanics of policy. 
The Cabinet was never really the forum for policy making (JP 21 June 1991) while, the 
importance o f Moshe Arens was reduced as he moved from the Foreign Ministry to the 
Defence Ministry. The influence of Foreign Minister David Levy was limited by Shamir 
on issues of major importance regarding the peace process. Sharon exerted significant 
indirect influence over relations because through his position as Housing Minister he 
exercised great authority over Israel's settlement policy. Since the issue of where the mass 
of new immigrants from the USSR would settle was a major question in US-Israeli 
relations, Sharon's actions were important.
The Gulf Crisis 1990-91
The new government's guidelines rejected the compromise put forward by Arens, Baker 
and Rabin a few months earlier. In actual fact, Shamir attached an extra condition to 
entering negotiations whereby parallel to the Palestinian track, there had to be 
negotiations with the Arab states (JP 13 June 1990). Knowing that Syria would reject any 
American terms for a conference, Shamir’s condition was another means of deflecting 
American pressure for progress. As a consequence of this public rejection of US policy, 
Baker informed Shamir via the public hearings of Congress, “the White House number is 
202 456 1414, when your serious about peace call us” (JP 13 June 1990). In response, 
given that the US-PLO dialogue was now over, Shamir felt able to gain some credibility
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in the US by stating that the Palestinians representatives could consult with the PLO so 
long as they themselves were not PLO (WJW 19 July 1990: 4). As usual such an 
approach was designed to delay negotiations and put the ball into the Arab court. The 
Shamir government was able to do this without any serious consequences for US-Israeli 
relations due to Arab actions. First, the US suspended its dialogue with the PLO on 20 
June, after Arafat had failed to condemn a terrorist attack on Israel by a faction closely 
associated with him. Second, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, American attention 
shifted away from Israel and the peace process.
However, in an attempt to break Arab support for the US position, Saddam proposed 
linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from the territories. The initial 
move failed but the US was concerned that any incident in Israel could turn Arab 
attention away from Kuwait and cause Arab support for the US against Saddam to 
dissipate. They were concerned by what might happen in the event that Israel retaliated 
directly against Iraq. Although the radical inclination generally favoured retaliation, on 
this occasion Shamir was extremely reluctant to retaliate and preferred to rely on coalition 
forces to destroy SCUD launchers and American Patriot missiles to protect Israeli cities. 
Shamir was prepared to toe the American line in expectation of a trade off on the 
Palestinian question. For him the crucial issue was the future of the territories and not 
Israel's overall deterrence posture. Shamir realised that following the successful 
conclusion to the Gulf War the Americans would have an unassailable position in the 
region, which they would want to use to promote the peace process (Shamir 217-224; 
Melman and Raviv 1994: 392-4). Baker told the Palestinians explicitly that they had to 
pay for their support of Iraq during the Gulf War and the reverse held true for Israel. 
Indeed, as a result, Shamir was able to get Baker to agree to all the Likud’s minimal 
procedural conditions on a peace conference including on the issue of Palestinian 
representation over which the talks had collapsed in 1990.
The Madrid Conference 1991-2
Between March and November 1991, intense negotiations took place between the United 
States, the Palestinians, the Arab States and Israel over the format and procedure for the
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Madrid Conference and the subsequent bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations. Within the 
Israeli government there were three approaches towards attending the Madrid conference 
and the subsequent negotiations with the Palestinians. The first approach adopted by 
Sharon and the parties of the radical right sought to prevent Israeli participation in the 
talks completely. Following the Gulf War, in the Cabinet Sharon, Rehavam Zeevi and 
Yuval Neeman tried to prevent the government announcing its support for the 1989 
Shamir Plan (JP 4 March 1991:1). They wanted to prevent any diplomatic initiative and 
emphasised the need to crush the Intifada with military force as the primary objective 
(Arens: 222). The right-wing of the Likud as well as Techiya and Moledet railed against 
the conference as a US dictate, a repeat of Munich and a potential Holocaust (NYT 20 
September 1991, JP 24 October 1991; JR 3 October 1991: 15). Sharon attempted to 
disrupt the American sponsored negotiations several times by deliberately timing 
settlement initiatives to coincide with Baker’s visits to the region.
The second approach was represented primarily by the conservatives: David Levy, Moshe 
Arens, Ehud Olmert, and Dan Meridor, all favoured attendance at the conference as a 
genuine, if small, step towards peace. The PLO's position had been greatly weakened 
while the US agreed to assurances for Israel and had created a two track approach that 
resulted in direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states for the first time (NYT 8 
March 1991:1; JR 24 January 1991: 5; NYT 28 October 1991; FBIS 16 October 1991: 
17). The Conservatives were also concerned to stay on good terms with the United States 
(JR 28 March 1991:20) and were thus relatively willing to make concessions to the 
Americans on procedural matters. Twice Levy agreed to American compromises on 
procedure only for Shamir to retract the agreement (JP 12 April 1991:1; NYT 29 April 
1991: 9). Levy thought the government should act quickly to overcome procedural 
obstacles in order to enable greater US-Israeli co-ordination on substantive issues (JP 21 
June 1991). He wanted to take advantage of Baker’s suggestion that Israel and the US 
write up an informal memorandum (Arens: 227). Baker had hoped he would be able to 
make progress with Levy, but events proved that Shamir was the final arbiter of policy 
(JP 6 July 1990).
The third approach belonged to the radical but pragmatic Shamir. Shamir was not really
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interested in the actual concrete moves towards reconciliation with the Palestinians 
(Arens: 223). The absorption of Israel's recent immigrants, the fulfilment o f a crucial 
Zionist objective, concerned him more that hold ups in the peace process (WJW 9 May 
1991:14). A 'close advisor to the Prime Minister', (Ben Aharon?) stated that he would 
“shed no tears if the process fell apart” (NYT 16 October 1991). However, Shamir 
recognised the need to stay on good terms with the US and not be blamed should the 
current initiative fail (JR 28 March 1991:20). He never thought symbolic acts of defiance 
of any value, instead he made sure that the terms of reference and procedural set up of the 
conference did not put Israel in the position of coming under immediate pressure to cede 
territory. He aimed to stay within the confines of the conference, but drag out its 
procedures to delay issues of substance from coming to the table, in order to allow time 
for Jewish settlements to dictate a new reality on the ground. As Shamir explained just 
after he left office, “I would have carried autonomy talks for ten years meanwhile we 
would have reached half a million Jews in Judea and Samaria”(MA 26 July 1992).
Getting to Madrid
Between the end of the Gulf War and Syria’s agreement to go to Madrid in July, US- 
Israeli negotiations focused on the modalities for the peace conference. Shamir assumed 
that the US was unlikely to be able to obtain Syrian adherence to their concept of a 
conference which did not guarantee, in advance, the return of all territory captured by 
Israel in the Six Day War. Subsequently, his tactics consisted of giving just enough to the 
Americans to prevent Israel being seen as the cause of the collapse of the peace process, 
while holding firm on procedural formulas in order to keep up American pressure on the 
Arab side. The American idea was for a regional conference sponsored by the US and the 
USSR, based on UN resolution 242 and incorporating a Palestinian negotiating team 
consisting of seven individuals none of whom were residents of Jerusalem. Shamir agreed 
that the conference would be based UN resolution 242, but that each party was allowed to 
maintain their own interpretations. The Likud argued that by returning Sinai it had already 
complied with the territorial component of the resolution.
On the question of Palestinian representation, Baker accepted Shamir’s demand that there
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would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Baker rejected virtually all the 
Palestinian demands, including that for an overt PLO role in the process. Israel got its 
way on the question of Palestinian representation to the point where, Shamir was even 
able to see the names of the Palestinian negotiation team prior to its announcement 
(Baker: 497, 504). Baker was prepared to be accommodating to Israel as his main 
objective was to get the Likud into the negotiating process. This became a virtual 
certainty after 14 July the Shamir government became aware that the Syrians had agreed 
to direct negotiations with a UN observer, as Baker had wanted. Subsequently, Shamir set 
up a committee to work on Israel's negotiating strategy for the up-coming peace 
negotiationsand in early August he accepted the idea of a UN observer. The Syrian 
surprise was the crucial turning point in Israel's decision to go to a conference (Shamir 
interview). Shamir realised that if  Israel did not now go along with American plans and 
attend the Conference, it would be publicly blamed by the US for the breakdown, an 
action that would seriously damage Israel’s relations with the US with all the 
consequences that entailed (Baker 494-6, NYT 23 July 1991:1). Shamir was also 
surprised by the American tenacity in promoting the conference, it jarred his conception 
whereby the balance of interest on the issue lay with Israel. American prestige was at an 
all time high in the region and given that the US had made the peace process a major 
policy priority it was difficult for the parties in the region to reject the American initiative. 
Baker’s eight shuttles to the region demonstrated that US commitment to advancing the 
process was great and that he would not be prepared to let the process quietly grind to a 
halt as it had done before. Hence, Baker’s continual threat to Shamir that if he did not 
compromise, “the dead cat would be on Israel's doorstep” was credible (Baker: 218; 412- 
7). For the first time since Camp David, the US was able and ready to apply serious 
pressure against a Likud government that sought to avoid negotiations.
Shamir tried to escape from the predicament. He tried to use Syrian opposition to 
attendance at the multi-lateral negotiations as a reason for stalling Israeli attendance at 
Madrid, but he backed down when Baker threatened to blame Israel for the failure of the 
conference. Similarly, Shamir backed down on his demand that the Palestinians in the 
delegation would have to publicly disavow the PLO (Baker: 446). Even when a 
Palestinian delegate broke the conference rules and declared that their delegation
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represented the PLO, Israel did not abandon the conference for fear of the American 
response (NYT 23 October 1991). Shamir publicly questioned the US's ability to be an 
honest broker, but he saw “no choice” but to attend or face a dead cat on Israel’s doorstep 
(JP 15 November 1991).
The Bilateral Negotiations
For Shamir the opening of the conference in Madrid was important enough for him to feel 
that he, and not David Levy, should lead the Israeli delegation. In contrast, all other 
delegations were led by their respective foreign ministers. However, Shamir was 
mistrustful of Levy and preferred to give control over the key bilateral negotiations to his 
personal aides from the Prime Ministers office, Yossi Ben Aharon and Eli Rubinstein. In 
a sense Ben Aharon's uncompromising and negative attitude to the peace process and 
Rubinstein's commitment to autonomy for the Palestinians represented the maximum and 
minimum positions for Shamir. The actual speeches and first face to face meetings of the 
bilateral committees were of symbolic significance, but contained little substance. 
Shamir's speech, penned by Ben Aharon, contained all the key elements of the 
particularist perspective. It focused on past Jewish tragedy, especially the Holocaust and 
referred to the Jews exclusive claim to the land, emphasising that the root of the conflict 
was existential and not territorial (Frankel: 309). Shamir rejected Meridor's plea to try and 
outflank the PLO by appealing to the Palestinian moderates (Frankel: 309).
The bilateral negotiations lasted from 10-18 December, but the Israeli-Palestinian track 
never got beyond corridor diplomacy, as the Palestinian team demanded that Israel 
negotiate autonomy with it separately and not with the full Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation. The Israelis refused to accept this as it constituted a breech of the Madrid rules 
which related only to a joint delegation. By the third round of the bilaterals this issue had 
been resolved and the Palestinians presented an outline for interim self-government which 
was basically a state in the making. The document called for East Jerusalemites to be 
included in elections and for an immediate settlement freeze. For all these reasons it was 
unacceptable to the Israelis. The Israeli team was prevented by Shamir from presenting a 
full plan for autonomy. But even their presentation of two page document was too much
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for Techiya and Moledet who withdrew from the government. This coupled with the 
defection of the other radical right party, Tzomet, back in December, meant that the 
government lost its majority. Shamir then called an election for June. In the meantime 
however the negotiations continued. At the fourth round of talks, the Israelis did present 
their own draft for an interim solution known as ISGA (Interim Self-Government 
Arrangement). Unlike the Palestinian draft, it concentrated on negotiating function by 
function the responsibilities of a future Palestinian administration. At the fifth round of 
negotiations, the last before the Israeli elections, Israel proposed Palestinian municipal 
elections and ‘early empowerment’ which would give the Palestinians immediate control 
of 19 hospitals in the territories (MECS 1992: 124). This was rejected by the Palestinians. 
None of these Israeli proposals threatened in any way Israeli control of the territories 
From Shamir’s perspective they helped deflect the negotiations away from Palestinian 
demands by framing the negotiations within an autonomy setting.
Israel, the US and the Bilaterals
Israel sought to obtain commitments from the Americans to strengthen its negotiating 
position through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The Israelis tried to tie the 
Americans down to Israeli positions opposing a Palestinian state and land for peace. 
However, the US insisted that if Israel put such positions in the MoU then the US would 
be forced to put its long standing opposition to those Likud positions in the MoU too. The 
US would not enter the process as a public ally of Israel, but rather as the honest broker, 
subsequently Israel had to settle for a letter of assurance along with all the other parties to 
the conference. Even that was a disappointment to Israel, at one point Israel demanded 45 
changes to it (Baker: 498; YA 6 October 1991:2, 11 October 1991:1). The 17 Point letter 
reiterated America's commitment to Israeli security and recognised that the pre-67 borders 
were 'indefensible'. But these points were calculated more to fit Labour's minimal 
territorial agenda rather than the Likud's position.
The best thing from the Likud point of view was American agreement not take part in any 
bilateral negotiations without both parties agreement. The right’s ‘whole land of Israel’ 
ideology always dictated that it sought as minimal role as possible for the US in
199
substantive negotiations over the territories. They had always argued against an 
international conference, fearing that the superpowers would intervene and impose or at 
least apply pressure for an unfavourable solution. On the Palestinian track they were 
especially concerned about US intervention given that during the 1981 autonomy talks the 
American conception of autonomy had been closer to the Arab outline than to the Israeli 
outline (JP 28 November 1991).
When the invitations for the bilaterals were about to go out Shamir, in meetings with 
Bush and Baker in Washington, argued for conditioning the start of bilateral negotiations 
on the holding the talks in the Middle East. When Baker informed Shamir that the US 
would be sending out the invitations for the bilaterals irrespective of whether or not there 
was an agreement on venue, Israeli concern surfaced. The Israelis felt their fears were 
confirmed when the invitation was accompanied by American suggestions for talking 
points including the idea of trading land for peace on the Golan. To counter perceived 
American designs for a mediatory role, Shamir took the opportunity to try and slow down 
negotiations. Hence, the Israeli team turned up late for the negotiations in Washington, 
thereby registering their determination not to be pushed around by the Americans without 
doing serious damage to their overall credibility. However, the Americans had no 
intention of intervening. When the Israelis refused a Jordanian-Palestinian request for 
American mediation, the Americans remained aloof. They saw the negotiations as 
essentially ‘getting to know you’ sessions and did not expect much progress until after the 
Israeli elections. This American role, as facilitator rather than mediator, fitted perfectly 
with Shamir’s overall strategy on the Palestinian question. Framed in this manner, the 
conference did not spell the end of the dream embracing the whole land of Israel. 
However, while the Americans were accommodating on procedure, they were prepared to 
confront Shamir over substance: settlements.
Loan Guarantees and Settlements
In his memoirs, Shamir (149-150) stated that what stood out for him about the Reagan 
administration was its attitude on settlements:
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"From 1977 to 1984...230 settlements were established... A new map of 
the land of Israel had already been created, and though disapprovingly 
mentioned in various US administration statements, those settlements were 
never placed in the forefront of US Middle Eastern policy, never in those 
days described as or considered illegal or awarded the intense and negative 
attention they received first from President Carter and afterwards from 
President Bush. Fortunately, President Reagan was free from any such 
fixation.”
Reagan and Shultz stuck to the line that settlements were merely 'unhelpful' to the peace 
process, not illegal, and certainly not worth pressuring Israel about under the 
circumstances. As a result, between 1981-88, the number of Jewish settlers in the 
territories grew from 16 000 to 70 000 (Tessler: 671).
For the Shamir government 1990-92, the value of retaining the whole land of Israel was 
more important than obtaining the funds to absorb Soviet immigrants and more important 
than doing significant damage to the US-Israeli special relationship with all that entailed. 
Concessions could be made on procedural elements within the peace process as this need 
not harm Israel's position on the ground, but continued settlement in Zionist history had 
proven itself a crucial determinant of Israel's ability to hold on to territory. Shamir's 
strategy relied on expanding the number of settlers in the territories so as to make any 
territorial compromise an impossibility. All his activity in the peace process needs to be 
understood in this light. Therefore, settlements were not negotiable. If Israel stretched out 
the negotiations over along period it could continue to strengthen its position on the 
ground while the talks went around in circles. This was to be Shamir's strategy for the 
remainder of his time in power. As he told an reporter just after the 1992 elections, “I 
would have conducted negotiations on autonomy for ten years and in the meantime we 
would have reached half a million people [in the West Bank]. Without this demographic 
revolution, there is no reason to hold autonomy talks...” (NYT 27 June 1992: 1). With the 
formation of the narrow right-wing government, and the surge in immigration from the 
Soviet Union, conditions became extremely ripe for the implementation of this policy.
From the second half of the 1970s most Jews who had left the Soviet Union on Israeli 
visas preferred to emigrate to the US. During the 1980s, the drop-out rate of Soviet 
Jewish immigrants soared to 90%, but absolute numbers remained low. The United States
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government recognised these Jews as refugees and the American Jewish establishment 
welcomed them. On more than one occasion in the late 1980s (Gurevitz 18; Jones 48) 
Shamir asked the administration privately to prohibit Soviet Jews with Israeli visas from 
entering America, but US policy only changed in response to the open door policy 
pursued by Gorbachev after 1987, when Soviet Jewish emigration reached massive levels. 
Ultimately, neither the American Jewish establishment nor the American government 
could find the money to underwrite such a large immigration to the United States 
(Gurevitz 19-22; WP 15 February 1987). So, from 1 October 1989, strict US quotas came 
into force as a result of which Israel remained the only viable alternative for the vast 
majority of Soviet Jewish immigrants.
Shamir saw the mass immigration as an opportunity. On 14 January 1990 in a speech
before Likud party factions he stated:
"We need space to house all the people. A big immigration requires Israel 
to be big too...We must have the land of Israel and we have to fight for it, 
struggle for it.Ju s t when many said that time is working against us, time 
has brought us this aliyah and has solved everything. In five years we 
won't be able to recognise the country. Everything will change - the 
people, the way they live - everything will be bigger, stronger. The Arabs 
around us are in a state of disarray and panic. They are shrouded by a 
feeling of defeat, because they see that the Intifada does not help. They 
cannot stop the natural stream of the Jewish people to their homeland”
(Jones 57).
Shamir proclaimed that the Soviet immigrants were to become his government's top 
priority (Jones 66). Subsequently, between 1990-92, with Sharon as Housing Minister, the 
population in the territories rose from around 90 000 to around 130 000; with 22 000 
housing unit starts in 1991 alone, a quadrupling of the construction the territories the 
previous year under the NUG (JP 6 April 1992; Frankel 298).
Shamir wanted settlements expanded quietly in a manner that would not annoy the United 
States. However, Sharon’s radical unilateralism precluded such a strategy. As with the 
Lebanon War Sharon got Cabinet approval for his broad policy and then he took his 
activities well beyond what the Prime Minister had envisaged in order to try and fulfil the 
grand design (Frankel: 296). Nonetheless, when Sharon did deliberately challenge the US
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and incur its wrath, by demonstrably setting up settlements every time Baker arrived in 
Israel, Shamir did little to rein in Sharon (Baker: 123). Shamir recognised that the US did 
not support Israel's settlement policy but he relied on the fact that Bush would not see the 
issue as crucial to American interests. Shamir was sure that the balance of interest on the 
issue remained in Israel’s favour. As he explained to the Jerusalem Post (23 February 
1990):
“There are things we do not agree on with the US government. For 
example settlements. ...It is an old thing. There was also no agreement with 
the Reagan administration. But it has not harmed the advancement of 
friendly ties between both countries. The principle in our relations with the 
US is that there is friendship, common interests and joint strategic co­
operation, despite difference of opinion. So there are differences of 
opinion, okay.”
This was Shamir's first and most crucial error. For Bush the settlement question was not 
something the two countries could simply agree to disagree on. Bush saw the issue of a 
settlement freeze as the touchstone of US credibility in the Arab world. Moreover, once 
Israel requested loan guarantees, in order to help absorb the new immigrants, the US felt 
it had a right to make sure that Israel did not increase its settlement activity in 
contravention of US policy (Baker: 548). The issue became a personal one for Bush as he 
felt Shamir had deliberately misled him as to Israel's settlement policy following their 
first encounter in Washington in April 1989. At that meeting, Shamir had tried to present 
settlements as a purely domestic matter and was surprised at the power with which Bush 
raised the issue. In the end Shamir told Bush, “Don't worry, they won't be a problem”; by 
which he meant they were not an issue which should be of great concern to US interests. 
However, Bush understood this as a commitment to restrain settlement activity and felt 
betrayed when two weeks later a new settlement was established. For Bush settlements 
had become the litmus test of whether the Israeli leader was taking him and the United 
States seriously (MECS 1989: 27). Hence he was livid when Shamir told US ambassador 
to Israel, Bill Brown, that “settlements are not an earth shattering matter for the President” 
(Baker: 123; Melman and Raviv 1994:410).
But the Bush administration would not drop the subject o f settlements. In June 1989, in
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his AIPAC speech, Baker called on Israel to, “Lay aside once and for all the unrealistic 
vision of a greater Israel and stop settlement activity” (MECS 1989: 21). But it was only 
after Peres first spoke to the US about a possible $400 million loan guarantee to cover the 
cost of absorbing the new immigrants that the administration obtained a lever with which 
to extract a settlement freeze. Baker told Congress that Israel should only get the loan 
guarantee if it gave assurances that there would be a freeze on all settlement activity, 
otherwise, he argued, US funds would free other money in the Israeli budget for 
settlement activity; this was the so called fungibility issue (JP 2 March 1990). Eventually 
Levy and Baker agreed that Israel would obtain the loan guarantee without a settlement 
freeze. In return, Israel was obliged to not to use the money directly for settlement 
activity, not to provide special incentives for immigrants to move beyond the green line 
and was also supposed to supply the administration with information about its settlement 
activity. However, Shamir retracted Levy’s agreement because the document referred to 
the green line which included the Israeli suburbs of East Jerusalem (Baker 544, Frankel: 
298). In any case, the Americans held up delivery of the loan guarantee after the Cabinet 
voted to build 15 000 homes mainly in East Jerusalem (JR. 17 March 1991; JP 31 October 
1990). In February 1991 Baker was about to approve the guarantees when he became 
aware that Sharon was planning to build a further 12 000 new homes for settlers. Shamir's 
office informed the Americans that the Cabinet had not approved those plans and the 
guarantee was granted. However, three weeks later Sharon told reporters that the real 
figure was 13 500 and that he already had authorisation to go ahead so no cabinet 
agreement had been necessary. Moreover, in contrast with the agreement forged in the 
Levy letter, Ben Aharon refused to provide the Americans with the relevant data on 
settlement construction, leaving the Americans to use spy satellite pictures to keep tabs on 
Israeli activities (Frankel: 299).
The administration then tried to make it clear to the Israelis that it would not allow the 
fiasco of the $400 million loan guarantee to repeat itself. In May, Baker told Congress 
that settlements were the biggest obstacle to peace and encouraged congressional attempts 
to reduce aid to Israel by the amount of the Israeli budget spent in the territories (JP 22 
May 1991, 21 June 1991). Meanwhile, Bush asked a group of American Jewish leaders to 
convey his call for a settlement freeze to Shamir (JP 3 July 1991). Shamir's reply was that
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the territories belonged to Israel; there would be no settlement freeze (Baker: 446). At this 
time, the administration was concentrating on the peace conference and feared that 
focusing on the settlement question would only provide an excuse for either side to stay 
away (JP 17 April 1991; WJW 13 June 1991:10). Consequently, it wanted the Israeli 
government to delay its request for the guarantees from September 1991 by 120 days until 
after the opening of the Peace Conference.
It was clear to the conservative Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval, that given the 
standing of President Bush following the Gulf War, Israel would have to chose between 
settlements and loan guarantees (JP 23 June 1991). However, the Shamir government 
rejected suggestions of compromise. The key figures in AIPAC, the embassy in 
Washington and the Prime Ministers Office, all felt that they could defeat the 
administration through their power in Congress. Yoram Ettinger, a Likud loyalist who 
reported direct to the Prime Minister's Office from the Washington Embassy informed 
Shamir in a cable on 4 September, that the administration had only a very limited ability 
to control the agenda. Ettinger’s attitude was symptomatic of the radical style of foreign 
policy based on a belief in the power of the Zionist will. The radicals tended to think they 
could and should act with a great degree of autonomy regarding the United States based 
on the belief that Israel was of more use to the United States than the other way around. 
This approach was reinforced by the successes achieved during the Reagan years (MECS 
1991: 32; Frankel: 299-302; Schiff 1987/8). Hence, Shamir and his top advisor Ben 
Aharon were strongly inclined to accept Ettinger's advice. Indeed, the Shamir government 
was so confident of success that it included the first instalment of $2 billion dollars in the 
budget for the year ahead. Subsequently, Israel formally submitted its request for the $10 
billion in loan guarantees on 6 September. The Israeli-AIPAC strategy was to drum up 
grass roots support among Israel’s supporters among the US public and then drum up 
legislative support in Congress behind the Israeli demand. All the activity was set to 
culminate in Washington on 12 September when pro-Israel lobbyists were set to descend 
on the Capitol in support of loan guarantees.
With Congress seemingly behind the Israeli position, President Bush went straight to the 
American people in a television address. Shamir's initial response was to minimise the
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importance of Bush’s speech. He still felt Israel would get the guarantees (WJW 13 
February 1992: 13) and was angry at Cabinet ministers for raising the temperature by 
referring to Bush as an anti-Semite. Shamir calmly told the press that the history of US- 
Israeli relations is a history of such ups and downs (Melman and Raviv 1994 427). But 
this was more than just an aberration, the mood in Congress had changed as Senators 
were not prepared to challenge Bush's request for a 120 day delay before granting the 
guarantees. Subsequently, Israel’s supporters in Congress agreed to delay consideration of 
the loan guarantees. The White House had won (JP: 3 October 1991).
The Israeli government and the US administration then resumed negotiations on the loan 
guarantees after the opening of the Madrid Conference, in January 1992. But by then a 
major change had taken place in that the pro-Israel lobby was no longer available as a tool 
to pressure the Bush administration. Shamir thought that there could be a compromise 
whereby Israel would not have to agree to a settlement freeze, but merely to allowing the 
US some control mechanism over the money granted (JP 26-7 January 1992; FBIS 3 
February 1992:26; WJW 13 February 1992). Indeed, once negotiations got under way, 
various compromises were put forward (JP 2,10,24,25,27 February 1992; WP 16,19 
March 1992). However the bottom line was the administration required a settlement 
freeze which was completely unacceptable to a government founded on radical 
particularism. Thus, by the middle of March either Bush and Shamir had rejected all the 
compromises put forward. However, with the Likud ahead in the polls and Bush in need 
of Jewish money and votes in an election year, Shamir felt confident he could always get 
the guarantees after the Israeli election when the administration would be in a weaker 
position (Shamir interview). Again Shamir made a major tactical error, as Baker allegedly 
put it, “F—k the Jews they don’t vote for us anyway” (New York Post 6 March 1992).
The Bush administration's success in not granting the loan guarantees without a 
settlement freeze, was a major defeat for the Shamir strategy which had been so 
successful beforehand. Shamir had made a major error in underestimating the importance 
of the settlement issue to the Bush administration, while overestimating Israel's ability to 
get Congress to overrule the presidency. The price the Shamir government paid was not 
simply its failure to attain the loan guarantees but a major breakdown in the Likud's
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relationship with the United States. For Shamir, although usually a pragmatist on 
instrumental considerations, settlement activity went to the core of his and the radicals 
values system. The consequences of this approach became apparent in the run up to the 
Israeli election.
Thus, whereas previously under Shultz in 1987 and again under Baker in March 1990, the 
US had refused to actively take sides in Israeli domestic politics even when the outcome 
affected the peace process significantly, this time the administration appeared to try and 
undermine the Likud position in the forthcoming Israeli elections by intimating that the 
US-Israeli special relationship was under threat if the Likud remained in power (WP 9 
February 1992). It was in this spirit that leaks alleging the sale by Israel of American 
military technology to China were made at the same time as Arens visited Washington 
(WP 18 March 1992: 4).Moreover, a week before the Israeli elections, Baker publicly 
accepted Rabin’s campaign distinction between political and security settlements (WJW 
14 June 1992: 17). Israeli Labour party figures recognised the importance of the issue and 
privately urged the administration and Congress not to grant the loan guarantees without a 
settlement freeze (JP 21 March 1992). Indeed, the crisis did help Labour to win the 
election and once Rabin came into office, the administration granted him the loan 
guarantees without insisting on a complete settlement freeze.
Conclusion
Under Shamir, the Likud's foreign policy was radical in substance but pragmatic in style. 
However, over the loan guarantee/settlements issue Shamir had been forced to adopt the 
full radical approach because a settlement freeze would have destroyed the key to Israeli 
control over the whole land of Israel in the long-run. Shamir had thought that ultimately 
the balance of interest on the settlement question lay with Israel. American 
administrations' always had other priorities, domestic or global, in which relations with 
Israel were important enough to reduce the importance of settlements to a minor irritant. 
However, with the passing of the Reagan administration with its special sympathy for 
Israel and with the end of the cold war, the balance of interest had begun to shift. After 
the Gulf war, with the PLO and Syria on board and American credibility at an all time
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high, the convening of a regional peace conference became a core priority for the 
administration. Baker had been prepared in principle to pressure Israel between 1988-90 
but the problem had been with the circumstances. After the Gulf War, circumstances were 
favourable and as a result Shamir and the radicals’ control over the relationship finally ran 
out. Ambassador Shoval recognised the damage being done to the Likud and tried to 
place the 'special relationship' on new justifications relevant in the post cold war era. Thus 
he spoke of the role Israel could play in combating the fundamentalist Islamic threat to 
the West and the moral dimension to the relationship between democracies. However, 
ultimately, it was clear that in the post-cold war era, the relationship depended on the 
peace index; that is on how much in American eyes, Israel was serious about the peace 
process and on this the Likud score was very low (NYT 23 February 1992; JP 27 March 
1993).
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Chapter 9 
Progressivism. Mamlachtiut and the Oslo Breakthrough: 1992-96
Introduction: Personalities. Political Culture and Policy-Making
Within the Labour government there were two policy approaches: Rabin’s mamlachtiut, 
and the progressivism of Beilin. At the most general level, both policy-making groups had 
similar existential values that distinguished it from the previous Likud government. 
Policy was underpinned by the conviction that Israel was a normal state and not therefore 
on a messianic crusade to fulfil the particular destiny of the Jewish people by gaining 
control over the whole land of Israel. The government was committed to maintaining 
Israel both as a democracy and as the state of the Jewish people and did not subscribe to 
the view that land was an existential value. This affected Israeli policy in two ways. First, 
unlike the Likud, the government supported the territorial compromise in the territories 
and sought to negotiate peace on this basis between 1992-96. Second, because the Labour 
government took this position, relations with the US improved. Partly as a result, the new 
government sought to increase the American’s role the peace process, whereas the Likud 
had generally sought to minimise that role.
Policy making revolved around Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres and their advisors, in particular Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin. Rabin 
solicited advice from military figures, such as Chiefs-of-Staff Ehud Barak and Amnon 
Shahak, who were very much in the mamlachtiut tradition regarding foreign policy. Rabin 
also retained Eli Rubinstein from the Shamir government to head the talks with the 
Palestinians, since he was known to be the Israeli with the best knowledge of all the 
autonomy negotiations. Nonetheless, Rabin tended to work alone, thus he ignored the 
reservations of Barak about Oslo I, while Rubinstein was not even aware of the channel 
until after the event. As a consequence of this tendency and the reliance of the 
government on the progressive and Arab Parties, the dovish tendency in the government 
was strengthened. Peres’ advisors, the Blazers, dominated the intellectual side of foreign 
policy, as one of them noted, “It was almost scary, we had no counterweight” (Makovsky: 
100-2). From June 1992 until the expulsion of the Hamas activists, Rabin and the
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mamlachtiut ethos dominated policy. Rabin put himself in charge of the bilateral tracks of 
the Madrid process and dominated the conduct of relations with the US, leaving Peres to 
concentrate on the multi-lateral talks. However, the expulsion o f the Hamas activists and 
the ensuing crisis brought Peres back into the loop regarding the Israeli-Palestinian talks 
and it also signalled the beginning of the Oslo process, which was initiated by Yossi 
Beilin. Subsequently, Peres and the Blazers exercised a greater influence on policy 
although the final word always rested with Rabin. Gradually, the adherents of 
mamlachtiut were pulled incrementally towards the approach of the progressives, as their 
own approach failed to yield the expected results.
Mamlachtiut and the Rabin Strategy
The Need for Peace
Rabin had adhered to the image of ein brairah for much of his political career, but for 
adherents of mamlachtiut, ein brairah was a contingent, rather than an existential, reality. 
In the 1990s Rabin came to believe that a new world was emerging, one that moved Israel 
beyond the era of ein brairah to a period in which the threat to the existence of Israel had 
been greatly reduced (Inbar 1996: 46). As he explained to the Knesset on taking office in 
1992:
“It is no longer true that we are necessarily a people that dwell alone. And 
it is no longer true that the whole world is against us. We must overcome 
our sense of isolation that has kept us in thrall for half a century. We must 
join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation, and co­
operation that is spreading over the entire globe these days - lest we be the 
last to remain, all alone, in the station.” (JP 14 July 1992).
Similarly, just prior to the Oslo Accord Rabin explained to the National Defence College:
“We are obliged to revise our thought processes, those embedded in years 
of enmity and hatred. We must think differently and see things 
differently... This is the time for change, to look around us, to dialogue, to 
fit in, to be more forthcoming, to make peace.” (Klieman 1994:106)
Rabin had seen a peace initiative on the Palestinian track as a priority since the Intifada. 
The Gulf War reinforced this priority. It demonstrated that the Palestinian issue still
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resonated in the Arab world and that it could be used as a rallying cry by Iran or Iraq to 
focus a military confrontation against Israel. Such a confrontation would be fought with 
non-conventional weapons, making it a war Israel could hardly afford to win, let alone 
lose. In this light, a deal with the Palestinians would serve to ease Israel’s position in the 
region. In turn this would facilitate Israel’s entrance into the American led grouping of 
moderate Arab states. Together this group would weakened the influence of the Iran and 
the other radicals in the Middle East, reducing their ability to present a strategic threat to 
Israel. Moreover, with the end of the cold war, the broader peace process itself became of 
great significance in tying the US to Israeli security. The primary American interest in the 
region had switched from the containment of the Soviet Union to the maintenance of 
peace and stability in the region. Although Israeli leaders continued to talk about strategic 
co-operation with the US against Islamic fundamentalism, with the absence of the Soviet 
Union, Israel could no longer argue so convincingly that it was a strategic asset to the US 
in the region. In recognition of this, Rabin strongly believed that in order to retain US 
support, Israel had to be seen by America to be sincere in its search for peace (Puschel; 
Inbar 1996: 12-3; NYT 3 August 1992: 8) As he explained, “The more the US can say it 
is bringing peace to the area-assisted by Israel acting in its own interest, the more Israel 
will serve the mutual interest in creating stability and leaving less room for extremists” 
(NYT 15 June 1992: A19).
In addition, Rabin actively sought to co-ordinate his diplomatic moves with Washington. 
Rabin’s mamlachti outlook favoured the application of a judicious mixture of political 
compromise and superior military power, whereby military power provided the 
foundations for both a firm deterrence strategy and a means of applying political pressure 
in the negotiations process. The US role in this strategy was to enhance Israel’s ability to 
compromise by ensuring the maintenance of Israel’s military qualitative edge and helping 
Israel to attain the type of compromise it desired through the co-ordination of policy. 
Thus, in return for American backing of Israeli vital interests in negotiations with the 
Arabs, Rabin was quite prepared to make concession to the US on non vital interests.
As far as Rabin was concerned, those vital interests with regard to any Israeli-Palestinian 
peace were based on maintaining Israel as a secure democratic Jewish state. Following the
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territorialist logic of his mentor, Allon, Rabin advocated a territorial and political 
separation between Israel and the Palestinians. Rabin sought to achieve this goal while 
simultaneously ensuring that Israel retained territorial control in three areas of the West 
Bank: in the Jordan valley for security reasons; in East Jerusalem with the nationalistic 
aim of solidifying a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty; and in a small proportion 
of the West Bank, containing the majority of Israeli settlers (though not settlements) and a 
minimal number of Palestinians, with the aim of annexing these areas to the state of 
Israel; thereby ensuring the demographic reality of the state of Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people.1
Loan Guarantees and Settlements
Rabin saw a partial settlement freeze as in Israel’s interest, in order to facilitate a 
territorial compromise. Thus, by the time he met Baker, on 19 July, the construction of 
7000 housing units in the territories was frozen and government incentives for settlement 
were ended. A month later after meeting with Bush in the US, Rabin gave the US a 
commitment not to create or approve any new settlements. Rabin retained the right to 
thicken ‘security settlements’ to create a positive demographic balance in those areas of 
the territories that Israel would seek to annex in the final status arrangements. Thus during 
1994 nearly 5000 housing units were under construction within settlements in the 
territories, the vast majority in ‘Greater Jerusalem’, with some other construction in areas 
such as the Jordan valley which were to be included in Israel under the Allon Plan (NYT 
29 September 1994: A l l ,  26 January 1995: 8, 28 January 1995: 3). Unlike Likud 
settlement activity, Labour’s was predicated on pursuing rather than preventing a 
territorial partition.
On 5 October Congress granted the loan guarantees, with the proviso that any money 
spent by the government on settlements in the territories would be deducted from the 
guarantees (Baker: 557). Rabin accepted US conditionality vis loan guarantees in return 
for the co-ordination of Israeli and American policy and compensation. This time Israel
1 According to an academic plan for settlements in the Final Status talks (Alpher 1995), known to be 
favoured by Rabin, 70% of the settlers would be incorporated into the state of Israel, however Israel would
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received $200 million worth o f military equipment. Such moves served to deepen the US- 
Israeli relationship, a major strategic objective for mamlachtiut (JP 24 July 1992:1; 14 
August 1992: 1). In actual fact, the Clinton administration sought to minimise the impact 
of ‘conditionality’ on Israel. Following the Oslo Accord, Warren Christopher agreed to 
look into ways of deducting as much as possible of the $437 million penalty for 
settlement activity. Thus Rabin succeeded in building in settlements where he deemed it 
in the interests of Israel and received ‘compensation’ and political support from the US 
for not building settlements in areas he was prepared to hand over to the Palestinians.
The Israeli-Palestinian Bilateral Talks in Washington
During the election campaign Rabin had promised to negotiate an interim autonomy 
accord with the Palestinians in nine months. On entering office he decided to concentrate 
on the Syrian track (Kimche interview) for two reasons. First Rabin’s mamlachti 
instrumental values dictated that peace with Syria was of greater importance than peace 
with the Palestinians since the Syrian state was a greater strategic threat, one that could 
threaten Israeli’s existence in conventional terms in a way that the Palestinians, without 
an army or a state, could not. Second, the US wanted to concentrate on the Syrian track to 
seeing it as the key to regional stability (NYT 2 September 1992: 6). As soon as Clinton 
took office Rabin had called for a meeting with the President to discuss co-ordination on 
the bilateral tracks of the peace process (JP 3 January 1993:1) and by March it appeared 
that they had agreed on a ‘Syria First’ strategy (JP 29 January 1993:1; 7 February 1993:1; 
18 February 1993:1; 16 March 1993:1 27 April 1993:1; Heikal 1996: 444). Since Rabin 
believed that Israel should only make full peace agreements, ‘one at a time’, once he 
decided to concentrate on the Syrian track, he did not feel the need for drastic progress on 
the Palestinian front (Makovsky: 114). Although Rabin’s actions did not rule out 
progress, the fact that interim negotiation proceeded on the basis that, ‘all options should 
remain open regarding the final status’, and not on the explicit basis of ‘land for peace’ as 
Rabin believed in principle, suggests that he was not prioritising the Palestinian 
negotiating track in the short-term.
retain less than 10% of the territories themselves.
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On the other hand, ultimately Rabin thought that peace rested on two legs: the Syrian and 
the Palestinian (Rabinovitch 1998: 122). Hence he was prepared to encourage the 
negotiation of an interim agreement with the Palestinians at the same time as seeking full 
peace with the Syrians. An Interim autonomy accord would provide Israel with the time 
to create facts on the ground around Jerusalem and also gave Israel a chance to test the 
security implications of Palestinian control before any final decisions were made. The 
staged process also had the advantage of being easier to sell to the Israeli public especially 
in the event of simultaneous territorial concession to the Syrians on the Golan.
To try and facilitate progress, between September and December 1992 Rabin introduced a 
number of concessions on Palestinian self-government including allowing a Palestinian 
administrative Council to enact a number of by-laws and expanding the nature of self 
government on offer to include some aspects of territorial control over land development 
and water resources. However, the Palestinians refused to negotiate an interim accord on 
the basis that ‘all option would remain open in the final status talks.’ Instead they 
concentrated on trying to bring final status issues such as Jerusalem and settlements into 
the talks, as well as focusing on issues of human rights abuses. They wanted to create the 
foundations for a mini-state in the interim period. Much to the disappointment of the 
Palestinians, the Americans generally stayed aloof from these disagreements. Then in the 
middle of December 1992 with the talks bogged down, Rabin deported 415 Hamas 
activists to Lebanon sparking a crisis in the peace negotiations.
The Hamas Deportations and US-Israeli Co-ordination
The deportation of Hamas activists led the peace negotiations to stall. Washington 
declared it a “terrible mistake” and backed UN Resolution 799 which ‘strongly 
condemned’ Israel. The Palestinians demanded the immediate return of all the deportees 
before negotiations could recommence with Israel. Although initially reluctant to 
compromise, Rabin entered into negotiations with the new Clinton administration in an 
effort to prevent UN sanctions and to get the Palestinians back into talks. Ultimately, the 
mamlachti political emphasis preferred a deal with the US to unilateral military acts. Thus 
the negotiations with the US over the deportees represented an opportunity for Rabin to
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co-ordinate policy. As Rabin’s negotiator during the crisis, Health Minister Efraim Sneh 
noted, “the co-ordination with the United States is a strategic asset in its own right” (JP 5 
February 1993). The US-Israeli agreement stipulated that all the deportees would be 
allowed to return home, though not immediately. The return of a limited number of 
Palestinians deported since 1967 was also adopted as a good will gesture (JP 14 April 
1993: 1). Rabin also announced that Israel had no plans for further deportations except 
under exceptional circumstances and as a sweetener to the Palestinians, agreed that Faisel 
Husseini, the leading Fatah figure in the territories, be allowed to join the Palestinian 
negotiating team (NYT 6 February 1993: 4). In return for these concessions, the US 
agreed to pressure the Palestinians to return to the talks and not to pressure Israel for 
further concessions. The Palestinians complained bitterly that they had not even been 
consulted on the deportees deal (JP 2,4,8 26, 28 February 1993; 5 March 1993: 1). 
Subsequently, on the 28 April the Tenth Round of Israeli-Palestinian talks resumed in 
Washington.
As ever, Rabin used the situation to make concessions on the issue at hand in return for 
compensation from the United States. This time Israel’s compensation came in the form 
of the creation of a bilateral science and technology commission. More importantly, 
Rabin had expanded US-Israeli co-ordination from the crisis itself to the peace process in 
general. Both Peres and Rabin called for greater US involvement in the process (JP 24 
February 1993:1) and on the American side both Sam Lewis the State Department Head 
of Policy Planning and Martin Indyk the new Ambassador to Israel favoured such a 
strategy. As a result the US announced that it was to become a ‘full partner’ in the 
bilateral talks. Subsequently, both Rubinstein and Peres went to Washington to consult 
with the new administration on how to proceed.
The Clinton Administration
The Clinton administration saw an unprecedented opportunity to move towards a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The key to this objective was held to be an 
Israeli-Syrian agreement. Such an agreement, coupled with the dual containment of Iran 
and Iraq, would ensure that an American backed grouping of moderate Arab powers and
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Israel would create a favourable balance of power against radical forces, thereby 
underwriting regional stability. The administration was staffed by pro-Israel figures such 
as Martin Indyk and Sam Lewis who favoured the co-ordination of policy with the Rabin 
government (JP 29 January 1993). Since 1982, at least, the Americans had recognised 
Rabin as the most pro-American Israeli leader and the one who shared relatively closely 
their vision of a final status agreement and their assessment of the region in general. 
Shultz had seen him as a force to be utilised in 1982 and Baker had worked closely with 
him in 1989. Now he had the domestic power base to act, the strategy of co-ordination 
reached a high point. Rabin’s demonstrable will to advance the peace process allowed the 
United States to simultaneously pursue its ties with the Arab world and thus help build a 
Pax Americana in the region, without having to face domestic opposition from the pro- 
Israel lobby as in the past. Unlike Begin, Rabin was content to allow American arms sales 
to Arab states so long as Israel received strategic compensation. The administration could 
thus remain both on the good side of the domestically powerful pro-Israel lobby and 
advance its regional objectives. In recognition of these benefits and the risk of losing 
them if  Labour were to lose the next election in Israel, the Clinton administration often 
accommodated Israeli demands, actions, and interests when even when they clashed with 
established American positions. The administration was more than content to adopt a 
strategy of reassurance, rather than pressure, towards the Rabin government (NYT 16 
March 1993: 8; 12 September 1993; WP 18 May 1995: A ll) .
The ‘Full Partner ’ Talks
Israel injected further concessions into a draft Declarations of Principles (DoP) which 
allowed the Palestinians a larger degree of legislative autonomy. Once again the 
Palestinians rejected these proposals for the same reasons as earlier (JP 13 May 1993). 
Subsequently, after consultations with Rabin (JP 13 May 1993:1) the US put forward, for 
the first time, its own draft of a tripartite statement on the areas of agreement between the 
parties. At this juncture the difference between the Labour coalition and the previous 
government as to the role of the US on the Palestinian track became apparent. Shamir and 
the Likud were always strongly opposed to the US introducing its own position papers in 
negotiations with the Palestinians, given that consistent American policy positions since
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1967 ran contrary to the Likud’s basic outlook on the Final Status issues. In contrast, 
Rabin who felt it was possible to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians, 
recognised the utility of an American role in the process (JP 15 June 1993:1). Yet for 
Rabin, unlike for the Likud or the progressives, the exact nature of the American role was 
determined at least as much by an interest in strengthening the US-Israeli relationship as 
by a calculation as to the compatibility of American and Israeli final status positions. On 
the one hand, he opposed the presentation o f unilateral American proposals such as the 
Reagan Plan, on the other hand he was prepared to see the Americans go beyond merely 
acting as a neutral arbiter in the manner of a UN representative. Thus, Rabin was content 
to see the US present its own bridging proposal for a DoP at the end of the ninth round of 
talks precisely because he had been able to co-ordinate with Americans officials and had 
seen the draft 36 hours in advance of it being presented to the parties (JP 20 May 1993: 1; 
21 May 1993: 5; NYT 9 July 1993: A3). Indeed, as a result o f that meeting, the US draft 
DoP was altered to exclude a reference to the draft agreement being based on the concept 
of land for peace, a fact which led the Palestinians to dismiss the American draft as a 
quasi Israeli document (JP 28 May 1993: 1). During round ten of the talks, the Americans 
worked on a second draft DoP after consulting both sides (JP 27 June 1993). Again, much 
to the chagrin of Hanan Ashrawi (Ashrawi: 250) the US draft was in line with Israeli 
preferences for the interim stage. Rabin was prepared to sign the American DoP but the 
Palestinians did not response positively to the US draft (WP 22 July 1993: A32; 4 August 
1993: A12).
Part of the reason for the failure of the Washington talks lay with Tunis. Arafat had 
ordered the Palestinian team in Washington to reject the Israeli proposal for ‘early 
empowerment’. Such obstructive tactics were designed to prevent progress in Washington 
in order to promote a direct PLO-Israel deal at Oslo. By the beginning of August, the Oslo 
track was imposing itself on the official talks in Washington. Arafat forced the 
Washington team to present a Palestinian DoP proposing ‘Gaza and Jericho First’ which, 
in contrast to all previous Palestinian proposals, agreed that Jerusalem would only be 
negotiated in the final status arrangements. Arafat was demonstrating to Rabin that only 
the PLO in Tunis could deliver the deal Israel wanted and only then by negotiating 
directly with the Organisation in Oslo (Corbin: 146-7).
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Beilin. Progressive Zionism and the Oslo Track
The majority of the government coalition, including 30 out of 44 Labour MKs, the Shas 
leader Deri, Meretz and the Arab Parties, thought the address for negotiations was the 
PLO and wanted to reverse the legislation banning contacts between Israelis and PLO 
officials. In 1991, Rabin had opposed Beilin’s introduction of a law to repeal the law 
fearing it might lead the US to reopen its dialogue with that organisation However, in 
1992 Rabin was reliant on the dovish Meretz Party for his majority and as part of their 
coalition agreement, Meretz got Rabin to allow the law to be repealed, which it was at the 
end of the year. While the progressive nature of the coalition helped to facilitate the 
possibility of talks with the PLO, it was the progressives within the Labour Party that 
took the diplomatic initiative, especially Yossi Beilin. As a close associate of his 
explained, “Oslo was the fulfilment of ten years of his thinking. He always believed, even 
at the time of the London agreement, that the only partner for negotiations was the PLO. 
He would tell Peres at every instance why it would not work with the others” (Makovsky: 
98).
To the progressives, peace and security, the core existential values of normalisation, 
hinged on the issue of recognition, which meant negotiations with the national leadership 
of the Palestinians, the PLO. Until the mid-1980s, the Labour progressives had not met 
PLO officials as they still felt that to do so was heresy, given the common view of the 
PLO and Palestinians in Israel (Beilin 1997: 26). Once the PLO began to move towards a 
pragmatic position of accepting a two state solution, Beilin felt that a political 
breakthrough was possible (Beilin 1997: 27). He was not traumatised by the Holocaust 
and the 1930s (JP 8 January 1997). Nor was he haunted by the PLO Charter that called for 
the destruction of Israel, (the words of a modem day Mein Kampf in Begin’s mind).2 
Rather he was concerned with the organisations practical minimal demands in any 
negotiations with Israel. However, once, the law banning Israelis from direct contacts 
with PLO officials was passed in 1986, Beilin was unable to meet directly with PLO
2 As Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, in 1987 Beilin stopped the use of the PLO covenant, which 
called for the destruction of Israel, in Israeli information campaigns.
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officials until the repeal of the law in December 1992, when the Oslo process began. 
Consequently, during the 1980s Beilin’s developed sub-political dialogue with 
Palestinians within the territories who were genuine political leaders linked with the PLO, 
who were also pragmatic enough for Israel to be able to do business with including Sari 
Nusseibah and later Hanan Ashrawi and Faisel Husseini. Beilin’s contacts with 
Palestinians associated with the PLO took place on three other fronts. First, Beilin and 
members of Mashov went to Egypt on a couple of occasions and met with Mubarak’s 
close advisers, who had close contacts with the PLO. Indeed on one occasion Nabil 
Shaath who Peres and Rabin had continuously refused to negotiate with, was also present 
at the talks. It was in these talks Beilin first proposed the idea of Gaza attaining 
independence as the Palestinian state first, with other parts of the West Bank to follow 
later (Beilin 1997:56-7). Another important channel for contact with the PLO, albeit 
indirectly, was set up by the Dutch Foreign Minister Max Van Der Stull who was also a 
useful link to fellow progressives in the European community. With his help, Beilin was 
able to set up a think-tank which sought to explore the possibilities for economic and 
political co-operation between Israel, the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours on the 
model of European reconstruction after the Second World War (Beilin 1997: 38, 53). 
Beilin himself stated that the papers he put forward through these channels with various 
Palestinians and the discussions and proposals of a Palestinian state within Labour Party 
circles at party conferences from 1990 onwards, formed the foundations for the Oslo 
process (Beilin 1997: 59).
Noticeable by its absence from this list is the US. The progressives had been disappointed 
by the American’s failure to help them to overcome Shamir’s opposition to the London 
Document in 1987 and by the American support for a Likud led NUG in 1989-90. Again 
at the end of 1992, Beilin was at odds with mainstream thought in the State Department 
which wanted Israel to focus on talks with Syria, as opposed to the Palestinian track. 
Beilin had suggested to a member of the American peace team, that the best that the US 
could do would be to reopen the US-PLO dialogue. However, the State Department team 
felt that it would be better to continue with the Madrid conference format (Beilin 1997: 
75). Since within the progressive worldview, the Palestinian problem was seen as the core 
of the conflict, to be resolved by direct talks, relations with the US were seen as merely a
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secondary factor. As the US would not help facilitate a deal with the PLO, Beilin looked 
to other mediators to help expedite matters; Norway.
Subsequently, two Israeli academics, Yair Hirshfeld and Ron Pundak, who worked for 
Beilin’s Research Institute (funded in part by EU money made available through Beilin’s 
contacts with Van Der Stull) met Abu Ala, a PLO official, in Norway. During the 
meetings Abu Ala suggested the concept of Gaza First which he acknowledged as an idea 
he had heard advocated by Shimon Peres. The two men reported their meeting to Beilin 
who in turn provided Peres with minutes of the meetings. In February Peres briefed Rabin 
on the existence of the academic channel in Oslo. Not expecting Peres or Rabin to agree 
to direct talk with PLO in Tunis, Beilin hoped to use the Oslo talks as a back channel for 
resolving problem that would then filter back into the main Israeli-Palestinian talks going 
on in Washington (Beilin 1997: 72). In the first stage of negotiations, the Israeli 
academics and the PLO representatives sought to negotiate a DoP, culminating in a 
document that became known as “Sarpsborg III” at the end of March. The draft agreement 
strongly reflected the Israeli team’s belief in the centrality of economic integration to a 
resolution o f the conflict, as well as, their liberal political credentials. Once Rabin 
upgraded the talks in May with the arrival of ‘Blazer’, Uri Savir, the Director-General of 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and later, lawyer and Rabin confidant Joel Singer, most of 
the Israelis energy was taken up with tightening up on security requirements (Makovsky: 
32-3).
Finally in the middle of August with Peres himself in Oslo on the telephone to Tunis, the 
crucial concessions were made by both sides. The final agreement itself granted territorial 
autonomy in Gaza and Jericho first, with early empowerment on functional issue 
throughout the rest of the West Bank. More significantly the DoP explicitly recognised 
the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” a phrase the Israelis had always 
deliberately avoided because of the specific connotation it had regarding the existence of 
a Palestinian state. During negotiations in Oslo, Savir had expounded on the basis, as he 
saw it, for a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. He spoke of the need 
for economic interdependence, of his private concern for human rights abuses in the West 
Bank and o f the possibility of a Palestinian state being consistent with the requirements of
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Israeli security (Makovsky: 97). Summing up the meaning of the Oslo Accord for its 
negotiators, Savir, in his speech at the signing ceremony in Oslo, declared,
“We Israelis have no desire to dominate the lives and fate of the 
Palestinians. Therefore with this agreement we are fulfilling not only 
political interest, but also (resolving) a moral predicament of our people.
We would like our meeting to be a moral high ground; an encounter of 
peace, democracy and economic prosperity.” (Corbin: 169).
Yet for Savir, Beilin and the whole progressive Zionist ethos, it was the accord on 
‘mutual recognition’, signed afterwards, that was the most important aspect of the 
agreement. It was this, in their eyes, that transformed the conflict from an existential one 
to a political one (Makovsky: 70). According to the agreement the PLO accepted UN 
resolutions 242 and 338, Israel’s right to live in peace and security, renounced terror and 
assumed responsibility for all PLO factions to comply with this, rendered inoperative and 
invalid those elements of the Covenant inconsistent with the right of Israel to exist, while 
simultaneously agreeing to obtain PNC approval for these changes in the future. In return, 
Israel recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
Through this act, more than any other, it was obvious that the whole Oslo project was 
very much founded on the values and ways of thinking of Beilin and the Blazers. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that without the support of both the Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres and the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Oslo track would never have moved 
beyond an academic discussion. Consequently, it is important to understand why both 
these politicians, especially Prime Minister Rabin, came to accept and support the Oslo 
track.
Peres began to come round to the view that the Palestinians and perhaps the PLO were the 
address for negotiations, after King Hussein’s announcement of 31 July 1988. The only 
question was whether they could deliver peace. Peres was finally convinced that Israel 
had to negotiate directly by the PLO when faced with the alternative of Islamic 
fundamentalism, the arch enemy. As he explained in reference to the PLO, "I do not love 
them (PLO) but in view of the fact that Hamas is the alternative, I have become 
romantic!” (Beilin 1997:124). By May 1993, Peres came to the conclusion that the 
Washington talks were fatally flawed, not only because of the absence of the PLO, but
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also because the interim agreement was founded on the principle that all options were to 
remain open regarding the final status. Peres felt that this raised Palestinian suspicions of 
Israeli territorial ambitions preventing progress in the talks (NYT 17 July 1993: 2). 
Subsequently he threw himself firmly into the Oslo process.
Despite the change in tactics, Peres still believed that only a Jordanian-Palestinian accord 
could ensure peace and stability (Peres 1995: 352) and economic integration remained as 
central as ever to peace. To Peres, “the fate of Gaza should be like that of Singapore from 
poverty to prosperity in one sustained leap” (Peres 1995: 350). He saw the DoP as a 
potential catalyst for “a mini Marshall Plan” for Gaza (Peres 1995: 326) and in the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst and Abu Ala he had interlocutors who shared this 
vision (Makovsky: 15; Corbin: 27). Peres continued to understand the peace process as 
part of a rational dialectic whereby, “The movements of Jewish national renaissance and 
the Arab renaissance met -and clashed- at the same place and time...The military 
confrontation required trained armies, fortified borders, constant vigilance and suspicion. 
But times are now changing. Our condition in the 1990s is very different from that which 
prevailed in the 1950s. The world in which these two movements were bom and grew, no 
longer exists. They both now have to seek new and uncharted solutions do their 
problems... Economic advancement requires a very different set of circumstances: open 
borders, markets that straddle political demarcation, goodwill, good products and constant 
competition” (Peres 1995: 320).
Rabin. Mamlachtiut and the Acceptance of Oslo
The progressives were clearly the driving force behind Oslo and the deal itself was 
negotiated by them, at certain stages behind Rabin’s back (JP 5 July 1994: 1). 
Nonetheless, without the support of Rabin, the whole project would have remained 
theoretical. On taking power, Rabin vetoed Peres’ requests to open a dialogue with the 
PLO as premature (Corbin: 27, Makovsky: 17). Although his government promised to 
repeal the law banning contact with PLO officials, Rabin delayed the measure until Bush 
left office to prevent the administration from using it as an excuse to reopen its dialogue 
with the PLO. Even then Rabin absented himself from the proceedings in the Knesset the
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day the measure was passed. Rabin allowed the Oslo channel to continue so long as it 
remained academic and did not undermine the American sponsored talks in Washington 
(Beilin 1997:89). He only became interested in the Oslo talks at the time of the Hamas 
deportation crisis. Then he felt very uncomfortable that he had caused the collapse of the 
talks just as a new American President had come into office. Therefore, he got Peres to 
use the Oslo channel to help restart the official talks in Washington which would help 
improve Israel’s standing in Washington (Beilin 1997:91). Again during June, Rabin 
sought to use the Oslo channel to advance the negotiations held under American auspices, 
this time by trying to get the Palestinians to agree to accept the American bridging 
document (Beilin 1997:109). Despite the focus on co-operating with the Americans 
through the official talks in Washington, Rabin began to change his mind on the role of 
the PLO in negotiations. According to Chaim Ramon, the fact that even after Faisel 
Husseini joined the Palestinian team in Washington there was no progress in talks, was 
crucial for Rabin. It was evident to him that the hope he had nurtured since the Intifada, of 
an independent pragmatic West Bank Palestinian leadership, had not come into existence. 
Rather than showing a pragmatic interest in early empowerment, the Washington 
Palestinians concentrated on issues such as human rights and Jerusalem; they were clearly 
not independent of Tunis. This was the assessment of Major General Uri Saguy in May 
1993. Rabin had given a similar assessment to Christopher and Dennis Ross when he met 
them earlier in the year (Makovsky: 38-41; Rabinovitch 1998: 123).
Yet the admission of the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian talks in Washington does not 
necessarily constitute a reason to open talks with the PLO. As late as the beginning of 
August, Rabin dismissed the Oslo channel in talks with Warren Christopher with a wave 
of his hand. Rabin thought there could only be movement on one track at a time and at 
that stage, with intensive American mediation, the Syrian track appeared to be moving 
(Beilin 1997: 132). Since Rabin saw the Syrian track as the strategic key to Israeli 
security in statist terms, he prioritised it. However, in August 1993 Rabin was 
disappointed with Asad’s response to his secret proposal sent via Christopher 
(Rabinovitch 1998:115). While the Syrian track was exhibiting some potential Rabin 
refused to consider an interim accord with the PLO which included the West Bank town 
of Jericho; Gaza First was acceptable, but not Jericho (Rabinovitch 1998: 138). But when
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the American negotiating team decided to take a holiday instead of pursuing the Syrian- 
Israeli track, a gap was created for Oslo in the mind of Rabin. Yet, Rabin could have 
waited for progress on the Syrian track, unless an agreement with the Palestinians, in of 
itself, was considered important.
With the concept of the independent leadership gone, Rabin faced the stark choice of on­
going conflict, and a rise in support for Hamas or dealing with the PLO. Previously, 
Rabin had regarded the PLO as a pawn in the global superpower confrontation, used by 
the Soviet Union to undermine American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East (FBIS 5 
September 1975:11). Now however, the cold war was over. One of his main rationale for 
supporting Oslo was his belief that Arafat ensconced in Gaza could deal with Hamas 
terrorism more effectively than Israel, as he would not be encumbered by the Israeli 
Supreme Court (Makovsky: 53, 113). Arafat in Gaza, it was argued, would come to 
represent primarily the Palestinians in the territories and not the Diaspora Palestinians, 
thereby making a deal possible in Rabin’s eyes. By transforming the PLO into the PA 
(Palestinian Authority) Rabin hoped that the PLO would wither away into a kind of 
World Zionist Organisation (WZO) as he had envisaged back in 1989, only now Arafat 
and not Faisel Husseini would represent the Palestinian ‘insiders’ (Makovsky: 110). What 
convinced Rabin that this was possible was the DoP itself. Crucially, at Oslo the PLO 
agreed to make several concession that the team in Washington did not. They agreed to 
the outlines o f the deal Rabin wanted from the insiders. They allowed Israel overall 
control of security in the Interim Period and they also agreed to exclude the settlements 
and Jerusalem3 from Palestinian control in the interim deal. This allowed Rabin to sustain 
the belief that in the final status negotiations, Israel would not have to withdraw to the 
exact pre-1967 borders or divide Jerusalem (JP 6 October 1993: 11; Makovsky 65,78). 
Under these circumstances Rabin was prepared to switch tactics, accept the PLO and the 
possibility o f a Palestinian state as a potential arrangement, under certain circumscribed 
conditions, in the final status talks.
3 Arafat agreed that Jerusalem would not be a base for the Palestinian Authority, though in return Peres 
agreed to sign a separate secret agreement in which he committed the government not to close Palestinian 
institutions in Jerusalem (Makovsky: 71; Corbin 156).
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The mamlachti theoretician who first outlined the abstract logic that Rabin eventually 
followed in practise was the former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, Yehoshafat 
Harkabi. In the 1970s Harkabi had written books exposing the basic Arab and Palestinian 
refusal to recognise Israel’s right to exist. In the 1980s he began to argue that the position 
of the Arab states and the Palestinian people had changed. Harkabi distinguished between 
the concept of a goal and that of policy. The former is what one aspires to, without 
necessarily knowing how it will be brought about while the latter is a set of actions 
designed to achieve what is considered possible and attainable. A distinction which he 
argued was fundamental to human life. For many years the Arab position on the Arab 
Israeli conflict was unique in that both grand design and policy focused on the destruction 
of Israel. This was seen not merely as an abstract aspiration but as a practical role in the 
realm of international politics which left no opening for a political settlement. Indeed, 
both Harkabi and Rabin saw the 1974 decision of the Palestinian National Council which 
expressed a willingness to setde for a Palestinian mini-state, as tactical; strategic 
gradualism, a stage on the way to the destruction of the state of Israel (Harkabi 1988: 5). 
After all, it was accompanied by a demand for the restitution of all Palestinian rights 
including the right of return and of self-determination on the entire territory o f  Palestine. 
It also ruled out any plan whose price was recognition, peace, secure boundaries and the 
concession of national rights to the Zionists. Subsequent to this Rabin had got the 
Americans in 1975 to agree not to negotiate with the PLO until it changed these positions. 
Yet as Chief-of-Staff immediately following the Six Day War, Rabin and other exponents 
of mamlachtiut had been comfortable with the idea of a Palestinian state in the territories 
(Pedazur 1995: 278). What they opposed was the PLO, which represented Palestinian 
interests of the ‘outsiders’. The ‘outsiders’ core interest was the destruction of the state of 
Israel or at least a right of return for all Palestinian refugees to Israel. This represented a 
serious threat to the continued existence of Israel as a state with a Jewish majority. Yet 
following the mamlachti conception of ein brairah as contingent and not existential, 
Harkabi argued that the best that was achievable in an international dispute was to bring 
ones adversary to differentiate between their ideal and their policies. By the end of the 
1980s, Harkabi saw the PLO as following in the footsteps of Sadat and accepting this 
distinction. Crucially, he calculated that they were willing not only to agreed to peace and 
the principle of normalisation, but also the creation of facts that could forestall the
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possibility o f turning the clock back to the era when the destruction of Israel was 
considered a political objective (Harkabi 1988: 28-42). In 1993 Rabin effectively 
accepted Harkabi’s assessment, when the PLO took such a step by agreeing to Israeli 
conditions for the Interim Period.
Rabin’s adoption of the distinction between PLO ideals and policy meant that the Oslo 
Accord was a realistic policy option in a way it was never likely to have been for Israeli 
leaders like Begin and Sharon. To Rabin, “The claim that the whole world is against 
Israel was blown away on the winds of peace” (SWB 5 Oct 1994). In contrast to the 
particularists the Holocaust had proved that the only way Jews could survive in the 
post-Holocaust world was by relying on the sword. They could not and should not trust 
anyone. No matter how strong Israel became, they always spoke and behaved like victims 
who had to be defensive and reactive, not shapers of their own destiny. Opponents of the 
Accord saw the European and Jewish experience in the 1930s and the Holocaust as 
defining the international environment for Israel as fundamentally one of siege in which 
the changes seen by Harkabi and Rabin in the Palestinian position were unreal, just for 
show. For them Oslo was a disaster comparable to appeasement in the 1930s. They 
compared Rabin to Chamberlain and Petain, and castigated him for signing an agreement 
“with the greatest murderer of Jews since Hitler” (JP 1 September 1993: 1; Heikal: 457; 
NYT 14 September 1993: A16). On the other hand, according to Israeli political theorist 
Yaron Ezrahi, What Rabin, who is the first Israeli-born Prime Minister of Israel and the 
embodiment of the Israeli citizen-soldier, has done is draw just the opposite lesson from 
the Holocaust experience. The lesson is that having power allows you to move in the 
direction o f compromise. Power allows you to reshape your own future, not just hunker 
down” (NYT 10 September 1993: A l). This represented a significant amendment or 
change of emphasis to the classical mamlachti interpretation of the Holocaust as 
enunciated by Ben Gurion. The important thing about the Holocaust had been the need for 
Jewish sovereignty and power. But now, with that power, Israel had the ability, given the 
change in circumstances, to reshape its future. These changed circumstances were 
something classical mamlachtiut accepted as a possibility but which it had not seen in 
practise during its heyday 1948-67. Now however Rabin had seen circumstances change, 
changes he was able to see because he did not accept that Israel was forever destined to
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dwell alone. Rabin pursued this line of thought in representing Israel at the fiftieth 
memorial ceremony commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 1993. There 
he declared: “Wherever we go, the memory of the Holocaust goes with us...” but in spite 
of the Holocaust he argued “we still believe people can change”. Moreover, he deemed 
the highest lesson of the Holocaust to be “No more violence, no more wars” (Klieman 
1994: 106). As if to emphasis this Rabin suggested that the famous phrase spoken by 
Zionist hero Joseph Trumpeldor, after he fell in the battle of Tel Chai, "it is good to die 
for our country," should be changed to "it is good to live for our country" (AH 14 March 
1995).
Rabin also gave vent to another implicit side of mamlachtiut which had got lost over the 
years. Back in the 1950s, Ben Gurion had been able to understand and even sympathise 
with the Palestinian fedayeen who attacked Israel, nonetheless in the 1970s and 1980s 
Harkabi (1971, 1988) noted the dominant Israel attitude had been to dismiss Palestinian 
suffering as a direct outcome of their own extremism. Only the younger generation of 
Israeli liberal doves and the post-Zionist new historians sympathised with Palestinian 
suffering as a result, albeit unintended, of Zionism. However, following the Hebron 
massacre, Rabin, using language he had never used before in public, echoed the call of 
Israeli’s new historians, accepted a degree of blame on Israel for the conflict. He told the 
Knesset, “For twenty-seven years the Palestinians...have risen in the morning and 
cultivated a burning hatred for us as Israelis and as Jews. Every morning they awake to a 
difficult life and it is partly our fault... It cannot be denied, the continued rule of a foreign 
people who does not want us has a price... the price of constant confrontation between 
them and us” (Frankel: 377). According to Yaron Ezrahi, such sentiments and the Oslo 
Accord themselves represented, “a triumph of Palestinians and Israelis... over their own 
histories” (NYT 10 September 1993: Al).
Indeed, Ezrahi was right to point to the wider foundations of the accord. For without the 
public legitimacy for negotiations with the hitherto demonised enemy, the PLO, Oslo 
would probably have remained just an academic discussion. Unlike in 1985-6 when Peres 
had been held back from progress in part by the Israeli public’s refusal to countenance 
negotiations with the PLO, in 1993 Rabin was able to act. The public’s attitude towards
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the PLO and the Palestinians was no longer a block on Labour diplomacy. Rabin’s private 
polls told him a majority of Israelis would favour not only territorial compromise but 
direct talks with PLO if  it renounced the Charter calling for Israel’s destruction. Between 
1978-85, support for negotiations with the PLO among Jewish Israelis fluctuated between 
13 to 22%. Following the Intifada, in 1988-9, polls suggested that if  the PLO recognised 
Israel and ceased terrorist activities then those who favoured negotiations with it rose 
from 43% in April 1987 to 50% in March 1989 (Arian 1996: 106). In September 1993, 
62% of the public supported Oslo (JP 13 September 1993: 1). However, for the public, 
this acceptance had less to do with triumphing over history and more to do with a 
recognition of Israel’s inability to triumph over the present. There had been no change in 
Israeli Jews preference for negotiations with the PLO and the creation of a Palestinian 
state: they did not want it. But due to the changed circumstances described in Chapter 4, 
they were more willing to accept it (Shamir and Shamir 1993: 47).
Implementation: A New Israeli Security Concept
Negotiations between Israel and the PLO on the terms of implementing the DoP turned 
out to be a more protracted affair than envisaged by the signatories. The primary reason 
for the delay in coming to an agreement was the difficulty in resolving PLO demands for 
a semblance of sovereignty and Israeli demands for security (JP 25 November 1994: 1). 
Israeli security demands were pursued more vigorously than before due to the change in 
the Israeli negotiating team, from Peres’ ‘Blazers’ to a group of army officers close to the 
mamlachti approach, under the tutelage of the Primer Minister. Amnon Shahak the Chief- 
of-Staff became the chief negotiator, Lieutenant General Uzi Dayan was Head of the 
security sub-committee and Danny Rothschild, former military commander of the West 
Bank, was put in charge of the talks with the PLO in Washington.
It was only when Peres re-entered the negotiating loop in December that agreement was 
reached in the security sphere, with the Palestinians agreeing to joint patrols,, in return for 
which the Israeli team dropped the right to hot pursuit into the areas controlled by the 
PLO (JP 12 December 1993: 1). Again, even after the extensive shuttling of Rabin’s 
envoy Jacques Neriah to Tunis, it was Peres who finally reached agreement with Arafat
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on the issue of border controls (JP 10 February 1994) and on the timetable for 
redeployment (Heikal: 478-491). It was only after direct Arafat-Peres talks on 21-22 
April, when Israel agreed to the Palestinians obtaining some of the symbols o f statehood, 
such as passports, postage stamps and a separate international dialling code, that, in 
return, the Palestinians gave way on Israeli security demands (Heikal: 513). The full 
economic agreement, outlined during the Oslo agreement by Beilin’s associates and Abu 
Ala, was agreed in Paris on 29 April. On 4 May in Cairo the overall Gaza-Jericho 
agreement was signed and on 13 May the redeployment commenced4. In August, 1995 
Peres also led the Israeli team that came to an agreement on the Further Transfer of 
Powers to the Palestinian Authority, which transferred civilian authority to the PA in 
eight spheres throughout the West Bank. External security arrangements and 
responsibility for the security of settlements was retained by Israel, but internal security 
arrangements were handed over to a 900 strong Palestinian police force. The real key to 
the post-Oslo agreements lay in Israeli-Palestinian security co-operation, institutionalised 
in the joint Israeli security co-ordination and co-operation committee.
Here, in practice then, was the beginning of the institutionalisation of a new set of 
instrumental values drawn from a progressive view of the world rather than a pure 
mamlachti perspective. In this regard, it was not coincidental that Peres and not Rabin’s 
mamlachti negotiators made some of the key concessions, especially forgoing the right 
for the IDF to enter Gaza or Jericho in hot pursuit, for this concession represents a 
significant alteration in Israel’s security concept. Self reliance was replaced by a mixture 
of political concessions, independent military force, security co-operation with Arafat’s 
forces and Israel’s ability to pressure the Palestinians economically through the closure of 
the territories from Israel.5 This change in instrumental values at the expense of the IDF’s 
independent capability is what led former Chief-of-Staff and exponent of mamlachtiut 
Ehud Barak to express serious reservations about the agreement (Makovsky: 57). 
Nonetheless, Rabin and the adherents of mamlachtiut acquiesced voluntarily in this new
4 For details of this and all the Israel-Palestinian agreements, see The Middle East peace process: An 
Overview Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, May 1996.
5 More broadly, Rabin also supported US aid to Arab states like Jordan, as a means of strengthening those 
states interest in peace with Israel (JP 31 May 1995:1). Even more symbolic of the new multi-lateral Israeli 
approach to security was the fact that, following the Hebron massacre, the Israelis agreed to an international 
presence in the territories.
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security concept. The change in external reality, i.e. a moderation in implacable Arab 
enmity made such a change possible, but it did not predetermine this change. Rather, once 
those changes had taken place, the old mamlachti instrumental values based on the 
perception of an on-going siege, was unable to resolve the issues arising out of the new 
political reality engendered by the Madrid process and then Oslo. The instrumental values 
of mamlachtiut appeared incapable of leading its adherents towards the normalisation of 
Israel’s international position, as hoped and expected. As a result, the old instrumental 
values were sidelined. Only the alternative view of the nature of international society held 
by the progressives had the vision whose central values led it to initiate and carry through 
this change. This process of change in political culture was reflected in the fact that it was 
Peres and the Blazers that took all the initiatives.
Yet the final word always rested with Rabin. Thus, although Rabin and the mamlachti 
generals lacked the necessary core values to create this new reality, once the agreement 
had been reached, Rabin and the army officers who had been sceptical towards it, were 
able to accept it and adapt to the new reality relatively easily. Part o f the reason for the 
flexibility of most of Rabin’s informal advisors, who were also military men, was that 
they tended to view the territories in primarily instrumental terms;6 that is they measured 
the value of the territories against the degree by which the retention of the land aided the 
security of the state of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Since it was clear that their own 
instrumental values had failed, they were prepared to go along with those of the 
progressives at least so long as they continued to produce the necessary results. Rabin and 
the top brass accepted the Oslo process on the basis that it could be stopped at any time 
should Israel come to believe, after empirical analysis, that the new reality on the ground 
was not enhancing Israeli security. In this vein, Rabin continually emphasised that the 
agreement with the PLO was a test, whereby future political progress would be dependent 
on Arafat’s ability to control terrorism (JP 5 September 1994: 5). For Rabin, Arafat’s 
ability to control terrorism was the touchstone of his abandonment in practise of the 
PLO’s maximalist objectives. The step by step structure of the interim accords predicating 
Israeli concessions on Arafat’s record against terrorism. In contrast, the progressives
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tended to argue that the process was irreversible. They argued that hastening the peace 
process would have a positive effect on the struggle against terrorism (HA 1 December 
1994), because ultimately, Israeli security depended on recognition and economic 
integration, not statist military security concerns.
From Rabin’s point of view, the agreements laid the building blocks for separation and 
the prevention of Israel turning, by dint of demography, into a binational state (MM 25 
September 1995). The agreement also left open the possibility of Israel retaining areas of 
the West Bank in final status negotiations and indeed Rabin publicly declared that he 
wanted to incorporate certain blocks of settlements and Jerusalem into the state of Israel, 
while keeping the Jordan valley as Israel’s ‘security border’ (SWB 26 September 1995; 
JR 2 November 1995: 16). In return, Rabin accepted that the elected Palestinian Council 
should have both legislative and executive powers. Previously a legislative assembly had 
always been opposed by Israel as it represented a considerable step toward a Palestinian 
state, a key progressive position.7
Israel. The United States and the Oslo Agreements
Prior to Oslo some progressives wanted the US to pressurise the ‘overly hawkish’ Rabin 
to modify his position (FBIS 26 February 1993; JP 23 October 1992:1; 18 May 1993:1; 2 
July 1993:1; NYT 23 May 1993: 4).8 Indeed, regarding the incorporation of Faisel 
Husseini into the Palestinian negotiating team in February 1993, Peres suggested to 
Christopher that he suggest to Rabin to bring Husseini in. Peres felt Rabin was more 
likely to accept such a concession if it came from the United States and not from himself 
(Makovsky: 75). Yet, it was Norway and not the United States which turned out to be the 
most effective mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. Even after the DoP was 
signed in Washington, Israel and the PLO continued to use the Norwegian channel to 
resolve disputes over mutual recognition (Heikal: 464). For Peres and the Blazers, the US 
role in the Palestinian track was not crucial to Israeli interests, but merely useful in so far
6 As Ben Aharon commented with regard to the Army top brass, “There is not one Likudnik among them”. 
The only Rabin advisor to strongly oppose the accord was Eli Rubinstein, precisely because he did not view 
the territories in purely instrumental terms (Makovsky: 101-2).
7 Differences between the progressive and mamlachti approaches to final status issues remained over 
Jerusalem and the Jordanian role (Makovsky: 123; HA 5 August 1996: B5).
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as it helped bring about acceptance of a bilateral accord and helped to underwrite the 
economic substructure of peace. When they felt that the US sponsored talks were not 
going to produce results they did not hesitate to use other countries as mediators.9 Peres 
and Beilin had been severely disappointed by the Americans lack of forcefulness since the 
1987 London agreement. Consequently, they feared US involvement might torpedo 
progress and hence they sought not to involve the US too closely in the talks. Thus, 
although the United States had been told about the Oslo talks by various Israelis, it had 
not been updated by the Israeli government in any formal manner (Beilin 1997:138). 
Beilin deliberately avoided telling the Americans that the Director-General of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, was leading the negotiations for Israel at Oslo; instead 
allowing Christopher to believe that the talks were primarily an academic exercise, even 
at quite a late stage in the negotiations (Beilin 1997:104, 113). Indeed, Peres expressly 
asked the Norwegian to stop briefing the United States about the talks once they were 
upgraded to a serious level in May 1993 (Larson). Although Peres and the Blazers had 
become sceptical of the US ability to broker a successful agreement in Washington, they 
nonetheless felt compelled to keep the US informed for fear of raising American ire and 
thus potentially endangering any agreement (Corbin: 162; Abbas: 127). Both Ed Djerijan 
and Dan Kurtzer of the State Department were aware of the negotiations, while 
Christopher was handed drafts of the Sarpsborg document in February and March and was 
briefed again by Peres in July (Corbin: 65). Subsequently, after the agreement had been 
reached Peres went with the Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst to break the news to an 
extremely surprised Dennis Ross and Warren Christopher (Peres 1995: 351).
Peres was concerned that the Americans would not be prepared to back the agreement due 
to their clear preference for progress on the Syrian track. Moreover, he was still scared by 
his experience with Shultz over the London Agreement in 1987. Indeed, some members 
of the US team were rather annoyed with the way the secret deal was made (Rabinovitch 
1998: 146). However, ultimately they realised that it was an important achievement on the
8 Occasionally, even after Oslo, Beilin and the doves argued for more vigorous US intervention to get the 
talks back on track, including US pressure on both sides (JP 1,10,17 March 1994:1-2).
9 Aside from the Norwegians, it was the Egyptians who provided the most important back channel of 
communication between Israel and the PLO (Corbin: 27,56; Peres 1995: 322). Peres also looked to the 
French to mediate in the peace process 1992-3, however, Rabin vetoed the idea (Satloff 1992; Ashrawi 
1993: 238-9).
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way to a regional peace. Thus, Christopher was delighted with the breakthrough. Since 
1983, the US had nearly always taken the position that it was primarily up to the parties 
themselves to provide the initiative for progress before their intervention could help and 
here was a fruit of that concept. The Americans had thought for a long time that the PLO 
would eventually have to be brought into the process, but since the failure of the Reagan 
Plan, they had seen it as a decision which only Israel could make. However, as in 1987, 
the US refused to present the DoP as its own proposal. Everyone on the Israeli and 
Palestinian side had thought that any agreements reached in Oslo would filter into the 
official talks in Washington. Indeed, at the tenth round of talks the idea of implementing 
full autonomy in ‘Gaza and Jericho First’, which first surfaced in Oslo, came to the table 
in Washington (Ashrawi: 250-252). Ultimately it was expected that any agreement 
reached in Oslo would be handed over to the United States and which would then send 
Warren Christopher to the region to present it formally to the parties. The parties would 
then sign the agreement in Washington after Arafat and Rabin told them to agree to the 
‘American bridging document’ without any changes (Makovsky 83, 115). As in 1987, 
Peres suggested this idea, in order to make the agreement more acceptable to both 
domestic constituencies (Peres 1995: 339,351; Corbin: 176-7; Makovsky: 49,75). Only in 
1993, at least as far as the Israeli public was concerned, there was no need for such 
subterfuge. In any case, Warren Christopher dismissed the idea because secrecy would be 
impossible to maintain.
However the US did agree to Peres’ request that it use its political and economic 
leadership to help create a Marshall Plan for the Middle East which would help 
underwrite peace. Subsequently the US organised a Donors Conference at which $2 
billion was promised to the Palestinian Authority including $500 million from the US. 
The US also encouraged Peres’ New Middle East of economic co-operation in other 
ways. They promoted a scheme to encourage private investment in the territories known 
as ‘Builders for Peace’ and sought to end the Arab boycott through the Middle East-North 
Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca and through the co-sponsoring of the follow up 
Amman Conference in 199510 (NYT 30 September 1993: A l; JP 21 January 1994: 6;
10 The US also helped by pressurising the Gulf and North African states to recognise Israel and open 
diplomatic relations (Makovsky: 78).
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Israeline 27 February 1995).
Whereas the progressives feared that the US might damage Oslo, The mamlachti ’im were 
more concerned that Oslo might damage the US-Israeli relationship. Rabin did not want 
to involve the US too deeply in the Oslo track for fear that Oslo would fail and as a result 
the US-Israeli relationship would suffer (Makovsky: 65). Moreover even after Peres had 
initialled the DoP in Oslo, Rabin only adopted it on condition that the Americans agreed 
to support it (Rabinovitch 1998: 144). Indeed, Rabin only agreed to attend the signing 
ceremony in Washington with Arafat, against the advice of his advisors, after President 
Clinton had asked him personally (NYT 13 September 1993: 11). Following the Oslo 
accord, Rabin returned to a policy of close co-ordination with Washington. As one well 
informed American Jewish leader observed, “This administration is the most ‘in sync’ 
with the Israeli government”, there being, “constant temperature taking, reassurance and 
co-ordination” (JP 7 February 1994: 7)”. For Rabin, one advantage of co-ordination was 
the influence it gave Israel over US policy. There was consistent US pressure on Rabin to 
push forward on the Palestinian and Syrian fronts simultaneously (Heikal: 485; JP 3 
December 1993:1. 5 March 1994: 1; 5 September 1994: 5; 16 December 1994: 2; 
Rabinovitch 1998: 164). However, Rabin argued that the Israeli public could only deal 
with one track at a time and that the Palestinian track should be given priority. 
Consequently, after a Rabin-Clinton meeting, Israel and the US agreed that an agreement 
with Syria should be the third priority in their strategy for peace after the implementation 
of the DoP and an accord with Jordan (JP 19 November 1993: 1). In addition, because the 
Rabin government was basically pursuing a joint peace strategy with the Clinton 
administration, the administration consistently supported the Rabin government against 
complaints by the Palestinians, even though it was concerned about the humanitarian and 
political impact of the closures (NYT 6 February 1995: 8; JP 12 February 1995: 1). 
President Clinton loudly condemned acts of terror against Israelis, put pressure on Arafat 
to do more against Hamas terrorists and was understanding about delays in Israeli troop 
withdrawals in the wake of terrorist attacks (WP 27 January 1995: A21). Indeed, despite 
numerous requests by Arafat, the US did not intervene in the PLO-Israel talks without
11 For an example of the informal and intimate nature of American-Israeli discussions see Rabinovitch 
(1998: 123).
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Israeli approval; neither Rabin nor Christopher wanted to rekindle in Arafat’s mind the 
idea that the US would deliver Israeli concessions (JP 15 November 1993: 1; NYT 11 
December 1993: 6; 22 January 1994: 13). Even after the Hebron massacre, the US, to 
Rabin’s satisfaction, refused to involve itself in the negotiations (Heikal: 496-505; JP 10 
March 1994: 2).12
Moreover, true to form, following the Oslo agreement Rabin got Clinton to agree to 
compensate Israel for the risk it was taking for peace in the form of F I5 advanced 
bombers capable of reaching Teheran and Baghdad, coupled with the Israeli acquisition of 
a supercomputer previously blocked by the Pentagon (Makovsky: 121). Similarly, with 
regard to Oslo II signed two years later, Rabin agreed to a large scale signing ceremony in 
Washington despite his fear that this would anger Israelis after the wake of a spate of 
terror attacks. In return for Israeli concessions, in the wake of these attacks the US 
compensated Israel with the granting of higher quality supercomputers, permission to use 
the loan guarantees to cover the regular deficit and a promise to reduce the penalties on 
the guarantees for Israeli building over the Green Line in Jerusalem (JP 24 August 1995: 
1; MM 29 September 1995).
Israel-US Relations in the Wake of the Rabin Assassination
In many ways the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin represented the success of his vision of Israel. 
The large number of world dignitaries present and the speeches made by Mubarak and 
King Hussein reinforced the image of Israel as an accepted and respected member of the 
international community, a normal state and not a nation that dwells alone. The American 
response to the assassination highlighted the strength and depth of relations between the 
two countries. The White House flag stood at half mast and President Clinton led a 
delegation of over 70 dignitaries, including former presidents and high ranking members 
of congress, to the funeral. President Clinton reassured the Israeli people that America 
would not forsake them and his epitaph shalom haver [Goodbye my friend] touched
12 The Americans only took a mediatory role when Israel and the Palestinians asked for it. For example, 
regarding the most difficult issues in bilateral negotiations for Oslo II, namely, the extent of Israeli 
withdrawal from Hebron and control over water resources in the West Bank. A trilateral committee was set
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Israelis instantly becoming a symbol of the special relationship (WP 7 November 1995: 
A15). Peres’ address to Congress on his visit to the US in December 1995 strengthened 
this image further. The Clinton administration continued to co-ordinate policy with Israel, 
blaming Hamas for the closure of the territories, focusing on terrorism against Israel 
rather than the Arab emphasis on the need for further concessions from Israel at the Cairo 
summit (JP 15 March 1996: 1), as well as, supporting initially Israel’s bombardment of 
Lebanon, ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ (JP 28 April 1996: 1). The US continued to 
‘compensate’ Israel for the costs of peace, providing $100 million and technology to 
enhance security against terrorist infiltration (JP 14 March 1996). The two states also 
signed a statement of intent to provide Israel with defence against missile attack and to 
cooperate against the terrorist threat emanating from Iran thereby providing Israel with a 
useful role in the new ‘Pax Americana’(MM 29 April 1996).
The new Prime Minister, Peres, had a different motive for pursuing an American-Israeli 
alliance. Just prior to the 1996 Israeli elections, Peres wanted to issue a joint communique 
with Clinton, which would form the basis of a US-Israeli formal alliance and thereby help 
Peres election chances (MM 12 March 1996). Once again, with the electorate evenly 
divided in Israel, Peres wanted US public support to help him win the election. Although 
he did not get the communique, he did effectively get an endorsement from President 
Clinton the day before the election and in any case much of US policy from 1995 onwards 
was based on the premise that the US had to help Labour get re-elected in order to sustain 
support for the peace process (MEI 20 October 1995: 6; JP 28 June 1996:1). Despite 
Clinton’s open support, the Peres strategy failed again as Netanyahu won the election by 
the narrowest of margins.
Conclusion
Israeli policy 1992-96 was driven by the ethos of normalisation. The progressive 
approach took the important initiatives creating the Oslo process. Self reliance was 
replaced by a mixture of political concessions, independent military force, security co­
up to deal with the water issue. (JP 21 August 1995:2; NYT 22 September 1995: A l; MM 25 September 
1995).
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operation with Arafat’s forces and Israel’s ability to pressure the Palestinians 
economically through the closure of the territories from Israel. The adherence of the 
mamlachti'im  to this new style of foreign policy demonstrated that international and 
regional circumstances had changed to the point where they were comfortable enough to 
allow this approach to reach fruition. The change in external reality, i.e. a moderation in 
implacable Arab enmity made such a change possible, but it did not predetermine this 
change. Rather, as the instrumental values of mamlachtiut appeared incapable of leading 
its adherents towards normalisation, the old instrumental values were sidelined. Only the 
alternative view of the nature of international society held by the progressives had the 
vision whose central values led it to initiate this change. As a result, the American-Israeli 
inter-governmental relationship reached new heights. However, while the governments 
reached new levels of intimacy the relationship between Israel and its traditional 
supporters in the US reached a new low.
237
Chapter 10: The ‘Special Relationship”: Bevond the Executive
Introduction
Israel and the United States are often said to be participants in a ‘special relationship’. 
Like other states who have a close relationship with the US, Israel has maintained strong 
ties with various US administrations and the military industrial complex. Still, one of the 
key factors distinguishing the relationship from normal state to state relations are the 
strong and politically fruitful relations which the government of Israel maintains beyond 
these governmental bounds. The core of this relationship is with the organised American 
Jewish community, but it also incorporates Gentile groups and Congressmen that come 
together to make up the pro-Israel lobby. It is in regard to these groups that this chapter 
will refer to a special relationship between Israel and the United States.
This chapter will argue that the traditional Zionist negative attitudes to Diaspora Jewry, 
was an influential factor in determining the character, nature and extent of relations within 
the special relationship. However, the determining factor was the extent to which Labour 
and Likud’s approaches to the Palestinian question was compatible with the approach of 
the American executive. Because the Likud’s attachment to the land of Israel put it at 
odds with the American executive, it made greater use of the special relationship. 
Moreover, this chapter will argue that between 1981-92, when the Likud was the 
dominant power in Israel, the conflict between Israel and its American supporters over 
issues related to the peace process was primarily underpinned by a conflict over the 
meaning of Zionism and its implications as to the correct locus for the political loyalties 
of American Jews. In contrast, this chapter will argue that between 1992-96, when Labour 
was in power, the conflict was not so much one that divided Israel from its American 
supporters, as a conflict that cut across both the Israeli and US pro-Israel body politiques. 
It was a conflict between, on the one hand, an Israeli government with a basically 
optimistic, progressive worldview, a government that did not believe that non-Jews are 
basically hostile and which tended to value the idea of Israel becoming a “normal” 
country, against, on the other hand, those in the Likud and among Israel’s supporters in 
the US, with a pessimistic, conservative worldview, that tended to have a more 
particularistic sense of Jewish identity, a strong perception of the Gentile world as
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basically antagonistic and a sense of Israel as a ‘special’ country.
Zionism and the Diaspora
The early Zionists, unlike the majority of their eastern European brethren who chose to 
emigrate to America to escape the Pogroms at the turn of the century, consciously chose 
to reject a Diaspora existence. Instead they emigrated to Palestine to set up an 
autonomous society. This idea was encompassed in one of the central motifs of Zionism, 
the concept of shlilat hagalut- [the negation of the Diaspora]. This concept contained two 
dimensions; getting the Jews out of the Diaspora and getting the Diaspora (mentality) out 
of the Jews. ‘Getting the Jews out of the Diaspora’ meant simply that Zionists believed 
that all Jews should abandon the Diaspora and immigrate to Israel. In other words, far 
from accepting the permanence of American Jewish political affiliation, by seeking to 
dissolve the Diaspora, Zionism sought to make all Jews citizens of the state of Israel. 
‘Getting the Diaspora (mentality) out of the Jews’, referred to the idea whereby Zionism 
was conceived as a revolt against the quietistic bourgeois existence of the Jews in the 
Diaspora. The Zionist image of the Diaspora Jew was of a weak and pliant soul, reliant 
for security and well-being on the good will of host society, unwilling to proudly fight to 
protect Jewish rights, and hence living out an undignified existence. One of the key 
elements of the Diaspora mentality that the Zionists sought to change was the style of 
Jewish politics. In place of the diplomatic tradition of Diaspora Jewry, with it reliance on 
the intercession of ‘court Jews’ on behalf of the community, a process known as 
shtadlanut, the Zionists advocated self reliance, political independence and military 
power.
On the other hand, for the vast majority of American Jews “Zionism” meant political and 
philanthropic support for Israel and was certainly not a commitment to make aliyah 
[immigrate to Israel] or an assertion of primary political loyalty to the state of Israel. 
Rather, support for Israel was seen by American Jews as an expression of their 
Americaness as much as their Jewishness. In essence, American Zionism sought to 
express communal solidarity whilst simultaneously avoiding charges of dual loyalty from 
their fellow Americans. This outlook was articulated clearly by one of the founders of
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American Zionism Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis(1984: 520). He declared that 
just as, “Every Irish American who contributed towards advancing Home Rule was a 
better man and a better American for the sacrifice he made. Every American Jew who 
supported Jewish settlement in Palestine, though he feels that neither he nor his 
descendants will ever live there, will be a better man and a better American for doing so.”
Despite the Israelis negative image of Diaspora Jewry, Israel came to terms with its 
pragmatic need for the financial and political support of American Jewry. Subsequently, 
the Israeli government sought to institutionalise the relationship, which was not only a 
source of financial support in of itself, but was also the key to increasing the level of 
economic and political support from the US government. In this regard, two initiatives 
were taken. First, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee -AIPAC- was founded to 
lobby Congress and to help maintain public sympathy for Israel. Second, in order to 
maximise support for Israel, Ben Gurion created a partnership with mainstream American 
Jewry which had traditionally been unenthusiastic about Zionism. In fact, he made what 
amounted to a ‘concordat’ with the largest Jewish organisation in the US, the non-Zionist 
American Jewish Committee. In the agreement, Ben Gurion received American Jewish 
agreement not to intervene in Israeli politics, and in return for broad American Jewish 
support, the government of Israel agreed not to interfere in American Jewish politics. It 
also recognised and accepted, as Ben Gurion put it that, “American Jews have only one 
political attachment and that is to the United States of America. They owe no political 
allegiance to Israel.”(Gruen 211). This statement was demanded by American Jewry, to 
protect their position and status in America which could be threatened if their support for 
Israel was construed as dual loyalty.
Although, formally the state of Israel accepted that it would not intervene in American 
Jewish politics, in practice successive governments of Israel continued take positions that 
put them at odds with the mainstream American Zionism. The government of Israel 
tended to involve itself in American politics in order to increase Israeli influence in 
Washington, without that much regard for American Jewish interests. Thus, the Begin 
government pursued ties with Jerry Falwell and the Christian fundamentalist Right, 
despite the fact that most Jews in America perceived the Moral Majority as a threat to
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their position in the US. Since Israeli Zionists had no principled reason for ensuring the 
continued comfort of Jewry in the United States, they were not that bothered by such 
problems. In any case, Israeli leaders generally understood the interests of world Jewry as 
equivalent to the interests of the state of Israel as interpreted by its government and 
consequently, they expected American Jews to put Israel’s interest above their own 
domestic interests1. Consequently, American Jewish public criticism of Israeli foreign 
policy was deemed against the rules by all Israeli leaders. American Jews who did 
criticise Israel were seen typically as “faint hearted Jews” (Tivnan: 175-6) worried about 
their vulnerable position in gentle society, who criticised Israel, “out of concern for their 
own skin” (Golan 1993: 36). Israeli Zionism retained this tendency to ignore the reality of 
American Jewry’s position in the US and instead equated it with the position of the 
archetypal Diaspora Jew. To see it any other way would be to undermine one of the root 
axioms of Zionism namely that a normal Jewish existence was impossible in the 
Diaspora.
The Special Relationship and the Peace Process
I.L. Kenen, the founder of AIPAC used to say that the organisation existed to, “Lobby 
Congress to tell the President to overrule the State Department” (Ball: 116). Yet until the 
Six Day War the special relationship had not really been strong enough to confront an 
administration determined to confront Israel as Eisenhower had when he demanded 
Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai in 1957. Following the Six Day War Israel’s position in 
Washington was substantially strengthened. As a result, Israel began to utilise the special 
relationship more successfully to counter-balance administration attempts to extract 
concessions from it as part of the peace process. For example, in 1975 the Labour 
government under Rabin was able to counteract the Ford administration’s threat to 
‘reassess’ relations with Israel through the use of its friends in Congress (Ben Zvi 1993: 
49-102).
The consistent position of the US since 1967 has been in favour of a ‘land for peace’
1 The most extreme example of this occurred when Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew working for the US 
government, was caught spying for Israel.
241
formula. In addition, from the mid 1970s onwards a number of important figures in the 
State Department were inclined to try and bring the PLO into the peace process. This was 
potentially a problem for both parties in light of Israel’s increasing reliance on American 
military aid and political support since 1967. But it was particularly a problem for the 
Likud which was ideologically committed to ‘the whole land of Israel’ and which 
recognised the imperative of avoiding a choice between American support and land. 
Consequently, whereas Labour was able to co-ordinate its policy with American 
administrations on the basis of ‘land for peace’, the Likud was not able to do so. As a 
result, it came to rely increasingly on the special relationship with the pro-Israel lobby 
and Congress to counteract the executive bias against i t .
The Likud, the Special Relationship and the Peace Process
The Likud used the special relationship to promote its agenda over the Palestinian 
question in two ways: hasbara [spin-doctoring] and lobbying Congress. In its relations 
with the US, Zionist/Israeli hasbara had always played on two strands within Western 
political culture. First, Israel sought to present the itself as deserving of US support 
because of its uniqueness and its moral affinities with the US. Israel promoted itself as a 
modem technological country similar to America in that they had common roots, as 
immigrant societies trying to secure frontiers, as well as, common democratic values 
(Eban 1993: 596). This line of argument was most prominent prior to 1967. After that it 
continued to play a role but was gradually superseded by the second line of argument, 
namely that Israel could be a strategic asset to the West. Likud promoted hasbara to a 
high rank in its foreign policy and not just because the American executive was opposed 
to its ideological position on the territories. The Likud tradition itself was more inclined 
to value hasbara as a tool of foreign policy. Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionism had 
emphasised the political significance of public opinion in Liberal democracies for 
Zionism, the idealist tendency within the Revisionist movement tended to believe that 
rhetoric was more significant in politics than did Labour. Partly as a consequence of this 
the Likud was more sensitive to the changing nature of the conflict which militated in 
favour of increased use of hasbara.
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After the Vietnam War it was becoming clear that television and media were becoming 
increasingly important in international politics. With the passing of the ‘Zionism is 
racism’ resolution at the UN in 1975, the PLO was gaining increasing legitimacy and 
recognition throughout the world. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in a sense this 
became one of the main threats to Israel. As Netanyahu saw it, the political threat to Israel 
from the PLO could be explained as follows, “Slowly imperceptibly, the initial horror [of 
the terror attacks] recedes and in its place comes a readiness to accept the terrorists point 
of view...Before we know it the hijackers and killers have spokesmen and commentators 
of their own and the terrorists have been transformed into merely another type of political 
activist that had to be considered and even given equal time.” (Netanyahu 1993: 383). In 
response to this threat, “the Israeli Foreign Ministry commissioned roughly one hundred 
freelance articles a year about different aspects of Israeli life and distributed them to 2000 
US publications... The Israeli broadcasting service set up by the Foreign Ministry 
produced radio shows for US audiences... the government also sent 90 second news 
videos on Israel to local channels as well as, bringing four 400-500 key opinion makers to 
Israel each year" (Friedman 1990:441).
Nonetheless, for the Likud the aim of hasbara was limited. It was not designed to gamer 
support for the Likud’s whole land of Israel philosophy but to counteract the Arab spin on 
events, maintain a political atmosphere in Washington conducive to understanding Likud 
policies and thus prevent American pressure for a peace settlement based on land for 
peace which incorporated the PLO. Having been brought up in the United States, the 
Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Moshe Arens 1981-3 together with Binyamin 
Netanyahu, the Deputy Ambassador 1982-4 and later Israeli Ambassador to the UN 1984- 
88, were particularly skilled at explaining Israel’s case in terms that resonated for 
Americans. Arens understood that the American public in general did not sympathise with 
Begin and his Revisionist ideology (Tivnan: 175), but that it could understand the 
conservative hawkish pragmatism of a like minded democracy (Blitzer: 81, 111-2; 
Melman and Raviv 1994: 215). An AIPAC insider expanded on this logic, "we wanted to 
broaden Israel’s support to the right- with the people who don”t care about what’s 
happening on the West Bank but care a lot about the Soviet Union" (Tivnan: 181). Indeed, 
during the 1980s they were highly successful in harnessing highly influential conservative
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and neo-conservative intellectuals and politicians to sympathise with Likud positions, 
such as Dan Quayle and Jesse Helms (Melman and Raviv 1994: 429; JR 26 June 1995: 
36-7). Netanyahu was able to win them over by successfully emphasising the idea of 
America and Israel as exceptional states, sister democracies that had to act vigorously 
with decisive military force against a terrorist threat emanating from the implacable anti- 
American dictatorships (Syria/PLO) surrounding Israel.
‘H ellN o to the PLO !’
One o f the main thrusts of the hasbara effort in the 1980s under the Likud was to 
delegitimise the PLO as a potential negotiating partner. Apart from identifying it as an 
ally o f the Soviet Union (Simon: 37) Israeli hasbara presented the PLO as a terrorist 
organisation which sought to destroy Israel stage by stage. There was also a continual 
effort to delegitimise the concept of Palestinian nationalism. Under Netanyahu, ‘Jordan is 
Palestine’ committees were set up in the United States (Van Leewan, 354-6; Shindler 
1995: 222), which argued that Jordan was the real Palestinian state and that there was 
therefore no need for a second Palestinian state in the territories. In presenting his 
argument to the American public against such a state Netanyahu used the analogy of 
Hispanics claiming independence from the United States in the event of their becoming a 
majority in the South West region of the United States; a second Mexico (Tivnan: 150).
These hasbara programmes provided the foundations for concrete efforts to weaken 
moves towards a ‘land for peace’ deal involving the PLO, through Congress. In 1982, the 
size of support for Israel in Congress meant that when the Reagan administration tried to 
link the level of aid to Israel to the Likud government’s position on the Reagan plan, 
Begin and AIPAC were able to defeat the administration and fight off the linkage. Instead 
of lowering the quantity of aid granted to Israel and transforming that aid from a grant to 
a loan in December 1982 Congress approved an increase in aid to Israel in the form of a 
grant. In 1985 the Likud undertook moves to counter Peres’ and Shultz’s attempts to start 
negotiations with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation through the Murphy 
rendezvous. Recognising the pivotal role of the PLO in this scheme, the Likud and the 
pro-Israel lobby managed to tighten the terms under which the United States could open a
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diplomatic dialogue with the PLO in the International Security and Development Co­
operation Act. Subsequently, AIPAC and the Likud also tried to close down the PLO 
offices in Washington DC and their mission at the UN in New York. More importantly, 
the Likud was able to use its connections in the pro-Israel lobby and the threat of using 
those connection as a potent weapon to prevent progress towards the opening of Jordan- 
Israel peace talks. Thus after Peres had negotiated the London agreement with Hussein, 
Shamir sent Arens to speak to Shultz to prevent him from going to the region to take up 
the agreement as its signatories expected. Arens told Shultz that if  he came the Likud 
would accuse the President of interference in the internal affairs of Israel (Golan 1989: 
331). This message was backed up by pro-Likud figures in the United States who also 
lobbied Shultz against the adoption of the London agreement. This may well have been 
backed up with certain threats regarding the implications of such an act in terms of 
American domestic politics (Shindler 1994: 231). Subsequently, Shultz refused to play 
the part assigned to him by the authors of the London agreement and he did not come out 
to promote the agreement in the Middle East.
The relationship between Shamir and the American administration began to break down 
with the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987. Following this, Shultz pushed the 
Palestinian question up America’s diplomatic agenda symbolised in the promotion of his 
own peace plan. While Shamir himself did not want to be seen to say no to the plan, he 
did get AIPAC to reverse its initial support for the plan (Shultz: 1032). But it was not 
until the onset of the Bush administration that the Likud was forced to bring this 
Congressional strategy to the forefront of policy. The new Bush administration, unlike its 
predecessor, lacked a special emotional or ideological affinity with Israel. Furthermore, 
with the end of the cold war in sight, the idea of Israel’s usefulness as a ‘strategic asset” 
was not popular in the new administration, especially after the Gulf War in which Israel 
appeared as more of a strategic liability than an asset to US interests. Confronted by an 
antagonistic administration which opposed settlement activity and was in active dialogue 
with the PLO, the Likud looked to the special relationship to redress the balance and 
constrain the administration without damaging America’s long-term political, economic 
and strategic support for Israel. For example, following the presentation of the Israeli 
Peace Plan in May 1989 Shamir had made some public comments opposing territorial
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compromise. Baker had responded by making a forceful speech to AIPAC in which he 
called on Likud to drop its whole land of Israel ideology. Subsequently, in an AIPAC and 
Israeli embassy joint operation (WJW 15 June 1989) 95 Senators publicly expressed 
support for the Shamir Peace Plan and urged the administration to support it (FBIS 13 
June 1989: 31).
The thrust of Likud activity 1989-90 focuses on trying to close the newly opened US- 
PLO dialogue. The Prime Minister’s Solidarity Conference2 for Diaspora leaders was held 
in an effort to try and bolster opposition among Israel’s supporters in the US against the 
dialogue and simultaneously marginalised the progressives who favoured talks with the 
PLO. As a result of the Conference, the Anti Defamation League (ADL) and the 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations (Presidents 
Conference) began to monitor the PLO’s role in terrorism, thereby complementing the 
efforts of Shamir’s advisor on terrorism Yigal Carmon. The Likud also attempted to 
curtail the administration’s dialogue with the PLO through legislation in Congress. 
Subsequently, a bill sponsored by Republican senator Jesse Helms, who had his own 
contacts direct with the Likud party operatives, sought to prevent the administration 
speaking to any PLO official who had been previously involved either directly or 
indirectly, in terror. The Helms bill was defeated, but Congress did pass the Lieberman- 
Mack legislation which required the administration to report to Congress every 120 days 
on whether the PLO was complying with the terms of the dialogue, and also required that 
the President inform Congress in the event that the administration spoke directly with 
known terrorists. The Likud faced an even greater clash with the administration when 
they attempted to involve senators in monitoring PLO compliance (WJW 2 November 
1989). However, according to a senior official then in the Israeli embassy in Washington, 
these efforts were not important in the actual termination of the dialogue in May 1990, after 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat refused to condemn a terrorist attack by one of the Fatah 
factions of the PLO on a Tel-Aviv beach.
2 Although the Conference was organised by Likud MK Ehud Olmert in conjunction with Labour Hawk, 
Motta Gur, the Likud was the primary force behind the operation to end the PLO dialogue. Labour 
ministers were briefed by the US on their conversations with the PLO in the hope that this might help 
advance the 1989 Israeli Peace Plan, whereas the Likud refused to listen to these reports.
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Loan Guarantees and Settlements
After the collapse of the NUG and the Gulf War, the new Likud led government asked the 
US for $10 billion worth of loan guarantees to help absorb Russian immigrants. The 
administration wanted to link the guarantees to a settlement freeze or at the least get Israel 
to delay the request for 120 days until after the Madrid Conference had opened. However, 
the Israeli government refused both ideas and formally submitted its request for the $10 
billion in loan guarantees on 6 September. They felt that the special relationship would be 
able to defeat the administration through their powerful support in Congress (Frankel 292- 
302). Indeed, the Shamir government was so confident of success that it included the first 
instalment of $2 billion dollars in the budget for the coming year ahead. The Israeli- 
AIPAC strategy was to drum up grass roots support among Israel supporters in the US. 
They did this by using media friendly figures such as Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, and Health Minister Ehud Olmert, to sell the message that this was 
‘humanitarian assistance’. Meanwhile, AIPAC and the Israeli Embassy worked Capitol 
Hill to drum up legislative support behind the Israeli demand. All the activity was set to 
culminate in Washington on 12 September when thousands of pro-Israel lobbyists were 
set to descend on the Capitol in support of loan guarantees. However, President Bush 
surprised the lobby by appealing straight to the American people. As a result, Israel’s 
position in Congress crumbled and Bush’s request for a 120 day delay before considering 
the guarantees was granted. Even when negotiations recommenced in January 1992, the 
Israeli government was unable to drum up the necessary support within the special 
relationship to obtain the loan guarantees on its own terms.
The Likud and American Jewish Opposition
The failure to drum up sufficient support to confront the Bush administration on the loan 
guarantees issues was symptomatic of deeper rifts within Israel’s relationship with its 
supporters in the US. The standard operating procedure of American Jewry allowed 
criticism of Israeli policy in private but not in public. As Abe Foxman the head o f the 
ADL put it, “Israeli democracy should decide; American Jews should support” (Frankel: 
222).
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It was during the Lebanon War that the community consensus on not criticising Israel in 
public had first been called into question. Most American Jews and American Jewish 
organisations were publicly positive about the Reagan Plan (Tivnan: 206) which had been 
summarily rejected by the Begin government. Even AIPAC leader, Tom Dine had 
expressed a positive opinion of the Reagan plan. American Jewry always sought to avoid 
any potential clashes between their American and Jewish loyalties by minimising the 
potential for any clash between the Israeli and American governments that could threaten 
increase anti-Semitism in the US (Novik 1986: 69). For this reason AIPAC was primarily 
interested in good US-Israeli relations over and above any particular bias on the peace 
process itself. Still, a 1983 a Poll showed that 51% of American Jews favoured a 
settlement freeze, while a further 73% approved of negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO, on condition that the organisation recognised Israel’s right to exist and renounced 
terrorism (Tivnan:206).
The most significant change in American Jewish-Israel relations occurred in the wake of 
the Sabra and Shatilla massacre. For the first time mainstream Jewish organisations such 
as the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, Bnei Brith and 
mainstream leaders such as Rabbi Alexander Shindler a leading reform Rabbi, strongly 
opposed the government line by demanding an inquiry into the massacre (American 
Jewish Yearbook 1984: 84-90). But it was the Intifada which placed intolerable strains on 
the non-critical tradition. The pro-Israel community had come to be as polarised as the 
Israeli public over the future of the territories. Despite public pronouncements of support 
for the Likud’s policies, a majority of the American Jewish public and a majority of 
American Jewish leaders favoured ‘land for peace’ (Melman and Raviv 1994: 432-433). 
The more marginal and most progressive elements of American Jewry segments of US 
Jewry were even beginning to meet with the PLO. They formed the Jewish Peace lobby 
which lobbied against the Likud government and in favour of linkage of loan guarantees 
and a settlement freeze. They were backed by a number of Israel Peace Activists who 
broke the powerful taboo that Israeli public figures should not criticise the Israeli 
government while abroad (NYT 21 February 1988, WJW 16 March 1989, 10 October 
1991, JP 23 August 1990, 6 February 1992). More worrying for the Likud was the
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breakdown in support for their position among mainstream US groups (JP 6 July 1990; 
American Jewish Yearbook 1992: 245). These splits weakened the image of a solid pro- 
Israel front, on which the special relationship relies to be really effective. In March 1988 
30 Senators, including long standing supporters of Israel, criticised Shamir’s opposition to 
land for peace. On one visit to the US, Shamir’s was greeted by an open letter signed by 
41 American Jewish leaders which informed him, “not to mistake courtesy for consensus 
or applause as endorsement for the policies you pursue” (MECS 1991: 27).
Most dangerous for the Likud was the American Jewish response to the US-PLO 
dialogue. One member of the Presidents Conference had helped clear the way for the 
dialogue by meeting Arafat in Stockholm with five other prominent American Jews just 
prior to Shultz announcement of the opening of the dialogue. The situation was such that 
when the US-PLO dialogue started one Shamir aide noted, “Israeli officials were aghast 
that our friends in the United States did not rise in unison to criticise this step...our friend 
are either critical, passive or paralysed” (Shindler 1991: 142). Subsequently, Foreign 
Minister Moshe Arens tried to get the Presidents Conference to strongly condemn the 
dialogue but the Conference refused to confront Bush over the opening of a dialogue with 
the PLO (Frankel: 226). These negative responses by key American Jewish organisations 
to the Likud agenda were primarily a result of the Party’s handling of the ‘Who is a Jew 
crisis’ following the Israeli election at the end of 1988.
The 1988 election had ended in a virtual stalemate. The right-wing parties led by the 
Likud had a slight advantage over the left, but the religious parties held the balance of 
power. In return for their support for a Likud led government they demanded a change in 
the law of return whereby only Jews who were defined as Jewish according to orthodox 
Jewish law [halacha] would be granted automatic citizenship. To begin with both major 
parties were prepared to pay this price, they did not initially think that their agreement 
would cause a crisis with American Jewry. Although, unlike in Israel, the majority of the 
American Jews affiliated to non-orthodox -reform and conservative- streams of Judaism, 
on a practical level, only a minute number of people would actually be affected, since 
very few non-Orthodox converts, visit let alone, emigrate to Israel. Nonetheless, the move 
was seen by American Jewry as an attempt to de-legitimise their Jewish identity.
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Israelis had little respect for American Jewish identity. Despite the size and importance of 
American Jewry, little time in the Israel school curriculum was devoted to studying the 
community (Shindler 1991: 85-104; Friedman 1990: 451-91). Israelis tended to see things 
through the Zionist prism, which ‘negated the Diaspora’ and thus could not take seriously 
Reform’s claim to be living a full modem Jewish life in the Diaspora. This attitude was 
reinforced by the fact that in Israel there was virtual no non-Orthodox religious Jews. For 
Israelis a person was either observant and hence Orthodox or non-observant and hence 
secular. Hence there was a tendency to view Reform Judaism as somewhat assimilationist 
and not as a serious affiliation. Consequently, Shamir underestimated the enormous 
American Jewish opposition to his promise to change the Law of Return. Israeli 
politicians failed to grasp the symbolic significance of a change in the Law of Return.
Shamir became aware of the scale of the crisis in relations when the usually apolitical 
organisations such as the United Israel Appeal and Hadassah lobbied Jerusalem (NYT 
3/12/88: 6). Even then Shamir appeared to be prepared for a crisis with US Jewry and 
even a drop in the amount of money they raised for Israel until it was made clear to him 
by leading AIPAC officialsand Moshe Arad, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington that 
the passing of the law would weaken Israel’s political power in the US, weaken its ability 
to stand up to a hostile US administration and weaken its ability to guarantee aid through 
Congress. The sluggish American Jewish response to the PLO dialogue was recognised as 
evidence of this tendency. Subsequently, to protect the Likud’s ability to counteract the 
US administration over the Palestinian question, Shamir agreed to drop the religious 
parties demands and enter another NUG. Most of American Jewry then fell into line over 
the PLO dialogue. However, a worse crisis was to follow over the question of loan 
guarantees.
Tom Dine tried to unite his AIPAC constituency behind the Israeli demand for loan 
guarantees without a settlement freeze. He told those who disliked Israeli settlements in 
the territories to, “Swallow hard, roll up your sleeves and get to work to fight linkage” 
(Melman and Raviv 1994: 419). Following President Bush’s dramatic news conference 
Shamir still wanted American Jewry to fight the administration for the guarantees, but the
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community was divided over the issue and turned decisively against Shamir’s 
confrontational approach. American Jewish leaders publicly declared that they would not 
act as the lackey for the Israeli government, they had not raised the settlements issue and 
they were not prepared to fight it. Shoshana Cardin of the Presidents Conference (the 
most important American Jewish organisation) criticised the Israeli Finance Minister for 
stating that settlements were more important than loan guarantees and stated that the 
organisation would take a low profile on the question of linkage and let a direct deal be 
worked out between the administration and the Israeli government (JP 17 October 1991; 
22 January 1992).
The pro-Israel community did not wish to confront Bush after his speech. In pragmatic 
political terms, following the President’s successful appeal to the American people, most 
o f them genuinely believed that they could not defeat Bush on the issue in Congress. In 
addition, they resented the Shamir government for pursuing its ideology at the expense of 
the American-Israeli relationship. American Jewry sought to avoid a confrontation 
because they had been implicitly charged by Bush with dual loyalty; AIPAC had been 
equated with a “foreign interest” (JP 13 September 1991). This implicit charge of dual 
loyalty threatened, in the eyes of many American Jews, to raise the level of anti Semitism 
in the US. Indeed one of the first things the Presidents Conference did following the 
speech was to obtain an apology from President Bush precisely on this point (Melman 
and Raviv 1994: 428). Even staunch supporters of the government such as Abe Foxman 
of the Anti Defamation League criticised the Likud for its lack of realism and its 
insensitivity to embarrassing American Jews (JR 10 October 1991).
To the Israelis the response of American Jewry appeared to fit the paradigm of typical 
Diaspora Jewish behaviour. Netanyahu put American Jewish reluctance to confront the 
Bush administration down to typical Diaspora cowardice (Shindler 1991:143). Similarly, 
all the advice given by American Jewry telling Shamir that his demands were unrealistic, 
were dismissed by the Prime Minister’s Office as just the pathetic attempts of American 
Jews to protect their own skin, by ingratiating themselves with the goyim [gentiles]. 
Rather than support the cause of their own people i.e. the state of Israel they were 
cowering in front of President Bush. Even AIPAC’s professional advice that a
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compromise was necessary was dismissed by key Likud figures Yossi Ben Aharon, 
Yoram Ettinger and Moshe Katsav, as emanating from a sense of defeatism and a “galut 
[Diaspora] mentality” (JP 31 January 1992; Frankel: 306).
Indeed, the Likud’s general response to increasing Diaspora criticism was based on its 
perception that Diaspora opposition stemmed from a galut mentality. Yossi Ben Aharon, 
Shamir’s right hand man in the Prime Minister’s office, argued that this Diaspora 
mentality could be countered by pressurising American Jewry. This, he argued, would 
make American Jewry lobby forcefully on Israel’s behalf. Ultimately, despite Israeli 
declarations of loyalty to the terms of ‘the concordat’, the Israeli government was not 
inhibited from interfering in American Jewish politics to weaken critics of its policies, nor 
was it overly concerned that the demands it was making on American Jewish support 
threatened the Jewish community with the charge of dual loyalty. As Shamir argued to the 
Presidents Conference back in 1988, “Jews abroad have a moral duty to support the Israeli 
government, never a foreign government against Israel”(Gruen: 217). American Jews who 
publicly opposed the Israeli government were viewed by Sharon as “informers” a 
reference Shamir found to be factually correct (Frankel: 225).
Overall then during the Bush administration the Likud reliance on the special relationship 
was a function of the clash of its values with the interest of the United States as 
represented by Bush administration. The way in which the Likud handled its relations 
with the pro-Israel community was characterised by the image of shlilat hagalut, with its 
concurrent insensitivity to the issue of dual loyalty for American Jewry. As a result, Likud 
activities between 1989-92, raised opposition within the special relationship primarily 
because they threatened the ‘Americaness’ of American Jewish identity; raising the 
opportunity for anti-Semites to charge that American Jews carried dual loyalties.
Labour, the Special Relationship and the Peace Process
Labour, like the Likud saw the special relationship through the prism of shlilat hagalut. 
Prime Minister Rabin had an obvious disdain for shtadlanut which was one of the reasons 
that the special relationship was almost peripheral to Labour’s peace process strategy. As
252
Rabin wrote in his memoirs, “Some of the leaders of the American Jewish community 
exercise their influence by means of a shtadlan [Court Jew] the traditional intermediary 
who sought the favour of the ruling powers in Europe... I believe that the Israeli Embassy 
should assume the principal role of handling Israel’s affairs at the political level 
(Horowitz 157).”3 Disdain for shtadlanut reinforced strong political reasons for the 
minimal role assigned to the special relationship in Labour’s peace strategy.
First, Rabin’s mamlachti values system led him to try and limit the role of the special 
relationship because he believed that aggressive lobbying undermined the most important 
element in US-Israeli relations, namely the inter-governmental strategic basis of the 
relationship. As Ambassador, Rabin had been cool about supporting the Jackson-Vanik 
legislation in Congress which linked Detente to freedom for Soviet Jewish Refuseniks for 
fear of alienating the administration (Horowitz: 157) For the same reason in 1992, despite 
AIPAC’s enthusiasm, Rabin agreed not to challenge the sale of 72 F-15 fighters to Saudi 
Arabia in return for Apache helicopters and the prepositioning of American equipment in 
Israel (Feuweger: 55). But for Rabin the loan guarantees fiasco was the worst of all; by 
fighting a losing battle, AIPAC had been party to one of the most serious wedges between 
the US and Israel since 1957. Hence, on his first visit to the US as Prime Minister in 
August 1992, Rabin lambasted AIPAC for its role in the loan guarantees affair and 
informed them that it was for the government of Israel to negotiate with the 
administration and not for them (NYT, 23 August 1992:2; MA 18 August 1992: 3).
Yet the most powerful reason for Labour’s attitude towards the special relationship’s role 
was that Labour’s preference for ‘land for peace’ enabled it to work closely with the State 
Department and the administration. Thus, during the mid-1980s, while the Likud was 
busy building up its contacts within Congress and the pro-Israel community, Labour 
leader Shimon Peres concentrated his efforts on co-ordinating with the United States 
administration. Periodically, some in Labour argued in favour of using dovish elements in 
the American Jewish community to weaken the Likud4. But only when the Reagan
3 This attitude was echoed by Colette Avital, Israel’s Consul General in New York 1993-96 (Melman and 
Raviv 1994: 344).
4 One American Jewish leader claimed that a Labour leader had privately asked for his help in getting the 
United States to cut economic aid to the Begin government to help bring it down and thus advance the
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administration refused to play its assigned role over the London agreement did Peres 
appeal to American Jewry in May 1987 to support his proposal for an international 
conference against Likud opposition (Shindler 1991: 231). Hence, although some 
supporters of the dovish position criticised and even testified against Likud policy on the 
loan guarantees in Washington, once Labour returned to power in 1992 the role of the 
special relationship in Israel’s peace policy became marginal. As Deputy Foreign Minister 
Yossi Beilin explained, “Labour’s coming to power pulls the rug from under AIPAC. We 
want US involvement in the peace process; their [AIPAC under the Likud] agenda was to 
keep the Americans out. We want peace based on compromise, and their agenda was to 
explain why compromise was impossible” (Horowitz: 159).
The belief that Israel was entering an era of peace further undermined the political logic 
which had held the special relationship together since 1948. The Foreign Ministry, under 
Shimon Peres decided it need no longer needed to engage in hasbara. Peres argued that 
good policies did not need hasbara and that the raison detre of hasbara had been the need 
to explain the lack of a peace policy; now that Israel was pursing peace with the PLO, 
policy spoke for itself. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry tried to shift the emphasis of 
their work away from hasbara towards the promotion of economic relations (Horowitz 
:159; JP 22 October 1992: 2-3; 4 May 1993: 1). Without an emphasis on hasbara, there 
was no political urgency in maintaining the link with American Jewry. After all, this 
relationship had been primarily built up as an antidote to ‘the siege’ which the Israeli 
government appeared to sense was virtually over. One consequence of this sense of 
‘normalisation’ was that the special relationship with American Jewry seemed of little 
future political importance to Israel and consequently Israel had less interest in 
maintaining close ties with the pro-Israel community in the US. Israel could afford to 
negate the Diasporas. Indeed, the weakening of relations was apparent by virtue of the fact 
that Rabin left the position of advisor to the Prime Minister on Diaspora Affairs vacant.
peace process (Blitzer: 106). Following the outbreak of the Intifada, members of the Israeli liberal 
establishment appealed to American Jewry not to support the Israeli government (NYT: 21 February 1988).
5 Moreover, with Israel beginning to consider itself a reasonably well off country, there was a growing 
acceptance that Israel should phase out the $1.4 billion in annual civilian aid granted by America. If Israel 
did not need the civilian aid, it would presumably have even less need for a powerful pro-Israel lobby or 
American Jewish cash as Yossi Beilin told a group of American Jews in 1994 (NYT, 1 February 1994: A3).
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In fact, the special relationship was actually somewhat of an irritant to Labour’s peace 
policies. For in order to protect the peace process and close relations with the 
administration, Labour sometimes had to restrain the Lobby. This was particularly in 
evidence on issues relating to Jerusalem.6 Following the Hebron massacre, the UN 
Resolution condemning the act referred to Jerusalem as occupied territory. The unity of 
Jerusalem being an emotive and unifying issue among American Jewry, AIPAC wanted 
to pressure the administration to veto the Bill. However, the unofficial Israeli government 
line was that AIPAC should not do so because the implications of a US veto might 
prevent the PLO from returning to the peace negotiations. The administration ended up 
just abstaining on the offending line referring to Jerusalem as occupied territory. As Peres 
put it, “Too big a victory for Israel is not in the interests of the peace process” (NYT, 20 
February 1994: A39; Horowitz: 155).
Labour and its American Jewish Opposition
When the dovish Labour government came to power in 1992, American Jewish public 
opposition to the Israeli government reached an unprecedented level of intensity. Not only 
was the taboo of publicly criticising the Israeli government well and truly smashed but 
American Jews actually lobbied against the Israeli government on security related issues. 
AIPAC Vice President Harvey Friedman declared that Rabin had chutzpa for suggesting 
that Israel might withdraw from the Golan and after a derogatory reference to Yossi 
Beilin he was forced to resign. Neo-conservatives, such as Norman Podhoretz, who had 
always argued against criticising Israel during the Likud years, reversed their position on 
the basis that it was legitimate to criticise Israel on security grounds, as opposed to moral 
grounds. Moreover, some previously mainstream American Jews took this one step 
further by lobbying Congress against Israel government policies. For example, Zionist 
organisations like Morton Klein’s Zionist Organisation of America (ZOA) and several 
think tanks in Washington such as the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs 
(JINSA) opposed aid to the Palestinian Authority and US troops on the Golan.
6 See also with regard to American Jewish involvement on the issue of Congressional monitoring of PLO 
compliance with its commitment to fight terrorism (NYT 31 March, 1995 A: 31).
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Why did this Breakdown Occur?
When surveyed during the 1980s and 1990s American Jewry as a whole, tended to be 
more dovish than the positions espoused by the Likud, despite the general lack of 
criticism for Likud positions. While a majority of American Jews opposed negotiations 
with the PLO and a Palestinian state in the first half of the 1980s, that majority was 
reversed if evidence was provided of the PLO’s peaceful intent (Novik 1986: 71-4). So it 
was not really that surprising when most American Jews lined up behind the Oslo 
agreement (MM 13 September 1995). Yet opinion surveys tended to show that while the 
majority of American Jews were dovish, this was most true of the less identifying and less 
involved sections of American Jewry. Correspondingly, among the more involved 
sections of American Jewry, including many pro-Israel activists and those with the 
strongest sense of a particular cultural/religious Jewish identity, there was a significantly 
higher proportion of hawkish attitudes, which appeared to favour the Likud approach 
(Novik 1986: 81; Gruen: 37-39. MM 13 September 1995).
Until the Six Day War, American Jews had tended to see Israel as a safe haven for Jewish 
Refugees from other countries. American Jews supported Israel as an act of charity; Israel 
did not play a significant part in American Jewish identity. The Six Day War changed 
these attitudes. The run up to the War, with the spectre of a second holocaust widely 
feared, had the effect of making American Jews feel separated from their fellow 
Americans, accentuating their particular Jewish identity. Following the war, the sense of 
Jewish solidarity coupled with pride in Israel its power and its victory, became central to a 
new more assertive form of American Jewish identity. In a sense support for Israel 
became the religion of American Jewry.
This new sense of American Jewish identity spawned a “New Jewish Politics” (NJP)
more aggressive and assertive than the traditional style of shtadlanut politics, whose quiet
compromising deferential style was deemed to have contributed to the Holocaust. The
credo of this new politics can be summed up as follows:
“The survival of Israel is at stake; the meaning of Jewish life everywhere is 
dependent on Israel...a threat to Israel’s survival is a threat to Jews 
everywhere; Jews must be militant in acting to ensure Israel’s survival; in
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acting to ensure Israel’s survival, Jews are thereby acting to ensure their 
own survival and continuity; the response of non-Jews to Israel’s struggle 
is indicative of their attitude to Jews in general; in the light of history, 
indifference to these concerns is as dangerous as outright anti-Semitism.” 
(Medding 1987: 38-9)
The most important articulators of the NJP were the neo-conservatives led by Norman 
Podhoretz and Commentary magazine. They disassociated themselves from their former 
liberal universalist principles, became virulently anti-Communist and argued that Jews 
could not rely on anyone but themselves. They had a significant influence on American 
politics during the Reagan administration, but the most powerful symbol of the 
actualisation of the NJP was the rise to power of AIPAC whose membership rose 
dramatically during the 1980s.
The rise in American Jewish particularism which brought about the NJP after the Six Day 
War matched the rise in Jewish particularism that helped bring the Likud to power in 
1977. The centrality of the Holocaust to the NJP matched Israel’s new civil religion and 
the outlook of Menachem Begin. The focus on the centrality of Israel to Jewish survival 
was also a shared value as Arens asserted, “There is a partnership between Israel and Jews 
in the Diaspora because we share a common destiny.... If you are not living in Israel, 
however, you are not less of a Jew. A Jew is a person who believes in Jewish survival, 
who believes in the unity of the Jewish people - that we are responsible for each other as 
Jews, and who believe in the centrality o f the state o f Israel." (Simon: 130). Another key 
shared value is the emphasis on political assertiveness of the NJP (Gomy 1992: 134-9) 
which is matched in the thought of Jabotinsky. Revisionism and the NJP shared a belief 
that Jewish self-assertion was not only an instrumental value but also an existential value. 
Tom Dine even spoke publicly of AIPAC representing ‘the new Jew’, politically active 
and prepared to proudly defend Jewish interests (Tivnan: 165). Thus, while the Israeli 
military establishment and Rabin did not oppose the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 
1981, Begin and AIPAC opposed the move on principle, as a symbol of Jewish self- 
assertion (Melman and Raviv 1994: 103,192-3).
Labour was also out of touch with another key element of the NJP. Prime Minister 
Rabin’s declaration that ‘the siege’ was over, Foreign Minister Peres argument that 
Israel’s security could not be guaranteed unilaterally but only through economic
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interdependence and a regional security pact, and Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin belief 
in the importance of Israel being a part of the world community (Klieman 1994: 96-117), 
clashed with the fundamentals of the NJP. The new assertive American Jewish politics 
resonated more with the Likud’s defiant rhetorical style of politics than with Labour’s 
optimistic progressive politics of compromise. This became apparent at AIPAC’s annual 
policy conference in Washington in 1993. Israeli Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich told the 
2,400 participants that, “not just Arabs but also Israel would have to make compromises 
for peace. Only one delegate in the cavernous auditorium clapped. Sensing the awkward 
moment, Rabinovich recovered by saying: "If it is hard to applaud the concessions we 
have to make, let us applaud the concessions the Arabs will have to provide." The crowd 
roared” (JP, 9 July 1993). In essence the whole Rabin peace policy of conciliation clashed 
with the NJP whereby political assertiveness was deemed to be the key to security.
The Labour government’s peace policy also uncovered a deeper clash between the 
symbolic heroic special Israel of American Jewish consciousness and the real, pragmatic 
Israel which aspired to normality, peace and a quiet life. As Matti Golan (1993: 38), the 
biographer of Shimon Peres, explained in his dialogue with an American Jew, “Were 
burned out, we”re exhausted. I talk with my friends. All were bom in this country. All 
hold important jobs. All have good incomes. And nearly all are ready to leave Israel... 
Offer them a good, well paying job in America and they”ll start packing immediately. 
You (American Jews) want a Jewish state? Then please be so kind as to stand guard over 
it yourself. I”ve been doing it for dozens of years...I just can’t take it any more.” For large 
sections of active American Jewry wanted Israel to symbolise something special in terms 
of Jewish history culture and religion, whereas the Israelis were primarily concerned to 
advance the reality of the process of normalisation in the Middle East.
Thus for American Jewry, the issue of Jerusalem as the undivided sovereign capital of 
Israel had always been a consensus issue of great symbolic importance and consequently 
what appeared to be Israeli nonchalance regarding the symbolism of the Jerusalem 
question caused friction between American Jewry and the Rabin government. In January 
1995 after promotion of the issue among American Jewish groups, 93 senators wrote to 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher regarding the moving o f the American Embassy to
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Jerusalem and subsequently Senator Dole sponsored a bill in Congress to that effect. Both 
the administration and the Labour government were not keen on Dole’s Bill as they feared 
that bringing up the issue of Jerusalem at this stage would cause the peace process to 
collapse (NYT, 20 February 1994: A39; Horowitz: 155). For opponents of the Labour 
government the issue was a good one on which to attack, as it would be difficult for Rabin 
to publicly oppose the move without doing great damage to his standing in Israeli public 
opinion. Consequently, despite private reservations Rabin publicly supported the move 
when he met Dole in May. This incidence of American Jewish opposition to the Rabin 
government caused Akiva Eldar, the Ha’aretz correspondent in Washington to comment, 
"Never before has a group of Jews so blatantly exploited its political clout to thwart a 
diplomatic compromise reached by Israel and United States government leaders” (HA 21 
March 1994).
The most vociferous opposition to the Labour government following the Oslo Accords 
came from the Orthodox Jewish community (MM 13 September 1995; JC 13 September 
1995) mainly based in New York. They perceived the Labour government as founded on 
secular Western materialistic values which they opposed. The aspiration to normalisation 
was an anathema to them as it symbolised collective assimilation and contradicted their 
basic concept of the Jewish people as a ‘people that dwells alone’. They shared this 
orientation with many Orthodox Jews in Israel. This outlook coloured heavily the way 
they looked at the Oslo accords. They saw the Oslo deal, particularly in the wake of 
subsequent terror attacks, as a symptom of the fact that Labour was unconcerned about 
Jewish lives in Israel (Jewish Press 15 September 1995: 14). They argued that the Oslo 
Accords could lead to a new Holocaust and compared the Rabin government to a 
“Judenrat” handing over Jews to be killed by Arafat (Jewish Press: 6 October 1993: 16; 
Los Angeles Times 9 September 1995, JP 6 September 1995; JR 19 October 1995: 38; 
WP 14 June 1995: A32). Many other Orthodox Jews opposition to the Rabin government 
was supplemented by their belief that it is forbidden by Jewish law to cede territory in the 
land of Israel (MA 11 September 1995: 7). Many Orthodox and other identifying Jews 
opposed to the peace process live in New York. Two of the main Congressmen who 
challenged the Rabin’s government policies in Congress, Republicans Senator A1 
D”amato, and Representative Benjamin Gilman, represented New York as did another
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opponent of the Rabin government Charles Schumer who represented Brooklyn (NYT 2 
July 1994: 19).
This tendency to favour the Likud was compounded by the fact that during the 1980s the 
Likud had built up a strong network of supporters in the American Jewish community and 
in Congress including groups such as Americans for a Safe Israel and key leaders within 
the President’s Conference. Netanyahu, as Deputy Foreign Minister, tried to make sure 
that right-wing speakers were promoted in the American Jewish community and tried to 
support right-wingers to obtain positions of communal power. Also, conservative 
Republican senators, such as Jesse Helms, were sympathetic to the Israeli opposition’s 
agenda in Washington. They too were sceptical of the Labour government’s peace policy 
which involved concessions to former PLO terrorists who had been ‘allied’ with the ‘Evil 
Empire’. Nor were they keen on supplying American aid to Arab dictatorship for the sake 
of peace, which to them sounded like ‘appeasement’ or worse, Detente7. In addition, their 
fiscal conservatism encouraged them to oppose US troops on the Golan and the extension 
of foreign aid to the PA (JR 15 December 1994: 32-35).
While the conservatives were uncomfortable with Labour’s ‘soft line’ on security; 
Christian Zionists opposed territorial compromise for the same reason Gush Emunim and 
the religious right did in Israel, namely that to do so would threaten a reversal of the 
messianic process. In a broader sense, in the Christian fundamentalist theology of history 
the Jewish people had a special role to play in the ‘second coming’. Thus the expressed 
desire o f the Israeli leadership to ‘normalise Israel’ was fundamentally at odds with their 
particular Christian vision (Melman and Raviv 1994: 349-361) In this vein Christian 
Zionist Jan Willen Van der Hoeven attacked Rabin’s land for peace policy (American 
Jewish Yearbook 1995:15).
The Challenge to Labour’s Peace Strategy in the US
The Israeli right’s penetration of the pro-Israel lobby was evident during the 1980s 
(Tivnan: 213-248). However Likud and American-Jewish opposition to Labour only
7 For an example of this approach see Newt Gingrich’s speech to AIPAC (JP 9 April 1997).
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became really apparent between 1992-96. Leading the anti-Labour coalition on Capitol 
Hill, were the Israeli Likud activists Yossi Ben Aharon, Yoram Ettinger, and Yigal 
Carmon, all of whom had been key government players during the Shamir years in the 
US. The team was an offshoot of a group set up by Netanyahu during the Shamir years to 
secretly raise funds from US Jews to help ‘correct’ Israel’s image in the media (JP, 13 
July 1995: 4). While in opposition, they worked with groups sympathetic to the Likud in 
the USA and conservative Republican senators with whom they had established strong 
connections during their years in power. Ever since the Lebanon War, the Likud had 
rejected the right of Labour and American Jews to criticise the Israeli government while 
in the United States. Now they were in opposition, the taboo was broken. Shamir 
criticised the Oslo Accord in a meeting with the President’s Conference, Sharon declared 
that American Jews were welcome to criticise the Israeli government publicly, other 
Likud figures toured US Jewish communities promoting the Likud line (JP 31 January 
1994: 7, 3 November 1995:4).
However, the real shift was not so much the public criticism but the fact that former top 
Likud officials were openly lobbying against the Israeli government in Washington. 
Following the Oslo Accord, Congress allowed the President to suspend the anti-PLO 
legislation and grant aid to the Palestinian Authority in return for periodic reports on PLO 
compliance with its commitments in the DoP, in particular, to end terror. This agreement 
then formed the basis for the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) which allowed 
this arrangement to continue for a year. With the renewal of MEPFA due in June 1995, 
the opposition in America in conjunction with the three Likud activists undertook a 
serious campaign to stop the flow of American aid to the PA. They encouraged 
Congressional initiatives to set up separate Congressional committees to monitor PLO 
compliance. They hired a Washington public relations firm to discredit the PLO. 
Meanwhile, Netanyahu and the Likud in Israel “bombarded Congressmen’s offices with 
faxes” attacking the Oslo accords and the Palestinian Authority’s record regarding 
implementation(WP 10 July 1995: JR 27 July 1995: 11; JP 22 July 1996; WJW 24 
August 1995). Likud MK Uzi Landau lobbied Congress against MEPFA and Senator 
Alfonse D’amato introduced a bill which sought to stop aid flowing to the PA altogether 
(JR 27 July 1995: 11-12). Jesse Helms, apparently after talks with Ben Aharon and the
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ZOA, introduced a bill which sought to tighten the terms of MEPFA by linking US aid to 
the PNC’s cancellation of the Palestinian Covenant and the extradition of terrorists (JP 18 
November 1994: 3, 19 September 1995: 2, 6 October 1995:10). MEPFA became law at 
the end of the 1996 but subsequently, Helms continued to echo Likud doubts as to the 
PNC’s actual revocation of the PLO Covenant, while Gilman’s Committee blocked $13 
million in aid from reaching the PA (WP 1 November 1995; AP 12 March 1996: 1; 
Reuters 9 May 1996).
In response to the threat posed by Likud supporters in the US, the Labour government 
recognised the importance of working with the special relationship and using hasbara in 
the Jewish community. They could not afford to negate the Diaspora, if  only for political 
reasons. Even Rabin, by now, recognised the political importance of Diaspora Jewry and 
finally appointed an advisor for Diaspora relations. Subsequently, the Labour party set up 
an American desk for the first time which arranged for English speakers to promote the 
Labour line in the Jewish community (JP 11 January 1994: 7, 4 September 1994: 4, 14 
February 1995: 6; HA 11/9/95: 2). Israeli Officials also began to seek a dialogue with 
Orthodox Jews in America (WJW 27 July 1995: 27; YA 11 September 1995:1).
Conclusion
Although Labour and Likud had opposite approaches to using the special relationship in 
the context of the peace process, both parties were primarily guided by the same 
calculation: the compatibility of their approach to the Palestinian question [chapter 3] 
with that of the American executive. In addition, both parties made sense of their 
relationship with pro-Israel forces in the US and were influenced in that relationship, by 
the idea of shlilat hagalut. In the case of the Likud, the concept helped explain why the 
pro-Israel lobby failed to defeat the President over loan guarantees and also helped map 
out a strategy to try and reverse that position. In the case of Labour, the idea helped 
explain why a ‘special relationship’ was apparently undesirable and hence led to it being 
neglected. Indeed, it can be concluded that while the idea of a ‘negation of the Diaspora’ 
encouraged the Likud to overestimate the potential of the special relationship, it also led 
Labour to underestimate the importance of the special relationship.
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One of the consequences of this was that while Likud actions were perceived by sections 
of American Jewry to have threatened the ‘Americaness’ of their identity, Labour actions 
were perceived by sections of American Jewry as threatening to the ‘Jewishness’ of their 
identity. It was the tension between communities, between Israel and the Diaspora, 
focused around the idea of the ‘negation of the Diaspora’ and over the meaning ‘Zionism’ 
that was primarily behind American Jewish opposition to the Likud between 1989-92. In 
contrast, American Jewish opposition to Labour, stemmed from a tension to be found 
across both communities. The debate was between those with, on the one hand, a more 
particularistic sense of Jewish identity, a strong perception of the Gentile world as 
basically antagonistic and a sense of Israel as something special; as opposed to those, on 
the other hand, with a more universalistic tendency within their Jewish identity, who do 
not believe that non-Jews are basically hostile and who tend to value the idea of Israel 
becoming a ‘normal’ country.
Thus, the underlying dichotomy in Israeli political culture that distinguished left from 
right in terms of universalism and particularism is also the key dichotomy which has 
increasingly determined the nature of Labour and Likud respective relationships with the 
pro-Israel community over the peace process. Moreover, the breakdown of the consensus 
against criticising Israeli government policy whilst abroad and lobbying against it in 
Congress, suggests that Israeli political culture, which was held together by Zionism and a 
common enemy, is now polarised to such an extent that there are developing closer bonds 
between the universalists and particularists across national boundaries than between 
political opponents within the territorial boundaries of the state of Israel.
What does this change in the special relationship mean for Israeli political culture? Some 
academics, notably David Vital (1990) have argued that a distancing between Israel and the 
Diaspora is inevitable; post-Zionists agree seeing the phenomena as the desirable outcome 
of the process of normalisation. Certainly, aliyah from Western countries is no longer a 
mainstream political objective. Indeed, for the first time Israeli figures on the right and the 
left have spoken of the need for Diaspora Jewry to invest in their own communities to
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ensure cultural survival and prevent complete assimilation, rather than focus on Israel8. 
Though this may indeed hint at an underlying post-Zionist tendency, it does not represent 
conscious post-Zionism, rather it represents a turn towards a kind of cultural Zionism akin 
to that proposed by Ahad Ha’am (JP 13 November 1992: 6, 9 November 1993: 6; YA 29 
January 1996: Beilin 1997: 257). As Peres put it, “Israel needs more Yiddishkeit (Judaism), 
the Diaspora more Hebrew. Israel was an answer to Jewish tragedy and the Holocaust. Now 
it must attract people by choice... Israel must be a spiritual centre, where whatever is Jewish 
historically, universally and intellectually should be brought to Israel” (JP 9 April 1996: 7).
8 To an extent, this concern is shrewd politics, with the end of the cold war questioning the continued strategic 
rationale for a close relationship and with the memory of the Holocaust fading from mainstream American 
consciousness, the prevention of assimilation is the key to the maintenance of the special relationship as a 
political force at Israel’s disposal in the long-run (JP 4 January 1993).
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Conclusion
At the macro-level of Israeli political culture the central tension, identified in this thesis, 
has been that between universalism and particularism. After 1967 the political culture of 
particularism became increasingly dominant, albeit within an increasingly polarised 
environment. However, from the late 1980s onwards the universalist trend gained greater 
prominence. As a result, there was a movement toward the ethos of normalisation. Some 
analysts have defined this trend as post-Zionism. At the conscious level, both elite and 
mass in Israel are not post-Zionist. They continue to value Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people. However, there remains an impersonal force within Israeli political culture away 
from the sense of collective mission which characterised Zionism, towards a more 
individualistic bourgeois culture. In this more limited sense, Israel is becoming a post- 
Zionist society.
In what sense, if any, has these shifts affected Israel’s relations with the United States 
over the Palestinian question?
There was certainly a correlation between the development outlined within Israeli 
political culture and the development of Israel's relations with the United States over the 
Palestinian question from the government of Begin in 1981 to the government of Rabin in 
1996. At the very least, the increasingly dovish trend within Israeli foreign policy is a 
symptom of the more general trend towards normalisation. Within Israel the pursuit of 
normalisation, of private individual interests, was mirrored by a desire for normalisation 
and peace externally, as a means of actualising the ‘quiet life’, facilitating domestic 
objectives. But changes in policy cannot be solely attributed to this correlation. Most of 
the impact of the developments within Israeli political culture on foreign policy was 
indirect. The polarisation of the political culture and the advantage held first by 
particularism and then by universalism was manifest primarily through the impact of 
elections and coalition building. These determined which political sub-culture was in 
power. Thus, the particularist bias of the religious parties and the Sephardim was one 
factor which allowed the Likud to maintain control over foreign policy throughout the 
1980s. These general trends also helped to determine which political sub-cultures gained
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power within the main parties. Hence, the trend towards normalisation led to the 
increased strength of the progressive sub-culture within the Labour party and ultimately 
increased control over foreign policy. As a result of these trends, a favourable climate for 
a changing approach to foreign policy was brought about and the range of options which 
policy-makers considered desirable and legitimate was altered. Whereas, in 1981 
radicalism and its emphasis on settling the land of Israel was a popular core component of 
Israeli political culture, by 1996 the Likud, for the first time ever, did not mention the 
land of Israel and settlements in its election campaign. The debate was no longer focused 
on fulfilling the Zionist mission or values but on how best to secure the state of Israel.
These changes at the macro-level interacted with changes wrought by external forces, 
such as the end of the cold war, to force tactical amendments at the micro-level of 
political culture on the Israeli policy-making elite. But none of the about turns in policy 
towards the Palestinians and relations with the United States can be solely attributed to 
external pressures. First, Israeli political culture itself helps to constitute the external 
environment. Thus, when the conservatives stated that they came to terms with Oslo 
because it was part of a new reality which had been imposed upon them, one which they 
would not have chosen, this was true. But, that new reality was in part constituted by the 
actions taken by the Israeli progressives. Moreover, 'external reality' was not persuasive 
enough to force the radicals to accept Oslo. It is inconceivable that a government led by 
the radical Shamir would ever have signed the Oslo accord with the PLO. Indeed, this 
thesis has demonstrated that throughout the 1981-96 period, the differences within Israeli 
political culture, determined the different approaches, both in theory and practice, of the 
two major parties to relations with the United States over the Palestinian question.
Because of its emphasis on the land of Israel as an existential value, the particularist 
culture generally sought to limit the role of American administrations regarding the 
Palestinian question. As a result of American opposition to the implementation of the 
'whole land of Israel' ideal, relations between particularism and the American executive 
were generally strained. This reality was exacerbated by the radical tendency, prevalent 
between 1981-3, to value an aggressively defiant unilateral approach to the relationship, 
as a value in of itself. Ultimately however, it was the incompatibility of the American
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adherence to 'land for peace' and the Likud's adherence to 'whole land of Israel' that was 
of greater importance in determining the nature of the relationship. As a consequence, the 
Likud was forced to rely on relations with Congress to try and counteract this bias. On the 
other hand, the universalist political culture generally had a closer relationship with the 
various administrations, because of its flexibility over the land of Israel. Nonetheless, 
relations between the various American administrations and the progressives soured 
because of differences over the instrumentalities of peace. The progressives were not 
prepared to do things ‘the American way’ just to stay close with the US, in circumstances 
that suggested that peace was attainable through some other route, such as via Oslo. Thus, 
while the progressives and radicals had diametrically opposed approaches to the land of 
Israel, their shared sense of idealism led them to view relations with the United States as a 
secondary instrumental value. By way of contrast, both the conservatives and the 
mamlachti'im, whose similar perceptions of international relations emphasised the 
constraining role of the balance of power in foreign relations, saw relations with the 
United States as a crucial component of Israeli security and hence an instrumental value 
of the first order. Combining these two sets of conclusions, it is clear that the mamlachti 
approach was both most compatible in theory and the most successful in practice in 
sustaining a good relationship with the United States over the Palestinian question, while 
the radical approach was the least successful.
However, this reality was mitigated, for significant periods, by the particularists ability to 
play on the common values between the American and Israeli political elites. Building on 
pro-Israel themes in American political culture and playing on the theme of the cold war, 
the Likud was able to retain American support and continue settlement in the territories 
throughout the 1980s. It was even able to block opportunities for peace that fitted 
relatively closely with American preferences, such as the London agreement. However, 
under the less sympathetic Bush administration this strategy failed to deliver. The ability 
of Israel to manipulate the values of the American executive diminished. Moreover, with 
the fading of the Holocaust from the memory of younger generation and the 
transformation of Israel from a pioneering society, coupled with the end of the cold war, 
the ability of the Israeli elite in this regard will continue to weaken. In addition, the ability 
to call on the basic cultural affinity between the pro-Israel community in the US as a tool
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of policy is also diminishing as the peace process becomes a politically divisive issue 
within the lobby, and American Jewry becomes increasingly separate and even alienated 
from their Israeli brethren. Thus, increasingly, American-Israeli relations will become a 
function of the degree to which Israel fits into America's peace policy. This fact was 
recognised by Rabin, who had been the first to push the idea of an Israeli-American 
strategic partnership during the cold war. On coming to power after the cold war, he 
stressed the need for Israel to be cognisant of the new international realities, which 
demanded, 'fitting in' [with America] and 'making peace' [with the Arab states and the 
Palestinians] (Klieman 1994: 106). Whether, peace will be achieved depends, of course, 
not only on Israel, or even the US, but on their neighbours as well. But understanding the 
Israeli side of the equation has necessitated this examination of Israeli political culture, 
for as Shimon Peres (1980: 889) explained:
“To define what sort ofpeace Israel is looking for we first have to answer
the key question: what sort o f Israel do we want. ”
268
Bibliography
Primary Sources 
Interviews
American Officials
Samuel Lewis: US Ambassador to Israel 1977-85, Chief, State Department. Policy Planning /Assistant 
Secretary of State, Policy Planning 1992-95
American Jewish Community
Lenny Davis, Head of AIPAC office in Israel 1984-, Former AIPAC officer in Washington 
Sarah Stem, American Jewish pro-Likud Activist 1992-
Israeli Officials
David Kimche: Director-General Foreign Ministry 1982-87, Chief negotiator Israeli-Lebanon peace talks 
1982-3
Elyakim Rubinstein: 1977-81 Israel legal expert at Camp David, 1986- Cabinet Secretary, 1991-93 Head of 
Palestinian Track Negotiations, 1997- Attorney General
Israeli Political leaders
Moshe Arens MK: Ambassador to the United states 1981-3, Minister of Defence 1983-4,1990-92,
Minister without Portfolio 1984-87, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1988-90
Yitzhak Shamir MK: Foreign Minister 1981-83, 1984-86, Prime Minster 1983-4,1986-92
Israeli Policy Advisors
Dan Meridor: MK, Cabinet Secretary 1981-4, Minister of Justice 1988-90, Finance Minister 1996-7 
Salai Meridor: Advisor to Moshe Arens 1988-92 
Nimrod Novik: Policy Advisor to Shimon Peres 1985-93 
Ehud Olmert MK: Minister of Health 1990-92
269
Efraim Sneh MK: Head of the Military Administration in the West Bank 1985-88, Minister for Health 
1992-1996
Other
David Grossman: leading Israeli writer, at Yakar institute for Jewish studies, London, 1994
David Landau: Former editor of Jerusalem Post. Editor of Ha’aretz English edition 1997-, Writer on Ultra-
Orthodoxy and co-author of Peres’ memoirs
Tere Larson: [One of the Norwegians who help set up the Oslo Channel], Speech, Questions and Answers 
on the Oslo Process, London School of Economics, 13 March 1997
Newspapers, Wires and Electronic Information
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report (FBIS1.1986- 
Ha’aretz 1996- (HA)
Israeline 1994- 
Mideast Dispatch 1996-
Summarv of Editorials of the Hebrew Press 1993- 
Jerusalem Post 1988- (JP)
Jerusalem Report 1990- (JR)
Jewish Chronicle 1992- (JC)
Mideast Mirror 1993-96 (MM)
New York Times 1988- (NYC)
Washington Jewish World 1990-96 (WJW)
Washington Post 1985-(WP)
Occasional Articles 
A1 Hamishmar (AH)
Associated Press (API
270
Maariv (MA)
Middle East International (MED 
Mideast Mirror (MM)
Reuters
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB> 
Yediot Achronot (YA)
Books and Journal Articles
Abbas, M. (1995) Through Secret Channels, Reading, Garnet
Ajami, F. (1992) The Arab Predicament, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Alexander, E. (1994) The Holocaust and the War o f Ideas, New Brunswick & London, Transaction
Allon, Y. (1976) “The Israeli Case for Defensible Borders.” Foreign Affairs no. 55
Almond, G. (1956) “Comparative Political Systems”, Journal o f Politics, no. 18
Almond, G. and S. Verba (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.
Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press
Alpher, J (1995) Settlements, Final Status Issues for the Israeli-Palestinicm Peace Talks, Tel Aviv, Jaffe 
Institute for Strategic studies
Arens, M. (1989) Israeli Approaches to the Peace Process, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Arens, M. (1995) Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 
London, Simon and Schuster
Archer, M. (1990) “Theory Culture and Post Industrial Society”, in Featherstone Ed. Global Culture, 
London, Sage
American Jewish Yearbooks 1982-1993, New York
Arian, A. Ed. (1983) The Elections in Israel, 1981, Tel Aviv, Ramot Press
and Shamir, M. (1983) “The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections:" in Arian, A. Ed. The 
Elections in Israel 1981, pp. 91-112.
271
(1986) “Political images and Ethnic Polarisation” in Elazar, Ed. Israel at the Polls 1981, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, pp. 128-159
and Shamir, M. Eds. (1986) The Elections in Israel 1984, Oxford, Transaction books 
,Talmud I, & Hermann, T. (1988) National Security and Public Opinion in Israel, Boulder, 
Westview
and Shamir, M. (1990) “ The Intifada and Israeli Voters”, in Arian and Shamir The Elections in 
Israel 1988
and M. Shamir, Ed. (1990a) The Elections in Israel 1988, Boulder, Westview. 
and Ventura, R. (1991) “Left and Right in Israeli Politics”, State, Government and International 
Relations(Hebrew) 35: 21-49.
, Shamir, M. and Ventura, R. (1992) “Public Opinion and Political Change: Israel and the 
Intifada”, Comparative Politics, 24(3): 317-338
(1995) Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press and the Jaffe Institute for Strategic Studies
and Shamir, M. (1995a) “Two Reversals: Why 1992 was not 1977’ in Arian, A and Shamir, M 
Eds. The Elections in Israel 1992, Albany, State University of New York Press(SUNY), pp. 17-54 
and Shamir, M. Eds. (1995b) The Elections in Israel 1992 
Aronoff, M. (1988) Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict. New Brunswick, 
N J, Transaction Books
(1993) Power and Ritual in the Israeli Labour Party, New York, M.E. Sharpe 
(1993a) “The Origins of Israeli Political Culture” in Sprinzak, E. and L. Diamond, Eds. (1993) 
Israeli democracy under stress, Boulder, Lynne, Rienner
“Labour in the Second Rabin Era” in Freedman, R. O. (1995) Israel Under Rabin, Boulder, 
Westview
Aronson, G. (1990) Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank, London, Kegan 
Paul International and Institute for Palestine studies.
Aronson, G. (1990a) “Soviet Jewish Emigration and the United States”, Journal O f Palestine Studies, 19, 
Summer
Ashrawi, H. (1995) This Side o f Peace, London, Simon and Schuster
272
Auerbach, Y, “Rabin: Portrait of a Leader”, in Elazar, D and Sandler, S. Eds. (1995) Israel at the Polls 
1992, Lanham, MD, Rowan & Littlefield
Auerbach, Y. and Ben Yehuda, H.(1993) “Attitudes to Existence Conflict: Rabin and Sharon on the 
Palestinian Issue 1967-87” in Larsen, K. Conflict and Social Psychology, London 
Auerbach, Y. and Ben Yehuda, H. (1991) “Attitudes to Existence Conflict: Allon and Peres on the 
Palestinian Issue 1967-87” in Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 35 (3): 519-46
Aviad, J. (1991) “The Messianism of Gush Emunim ”, in Medding, P. Ed. Studies in Contemporary Jewry 
Volume 7.
Avishai, B (1985) The Tragedy o f Zionism, New York, Farrar Straus Girour 
Avnery, A. (1993) The Defeat: The Disintegration o f Likud Rule, Tel Aviv, Midot
Avineri, S. (1981) The Making o f Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins o f the Jewish state. London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Axelrod, R. Ed. (1988) Structure o f Decision: The Cognitive Map o f Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press
Ball, G. W. (1984) Error and betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis o f Israel's Invasion o f Lebanon and the 
Implications fo r U.S.-Israeli Relations. Washington, D.C, Foundation for Middle East Peace.
Ball, G. and D. Ball, (1992) The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the 
Present, London, Norton & Co
Baker, J. (1995) Politics and Diplomacy, New York, Putnam Publishing
Bard, M. G. (1991) The Water's Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence on United 
States Middle East Policy. New Brunswick, N. J, Transaction Publishers
Barnett, M. (1996) “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East” in Katzenstein, P. Ed. The Culture o f 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press 
Bar On, M. (1985) “The Lebanon War and Peace” Journal o f Palestine Studies, 14 (3)
(1988) “Israeli Reactions to the Palestinian Uprising” Journal o f Palestine Studies, no. 68 Summer
(1993) “Zionism into its Second Century”, in Kyle, K. and J. Peters, Eds. Whither Israel?: The 
Domestic Challenges. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs in association with I.B. Taurus
(1996) In Pursuit o f Peace: A History o f the Israeli Peace Movement, Washington DC, United 
States Institute of Peace
273
Bar Simantov, Y. (1987) Israel, the Superpowers, and War in the Middle East.
(1988) “Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign policy” Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 24
(1994) Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982: In Search o f Legitimacy fo r Peace, Albany,
SUNY
Barzilai, G (1990) “National Security and Voting Behaviour” in Arian and Shamir The Elections in Israel 
1988
(1996) Wars, Internal Conflict, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, 
Albany, SUNY.
Bar Zohar, M. (1990) Facing a Cruel Mirror, New York, Scribners 
Begin, Z (1993) A Zionist Stand: Collected Speeches. London, Frank Cass.
Beilin, Y (1992) Israel: A Concise Political History, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson
(1997) La’Gaat BeShalom [Hebrew] Touching Peace, Tel Aviv, Yediot Achronot.
Bellah, R. (1978) "Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic," Society, 15 May/June 
Beller, S. (1991) Herzl, Peter Halban, London.
BelofF, M.(1994) "The Diaspora and the Peace Process", in Karsh E. Ed. Peace in the Middle East: The 
Challenge fo r Israel
Ben Gurion, D. (1971) Israel: A Personal History, New York, Funk and Wagnalls
(1990) “Excepts from Ben Gurion’s War Diary” in Troen, S. and Shemesh, M. Eds. The Sinai- 
Suez Crsis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal, London, Frank Cass
Benin, J. (1991) “New History, New Politics. A Revisionist Historical View in the Struggle for Peace”, in 
Lustik, Land Rubin. B. Eds. Critical Essays on Israeli Society
Benvenisti, M (1989) Conflicts and Contradictions, Eshel Books, New York
(1995) Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land, Berkeley, University of California 
Press.
Benziman, U. and L. Rousso (1987) Sharon: An Israeli Caesar. London, Robson Books.
Ben-Zvi, A. (1986) The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973-1986. 
Boulder, Westview.
274
(1993) The United States and Israel: The Limits o f the Special Relationship New York, Columbia 
University Press
Biale, D. (1986) Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History, New York, Shocken
Bialer, U. (1989) Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press
Black, I. and B. Morris (1991) Israel's Secret Wars: A History o f the Israeli Secret Service. London, 
Hamish Hamilton
Blidstein, G. (1987) “Ideal and Real in Classical Jewish Political Theory” in Gitelman, Z. The Quest fo r  
Utopia: Jewish Political Ideas and Institutions Through the Ages, London, M.E. Sharpe, pp. 41-66.
Blitzer, W. (1985) Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebooks. New York, Oxford 
University Press.
Borhek and Curtis, (1975) A Sociology o f Belief, New York: John Wiley
Brandeis, L. (1984) "The Jewish Problem and How to Solve it," in Herzberg, A. The Zionist Idea, New 
York, Atheneum.
Brecher, M. (1972) The Foreign Policy System o f Israel, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Brenner, L. (1984) The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir, London, Zed books. 
Breslauer, G. and Tetlock, P. (1991) Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy, Boulder, Westview 
Brint, M. (1991) ^ 4 Genealogy o f Political Culture. Boulder, Westview
Brookings Study Group on Arab-Israeli Peace (1988) Towards Arab-Israeli Peace: Report o f a Study 
Group, Washington, D.C, Brookings Institution
Brown, C. (1994) “Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-foundationalism, Critical Theory and International 
Relations”, Millennium, 23 (2)
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society, London, Macmillan 
Butt, G. (1990) Behind the Star, London, Constable
Carr, E H (1939) The Twenty Year Crisis London: Macmillan, 1939, Second edition 1946.
Carlsnaes, W. (1992) "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis", International Studies 
Quarterly, 36:245-270
275
Cannon, A.(1993) “Political Education in the Midst of a National Identity Crisis. The Compatibility of 
Judaism and Democracy as a Pedagogical Theme” in Sprinzak and Diamond Eds. Israeli Democracy 
Under Stress
Caspi, D, Dikin, A. & Guttman, E. Eds. (1984) The Roots o f Begin's Success, London, Croom Helm 
Cathala-Hall, D, (1989) The Peace Movement in Israel 1967-87. London, Macmillan 
Chazan, N. “Practical Steps Towards an Israeli-Palestinian Peace” in Lesch, A. (1993) Transition to 
Palestinian Self Government; Report o f Study Group o f Middle East Program, American Academy of Arts 
and Science Bloomingdale, Indiana University Press
Chomsky, N. (1983) The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians. London, Pluto 
Cincotta,H. and J. Holden Eds (1994)77ie Season o f Peace: The Israeli-Palestinian Accord and the U.S. 
Commitment to the Middle East Peace Process. Washington, D.C, United States Information Agency 
Cobban, H. “Israel and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond” in Freedman, R. O. (1995) 
Israel Under Rabin, Boulder, Westview
Cockbum, A. (1991) Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story o f the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship. London, 
Bodley Head.
Cohen, R (1991) Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication, Obstacles in International Diplomacy, 
Washington DC, United States Institute for Peace
Coker, C. (1989) Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945. London: Pinter 
Commentary (1988) “American Jews and Israel: Symposium” Vol., 85 February 
Converse, P. (1964) “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in Apter, D. Ed. Ideology and 
Discontent, New York: Free Press
Corbin, J. (1994) Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO. London, 
Bloomsbury Publishing
Christion, K (1989) “The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz” Journal o f Palestine Studies, 18 (4) 
Davidowitz, L. (1975) The War Against the Jews 1933-45, London, Weidenfeld andNicolson 
Dayan, M.(1981) Break-through: A Personal Account o f the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations, London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Divrei Haknesset (Official record o f the Israeli parliament) 1967 -1980, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 
Government Printer
276
Don Yehiya, E. (1987) "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins 
of Gush Emunim," Middle Eastern Studies, 23 (2): 215-34.
Don-Yehiya, E. (1991) "Galut in Zionist Ideology and in Israeli Society” in Don-Yehiya Ed. Religion and 
national identity, Contemporary Jewish Politics Vol. Ill, Ramat Gan, Bar-Ilan University Press.
Don Yehiya, E . (1993) “Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust”, in Studies in 
Contemporary Jewry: Volume 9
Eban, A. (1965) “Reality and Vision in the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs no. 43
(1977) An Autobiography, New York, Random House.
(1993) Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes London, Jonathan Cape 
“Economist Survey of Israel”, The Economist, 22 January 1994.
Efrat, M. and J. Bercovitch, Ed. (1991) Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance 
o f Influence. London, Routledge.
Eisenstadt, S. (1985) The Transformation o f Israeli Society, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
Eisenstadt, S. (1992) Jewish Civilization: The Jewish Historical Experience in a Comparative Perspective, 
Albany, SUNY.
El-Khawas, M. and S. Abed Rabbo (1984) American Aid to Israel: Nature and Impact. Brattleboro, Vt, 
Amana Books
Elazar, D. Ed (1984) Self Rule, Shared Rule, New York, Lanham
(1986) Israel at the Polls, 1981, Bloomington, Indiana University Press
(1994) Political and Structural Arrangements in the New Era o f Israeli-Palestinian Relations, 
Jerusalem, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs
Elazar, D. J. and S. Sandler, Ed. (1990) Israel’s Odd Couple: The 1984 Knesset Elections and the National 
Unity Government. Detroit, Wayne State University Press.
(1992) Who’s the Boss?: Israel at the Polls 1988-9. Detroit, Wayne State University Press.
(1995) Israel at the Polls 1992 Lanham, MD, Rowan & Littlefield 
Eliav, L. (1971) “New Targets for Israel" in Avineri, S. Israel and the Palestinians,
New York, St Martin's press.
(1973) The Land o f the Hart, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society (JPS)
(1988) New Heart, New Spirit, Philadelphia, JPS
277
Ellis, M (1990) Beyond Innocence and Redemption. Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli power, New 
York, Harper & Row
Elon, A. (1983) The Israelis: Founders and Sons. New York, Penguin
(1985) “The Six Day War” Journal o f Palestine studies, 14 (4)
Evron, B. (1995) Jewish State or Israeli Nation?, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 
Evron, Y. (1980) "Some Political and Strategic Implications of an American-Israeli Defence treaty" in 
Shaked, H. and Rabinovitch, I. The Middle East and the United States, New Brunswick, Transaction, pp. 
371-94
Ezrachi, S. “Democratic Politics and Culture in Israel: Recent Trends”, in Sprinsak and Diamond Eds 
Israeli Democracy under Stress
Ezrachi Y. (1997) Power and Conscience in Modern Israel, New York, Farrah Strauss Giroux 
Falk, G (1985) “Israeli Public Opinion and Palestinian solution” Middle East Journal, Summer 
Findley, P. (1993)Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts About the U.S-Israeli Relationship, Chicago, 
Lawrence Hill Books
Flapan, S. (1977) The Birth o f Israel: Myths and Realities. London, Croom Helm 
Frankel, G. (1994) Beyond the Promised Land, New York, Simon & Schuster 
Freedman, R. O., Ed. (1984) The Middle East since Camp David, Boulder, Westview.
(1986) The Middle East after the Israeli Invasion o f Lebanon. Contemporary issues in the Middle 
East. Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse University Press.
(1991) The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada. Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse 
University Press.
(1991a) The Intifada: its Impact on Israel, the Arabs and the Superpowers, Miami, Miami 
International University Press.
(1991b) Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion o f Afghanistan, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University press.
(1993) “Religion and Politics: The 1989 Israeli Election”, Middle East Journal 43(3)
(1993a) The Middle East After Iraq's Invasion o f Kuwait. Gainesville, University Press of Florida
278
(1994) “Soviet Foreign Policy Towards the United States and Israel” in Goldberg, D. and 
Merantz, P. Eds. The Decline o f the Soviet Union and the Transformation o f the Middle East, Boulder, 
Westview.
(1995) Israel Under Rabin, Boulder, Westview
Feuerwenger, M. (1995)“Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era” in Freedman, R. O. Israel 
Under Rabin, Boulder, Westview
Friedman, M. (1985) “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma” in Kimmerling, B. Ed. The Israeli 
Society and State; Boundaries and frontiers, Albany, SUNY
(1993) “ The Ultra Orthodox and Israeli Society” in Kyle and Peters Eds. Wither Israel 
Friedman, T. (1990) From Beirut To Jerusalem, London, Fontana
Frisch, H. (1995) “The Arab Vote” in Elazar, D. and Sandler, S. Eds. Israel at the Polls 1992 Lanham, 
MD, Rowan & Littlefield
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End o f History and the Last Man. London, Hamish Hamilton 
Gal, A. (1991) David Ben Gurion and the American Alignment for a Jewish State, Indiana, Magnes Press 
Garfinklel, A. (1992) Israel and Jordan in the Shadow o f War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy, 
London, St Martin's press
(1997) Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities, York, M. E. Sharpe 
Gazit, S. (1989) “The Israeli Leadership and Intelligence ”, in Handel, M. Leaders and Intelligence, 
London, Frank Cass
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation o f Cultures: Selected Essays. New York, Basic Books 
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell
(1992) Post Modernism Reason and Religion New York: Routledge 
George, A. (1989) “ The Operational Code” International Studies Quarterly 13(1)
Gibbens, J (1989) “Contemporary Political Culture: An Introduction” in Gibbens, J Ed Contemporary 
Political Culture, Politics in a Post-Modern Age, London, Sage 
Gilbert, M. (1996) Jerusalem, London, Chatto and Windus
Gilboa, E. (1987) American Public Opinion Toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lexington, Mass, 
Lexington Books.
Gilpin, R.(1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
279
Girling, J. (1993) Myths and Politics in Western Societies: Evaluating the Crisis o f Modernity in the United 
States, Germany, and Great Britain. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers
Girvin, B. (1989)“Change and Continuity in Liberal Political Culture” in Gibbens, J Ed Contemporary 
Political Culture, Politics in a Post-Modern Age, London, Sage
Glick, E. B. (1982) The Triangular Connection: America, Israel, and American Jews. London, Allen & 
Unwin
Golan, G. (1990) Soviet Policies in the Middle East, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
(1992) Moscow and the Middle East: New Thinking on Regional Conflicts, London, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Pinter publishers.
Golan, M. (1982) Shimon Peres: A Biography, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson
(1989) The Road to Peace, New York, Warner Bros, Books
(1993) With Friends Like These: What Israelis Really Think About American Jews, New York,
Free Press.
Gold, D. (1988) America, the Gulf and Israel: CENTCOM (Central Command) and Emerging US Regional 
Security Policies in the Mideast. Boulder, Westview.
(1992) “In the Aftermath of US Elections: Anticipating Changes in US-Israel Relations”. Report 
o f JCSSStudy Group. No. 37, December
(1993) Israel as an American Non-NATO Ally: Parameters o f Defense-industrial Cooperation in 
a Post-Cold War Relationship. Boulder, Westview.
(1994) “Changing Political dynamics between Israelis and Palestinians”, in Elazar, D. Political 
and Structural Arrangements in the New Era o f Israeli-Palestinian Relations
(1995) Jerusalem: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, Final Status Issues, Study no 6, Jaffe 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv
Goldberg, Barzillia & Inbar (1991) “Impact of Intercommunal Conflict”, Leonard Davis Institute Policy 
Study, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 41
Golden, P. (1992) Quiet Diplomat: A Biography o f Max Fisher, New York, Herzl press.
Goldman, E. Ed. (1993) Yeshayahu Leibovitz: Judaism, Human Values and the State o f Israel, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press
280
Goldstein, J. and R. Keohane. Eds. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political 
Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press
Gomy, Y. (1987) Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948. Oxford, Oxford University Press
(1994) The state o f Israel in Jewish Public Thought, London, MacMillan 
Green, S. (1988) Living by the sword: American and Israel in the Middle East 1968-87, London, Faber 
Gowers, A and Walker, T. (1990) Behind the Myth, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, London, 
W. H. Allen
Greislammer, I. “The Likud” in Elazar, D. Ed. (1984) Israel at the Polls 1981, Detroit, Wayne State 
University Press
“The Religious Parties,” in Elazar, D. and S. Sandler Eds.(1990) Israel's Odd Couple: The 
Knesset Elections and the National Unity Government, Detroit, Wayne State University Press 
Grossman, D. (1988) The Yellow Wind, New York, Farrar Strauss, Giroux
Gruen, G. (1989) "Emerging Trends in American Jewish-Israeli Relations in Israel" in Mahler, G. Israel 
after Begin, Albany, SUNY
Gurevitz, B. (1996) Open Gates: The Story Behind the Mass Immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union
and its Successor States, Jerusalem, Jewish Agency for Israel
Gutmann, E. (1993) “The Israeli Left” in Kyle and Peters Eds. Wither Israel
Guttman, L. (1978) The Israeli Public, Peace and Territory: The Impact o f the Sadat Initiative, Jerusalem, 
Habermas, J. (1975) Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press, Boston
Hadar, L. (1992) “The Last Days of the Likud: the American-Israeli Big Chill”, Journal o f Palestine 
Studies, 21
. (1992a) “The 1992 Election Earthquake and the Fall of the Likud”, Middle East Journal, 46:
594-616
(1992b) Quagmire: America in the Middle East. Washington, D.C, Cato Institute.
Haig, A.(1984) Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, New York, MacMillan 
Hall-Cathala, D. (1987) The Peace Movement In Israel 1967-87. London, Macmillan 
Halliday, F (1995) Rethinking International Relations, London, MacMillan 
Handel, M. (1973) Israel's Political-military Doctrine. Harvard, Center for International Affairs
281
Harkabi, Y. (1968) “The Position of the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and their National 
Covenant” in Moore. J. Ed. (1977) The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documents and Readings, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press
(1971) “The Palestinians in the Arabs-Israel conflict", in Avineri, S. Israel and the Palestinians, 
New York, St Martin’s press.
(1972) Arab Attitudes Towards Israel, New York, Hart
(1983) The Bar Kochba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics, Chappaqua N.Y., 
Rossel Books
(1988) Israel's Fateful Hour, New York, Harper and Row 
Hartman, D. (1985) The Living Covenant, Philadelphia, JPS
Heller, J. (1995) The Stem Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror 1940-49, London, Frank Cass 
Heller, M. (1983) A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel, London, Harvard University Press 
Hersh, S (1983) The Price o f Power, New York, Summit
Hertzberg, A. Ed. (1984) The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. Westport, Conn, Greenwood 
Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1983) The Invention o f Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Hoffman, L. (1986) The Land o f Israel: Jewish Perspectives. Bloomingdale, Indiana University Press. 
Hollis, M and Smith, S (1991) Understanding and Explaining International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press
Horowitz, D. and Lissak, M. (1978) Origins o f the Israeli Polity. Chicago, University of Chicago Press
(1989) Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity o f Israel. Albany, SUNY.
Horowitz D. (1993) “The Israeli Concept of National Security’^  in Yaniv, A., et al., Ed. National Security
and Democracy in Israel. Israel Democracy Institute Policy Study. Boulder, Lynne Rienner
Horowitz, D. Ed. (1996) Rabin, Soldier o f Peace, London, Peter Halban
Howard, M. (1991) The Lessons O f History, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Heydemann (1991) “Revisionism and the Reconstruction of Israeli History”, in Lustik and Rubin Eds.
Critical Essays on Israeli Society
The International Centre for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME) (1993) Jewish Settlement in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip: Profile 1992, ICPME, Tel Aviv
282
Inbar, E. (1991) War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security, London, 
Rienner.
(1991a) “Israel’s Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada”, Armed Forces and Society, 
18(1): 29-50.
and S. Sandler (1995) “The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation”, Review o f International Studies:
21(1)
(1996) “Contours of Israel’s New Strategic Thinking” . Political Science Quarterly, 11 (1)
(1996a) “Rabin and Israeli National Security” BESA Security and Policy Study no. 25 
International Encyclopaedia o f the Social Sciences (1968), New York, Free Press.
Isaacson, W. (1992) Kissinger, A Biography Faber & Faber, London
Israeli, R. (1991) Palestinians between Israel and Jordan: Squaring the Triangle. New York, Praeger. 
Jacobson, E (1991) “Between the Promised Land and the Land of Promise” in Lustik and Rubin Eds. 
Critical essays on Israeli Society
Jaffe Institute Staff (1989) The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options fo r Peace. Jerusalem, Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies: Jerusalem Post
Jansen, M. (1987) Dissonance in Zion, London, Zed
Jervis, R. (1976) Perceptions and Misperceptions in World Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
Johnson, P. (1987) A History o f the Jews, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Jones, C. (1996) Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989 to 1992 Impact and Implications fo r Israel and the Middle 
East, London, Frank Cass.
Karsh, E. Ed (1994) Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge fo r Israel, London, Frank Cass 
and Mahler, G. (1994a) Israel at the Crossroads, New York, St Martins Press
(1996) Between War and Peace, London, Frank Cass
(1997) Fabricating Israeli History, London, Frank Cass
Katznelson, B (1984) “Revolution and Tradition” in Herzberg, A. The Zionist Idea, Atheneum, New York, 
pp. 391-395.
Katzenstein, P. Ed. (1996) The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New 
York, Columbia University Press
Kaufman, Y. (1985) “Israel's Flexible Voters”, Foreign Policy, volume 61: 109-124.
283
Kearney,R. (1984) Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press
Kedourie, E (1992) Politics in the Middle East, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Kelley,R. (1989) Battling the Inland Sea, London: University of California Press
Kenen, I (1981) Israel’s Defence Line, Her Friends and Foes in Washington, Buffalo, Prometheus Books
Keren, M. (1983) Ben Gurion and the Intellectuals, Chicago, Northern University of Illinois Press
(1989) Israeli Intellectuals and the Making o f a Nation State, Boulder, Westview
(1994) “Israeli Professionals and the Peace Process” in Karsh Peace in the Middle East, pp. 149-
164
(1994a) “Israeli Intellectuals and the Peace Process”, SOAS lecture, 15 February
(1995) Professionals against Populism: the Peres Government and Democracy Albany, SUNY 
Kimche, D. (1991) The Last Option: the Quest for Peace in the Middle Exist, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson.
Kimmerling, B. Ed. (1989) The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers, Albany, SUNY. 
Klieman, A. (1981) Israel, Jordan, Palestine: The Search fo r a Durable Peace. London, Sage Publications 
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
(1990) Israel and the World After 40 years. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's
(1994) “New Directions in Israeli Foreign Policy” in Karsh, Peace in the Middle East
Kuniholm, B. R. and M. Rubner (1985) The Palestinian Problem and United States Policy: A Guide to 
Issues and References. Claremont, CA, Regina Books.
Kyle, K. (1992) Suez, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Kyle, K. and J. Peters, Eds. (1993) Whither Israel?: The Domestic Challenges. London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in association with I.B. Tauris.
Lacquer, W. (1972) A History o f Zionism, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston 
Landau, D.(1993) Piety and Power, London,Seeker & Warburg
(1996) Who is a Jew: A Case Study o f American Jewish Influence on Israeli Policy, New York, 
American Jewish Committee and Argov Centre Bar Ilan University
Landau, P.(1993a) “The Israeli Economy in the 1990's” in Kyle and Peters Wither Israel?
Lanzmann, C (\994)Tzahal, (film)
284
Lehman-Wilzig, S. (1992) Wildfire: Grassroots Revolts in Israel in the Post-Socialist Era, SUNY, Albany
(1995) “The 1992 Media Campaign: Towards the Americanisation of the Israeli Elections” in 
Elazar, D and Sandler, S. Eds. Israel at the Polls 1992, pp. 251-282.
Leiter, Y. (1993) A Peace to Resist: Why the Rabin-Arafat Deal Must be Stopped, and How it can be Done, 
New York: Yesha
Lesch, A. M., et al. (1992) Transition to Palestinian Self-government: Practical Steps Toward 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Leshem, M. (1989) Balaam’s Curse: How Israel Lost its Way and How it Can Find it Again, London,
Simon and Schuster.
Lewis, A. (1984) “Ethnic Politics and the Foreign Policy Debate in Israel” in Myron J. AronofF Ed., 
Cross-Currents in Israeli Politics and Culture,. New Brunswick, NJ Transaction Books 
Lewis, S. (1987) “Israel: the Peres Era and its Legacy”. Foreign Affairs no. 65: 589-610
(1988) “ The United States and Israel ” in Quandt, W. Ed. Ten Years after Camp David, 
Washington, Brookings.
Liebman, C. and E. Don-Yehiya (1983) Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture 
in the Jewish State. Berkeley, University of California Press
Liebman, C. (1983) “Extremism as a Religious Norm”, Journal o f the Scientific Study o f Religion: 75-86 
and Cohen, S. (1990) Two World o f Judaism, New Haven and London, Yale University Press
(1993) “Religion and State in Israel” in Sprinzak and Diamond Eds. Israeli Democracy Under
Stress
and Katz Eds. (1997) The Jewishness o f Israelis: Response to the Guttman Report, Albany,
SUNY
Little, R. and Smith, S. Eds (1988) Belief Systems in International Relations, London: Blackwell 
Little, R. (1988) "Belief Systems in the Social Sciences" in Little, D. and Smith, S. Eds. Belief Systems in 
International Relations, London: Blackwell
(1993) “The Making of a Special Relationship 1958-68”, International Journal o f Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 25
Lustik, I. (1988) For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. New York 1988
and B. Rubin, et al., Ed. (1991) Critical Essays on Israeli society, Politics and Culture, Vol 2,
285
Albany, SUNY
Middle East Contemporary Survey[MECS] 1981-93, Tel Aviv, Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern Studies- 
Westview
MacIntyre, A. (1985) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London, Duckworth 
Mahnaimi and Abu-Sharif (1995) Tried by Fire, London, Little Brown 
Mahler, G. Ed. (1990) Israel after Begin, Albany, SUNY
Mansour, C. (1994) Beyond Alliance: Israel in US Foreign Policy. New York, Columbia University Press. 
Marcus, J (1990) “Discordant Voices: the US Jewish Community and Israel During the 1980s”, 
International Affairs, 66(3): 545-558
Medding, P. (1987): "Segmented Ethnicity and the New Jewish Politics" in Mendelson, E. Ed. Jews and 
Other Ethnic Groups in a Multi-Ethnic Society, Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol HI, New York
(1992) “The New Jewish Politics in the United states” in Gitelman, Z. The Quest fo r Utopia, pp.
119-151
Medzini, M. Ed (1990) Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1982-84, Jerusalem, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Vol 8.
(1992) Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1984-86, Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 9.
(1989) Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1986-88, Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 10.
(1993) Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1988-90, Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 11
(1993a) Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1990-92, Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 12
Meibar, B, (1982) Political Culture Foreign Policy and Conflict, Westport: Greenwood Press 
Melman, Y. (1986) “Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy in the Arab Israeli conflict”, Washington 
Quarterly, 9(3): 37-8
(1992) The New Israelis, New York, Birch Lane Press
and D. Raviv (1989) Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanian, and Palestinians New York, 
Greenwood press
286
and D. Raviv (1994) Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance, New York, Hyperion. 
Meridor, D. (1991) Proceedings o f Sixth Annual Conference, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
Milson, M. (1981) “How to Make Peace with the Palestinians” Commentary, May.
Mitrany, David (1966) A Working Peace System, Quadrangle Books: Chicago 
Morganthau, H. (1973) Politics Among Nations, New York: Knorf
Morris, B. (1987) The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Morris, B (1994) 1948 and After, Oxford, Clarendon Press
Nakhleh, K. and A. Wright (1983) After the Palestine-Israel War: Limits to U.S. and Israeli Policy. 
Belmont, Mass, Institute of Arab Studies
Naor, A. (1986) Cabinet o f War: Findings o f the Israeli Cabinet During the Lebanon War, Tel Aviv, Lahav 
[Hebrew]
Neff, D.(1995) Fallen pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945, Washington, D.C, 
Institute for Palestine Studies
Netanyahu, B. (1993) A Place Among the Nations, London, Bantam Books
Nisan, M. (1995) “A Post-Zionist Israel?” in Elazar, D. and Sandler, S. Israel at the Polls 1992
Novik, N. (1984) Encounter with Reality, Tel Aviv, Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies
(1985) “US Pressure on Israel”, Journal O f Conflict Resolution, June: 253-282
(1986) The United States and Israel: The Domestic Determinants o f a Changing US Commitment, 
Boulder, Westview
Neufeld, M. (1993) “Interpretation and the 'Science' of International relations.”, Review o f International 
Studies, 19 (1)
O'Brien, L. (1986) American Jewish Organizations and Israel. Washington DC, Institute for Palestine 
Studies.
Oppenheim, C. (1989) “Talking Peace; American Jewry, Israel Doves and Palestinians” Present Tense, 
September-October
Organski, A. (1990) The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel. New York, 
Columbia University Press.
Oz, A. (1983) In the Land o f Israel London, Chatto & Windus
287
(1987) The Slopes o f Lebanon, London, Harcourt Brace Janovitch
(1994) Israel, Palestine and Peace, London, Vintage
Peck, J. et al. (1984) The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, Washington, D.C, Institute 
for Palestine Studies.
Peleg, I. (1987) Begin’s Foreign Policy 1977-83, Israel’s Move to the Right, Westport, Greenwood Press
(1995)“The Likud Under Rabin IF’ in Freedman, R. O. Israel Under Rabin
Pedatzur, R. (1995) “Coming Back Full Circle with the Palestinian Option in 1967” Middle East Journal 
49(2)
Peres, S. (1970), David’s Sling, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson
and H. Eshed (1978) KaEt Machar (Tomorrow is Now), Tel Aviv [Hebrew]
(1978) “Strategy for an Interim Period”, International Security, no 2, Winter: 4-12
(1980) “A Strategy for Peace in the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, 58 (4): 887-901
and A. Naor (1993) The New Middle East, New York, Henry Holt
and Landau, D (1995) Shimon Peres Memoirs: Battling for Peace, London, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson
(1995b) Diplomacy in Transition Conference 29 March 1995, Israeli Foreign Ministry Information 
Division Web Site
Peri Y. (1983) Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
(1984) “Coexistence or Hegemony? Shifts in the Israeli Security Concept” in Caspi, D., Dikin, A. 
& Guttman, E. Eds. The Roots ofBegin's Success
Perlmutter, A. (1978) Politics and the Military in Israel, 1967-1977, London, Frank Cass 
(1982) “Begin’s Rhetoric, Sharon Tactics” Foreign Affairs, 16:1, Fall.
Pines, A. (1989) “Israeli Burnout and the intifada” New Outlook, December
Plessner, Y. (1994) The Political Economy o f Israel: From Ideology to Stagnation, Albany : SUNY.
Plumb, J. H. (1969) The Death o f the Past. London, Macmillan
Pollock, D. (1982) The Politics o f Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War.
Westport, Greenwood Press.
(1982) “Likud in Power: Divided We Stand,” in Frredman, R.O. Ed. Israel in the Begin era, New 
York, Praeger
288
(1991) “The American Response to the Intifada”, in Freedman, R. O. Ed. The Intifada: its impact 
on Israel, the Arabs and the Super powers
Porat, D. (1991)“Attitudes of the Young State of Israel Towards the Holocaust and its Survivors” in 
Silberstein, L. Ed. New Perspectives on Israeli History, New York, New York University Press 
Puschel, K. (1992) US-Israeli Strategic Co-operation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective, 
Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Jerusalem Post Press.
Pye, L ., R. J. Samuels, et al., Ed. (1992) The Political Culture o f Foreign Area and International Studies, 
Washington, Brassey's
Quandt, W. (1986) Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Quandt, W (1992) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 
Washington, D.C/Califomia, Brookings Institution/University of California Press 
Rabin, Y. (1979) The Rabin Memoirs. London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson
(1995) Comments Following the Terrorist Attack on Beit Lid: 23 January 1995, Israel Foreign 
Ministry Website
Rabinovich, I. (1991) The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations, New York, Oxford University 
Press.
Rael Isaac, J. (1981) Party and Politics in Israel, New York, Longman
Ravitsky, A. (1989) “Exile in the Holy Land: The Dilemma of Haredi Jewry” in Medding, P. Ed. Israel, 
State and Society 1948-88: Studies in Contemporary Jewry no. 5
(1996) Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press
Reagan, Ronald (1990), An American Life, London, Hutchison.
Reich, B. (1984) The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship. New York 
Eastbourne, Praeger.
(1995) Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War, Westport, 
Greenwood Press.
and Wurmser, D. (1995) “The Russian Immigrant Vote” in Elazar, D and Sandler, S (1995), Israel 
at the Polls 1992 Lanham, MD, Rowan & Littlefield 
Rokeach, M. (1973) The Nature o f Human Values, New York: Free Press
289
Romani, M. The Sephardi Factor in Israeli Politics, Middle East Journal (1988) 42(3) Summer 
Roth, J, Ed. (1988) The Impact o f the Six-Day War: A Twenty-year Assessment. Basingstoke, Macmillan 
Rowland, R. C. (1985) The Rhetoric o f Menachem Begin, London, University Press of America.
Rubin, B. (1985) The State Department and the Struggle over U.S Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press
(1994) Revolution Until Victory: The Politics and History o f the PLO, London, Harvard 
University Press
Rubinstein, A. (1984) The Zionist Dream Revisited, from Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back, New York, 
Shochken
Sacher, H (1987) A History o f Israel Vol 2. Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Sacks, J. (1989) Traditional Alternatives, London: Jews College Publications
(1990) Tradition in an Untraditional Age, London: Valentine Mitchell
(1991) “British Jewry and the State of Israel”, in Don-Yehiya, E. Ed. Religion and National 
Identity, Contemporary Jewish Politics Vol. Ill, Israel, Bar-Ilan University
(1992) Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought after the Holocaust, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press
Safran, N. (1981) Israel, the Embattled Ally, Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press
Sandler, S. (1993) Land o f Israel, State o f Israel: Ethnonationalism in Israeli Foreign Policy, Westport
Connecticut, Greenwood Press
and Katz, Y (1995) "The Origins of the Conception of Israel’s Borders and its Impact on the 
Strategy of War in 1948-9", The Journal o f Strategic Studies, 18 (2): 149-171 
Satloff, R. (1992) Peace Watch no. 36, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
Savir, U (1996) Speech to Presidents Conference, 6 October 1996, Israeli Foreign Ministry Web Site 
Schiff, Z., E. Ya'ari, et al., Ed. (1985) Israel's Lebanon war. London, Allen & Unwin
(1987/8) “The United States and Israel: Friendship Under Strain”, The National Interest, no. 10,
Winter
(1989) Security fo r Peace: Israel's Minimum Security Requirements in Negotiations with the 
Palestinians, Washington DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
and E. Ya'ari, (1990) Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising - Israel's Third Front. New York, Simon
290
and Schuster
(1991) “Israel After the War” Foreign Affairs 70 
Schoenbaum, D.(1993) The United States and the State o f Israel, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Segre, D (1980) A Crisis o f Identity: Israel and Zionism, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Segev, T. (1993) The Seventh Million, New York, Hill and Wang - Domino Press.
Seliktar, O. (1986) New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System o f Israel London, Croom Helm 
Shafrir G. (1991) “Ideological Politics or the Politics of Demography”, Lustick, I. and B. Rubin, Eds. 
Critical essays on Israeli society
Shaked, H and Rabinovitch, I (1980)Eds. The Middle East and the United States: Perceptions and Policies, 
New Brunswick, Transaction Books
Shapira, Y.(1993) “ Historical Origins of Israeli Democracy” in Sprinzak, E. and Diamond, J. Eds. 
Democracy under Stress
Shamir, J and M. Shamir (1993)7722 Dynamics o f Israeli Public Opinion on Peace and the Territories, Tel
Aviv, Tel Aviv University, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
Shamir, Y. (1993) Summing up: An Autobiography,. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
(1993a) For the Sake o f Zion, Vision and Faith: Addresses and Speeches, Tel Aviv, Beit Yair- 
Stem House
Sharett, M. (1978) Yoman lshi (Personal Diary), Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv. [Hebrew]
Sharon, A. and D. Chanoff (1989) Warrior: The Autobiography o f Ariel Sharon. London, Macdonald New 
York: Simon and Schuster.
Shavit, Y. (1988) Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948, London, Frank Cass 
Sheehan, E. (1976) The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger New York, Readers Digest Press 
Sheffer, G. (1980) “Resolution vs. Management: A Re-examination of the Confrontation between Ben 
Gurion and Sharett”, Jerusalem Papers on Peace, Jerusalem, Magnes Press
(1984) “American Jewry-Israel Relations” Jerusalem Quarterly
(1987) Dynamics o f Dependence: U.S.-Israeli relations, Boulder, Westview.
“American-Israeli Relations: An Israeli Assessment and Perspective”, in Efrat, M. and 
Bercovitch, Eds. (1991) Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance o f Influence
(1997) US-Israeli Relations at the Crossroads, London, Frank Cass.
291
Shindler, C. (1991) Ploughshares into Swords: Israelis and Jews in the Shadow o f the Intifada. London,
I.B. Tauris
(1995) Israel, the Likud and the Zionist Dream, London, I.B. Tauris 
Shlaim, A. and. A., Yaniv (1980) “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel.” International Affairs 
56(2)
Shlaim, A. (1983) “Conflicting Approaches to Israel's Relations with the Arabs: Ben Gurion and Sharett 
1953-56” Middle East Journal, 37 (2)
(1990) The Politics o f Partition, Oxford, Oxford University Press
(1995) War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History, London, Penguin books 
Shovel, Z (1994) "Towards a New Israeli-Palestinian Relationship: But is it Autonomy?", in Elazar, D. Ed. 
Political and Structural Arrangements fo r a New Era o f Israeli-Palestinian Relations 
Shultz, G. (1993) Turmoil and Triumph: Memoirs, New York, MacMillan
Sicherman, H., et al. (1993) Palestinian Autonomy, Self-government and Peace. Boulder, Westview. 
Silberstein, L.(Ed.) (1991) New Perspectives on Israeli History, New York, New York University Press
(1993) Jewish Fundamentalism in Contemporary Society: Religion, Ideology and the Crisis o f 
Modernity, New York, New York University Press 
Silver, E. (1984) Begin, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Simon, M. (1988,) Moshe Arens: Statesman and Scientist Speaks Out, New York, Dean Books 
Siniora, H and Abu Rahmaeh, F (1985) “The Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Delegation”, Journal o f Palestine 
Studies 83, Autumn
Slater, R.(1977) Rabin o f Israel; A Biography London, Robson books 
Smith, A. (1991) National Identity, London: Penguin
Smith, C. D. (1992) Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York, St. Martin's Press.
Smith H. (1983) Attitudes o f Israelis Towards America and American Jews, New York, American Jewish 
Committee
Smooha, S and Peretz, D.(1982) "The Arabs in Israel," Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 26 (3): 451-464
(1994) “Israel’s 1992 Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?” Middle East Journal, 46(4) 
Smooha, S (1993) “Jewish Ethnicity in Israel” in Kyle, K. and J. Peters Eds. Wither Israel?
Spiegel, S. (1986) The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chicago
292
Sprinzak, E. (1991) The Ascendance o f Israel’s Radical Right, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Sprinzak, E. and L. Diamond, Eds. (1993) Israeli Democracy Under Stress, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Sofer, S. (1988) Begin: An Anatomy o f Leadership, New York, Blackwell
Starr, J. (1991) Kissing through Glass: The Invisible Shield Between Americans and Israelis, Chicago, 
Contemporary Books
Stein, K. and. S. Lewis. (1991) Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis. Washington D.C., Washington 
Institute For Near East Policy.
Steinberg, (1992) “Israel Among the Nations” in Sandler and Elazar, Who’s the Boss?: Israel at the Polls 
1988-89
Stone, R. (1983) Social Change in Israeli Attitudes and Events 1967 -1979, New York, Praeger.
Susser, L. "Rise of the Backroom boys" Jerusalem Report, 11 July 1997:22-24 
Talmon, J (1970) Israel Among the Nations, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Tamir, A. and J. Comay, Ed. (1988) A Soldier in Search o f Peace: An Inside Look at Israel's Strategy. New 
York, Harper and Row.
Teveth, S. (1970) The Cursed Blessing: The Story o f Israel’s Occupation o f the West Bank, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson
(1972) Moshe Dayan, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson
(1985) Ben Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs, Oxford, Oxford University Press
(1987) Ben Gurion: The Burning Ground 1888-1948, Boston, Houghton Mifflin
(1990) “The Palestinian Refugee Problem and its Origins” Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1)
Tivnan, E. (1987) The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, New York, Simon & 
Schuster
Torgovnik, E. “Ethnicity and Organisational Catchall Politics” in Arian, A and Shamir, M. (1986) The 
Elections in Israel 1984, Oxford, Transaction books, pp. 57-79.
Troen, S. and Lucas, N. Eds. (1995) Israel: The First Decade o f Independence, Albany SUNY.
Troen, S. (1983) “Israeli Strategic Thinking After 1973”, Journal o f Strategic Studies, 6(l):36-60 
Tschirgi, D. (1989) The American Search for Middle East Peace, London, Praeger.
Tudor, H. (1972) Political Myth, London, Pall Mall Press
293
Van Leeuwan, M. (1993) Americans and the Palestinian Question: The American Public Debate on 
Palestinian nationhood, Amsterdam, Radopi
Vital, D. (1975) The Origins o f Zionism, Oxford, Oxford University Press
(1982) Zionism: The Formative Years, Oxford, Oxford University Press
(1986) "The Afflictions of the Jews and the Affliction of Zicmsm", in Cohen, S. and Don 
Yehiya, E. Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political life, Ramat Gan, Bar Ilan University press.
(1990) The Future o f the Jews: A People at the Crossroads?, London, Harvard University Press 
Wald, E. (1992) The Wald Report: The Decline o f Israeli National Security Since 1967. Boulder, Westview 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy[WINEP] (1988) Policy Forum, Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy
Weinberger, C. (1990) Fighting For Peace, London, Joseph Books
Weizmann, E. (1981) The Battle fo r Peace, New York, Bantam
Welch, D. (1983) Nazi Propaganda, London: Croom Helm
Welch, S. (1993) The Concept o f Political Culture, Basingstoke: Macmillan
Wendt, A. (1987) “The Agency-Structure Problem in International Relations”, International Organisation, 
41(2)
Wendt, A. (1992) “Levels of Analysis Verses Agency and Structure” Review o f International Studies, 18 
Wheatcroft, G. (1996) The Controversy in Zion: How Zionism Tried to Resolve the Jewish Question, 
London, Sinclair Stevenson
Wildavsky, A (1987) “A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation” American Political Science Review, 
81(1): 3-21.
Widlanski, M., et al., Ed.(1988) Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? Jerusalem, Institute for Advanced 
Strategic and Political Studies,
Willis, A, (1995) “Shas-The Sephardi Torah Guardians: Religious Movement and Political Power” in A. 
Arian and M, Shamir, The Elections in Israell992, pp. 121-139.
Wilson and Pronay Eds. (1985) The Political Re-education o f Germany and Her Allies After World War II, 
London, Croom Helm.
Wistrich, R. and Ohana, D. Eds. (1995) The Shaping o f Israeli Identity: Myth, Memory and Trauma, Frank 
Cass
294
Wurmser, D. “Israel’s Collapsing Labour Party”, Middle East Quarterly, September 1995 
Yaacobi, G (1991) Wanted, a New Course, Bnei Brak, Steimatsky
Yanai, N. (1991) "The Impact of the Intifada on the Likud in the Framework of Israeli Politics 1987-90", in 
Freedman, R. The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arabs and the Superpowers, pp. 293-324.
Yaniv, A. (1986) Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics o f Israeli Strategy, Massachusetts, Lexington 
Books
(1987) Dilemmas o f Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press
Ed. (1993) National Security and Democracy in Israel, Israel Democracy Institute policy study, 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner
Yaron, Z. [translated by Tomaschoff, A] (1991) The Philosophy o f Rabbi Kook, Jerusalem, World Zionist 
Organisation
Yehoshua, A.B. (1981) Between Right and Right, New York, Doubleday 
Yishai, Y. (1987) Land or Peace: Wither Israel?, Stamford California, Hoover Institution Press 
Yishai, Y. (1991) Land o f Paradoxes: Interest Politics in Israel. Albany, SUNY 
Zackheim, D. (1996) The Flight o f the Lavi, Inside a US-Israeli Crisis, London, Brasseys 
Zak, M.(1985) “Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations” Washington Quarterly, 8(1)
Zuckerman, A. Herzog, H. & Shamir, M. (1990) “The Party's Just Begun: Herat Activists in Power After 
Begin” in Mahler, G. Ed. Israel after Begin, pp. 235-56
295
